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Note: data sources are listed at ‘quality of government, measuring, datasets’, tables and figures at ‘tables and figures’, but discussion the content is indexed under subject headings such as ‘effectiveness, separation of careers as key factor, testing the thesis’; ‘corruption, separation of careers as protection against, testing the thesis’; Weberian closed bureaucracy, testing the reality

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