Introduction

When G. W. F. Hegel came to Berlin in 1818 to assume a professorship at the recently founded Royal Friedrich Wilhelm’s University, he was already a well-known philosopher in the Germanophone world. The author of The Phenomenology of Spirit, the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, and the Science of Logic, he was regarded by the Prussian authorities as a suitable successor to the celebrated and controversial Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who had died in 1814. During Hegel’s tenure in Berlin, which lasted until his death in 1831, he gave a series of increasingly popular lecture courses that attracted students from all over Europe.¹ A remarkable generation came to learn from him, which included figures such as the philosophers Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, and Max Stirner, the theologian David Friedrich Strauss, and the poet Heinrich Heine. These men found inspiration in his ideas and made use of them in different ways as their own thought developed.

After Hegel’s death in 1831, a group of his students set to work to create the first collected edition of his writings.² Over the next decade or so, they republished the four major monographs that Hegel had produced during his lifetime, along with his various articles and reviews. Aware of the importance of his lectures, they included these in their edition based on the redacted transcriptions of Hegel’s notes, when available, and those of his students. These notes were then collated and printed for the first time as the Lectures

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on the Philosophy of History,3 the Lectures on the History of Philosophy,4 the Lectures on Aesthetics,5 and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.6 These lectures did much to increase Hegel’s fame and importance, and many of the things that we today associate with his philosophy appear only in these lectures and not in the published works. In their edition the editors also supplemented two of the works that Hegel published in his lifetime, the Philosophy of Right and the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, with “additions” to the individual paragraphs, which were again taken from student notes.

This edition was published from 1832 until 1845, and with each new volume, new discussions and controversies about Hegel’s philosophy erupted. At this time students continued to flock to Berlin in the hope of studying with those who had been Hegel’s students. There thus arose a second generation of what might be regarded as Hegel students at a second remove, that is, those who never attended his lectures since they only arrived in Berlin after his death, but who studied under Hegel’s followers and were caught up in the buzz surrounding his philosophy. Many of those who came to Berlin during this time spoke of a kind of magical intellectual atmosphere that spread from the lecture hall to the coffee houses and beer halls. Among this talented second generation were thinkers and writers such as Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Søren Kierkegaard, and Ivan Turgenev. The Russian revolutionary anarchist Mikhail Bakunin reflects on his experience with Hegel’s philosophy during his time in Berlin:

Hegel . . . died at the end of 1831. But he left behind him at the Universities of Berlin, Königsberg, and Halle a whole school of young professors, editors of his works, and ardent adherents and interpreters of his


doctrines. Thanks to their tireless efforts, those doctrines were rapidly disseminated not only throughout Germany but in many other European countries. They attracted a multitude of German and non-German intellectuals to Berlin as to a vital source of new light, not to say a new revelation. Unless you lived in those times, you will never understand how powerful the fascination of this philosophical system was in the 1830s and 1840s. It was believed that the eternally sought Absolute had finally been found and understood, and that it could be bought wholesale or retail in Berlin.7

Looking back many decades after the fact, Friedrich Engels speaks with the same tone of excitement, describing the infectious nature of Hegel’s philosophy during this time:

One can imagine what a tremendous effect this Hegelian system must have produced in the philosophy-tinged atmosphere of Germany. It was a triumphal procession which lasted for decades and which by no means came to a standstill on the death of Hegel. On the contrary, from 1830 to 1840 Hegelianism reigned most exclusively, and to a greater or lesser extent infected even its opponents. It was precisely in this period that Hegelian views, consciously or unconsciously, most extensively permeated the most diversified sciences.8

While Engels and Bakunin describe the period that they experienced in Berlin immediately after Hegel’s death, this same nostalgic view is taken by Karl Rosenkranz, who describes the earlier period when Hegel was delivering his famous lectures in the 1820s:

Men from every class attended his lectures. Students from all parts of Germany, from every European nation, especially Poland, but also Greeks and Scandinavians sat at his feet and listened to his magic words. . . . for the most part the enthusiasm of his auditors was genuine, and in this enthusiasm the University of Berlin experienced one of its most beautiful epochs.9

All of these thinkers testify to the special intellectual atmosphere in Berlin that arose in connection with Hegel’s philosophy both during his lifetime and in the decades after his death. They were caught up by this in their youth, and the

excitement and enthusiasm for Hegel’s ideas haunted them throughout their lives.

This special atmosphere also spilled over into other countries, where Hegel’s ideas were presented by his international students as they returned home. The Dane Søren Kierkegaard recalls the great sensation that was caused at the University of Copenhagen when Hegel’s philosophy was introduced there in 1837. Somewhat suspicious of the new trend, he recalls, “Indeed, there was a matchless movement and excitement over the system then, and . . . there was hardly anyone in the whole kingdom, or at least in the whole capital, who in one way or another was not related to the system in suspenseful expectation.”

Another eyewitness to the reception of Hegel’s thought in the Kingdom of Denmark writes:

One had to have lived at that time to be able to conceive of the strange being [of Hegelian philosophy], indeed, even to be able to believe in the possibility of it. Under the absolutism of German philosophy, every thinker was zealous to work on the Tower of Babel of fantasy; what we heard all around us was nothing less than that every grandiloquent speaker made it virtually his goal in life to build a tower even higher. We were told that the universe with all of its large and small secret niches had been investigated and explained in the Concept; all riddles were solved; Hegel and his host of disciples in Berlin had 

After a short time this was the only air we inhaled.

All of these excited authors describe a unique moment in the history of philosophy, which they were witness to. They concede that their powers as writers fail them when they try to convey adequately the electric and energizing mood that they experienced as young men.

What was it about Hegel’s thought that was able to cause such a stir among so many highly talented thinkers coming from different countries and academic backgrounds? The present work represents an attempt to address this question. This is a selective history of European philosophy in the nineteenth century. The guiding idea is that the story of Continental philosophy in this period can be understood as the story of Hegel’s philosophy, which was


11 Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vol. X-6, B 137; Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vol. 6, 6636.

12 Johannes Fibiger, Mit Liv og Levned, som jeg selv har forstaaet det, ed. by Karl Gjellerup (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1898), p. 73.
disseminated and modified in different ways by later thinkers. The present work takes as its point of departure the intellectual milieu at the University of Berlin, which was the fountain of inspiration that nourished the leading figures of the age over a period of several decades.

The large number of interesting figures and philosophical writers that run through this period renders it impossible to aim at systematic or exhaustive coverage. For this work I have tried to isolate certain themes that I take to be defining and characteristic of this dynamic time. The text begins with Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* in 1807 and ends with the death of Friedrich Engels in 1895. It tries to follow a more or less continuous line of thought that connects these thinkers and other intermediary ones. The goal is to try to see the texts and ideas as figuring in an ongoing dialogue with one another.

## Alienation and Recognition as the Guiding Thread

The history of philosophy in the nineteenth century is a complex labyrinth of crisscrossing thinkers, texts, topics, and arguments. As a result, works on this period are often difficult to read for nonspecialists, who quickly get overwhelmed, finding themselves lost in the details. This makes it hard to appreciate the richness and originality of this period and its contribution to the history of philosophy generally. The goal of this work is to present an introduction to this period for students and more general readers that avoids this problem. In order to achieve this goal, I have selected a handful of themes that run throughout the period. These have been used to organize the text. This strategy has the advantage that it allows for a single continuous narrative to be followed, and this in turn facilitates an understanding of the individual figures since it allows the reader to place them in a concrete context and to compare and contrast them with other thinkers on specific issues. The obvious disadvantage, however, is that this is only a selection of themes, which, despite their centrality and importance, in no way exhaust the period under examination. This is a natural shortcoming of the genre of the history of philosophy – and indeed the history of anything – and is not specific to the present work. It lies in the nature of interpretation itself that certain things are focused on, while others are relegated to a secondary role or neglected altogether. The success of the interpretation offered by this work can only be evaluated by an examination of whether the selected themes have an explanatory power and whether the story told is insightful and meaningful. The interpretive strategy presented here, I believe, makes possible a wide overview of the tradition of Continental philosophy from the period and helps us to make sense of a great many of its major figures and key texts. Moreover, it helps us appreciate the specific or characteristic contributions of the nineteenth century to the history of philosophy in general. Of course, I readily recognize that other researchers might
well select different themes and come to very different conclusions, thereby presenting a very different picture of the period in question.

Thematically the focus in this investigation is on a number of key concepts, such as freedom, human nature, self-consciousness, rebellion, history, subjectivity, crisis, and God, but there are two related concepts that connect all of these: alienation and recognition. Alienation is a notion that arises with Hegel’s philosophy and resonates throughout the rest of the century in the work of several other thinkers. It can arguably be regarded as a defining, if not the defining, feature of the history of nineteenth-century philosophy, at least in the German tradition, broadly construed. The phenomenon of alienation, of course, existed long before this, but it only became an issue of explicit philosophical consideration in this period. This was the first time that alienation was examined as a concept in its own right.

What is alienation, and why is this such an important idea? This is not an easy question since there are many different definitions of it. At its most basic level, alienation means some kind of separation or division. We are alienated from something when we are separated from it. This basic idea is reflected in the original meaning of the word, which was used to refer to the transfer of property by means of sale or gift. For example, instead of saying that someone sold a piece of land, one could say that someone alienated it; that is, someone, so to speak, separated themselves from the land that they had previously owned. Today this linguistic usage is antiquated. Nowadays we are more accustomed to using the word “alienation” to describe the sense of estrangement that we might feel, for example, from our community, society, or the world in general. We sometimes hear people say that they feel alienated from some person or institution. Here again the sense of separation is implicit since the idea is that one feels separated from something to which one should, under different circumstances, have a positive relation.

The sense of separation is evident in the two German words for this term, which can be found in Hegel and later thinkers. The term Entäusserung means literally “externalization” in the sense that something that was inner becomes outward or comes to visible expression.13 The other term, Entfremdung, means literally “being foreign (fremd)” to something. This second term corresponds best to our usual usage of feeling alienated. English translators have sometimes attempted to capture this linguistic distinction by rendering Entfremdung as “estrangement” and Entäusserung as “alienation.”

If alienation means a kind of separation, then its opposite would be reconciliation or identification. When I identify with, for example, my family, community, or society, then I am not alienated from them. I am not uncertain about who I am but rather feel confirmed and, so to speak, at home there. What this means is that I can see my role in these contexts and am happy and satisfied

with it. I feel my own sense of self-identity affirmed by these larger instances. I can recognize a part of myself in them. For example, I see my own will and rationality reflected in rational laws that prohibit murder or theft. Although I did not personally create these laws, I can immediately affirm them as an extension of my own rationality. If I myself were to create a new set of laws, I would be sure to include these. By contrast, when I am alienated, I am dissatisfied with my role in these different contexts and thus can refuse to play it. When I have the feeling of alienation, I cannot identify with the larger context and feel more comfortable outside it. I do not feel at home there but more like a stranger or intruder. I cannot see myself in this other, and there is a fundamental separation or division between me and it.

The second important concept that will be used as a guiding thread is that of recognition (Anerkennung). Although it only appears in a limited way in Hegel’s texts, recognition has played an important role in the reception of his thought, especially in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This concept has to do with the way in which we regard each other as human beings, political agents, or members of a community.

Like alienation, recognition has a number of different meanings that can be applied in different contexts. Perhaps at its most basic level, we can talk about recognition as a kind of perception, for example, when we say that someone recognizes a danger. This means that one is able to look at the multitude of sensory information that we receive from the world and to identify in it something that might potentially be dangerous. This presupposes that we have ahead of time a certain idea or concept of danger in our minds, and then when we look at certain situations in the world, we are able to put them into this category. We are able to distinguish these situations from those that are not dangerous.

We can also talk about recognizing other people. This is important for issues of philosophical anthropology and ethics. When we look at the many things that are found in the world, we can immediately distinguish between human beings and other things or other living creatures. Again, at the perceptual level we have a concept of a human being that we use to identify those things in our perceptual field that fall under this rubric. In this sense I can recognize someone as human. This seems entirely obvious, but in fact it can become a complex issue. In hierarchical societies, it is necessary to recognize other people in their particular role vis-à-vis each other. We need to know if someone stands above us in the hierarchy or below us. This determines our behavior toward others and the nature of our interaction with them. This is important for our ethical relations with others and our self-image. Our understanding of ourselves is largely shaped by the recognition that we receive from others. If we are constantly subject to negative recognition, we are likely to develop a negative understanding of ourselves, our abilities, and our possibilities.
As an extension of this usage, the concept of recognition is also important for social-political philosophy. We recognize our fellow community members as human beings who have certain rights and who are protected by certain laws. This recognition is important for social life to exist at all. If we did not recognize that other people had rights, then we would be subject to constant struggles to assert our claims. If we did not recognize that a certain object is the property of someone else, then we might be inclined to take it ourselves. Thus social life itself requires us to recognize each other in many different ways. When we fail to do so, the social fabric breaks down and often violence occurs. Phenomena such as racism and sexism demonstrate a failure to fully recognize a certain group of people as being fully human and being owed the same rights and degree of respect as others. Hegel was among the first philosophers to have a glimmering of the sweeping importance of this concept.

Like recognition, alienation is a very broad concept since one can be alienated from a number of different things. It can be a question of psychology, when one feels alienated from oneself in the form of either one’s individual character or human nature in general. It can be a question of ethics or personal relations, when one feels alienated from one’s family, friends, or colleagues. It can be a question of social theory or politics, when one feels alienated from one’s community or state. It can be a question of economics, when one feels alienated from one’s labor and workplace. It can be a question of religion, when one feels alienated from the religious community, religious ceremonies, and practices. It is thus a rich concept that has a broad range of applications in several different spheres.

In this work we will look at a number of different philosophers who examined different aspects of the concepts of alienation and recognition in various contexts. As we will see, these are important ideas that shaped the direction of philosophy in the nineteenth century. This is especially true of the tradition of German philosophy, which will be the main focus here. Moreover, these concepts played an important role in the development of philosophy in the twentieth century in movements such as existentialism and Critical Theory. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the application of these concepts has been extended beyond the field of philosophy. Today they are regularly used by social scientists, especially psychologists and sociologists.

Given that alienation and recognition are the guiding threads of this selective reading of nineteenth-century philosophy, a number of otherwise important philosophers from the period have unfortunately been omitted from the present study since these concepts were not central to their thinking. These include thinkers such as August Comte and John Stuart Mill, who stand outside the tradition of German philosophy, but it also includes philosophers in this tradition, such as Schelling and Schopenhauer. The omission of any extended account of these thinkers here should not be taken to imply that they were not important for the development of the history of philosophy in the
nineteenth century. Their absence is merely the result of the selection of the interpretative focus chosen. With a different focus, they could easily be regarded as central figures. It might also be pointed out that the present work contains no chapter on Max Stirner or David Friedrich Strauss, who are often discussed in the context of German philosophy in the wake of Hegel. While I readily acknowledge this shortcoming, I can only point to the normal length requirements demanded by academic publishers today. It would have been desirable to have included chapters on these figures and others if space had allowed for this, but this would have resulted in either a superficial analysis or a manuscript that was unpublishable due to its excessive length. For these reasons, the present work should be regarded not as an attempt to give an exhaustive survey of nineteenth-century Continental philosophy but rather as tracing a handful of ideas emerging from Hegel’s philosophy.

Critical Theses

There are, of course, a number of outstanding works that treat the central figures in nineteenth-century philosophy, and I have made use of them fruitfully. The present study is designed as a historical overview and is not primarily polemical in nature, so I have generally refrained from discussing these works critically. However, this is not to say that it contains no critical element. I have, indeed, tried to show what I take to be the weaknesses of some

of the individual philosophical views discussed and to demonstrate how these prodded later thinkers to set out in new directions. Moreover, at the broad level, the present work offers a handful of perspectives or theses that are more or less new or original vis-à-vis earlier works on philosophy in the nineteenth century.

First, I want to show that religion plays an absolutely central and constitutive role in the development of philosophy during this period. In fact, the history of theology and even biblical studies cannot be separated from the history of philosophy in the nineteenth century. For many modern commentators it is surprising that the philosophy of this period was so closely tied to religion and theology; indeed, sometimes to the point that they were indistinguishable. There was much overlap between the two fields, and religious questions were key issues in the philosophical systems of the day. Likewise, philosophical questions plagued discussions of theology. It is no accident that during this period people talked about rationalism as both a philosophical and a theological school. It is thus a mistake when philosophers today reject this side of the history of philosophy since such a rejection distorts the nature of philosophy during this period. This is a modern prejudice that presupposes a clear demarcation of academic fields. But we cannot assume this of previous periods in the history of science and scholarship, when the fields had not attained the same level of specialization as today and where there was much greater tolerance for what we would nowadays regard as interdisciplinary work. As we will see, the concept of alienation is one that connects philosophy and religion in this period.

The connection between religious thinking and philosophy is often overlooked when people think of the important political dimension of nineteenth-century thought in connection with, for example, Marx, Bakunin, and the Revolutions of 1848. But, as we will see, these political trends were closely connected to the developments in religious thinking at the time. Thinkers traditionally defined by their social-political theories, such as Marx and Bakunin, were also deeply interested in the contemporary discussions concerning religion and self-consciously built on them. Indeed, Marx’s famous theory of alienation in the social-economic sphere began with an interest in alienation in the context of religious belief.

Second, there is also an important and rarely recognized literary dimension to philosophy in the nineteenth century. It has been known for some time that Hegel made fairly extensive use of literary sources in his own work, but the influence of his philosophy on important novelists and poets of the period has been less explored. The poet Heinrich Heine and the Danish poet-playwright Johan Ludvig Heiberg attended his lectures in Berlin and were clearly marked

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