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## Introduction

In 2016, Donald Trump, the Republican nominee for president, won an unlikely victory.

In the weeks before the election, political commentators largely agreed that Trump's path to the presidency was extremely limited and that various contingencies would have to be met for him to emerge victorious. By the end of the campaign, a Trump presidency was considered quite unlikely and election forecasts based on statistical models gave Trump little chance of winning in his matchup with Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton – anywhere from 29 percent (FiveThirtyEight) to 15 percent (*New York Times*) to less than 1 percent (Princeton Election Consortium). Election forecasts based on betting markets yielded similar, low odds – 11 percent (PredictWise).<sup>1</sup>

And yet, Trump *did* win. Key to his victory was his performance in the “rust belt” states of the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic, where he won Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania (and their 46 electoral votes), which had been considered Republican longshots. He also added Iowa and Ohio (and their 24 electoral votes), which were considered toss-ups. Why Trump won these states and ultimately emerged victorious in the election has been the subject of intense speculation, debate, and analysis since then. A host of competing (and complementary) explanations have been offered – from Trump's and Clinton's ability to connect with key voting groups, to their choice of which states to target with their resources, to news just before the election regarding an FBI investigation of Clinton's improper use of private email while serving as President Obama's secretary of state, to allegations of Russian tampering in the election.

<sup>1</sup> For these various forecasts and predictions, see Josh Katz, “Who Will Be President?” *New York Times*, November 8, 2018. [www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/upshot/presidential-polls-forecast.html](http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/upshot/presidential-polls-forecast.html) (accessed June 1, 2019).

While a consensus will probably never be reached on what factors were most important in deciding the outcome of the 2016 presidential election, one crucial element of Trump's victory was his ability to rely on the South – which we define as the eleven ex-Confederate states – as the foundation in his drive to the White House. Trump carried ten of eleven Southern states (losing only Virginia), which provided him with 155 electoral votes – more than half of his entire total.<sup>2</sup> His performance in the South was no surprise, as the former Confederacy has been the GOP's electoral base in presidential elections for almost a half-century: since 1972, in all but one election (1976), the Republican presidential candidate has carried a majority of Southern states. And, in five elections (1972, 1984, 1988, 2000, and 2004) the GOP nominee swept the South.

Republican dominance has also been established below the presidential level in recent years: since 1994, the GOP in every Congress has claimed a majority of Southern seats in both the House and the Senate. And in recent elections (2014 and 2016), the GOP yield has exceeded 75 percent in both chambers. At the gubernatorial level, Republicans first won a majority of governorships in 1994 and the party has controlled at least six, and as many as ten, Southern governorships since then. Finally, in Southern state legislatures the Republicans began to build success during the Clinton administration – winning as much as 40 percent of state legislative seats by the late 1990s – and finally achieved a majority breakthrough in 2010 when the Democrats were “shellacked” across the board in President Obama's first midterm election.<sup>3</sup> Since 2010, GOP state legislative gains have continued to increase; the 2016 elections represent the zenith, with the Republicans controlling roughly two-thirds of both state House and Senate seats in the South.

All of these national and subnational data point to the same fact: the contemporary Republican Party's electoral base is in the South – a fact that would have been nearly unimaginable to political actors on either side during the decades in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when it was the Democratic Party that dominated the South. As a result, a number of important books have been written in recent years to investigate the causes and consequences of the GOP's emergence and ascendancy in the South. Most of these accounts begin in the mid-to-late 1960s, with the rise of the Civil Rights Movement in the South, Barry Goldwater's racially conservative presidential campaign in 1964, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting

<sup>2</sup> Trump won 304 electoral votes overall. One caveat to this – in winning Texas, Trump received only 36 of the state's 38 electoral votes, as two members of the Electoral College who were pledged to vote for him did not do so. These “faithless electors” cast their votes for John Kasich and Ron Paul instead.

<sup>3</sup> Peter Baker and Carl Hulse, “Deep Rifts Divide Obama and Republicans,” *New York Times*, November 3, 2010. [www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04elect.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04elect.html) (accessed June 1, 2019)

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Rights Act of 1965, and Richard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” (a softer version of Goldwater’s racial messaging) in 1968. From there, scholars describe how conservative white Southerners first came to vote Republican – for president initially and then later for congressional and state legislative offices – and ultimately to identify as Republicans. And with that, the Solid Democratic South of the first half of the twentieth century was effectively replaced by a Solid Republican South by the early twenty-first century.

But what role did the Republican Party play in the South *before* the mid-1960s? If scholars of the contemporary era mention the GOP prior to the mid-1960s at all, it is usually in passing.<sup>4</sup> Some note, for example, that the Republican Party’s initial presidential election gains in the South started with Dwight Eisenhower’s candidacy in 1952. But aside from citing this – and Ike’s subsequent gains in 1956 along with Nixon’s lesser Southern success in 1960 – little is made of it. Of course, historical scholars have long studied the Republican Party’s role in the South during Reconstruction, when the GOP came to power in nearly every Southern state in the late 1860s but lost control everywhere by 1877. However, the lengthy period between the end of Reconstruction and the mid-1960s is something of a black box. The general belief is that the Democrats had firm control of the South during this period – to the point where scholars routinely refer to these years as one-party Democratic rule.<sup>5</sup> Any number of metrics can be used to support this belief. For example, in the eighteen presidential elections from 1880 through 1948, when 198 Southern states were up for grabs, the Republicans won just six of them, or 3 percent.

Yet, despite Democratic electoral dominance in the South in this period, Republican Party organizations remained active in every Southern state – though, as we will demonstrate, not with the intent of reaching the traditional partisan goal of winning elections and pursuing policy outcomes. Our goal in this book is to tell the story of the Republican Party in the South during this ostensibly one-party Democratic era. We show that the South remained important to the national GOP throughout this period, as the ex-Confederate states continued to make up a sizable proportion of delegates to the Republican National Convention. Because of this, local GOP leaders in the South had a meaningful hand in selecting Republican presidential and vice-presidential candidates, despite their states not contributing any electoral votes in the

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, James M. Glaser, *Race, Campaign Politics, and the Realignment in the South* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Earl Black and Merle Black, *The Rise of Southern Republicans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); David Lublin, *The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

<sup>5</sup> For example, Robert Mickey states: “In the 1890s leaders of the eleven states of the old Confederacy founded stable, one-party authoritarian enclaves under the ‘Democratic’ banner.” Robert Mickey, *Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America’s Deep South, 1944–1972* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 4. On this topic, see also Devin Caughey, *The Unsolid South: Mass Politics and National Representation in a One-Party Enclave* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

general election. This strength at the convention increased the value of Southern party organizations to national leaders, who began to use federal patronage to “buy” Southern convention votes, as well as to local state party leaders, who hoped to benefit from receiving such patronage (either by distributing it or selling it).

We show that, on the national side, this meant that Republican presidents and presidential candidates engaged in near continuous attempts at winning Southern state support at national conventions. In addition, a number of Republican presidents – including Hayes, Arthur, Harrison, Harding, Hoover, and Eisenhower – invested significantly (though, most often unsuccessfully) in rebuilding local party organizations in the South. Importantly, we show that every single Republican president between Grant and Nixon relied on some form of a Southern strategy aimed at winning (re-)nomination at the national convention and/or strengthening state party organizations in the South. This corrects a misconception in various historical accounts that Republican presidents effectively gave up on the South by the early twentieth century.

We also show that, at the state level, executive (federal) patronage and the considerable profits that could be gained from controlling it inspired frequent contestation over control of the local party organizations. That is, while many Republican state parties no longer functioned as regular political parties – often failing to even run candidates in state elections – control of the state party organizations continued to be valuable to local party elites. Initially, these contests largely involved different biracial groups surrounding (former) elected officials and federal office-holders. But over time, contests began to take on an increasingly racial hue, as Black-and-Tans (a faction of black and white Republicans) vied for control with Lily-Whites (a faction of white Republicans that sought to ban blacks from leadership positions in the party).

Importantly, this history of the Southern Republican Party is not merely a historical artifact. In an analysis looking at the racial makeup of state Republican Party organizations in the South, we find that changes in the racial makeup of local GOP leaders had an effect on the party’s performance in elections. Specifically, we show that in elections prior to the introduction of disfranchisement laws banning blacks from voting, an increase in white control of the state party is associated with a decline in the party’s electoral performance – suggesting that the black-dominated GOP electorate in the pre-Jim Crow era punished the state party for a decline of influence. However, *after* disfranchisement laws were introduced, an increase in white control is associated with an increase in the party’s performance in presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional elections – especially in the Outer South – which indicates that the now white-dominated Southern electorate became more open to voting Republican once the local GOP party organization became “whiter.”

These findings suggest that the degree to which the Republican Party in the South became a “white party” in the first half of the twentieth century can help explain the electoral performance of the Southern GOP in the modern era. That

is, we argue that the whitening of the Southern Republican Party in the first half of the twentieth century was a *necessary condition* for its subsequent emergence – and eventual dominance – in the second half of the twentieth century. Other developments were also necessary, of course, like the national Democratic Party's leftward move on civil rights and the national GOP's related rightward move on civil rights (and continued economic conservatism).<sup>6</sup> Together, over time, these various developments became sufficient for the Republican Party's Southern success. However, the first step for the GOP to become viable electorally in the Jim Crow South was to become a Lily-White party. Everything else, we argue, followed from that.

#### RECONSTRUCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

Before examining the state of the Republican Party in the South after Reconstruction, we first explore how the GOP emerged in the former Confederate states. A Southern GOP was not a foregone conclusion after the Union emerged victorious in the Civil War. In fact, creating a Southern wing of the Republican Party in the South was initially a minority view – pushed only by Radical Republicans, who sought to enfranchise the new freedmen (former slaves) and recreate society in the former Confederacy. Moderate Republicans, the dominant GOP coalition at the time, sought a more amicable restoration of the Union – and readmittance of the ex-Confederate states – and believed widespread black suffrage was too radical for the Northern public to accept. Only after President Andrew Johnson had fought the Republicans on Reconstruction, and seemed to desire a New South that placed the former white leaders in dominant positions once again with the ex-slaves clearly subservient to them, did moderate Republicans (and Northern opinion) begin to shift. By 1867, the desire to enfranchise the former slaves in the South – and use them as the foundation for a Southern wing of the GOP – was the modal Republican position. And the first Reconstruction Act, in December 1867, set the stage for the creation of Republican constitutions and governments in the Southern states.<sup>7</sup>

Republican successes during Reconstruction varied by state, but GOP governments came to power, at least for some period of time, in every Southern state but Virginia. During those years, black voters used their new franchise to

<sup>6</sup> Indeed, as we will argue, the GOP had to become the party of racial conservatism – widely understood – before the Republicans could make a significant electoral breakthrough in the Deep South.

<sup>7</sup> On the shift in thinking within the GOP, and the decision to build a Republican Party in the South, see Richard H. Abbott, *The Republican Party in the South, 1855–1877* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), chapter 4. See also W. R. Brock, *An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1865–1867* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 182–83; Michael Les Benedict, *A Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and Reconstruction, 1863–1869* (New York: Norton, 1974), 210–13.

support the party and elect white Republican leaders, as well as some of their own. But the Democratic Party would rebound, thanks to voter restrictions on ex-Confederates being lifted, paramilitary groups (working on the part of the Democracy) roaming the South to terrorize black voters, a financial panic in 1873 followed by an economic depression, and the Northern public's growing fatigue with all matters Southern. State by state, Republican governments fell, until only Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina were left. With the conclusion of the (disputed) presidential election of 1876–77 – and as part of a rumored deal between Republican and Democratic leaders – the GOP would no longer use the US army to oversee elections or protect civilian governments, and all three states would be quickly “redeemed” by the Democrats.<sup>8</sup>

But while the Republicans were vanquished throughout the South, and their Reconstruction initiative had thus come to an end, the GOP did not disappear overnight in the former Confederacy. This fact is not terribly well known outside of historically conscious scholars of party politics and the US South. Relatedly, in his classic book *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, C. Vann Woodward makes the case that “Jim Crow” – which he defines as the racial segregation in education, public accommodations, and the labor market in the South – did not emerge immediately after the fall of Reconstruction. Rather, it took decades to occur. In telling this story, Woodward notes that the rise of disenfranchising provisions (which would rob the Republican Party of its electoral base) also took time:

The impression often left by cursory histories of the subject is that Negro disfranchisement followed quickly if not immediately upon the overthrow of Reconstruction. It is perfectly true that Negroes were often coerced, defrauded, or intimidated, but they continued to vote in large parts of the South for more than two decades after Reconstruction.<sup>9</sup>

Woodward also notes that blacks “continued to hold offices as well” during this time. And this was because much of the South was still contested electoral terrain for two decades after Reconstruction. The Republicans continued to compete in Southern elections, and national Republican leaders – Presidents Rutherford Hayes, Chester Arthur, and Benjamin Harrison and several key figures in Congress – actively sought to maintain a viable Southern wing of the party.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> See C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1951); Keith Ian Polakoff, *The Politics of Inertia: The Election of 1876 and the End of Reconstruction* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973).

<sup>9</sup> C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 53–54.

<sup>10</sup> A small literature examines the GOP's efforts regarding the South in these years. See Vincent P. De Santis, *Republicans Face the Southern Question: The New Departure Years, 1877–1897* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959); Stanley P. Hirshson, *Farewell to the Bloody*

GOP leaders mostly attempted to rebuild the party in the South by reaching out to white voters. This was the strategy employed by Hayes, Arthur, and Harrison, as they tried either to sell “Whiggish” white Southerners on economic-development policies or to enter into fusion arrangements with Independents who were revolting against the Democratic Party. These strategies produced minimal electoral successes. Rep. Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) and Sen. George Frisbie Hoar (R-MA) took a different tack, leading Republicans in Congress to seek a new federal elections bill (or, per Southern thinking, a “Force bill”) that would have authorized the federal courts (through the appointment of federal supervisors) to ensure the fairness of Southern elections. The “Lodge Bill,” as it would become known, failed narrowly in the Senate (after passing in the House), due largely to defections by western (“silver”) Republicans.

Throughout this period, as Republicans battled to maintain a foothold in the South, Democrats in the former Confederacy fought back – both through rhetoric (painting the Republicans as the “black party”) and through terrorism (toward blacks and their white supporters). Eventually, faced with continued attempts by national GOP leaders to reclaim ground in the South along with the rise of populism and Populist leaders’ willingness to cross racial lines and work with Republicans in fusion arrangements, Southern Democratic leaders sought a more reliable way to protect themselves. They settled on a legal remedy – the adoption of a set of disenfranchising provisions (poll taxes, literacy tests, residency requirements, and felon restrictions) that would severely limit participation by blacks (and sometimes by poor whites as well) in elections.<sup>11</sup> While some Southern states passed some of these provisions by statute in the 1880s, the Mississippi legislature went a step further in 1890 and embedded them in a new state constitution (thus making them that much harder to change subsequently). The “Mississippi Plan” withstood a Supreme Court challenge in *Williams v. Mississippi* (1898) – whereby the Court ruled that the poll tax and literacy requirements were not discriminatory, as they applied to all voters – and was quickly copied by South Carolina (1895) and Louisiana (1898).<sup>12</sup> By

*Shirt: Northern Republicans and the Southern Negro, 1877–1893* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962); Charles W. Calhoun, *Conceiving a New Republic: The Republican Party and the Southern Question, 1869–1900* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

<sup>11</sup> To prevent poor whites from being disenfranchised, some states adopted the “grandfather clause,” which allowed citizens to bypass the voting restrictions if their grandfathers were able to vote prior to the Civil War. In 1915, the Supreme Court ruled the grandfather clause to be unconstitutional.

<sup>12</sup> On *Williams v. Mississippi*, see R. Volney Riser, *Defying Disfranchisement: Black Voting Rights Activism in the Jim Crow South, 1890–1908* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 46–73; Lawrence Goldstone, *Inherently Unequal: The Betrayal of Equal Rights by the Supreme Court, 1865–1903* (New York: Walker and Company, 2011), 171–76.

1908, all states in the South had adopted disenfranchising provisions of some sort.<sup>13</sup>

As white Democrats were disenfranchising blacks in the South, and thus eliminating the GOP's electoral base in the former Confederacy, the Republicans were expanding their electoral support in every other region of the nation. Beginning in 1894–96 and solidifying with President William McKinley's reelection in 1900, the Republicans asserted their electoral dominance, and the GOP established itself as the majority party in the United States – outside of a brief period between 1912 and 1920, when a Republican Party split allowed Woodrow Wilson to claim the presidency and ushered in six years of unified Democratic rule – for the first three decades of the twentieth century. As a result, GOP leadership concerns about a Southern wing of the party ebbed considerably. Presidents Warren Harding and Herbert Hoover would make efforts to rebuild a viable Southern Republican Party, but such efforts lacked the momentum and urgency of the late nineteenth century.

#### REPUBLICAN SUCCESSES IN THE SOUTH, 1877–1952

What, then, are we to conclude about the Republican Party's electoral success in the South following the end of Reconstruction in 1877 and prior to Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidential run in 1952? The typical characterization of this era as “one-party Democratic rule” is not far off the mark. But the GOP did have some successes, and it is important to make note of these.

The most significant successes occurred prior to the turn of the twentieth century, when national GOP politicians were actively trying to maintain a Southern wing and the Democrats' disenfranchising-law strategy was not fully vested. The Republicans held a small number of Southern seats in the House of Representatives during this time, exceeding single digits on four occasions: 12 seats in the 47th Congress (1881–83), 14 in the 51st (1889–91), 13 in the 54th (1895–97), and 11 in the 55th (1897–99). In these Congresses, however, seventeen of those fifty GOP seats, or 34 percent, were generated not by explicit election wins but rather by contested (or disputed) election cases in the House and majority decisions to “flip” the seat (or declare the ostensible loser of the election the winner) based on evidence of fraud or other irregularities in the electoral process. Overall, between the 45th (1877–79) and 56th (1899–1901) Congresses, the Republicans controlled 102 of 1,004 House seats in the South, or 10.2 percent. And 22 of those 102 GOP seats would occur because of

<sup>13</sup> On the rise of disenfranchising laws in the South, see J. Morgan Kousser, *The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974); Michael Perman, *Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888–1908* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

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contested election cases.<sup>14</sup> Seven blacks would be among the Republican House members during this time.<sup>15</sup> In the Senate, Republicans elected during this era included William Pitt Kellogg from Louisiana (45th–47th Congresses); William Mahone from Virginia (47th–49th), as part of a fusion arrangement with the Readjuster Party; Harrison H. Riddleberger from Virginia (50th–52nd), as part of a fusion arrangement with the Readjuster Party; and Jeter C. Pritchard (53rd–57th) from North Carolina. These very modest congressional victories far exceeded what the GOP was able to do at the presidential level, where no Republican candidate was able to win a Southern state (or electoral vote) in the six elections between 1880 and 1900.

At the subnational level, GOP success was sporadic prior to the turn of the twentieth century. Republicans elected three governors during this period: Alvin Hawkins in 1880 (served from 1881 to 1883) in Tennessee; William E. Cameron in 1881 (served from 1882 to 1885) in Virginia, as part of a fusion arrangement with the Readjuster Party; and Daniel Lindsay Russell in 1896 in North Carolina (served from 1897 to 1901). The GOP also had some state legislative success in these three states for a period of time: in both chambers in Virginia between 1879 and 1883, in a fusion arrangement with the Readjusters; in the state House in Tennessee between 1881 and 1883, thanks to the tie-breaking vote of a Greenbacker; and in both chambers in North Carolina between 1895 and 1899, in a fusion arrangement with the Populists.

The first half of the twentieth century saw far fewer Republican electoral successes in the South. As disenfranchising laws took hold and spread in the Jim Crow South, black voting – except in some select urban areas – dried up almost completely. As a result, the GOP's nineteenth-century electoral base in the South was virtually eliminated, and the party's ability to consistently compete electorally largely vanished. Writing in 1949, V. O. Key in his book *Southern Politics in State and Nation* said this about the Republican Party:

It scarcely deserves the name of party. It wavers somewhat between an esoteric cult on the order of a lodge and a conspiracy for plunder in accord with the accepted customs of our politics. Its exact position on the cult-conspiracy scale varies from place to place and

<sup>14</sup> For information on election contests and Republican House seats in the former Confederacy, see Jeffery A. Jenkins, "Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives, 1789–2002," *Studies in American Political Development* 18(1): 112–35, Table 11.

<sup>15</sup> The seven were John R. Lynch (47th Congress: Mississippi's 6th district), Robert Smalls (47th–49th: South Carolina's 5th and 7th districts); James E. O'Hara (48th and 49th: North Carolina's 2nd district); Henry P. Cheatham (51st and 52nd: North Carolina's 2nd district); John Mercer Langston (51st: Virginia's 4th district); Thomas E. Miller (51st: South Carolina's 7th district); George W. Murray (53rd and 54th: South Carolina's 7th and 1st districts); and George Henry White (55th and 56th: North Carolina's 2nd district). Some notes on these members: Lynch also represented Mississippi's 6th district in the 43rd and 44th Congresses; Smalls also represented South Carolina's 5th district in the 44th and 45th Congresses; Smalls represented the 5th district in the 48th Congress and the 7th district in the 49th Congress; Murray represented South Carolina's 7th district in the 53rd Congress and the 1st district in the 54th Congress.

time to time. Only in North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee do the Republicans approximate the reality of a political party.<sup>16</sup>

Between the 57th (1901–03) and 82nd (1951–53) Congresses, the Republicans controlled just 86 of 2,655 House seats in the South, or 3.2 percent.<sup>17</sup> And, per Key, all but six of these seats came from North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee.<sup>18</sup> For the first half of the twentieth century, the Appalachian areas of eastern Tennessee, western North Carolina, and southwestern Virginia constituted the GOP's electoral base – mountain whites who supported the Union during the Civil War and their descendants.<sup>19</sup>

Beyond House elections, GOP electoral success in the first half of the twentieth century is similarly bleak. During this time, *no* Southern state elected a Republican as US senator. In the four presidential elections from 1904 to 1916, no Southern state went for a GOP presidential candidate. This changed in 1920, when Warren Harding won a single Southern state: Tennessee. And in 1928, a potential breakthrough occurred, when Herbert Hoover won five Southern states: Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Hoover generated no congressional coattails, however, and much of his success was likely due to religious bigotry – as white Protestants in the South rejected Democratic presidential nominee Al Smith (NY), who was a Catholic.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, Hoover lost the entire South in 1932, amid Democrat Franklin Delano Roosevelt's landslide victory. And the Republicans won no Southern states in the next four presidential elections (1936–48). Below the federal level, the only GOP successes came in Tennessee, where two Republicans were elected governor: Ben W. Hooper in 1910 (reelected in 1912) and Alfred A. Taylor in 1920. The GOP did not hold majorities in any state legislative chambers in the South during this era.

#### SOUTHERN DELEGATES, REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTIONS, AND PATRONAGE POLITICS

Given the Republican Party's lack of electoral success in the post-Reconstruction South, especially in the first half of the twentieth century, one

<sup>16</sup> V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), 277.

<sup>17</sup> Party data taken from Kenneth C. Martis, *The Historical Atlas of Political Parties in the United States Congress, 1789–1989* (New York: Macmillan, 1989).

<sup>18</sup> These six House seats all came from the 14th congressional district in Texas, where Republican Harry M. Wurzbach served from the 67th through 72nd Congresses. He was elected outright five times (67th–70th, 72nd) and successfully contested the election of Democrat Augustus McCloskey to the 71st Congress. Wurzbach died in office on February 10, 1930.

<sup>19</sup> Digging deeper, the 1st and 2nd congressional districts in eastern Tennessee have elected Republicans in every election since 1880 – from the 47th (1881–83) through the 116th (2019–21) Congresses.

<sup>20</sup> The one coattails exception might have been in Tennessee, where the Republicans won 5 of 10 House seats. They would win no more than 2 in the decades before or after the 1928 election.