

SHARING KNOWLEDGE

Assertion is the central vehicle for the sharing of knowledge. Whether knowledge is shared successfully often depends on the quality of assertions: good assertions lead to successful knowledge sharing, while bad ones don't. In *Sharing Knowledge*, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion investigate the relation between knowledge sharing and assertion, and develop an account of what it is to assert well. More specifically, they argue that the function of assertion is to share knowledge with others. It is this function that supports a central norm of assertion according to which a good assertion is one that has the disposition to generate knowledge in others. The book uses this functionalist approach to motivate further norms of assertion on both the speakers' and the hearers' side and investigates ramifications of this view on other questions about assertion.

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SHARING KNOWLEDGE

A Functionalist Account of Assertion

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For Max and Mia

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