

Introduction

“Hath not a Jew eyes?”

Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice*

“Let their eyes be darkened so that they cannot see.”

Psalms 69:24; Romans 11:10

Across a long line of seemingly disparate writings – from the Gospel of John to Augustine’s sermons, from Shakespeare’s Shylock to Martin Jay’s history of the denigration of vision – an idea has persisted of a Jewish resistance to, or even incapacity for, vision. This enduring idea originates in vivid intuitions and ongoing assumptions about the biblical second commandment. The ancient taboo, “You shall not make graven images” (Exodus 20:4, put in the mouth of no less than the deity and echoed in prophetic denunciations), has been strongly associated with Jewishness in a way that the third commandment, “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain” (Exodus 20:7), for instance, has not.

Heinrich Graetz’s declaration in 1846, “Paganism sees its god, Judaism hears him,” still resonates as an explanation for an apparent Jewish antipathy toward images, and even toward vision itself.¹ And yet, it has been amply shown – from the seals and figurines of eighth- and seventh-century BCE Israelites to the mosaics of late-antique Palestinian synagogues more than a thousand years later – that Jews did in fact make and use images, even in religious contexts.² The prohibition against idolatry, to the extent that it was ever heeded, was interpreted and fulfilled in a variety of ways. Some refrained from making figurative images and restricted their art to aniconic images; certainly many refrained specifically from representing

¹ Graetz, *Structure of Jewish History*, 68.

² There is by now an enormous literature on this topic. For important recent examples, see the following and bibliographies therein: Meyers, “Jewish art and architecture”; Fine, *Art and Judaism*; Olin, *A Nation Without Art*; Friedheim, “Historical considerations.”

God. But this restraint did not always hold, and some even went so far as to represent the divine.

The notion that Jews rejected images in a wholesale, monolithic fashion is thus factually weak, but there is a much more fundamental problem with our all-too-common link between the prohibition against idolatry and Jewish antipathy toward vision. This is the understandable but logically unnecessary conflation that is so often made between sight and image-making. After all, visual images – that is, humanly produced artifacts, material objects, and pictorial representations – do not exhaust the range of objects in our field of vision. While images can be useful objects with which to “think” vision,³ the human eye sees a far broader range of phenomena, from landscapes to animals, from the built environment to other humans, and beyond. Thus, even if there really were a consistent Jewish iconophobia, a Jewish antipathy toward vision as such need not necessarily follow. So too, even if Graetz was right about the second commandment being (consistently) understood as a prohibition against depicting the Jewish God (as opposed to just other, competing deities) or as ruling out all representation (divine or otherwise), this would still not preclude the possibility that late-antique Jews *saw* God; and it certainly does not preclude the possibility that Jews saw much more besides.

Confusion about the interpretive history and material impact of the second commandment, alongside the unexamined conflation of a particular form of representation (images) and a mode of perception (the sense of vision), has had curious consequences. The idea of an absent or negative Jewish visuality, which we can gloss for the purposes of this discussion as “ways of being visual,” has been accepted, even valorized, whether in terms of philosophical or theological abstraction or in terms of an associated artistic aniconism. The alleged long-lived Jewish elevation of the auditory over the visual, or the denigration of vision, finds echoes in the writings of philosophers and intellectual historians such as Kant, Levinas, Derrida, and Jay, and resonates with the oft-argued binary between Jewish and Christian modalities, as well as with the writings of certain medieval Jewish rationalist philosophers. Relatedly, Jewish vision has often been assimilated into treatments of the production and use of artistic images, rather than in its own sensory terms. There are some important exceptions to this, but by and large Jewish vision, as such, has been understudied.⁴

³ Paraphrasing Claude Lévi-Strauss’s *bonnes à penser* (Lévi-Strauss, *Le totémisme*, 127–28).

⁴ The exceptions include the following important works, to which my own stands in genuine debt: Boyarin, “Ocular desire”; Wolfson, *Speculum*; Bland, *Artless Jew*; Bregman, “Seeing with the sages”;

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Schematically speaking, the dominant narrative of the history of vision usually begins in the ancient Greek world, progresses to the Roman republic and empire, nods further east to medieval Islamic optics – mostly in terms of its translation, preservation, and engagement with Greek optical theory – makes its way back (home) to the European middle ages, and then vaults toward modernity and the rise of new visual technologies.⁵ The ancient rabbis are often the *locus classicus* of the supposed antipathy towards images and, by logically fallacious extension, vision more broadly. By giving eyes to ancient Jews, and particularly to the rabbis of the first several centuries CE, this book offers an additional perspective on a formative era that has only recently begun to be studied for what it reveals of Christian and Greco-Roman visualities.

We might ask how this story changes if we consider the visuality of late-antique rabbis, who, as we will see, offer us an abundant sense of the importance of sight. How does this consideration complicate or expand what we know about vision's histories, and about late-antique history and Jewish history, in general? This brings us to two intertwined questions, the first of which concerns what it means to study the history of "Jewish" or "rabbinic" vision, and the second of which relates to studying the history of vision in the first place.

Let us begin with the second question, which involves elaborating on the study of vision. While vision is commonly understood to refer to the perceptual sense of sight, the premise of this study, shared by historians and art historians alike, is that there is more to seeing than the physiological, biological, and neurocognitive processes that constitute visual perception. Vision, or "visuality" as some like to distinguish,⁶ can also be studied through the cultural and historical forces that shape the range of phenomena known as seeing. In other words, aside from accounts in physics, physiology, optics, ophthalmology, and neuroscience (the last of

and Bregman, "Aqedah." For a recent, innovative study on the sense of smell in rabbinic literature, see Green, *Aroma of Righteousness*.

⁵ For example Lindberg, *Theories of Vision*; Wade, *A Natural History of Vision* mentions "Islamic" scholars twice (14, 66) and China once (26), but otherwise begins in Greece and stays in Europe; Darrigol, *A History of Optics*, 1, explains that despite the existence of ancient Indian and Chinese optical theories, "the Greek case is the only one of interest here, because it is the one that led to a corpus of specialized literature on which later European and Mediterranean science depended." Examples of studies that either integrate or focus on ancient non-Western theories of vision include: Selin (ed.), *Encyclopedia*, s.v., "Optics in Chinese science," 193–95, and "Optics in the Islamic world," 795–99; Vogel and Berke, *Brief History of Vision*, which is a world history of sorts; Gonda, *Eye and Gaze*; Graham and Sivin, "A systematic approach"; Brown and Bergeton, "'Seeing' like a sage"; Nylan, "Beliefs about seeing"; Gearney, *Epistemology*; Subbarayappa, "The physical world"; Qiupeng, "Optics"; McMahan, *Empty Vision*.

⁶ I address the distinctions, or lack thereof, between these two terms in the next chapter.

which are quite contested and rapidly evolving), there is a story to be told about what seeing has meant and how it has functioned across a variety of registers (from society to sociality, from race to gender to class) in different times and places.

The insight that vision has a history is related to the insertion of the body into history by philosophers, historians, literary scholars, and others.⁷ Vision, along with the body as a whole, is something that is understood, directed, conditioned, and experienced differently depending on its cultural settings. It can be studied across a range of arenas from the everyday (what is understood as visible/invisible, how people are recognized and categorized, how landscapes are navigated, how empirical observations are made, how the physical and social world is organized) to the sublime (how to see gods, view spectacles, observe bacteria, escape the evil eye, fall in love “at first sight”). As far as the rabbis go, my primary interest is in a cultural history of vision. I thus examine a broad spectrum of rabbinic discourse to understand how vision assuaged and exacerbated the hopes and fears of everyday life; how it served to channel encounters with the landscape and built environment; how it birthed ideas about and influenced practices of piety; and how it shaped the social, political, ethnic, gendered, and sexual subject.⁸

Terms like “visuality,” “viewing practices or habits,” “modes of seeing,” or what art historian Michael Baxandall called “the period eye,” indicate the ways in which meanings, understandings, and seeing itself shift according to differing cultural conditions.⁹ Thus, in the Renaissance, developments in mathematics and architecture, particularly the invention of single-point perspective, gave rise to new ways not only of representing the visual but also of experiencing it.¹⁰ Likewise, in the nineteenth century, emergent representational and scientific technologies made for new ways of understanding how vision worked, along with new modes of seeing. So too the rise of surveillance technologies in the twentieth and twenty-first

⁷ On vision’s history: Wartofsky, “Picturing and representing”; Levin, *The Opening of Vision*, 490. On the body’s history: Bynum, “The female body,” 171; Porter, “History of the body.”

⁸ My work is in dialogue with the more recent studies related to late-antique visuality (on which more below), but it is also indebted to scholars on the history of the senses, such as Lucien Febvre (the history of sensibilities), Alain Corbin (sound, smell), David Howes (the sensorium), Mark M. Smith (sound and other senses), and Susan Ashbrook Harvey (smell): Febvre, “Sensibility and history”; Corbin, *The Foul and the Fragrant*; Corbin, *Village Bells*; Howes, *Sensual Relations*; Smith, *Sensing the Past*; Harvey, *Scenting Salvation*; and Green, *Aroma of Righteousness*.

⁹ Baxandall, *Painting and Experience*, 29–103.

¹⁰ Panofsky, *Perspective*. For psychological or perceptualist analyses of viewing, see Gombrich, *Art and Illusion*; Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception*.

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centuries shaped and continue to shape visual experience.¹¹ As we will see, in the late-antique era – for our purposes, roughly the third to seventh centuries CE – ideas about the mechanics of vision shaped a variety of realms ranging from philosophy, medicine, and magic, to religion, ritual, and politics.¹² In a world in which the body and soul were thought to be directly impacted by what the eyes saw, vision was a charged matter.

Late antiquity has been subject to a “visual turn” both as a scholarly trend in the past decade or so, and as a characterization of the period itself.¹³ This turn to the visual has mostly focused on Greco-Roman modes of viewing, whether in representational terms of the shift from naturalistic to symbolic styles between the late-Roman and early-Byzantine period, or in terms of new forms of visual piety that emerged in the fourth and fifth centuries. The late-antique world, it seems, was becoming more visual. To this emerging picture of late-antique visuality, I add the perspective of those ancient Jews known as the rabbis. I situate an increasing preoccupation with the visual of post-third-century rabbis, in the context of this “visual turn.” We will continue to address the study of vision in the next chapter, but this brings us back to our first question: what does it mean to study Jewish or rabbinic vision? In considering this, we must briefly relate to even more basic, and contested, questions about the rabbis and their status among late-antique Jews.

The rabbis seem to have begun as a small, loosely connected group of sages that formed some time in the first, and certainly by the second, century CE. This group produced a Jewishness grounded in *talmud torah*, the practice of Torah study. The early rabbis, the Tannaim (late first- to early third-century Palestine), and the later rabbis, the Amoraim (third- to fifth-century Palestine, and third- to sixth-century Babylonia), produced copious literature, marked by an insistent scholasticism. These writings give us a lens onto an early Jewish social formation, at once conservative and innovative in its active interpretation of scripture, its emphatic attention to

¹¹ Crary, *Techniques of the Observer*. We might want to question the existence of a one-to-one relationship between the *forms* of representation (e.g. single-point perspective, abstraction, etc.) and the *experience* of vision; in other words, we might not want to assume a correspondence theory of representation and perception. See Hillis, *Digital Sensations*, esp. 117–20; Davis, *Theory of Visual Culture*.

¹² For discussion of the terms and periodizations such as “late antiquity,” “late Roman,” and “Byzantine”: Ando, “Decline, fall and transformation”; Vessey, “Demise.” For the content and impact of various theories of vision on philosophy, medicine, and magic: Smith, *Ptolemy’s Theory of Visual Perception*; Simon, *Le regard*; Simon, *Archéologie*. For excellent summaries of late-antique visual theories: Morales, *Vision and Narrative*; Frank, *Memory*, 123–33.

¹³ Just some examples of this work include Miller, *Corporeal Imagination*; Francis, “Living icons”; Frank, *Memory*; Goldhill, “Erotic eye”; Morales, *Vision and Narrative*.

halakhah (law), and its engagement with a vast range of mythic, narrative, ritual, and prosaic matters. We will address the possible impact of the rabbinic role and status in wider Jewish Palestinian and Babylonian societies in our study of rabbinic visuality below and throughout these pages.

At this point, we may acknowledge that the rabbinic project – as manifest not only in many explicit statements of the rabbis, but also in the very transmission, collection, organization, and redaction of rabbinic teachings themselves into various literary collections, regardless of their effects and impacts on wider Jewish and other circles – was in considerable measure about perpetuating rabbinic teachings and rabbinic-style *talmud torah* as a way of life and praxis. It was, in other words, largely about producing and reproducing rabbis. I will argue throughout this book that sight – and its interpretation, inscription, deployment, ritualization, and curtailment – was an important vehicle for conceiving this larger rabbinic project. In this sense, we can talk of a robust rabbinic visuality emerging during the time of the Amoraim, one that was vital to the formation of rabbinic subjectivity.¹⁴

This brings us back to the question of what it means to study Jewish or rabbinic vision. In arguing for the emergence of a rabbinic visuality, I do not mean to claim that an essential, unified, undifferentiated, or singular rabbinic way of seeing existed over centuries, across Palestine and Babylonia, and stood apart from preceding or contemporaneous visualities. While the rabbis and others may have at times liked to suggest that this was the case, it is precisely such claims about an inherently Jewish or rabbinic way of seeing that I wish to question and unpack. For example, at times rabbinic writings mark particular modes of seeing, or refraining from seeing, as peculiarly rabbinic (this is how “disciples of sages” look or refrain from looking). At other times ways of seeing are characterized as sinful

¹⁴ I tend refer to rabbinic visuality rather than a rabbinic “regime” partly in acknowledgment that rabbinic ways of seeing were those of a minority, perhaps among Jews and certainly among those who were not Jewish. Scholars talk of modernist, dominant, cinematic, gendered, or colonial visual regimes not just to emphasize the different cultural ways of seeing, but also to express their ordering nature. See the definition of a scopic regime as a “non-natural visual order operating on a pre-reflective level to determine the dominant protocols of seeing and being on view in a specific culture at a specific time” in Jay, “Scopic regime.” On late-antique subject formation: Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology*, 1–22; Wills, “Ascetic theology”; Schofer, “Self, subject and chosen subjection.” Foucault defines “techniques of the self” as “the procedures, which no doubt exist in every civilization, suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, through relations of self-mastery or self-knowledge” (Foucault, *Ethics*, 87). The term “rabbinic subject” or “rabbinic subjectivity” is meant to convey the project of rabbinic self-construction and something about the process that produces the sense of a rabbinic self. The terms “subject,” “subjectivity,” and “subject formation” as historical concepts and heuristic constructs are, of course, much debated. For example: Strozier, *Foucault, Subjectivity, and Identity*, and Spivak, “Can the subaltern speak?”

and essentially not rabbinic (this is how various others, such as the *min* – heretic; the *‘am ha’arets* – common, uneducated Jews; non-Jews; women, look). As we decipher the extent to which rabbinic and nonrabbinic vision is marked one way or another, we also ask about the extent to which it is inflected aside from these markings. To what extent is vision that is (self-styled as) rabbinic inflected with “Roman” or “Palestinian” or “Babylonian” ways of seeing?¹⁵ How is it specifically “scholastic” or “male”? We note the extent to which the rabbis worry about and trouble to constitute vision along gendered, religious, and ethnic lines. At the same time, they rarely acknowledge that their conceptions of the basic mechanics of vision across the realms of the sacred and the sexual have little to do with anything that is essentially rabbinic or Jewish.

Entertaining such considerations about the contours of a peculiarly rabbinic relation to the sense of sight means that while I focus chiefly on the rabbis and on the extensive sources they left, I seek to do so in conjunction with contemporaneous nonrabbinic evidence. In studying the intertwining and averted gazes of rabbis, everyday Jews, Romans, Christians, Zoroastrians, and others, we track the congruences between rabbinized and contemporaneous visualities. A curious example of this is in the rabbinic discourse on looking at the sacred images of others. While couched in the rabbinic language of idolatry and halakhic reasoning, the rabbinic visual strategies even at their ostensibly most rejectionist, rely upon contemporaneous modes of cultic viewing. The rabbis provide us with an excellent example (rather than a unique instance) of how useful vision could be. This study of rabbinic vision, then, does not argue for an inherently rabbinic eye (whether culturally or biologically grounded).

¹⁵ Such questions are regularly asked about the rabbis of Palestine and Babylonia, both in general and with respect to different issues. Understanding the rabbis as part of a wider “Greco-Roman” or “Eastern Roman” culture is a basic part of the toolkit of scholars of rabbinic texts and ancient Jewish history. For example, scholars have compared Palestinian rabbis to scholars; presented them as a provincial sub-elite; sought to understand their values vis-à-vis Roman notions of deference; compared their ethical literature to Roman, philosophical, and Christian literature (Cohen, “Patriarchs and scholars”; Lapin, “Hegemony”; Schwartz, *Mediterranean Society?*; Tropper, *Wisdom, Politics, and Historiography*). More recent studies have attended to the specificities of Babylonian rabbinic society, located at a meeting point between various cultures, and the Persian empire, with its Zoroastrian priesthood and Sasanian-Persian culture. Joel Walker urges us not to over-read the Persian-Zoroastrian and the Greco-Roman in contrastive terms, describing the shared “philosophical *koine*” between Iran and Rome (Walker, *Mar Qardagh*, 12). Studies that point to the Palestinian and Babylonian rabbis as part of a larger Roman East, culturally speaking, include: Becker, “Comparative study”; Kalmin, *Jewish Babylonia*, 61–86; Boyarin, “Hellenism.” For studies that highlight the Persian-Zoroastrian milieu of the Babylonian rabbis, see Secunda, “Talmudic text and Iranian context”; Elman, “Middle Persian culture”; Herman, “The story of Rav Kahana.” We will discuss Zoroastrian ideas about vision and the broader Indo-Iranian *koine* in the next chapter.

Rather, the argument goes in the opposite direction: Vision was harnessed in order to shape rabbinic subjectivity. To the extent that this subjectivity was in turn about the cultivation of a sense of uniqueness or exclusiveness, then vision played its part in this too, both in terms of rhetoric and in terms of the substantive shaping of the gaze. The articulation of this complex relationship between the senses and the subject is partly enabled by the complex affiliations, locations, and negotiations of this particular group of sages. To answer our earlier question: this is one of the ways that studying the rabbis and vision allows us to contribute to the broader histories of late antiquity and visuality.

More than just studying the rabbis for yet another perspective, we study the ways in which these rabbinic perspectives are themselves imbricated in various cultural formations. The rabbis' reach across Palestine and Babylonia allows our understanding of ancient visuality to cross the usual lines of empire, within which many studies are confined. Their travel back and forth between the Roman-Christian and Sassanian-Zoroastrian-Persian empires becomes a conduit for a variety of cultural and religious ways of seeing. Rabbinic visuality thus offers no unique, *sui generis* account of vision, but, in its very complex locatedness and embeddedness, it allows us to consider what it means to see (as minorities and provincials) under differing conditions of empire. It is thus that the study of rabbinic visuality not only challenges assumptions about whose vision counts as an object of study, but also illuminates the history of late antiquity in new ways by providing an additional lens onto histories of power, religion, ethnicity, and identity.

The rabbis, like others in the Mediterranean and Near Eastern world, understood sight to be loaded precisely because to see something was to be spiritually and physically affected by it. Conversely, looking at an object could affect it as well. These physical implications of vision reveal what is at stake in early rabbinic attempts to encode certain visual experiences liturgically, ensuring that a visual object would be marked, and indeed viewed, in the prescribed manner. We see the beginnings of such attempts in the rabbinic lists of "vision" blessings in the tractate *Berakhot* ("blessings") of the Mishnah and Tosefta, edited in the third century:

One who sees (*harō'eh*) a place where miracles were performed for Israel says, "Blessed is the one who performed miracles for our ancestors in this place."

[One who sees] a place from which idolatry had been uprooted says, "Blessed is the one who rooted out idolatry from our land."

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[One who sees] shooting stars, earthquakes, lightning, thunder, and storms says, “Blessed is the one whose power fill the world.”

[One who sees] mountains, hills, seas, rivers, and deserts says, “Blessed is the one who makes creation.” R. Judah says, “One who sees the great [Mediterranean] sea says, ‘Blessed is the one who made the great sea,’ but only if he sees it occasionally.”¹⁶

One who sees idolatry says, “Blessed is the one who is slow to anger.”

[One who sees] a place from which idolatry had been rooted out says, “Blessed is the one who rooted out idolatry from our land. May it be your will Lord our God that idolatry be rooted out from all the places of Israel, and that the hearts of your servants return to your worship.”

One who sees a crowd says, “Blessed is the wise one of secrets, for their faces are not like one another nor are their opinions like one another . . .”

One who sees a dark person, a pale person,¹⁷ a red person, an albino, an extremely tall person, a very small person (a deaf person, a mentally incompetent person, and a drunk person) says, “Blessed is the one who varies creatures.”

[One who sees] an amputee, a lame person, a blind person, or a person stricken with boils says, “Blessed is the true judge.”

One who sees beautiful human beings or beautiful trees says, “Blessed is the one who has created such beautiful creatures.”

One who sees a rainbow in a cloud says, “Blessed is the one who is faithful to his covenant, who remembers the covenant.”

One who was walking among the graves says, “Blessed is the one who knows your number. He will judge you, and he will resurrect you to judgment. Blessed is the one who is faithful to his word, who resurrects the dead.”

One who sees the sun, the moon, the stars, or the constellations says, “Blessed is the one who makes creation.” R. Judah says, “One who blesses over the sun, this is the way of heresy (lit. another way).” And R. Judah would say, “One who sees the sea at regular intervals and something about it has changed, he must bless.”¹⁸

These laws prescribe the uttering of specific blessings upon seeing a range of visual objects, from sites of miracles to idolatry absent or present, from a variety of natural phenomena to a panoply of “unusual” persons. Here the Tannaim seek to ritualize, guide, and shape affect for and experience of each visual object. Aside from the remarkable bundling of items in their individual rules, these lists, read as a unit with the iteration of “one who sees X says Y (*haro'eh X omer Y*),” constitute instruction manuals on how to

¹⁶ *M. Berakhot* 9:1–2.

¹⁷ The term *boreq* appears only in Ms. Vienna. See Lieberman’s suggestion to emend to *boheq* (Lieberman, *Tosefta*, vol. 1, 34, n. 28).

¹⁸ *T. Berakhot* 6:2–6.

perform vision. Even a preliminary look at these sources reveals the legacies of biblical narrative, the vicissitudes of the material landscape under Roman rule, the long shadow of the lost temple, apotropaic responses to good and bad fortune, and concerns about heresy.

This is an early example of how the rabbis sought to legislate and rabbinize vision. They did so by filtering a variety of visual objects in the landscape through a particular theological, halakhic lens that at once naturalizes and ritualizes seeing itself. Set within the halakhic framework of the tractate *Berakhot*, as well as within the larger context of the Mishnah and Tosefta, the rabbinization of vision is transparent to the point of invisibility, concealed in plain view within the very production, preservation, and stylization of rules that these vast works encode.

It is through just such a formulation of rules, narratives, rituals, interpretations, and everyday advice that the rabbis deployed, subverted, mimicked, opposed, resisted, “rabbinized,” or assumed contemporaneous modes of viewing. As we examine the moments of convergence and difference between rabbis and others, we will try to avoid binary explanations of either influence or deliberate resistance on the part of the rabbis.¹⁹ The rabbis turn out to be neither blinkered navel-gazers nor wide-eyed assimilationists, but rather participants in the contemporary visual *koine*, to a sometimes surprising degree.

Close readings of Palestinian (third- to fourth-, or early fifth-century) and Babylonian (third- to sixth-, or seventh-century) collections of rabbinic law, narrative, and exegesis that crystallize around the theme of sight and vision reveal the rabbis participating in the late-antique visual *koine* even when casting vision in their own idiosyncratic terms. In particular, I argue that the “visual turn” ascribed to late-antique piety, and to Greco-Roman and Christian culture, is a hitherto overlooked but crucial component of later (that is, Amoraic and later), rabbinic piety.²⁰ I examine this phenomenon in legal, narrative, exegetical, homiletical, and liturgical sources across a variety of arenas: how the rabbis imagined and produced memories of seeing God in the temple pilgrimage centuries after the temple’s destruction; how they dealt with the prevalent notion that sight and sexuality were intertwined; and how they attempted to steer Jewish eyes away from “idols,” and toward their own (sagely) persons as “icons” of the sacred.

¹⁹ A good argument for this is found in Satlow, “Beyond influence.” For a critical treatment of comparison, notions of similarity, influence, and dispersion, see Smith, “In comparison.”

²⁰ And perhaps of late-antique Zoroastrian piety, though this needs further study. See the call for work in this direction in Canepa, “Theorizing cross-cultural interaction.” On the importance of vision in ritual in ancient India, see Gonda, *Eye and Gaze*.