The American Political Economy

This volume brings together leading political scientists to explore the distinctive features of the American political economy. The introductory chapter provides a comparatively informed framework for analyzing the interplay of markets and politics in the United States, focusing on three key factors: uniquely fragmented and decentralized political institutions; an interest group landscape characterized by weak labor organizations and powerful, parochial business groups; and an entrenched legacy of ethno-racial divisions embedded in both government and markets. Subsequent chapters look at the fundamental dynamics that result, including the place of the courts in multi-venue politics, the political economy of labor, sectional conflict within and across cities and regions, the consolidation of financial markets and corporate monopoly and monopsony power, and the ongoing rise of the knowledge economy. Together, the chapters provide a revealing new map of the politics of democratic capitalism in the United States.

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The American Political Economy

Politics, Markets, and Power

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Contents

List of Figures  page vii
List of Tables  x
List of Contributors  xii
Acknowledgments  xiii

Jacob S. Hacker, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Paul Pierson, and Kathleen Thelen  1

I  POLITICAL ARENAS AND ACTORS  49

1  Hurdles to Shared Prosperity: Congress, Parties, and the National Policy Process in an Era of Inequality
Nathan J. Kelly and Jana Morgan  51

2  The Role of the Law in the American Political Economy
K. Sabeel Rahman and Kathleen Thelen  76

3  Collective Action, Law, and the Fragmented Development of the American Labor Movement
Alexander Hertel-Fernandez  103

II  RACE, SPACE, AND GOVERNANCE  131

4  Racial Inequality, Market Inequality, and the American Political Economy
Chloe Thurston  133
Contents

5 The Production of Local Inequality: Race, Class, and Land Use in American Cities
   Jessica Trounstine 158

6 The City Re-centered? Local Inequality Mitigation in the 21st Century
   Thomas K. Ogorzalek 181

7 The Political Economies of Red States
   Jacob M. Grumbach, Jacob S. Hacker, and Paul Pierson 209

III CORPORATE POWER AND CONCENTRATION 245

8 Mo’ Patents, Mo’ Problems: Corporate Strategy, Structure, and Profitability in America’s Political Economy
   Herman Mark Schwartz 247

9 Asset Manager Capitalism as a Corporate Governance Regime
   Benjamin Braun 270

10 Labor Market Power in the American Political Economy
   Suresh Naidu 295

IV THE AMERICAN KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 321

11 The United States as Radical Innovation Driver: The Politics of Declining Dominance?
   David Soskice 323

12 Public Investment in the Knowledge Economy
   Lucy Barnes 351

13 Concentration and Commodification: The Political Economy of Postindustrialism in America and Beyond
   Ben Ansell and Jane Gingrich 375

Epilogue: The American Political Economy Confronts COVID-19
   Jacob S. Hacker, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Paul Pierson, and Kathleen Thelen 407

Bibliography 419
Figures

1.1 Top 1% income share in the United States and five other rich democracies  page 54
1.2 Policy stasis and income concentration, 1913–2007  66
1.3 Inegalitarian effects of policy stagnation increase as income concentration rises, 1939–2006  68
1.4 Income concentration and the topics of public laws  70
3.1 The historical development of the US labor movement  105
3.2 Union coverage and membership rates in advanced democracies  106
3.3 Public- and private-sector union coverage rates in advanced democracies  107
3.4 The long-run political consequences of 1960s and 1970s teacher strikes  115
4.1 Public and private social spending in the OECD  136
4.2 Employer pension coverage by race  142
4.3 Employer health insurance coverage by race  142
4.4 Median family wealth by race  145
4.5 For-profit education: Contributors  154
4.6 For-profit education: Party donations  154
5.1 Land use regulation correlation with race and class segregation  169
5.2 Effect of race and class city makeup on spending equity  176
6.1 An example of re-centering: Relative value shifts in New York City  192
6.2 Locally fit averages of real estate values for all NY metropolitan tracts in 1980 (left) and 2010 (right)  194
List of Figures

6.3 Average tract-level estimated aggregate residential real estate value by distance from city center across 24 US metropolitan areas 195
6.4 Metropolitan gradient changes and the knowledge economy 197
6.5 Land gradients and decommodifying policies in big American cities 200
7.1 State growth rates versus per capita income, 1940–1970 and 1990–2020 213
7.2 Energy production, wages, and Trump vote 218
7.3 State economic policy, wages, and urbanization 219
7.4 Federal grants for states and localities, 1980–2020 222
7.5 Expanding variation in state economic policy 229
7.A1 Economic policy conservatism, wages, and Trump vote 240
7.A2 Energy, wages, and Trump vote 240
8.1 Top 100 firms’ share of all firms’ gross profit in 1961–1965 and 2013–2017 260
8.2 Top 100 firms’ share of all firms’ gross profit and capital expenditure, 1961–1965 260
8.3 Top 100 firms’ share of all firms’ gross profit and capital expenditure, 2013–2017 261
8.4 Top 100 firms’ capital expenditure as a percentage of gross profit by sector, 1961–1965 versus 2013–2017 (%) 261
9.1 The equity investment chain 272
9.2 The structure of US corporate equity ownership, 1945–2020 276
9.3 Retirement assets and their share of mutual fund assets, 1974–2020Q3 279
9.4 Domestic active equity funds versus domestic index equity funds (incl. ETFs), relative market share (1993–2019) and expense ratios (2000–19) 282
9.5 Distribution of equity and mutual fund holdings by wealth group, 1989–2020Q3, share of total 290
10.1 Monopsony at Convergys 303
10.2 Labor discipline at Convergys 306
10.3 Envelope theorem and “arbitrary wage cut” at Convergys 313
11.1 Nobel institutional mentions over time 331
11.2 Comparative government expenditure on R&D (GERD) 345
12.1 The expansion of knowledge employment: Share of persons engaged in work in knowledge-intensive services 354
12.2 Government-funded research and development as a percentage of GDP 361
12.3 General government spending on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP 363
List of Figures

12.4 The relationships between political institutions and public knowledge investment spending 367
12.5 Conditional relationships between economic inequality and public investment in knowledge economy inputs 372
13.1 Patent shares by US core-based statistical area 376
13.2 Gross investment in intangibles, 1995–2016 381
13.3 Income inequality and regional inequality by state (USA) and country (Europe) 384
13.4 Intangibles and national/regional inequality 386
13.5a Voting for the Democratic party and urban-rural divides 394
13.5b Voting for left parties and the urban-rural divide in Europe 394
13.6a Intangibles, income, and preferences about cutting domestic spending 399
13.6b Intangibles, income, and preferences about repealing Obamacare 400
13.6c Intangibles, income, and preferences about increasing infrastructure spending 400
13.6d Intangibles, income, and voting intention 401
13.7a Predicted redistribution support by income and industry-level investment in intangibles 404
13.7b Probability of voting center right by industry intangible investment and income 406
## Tables

1. Number of Electorally generated veto players in rich democracies  
   **page 16**

2. Principal locus of authority for key policies  
   **19**

4. Varieties of private, semi-private, or delegated provision  
   **137**

4. Employment benefits offered to workers (by employment status)  
   **139**

5. Segregation across cities has increased over time  
   **167**

5. Local expenditures  
   **172**

5. Demographic differences between suburbs and cities,  
   1927–2012  
   **175**

5. Segregation across cities among knowledge economy leaders in 2010  
   **179**

7. Measuring state characteristics  
   **217**

7. Comparing structural and policy explanations  
   **231**

7. Comparing structural and policy explanations (including energy production and Trump vote)  
   **241**

7. Correlations between measures  
   **243**

7. Explaining variation in state wages  
   **243**

8. Owned, managed and franchised shares of rooms and revenues for all Hilton Hotel brands, and ratio of all intangible assets to property, plant and equipment, various dates  
   **258**

8. Eight largest sectors in Forbes Global 2000 by share of cumulative profits in Germany, Japan, and the USA, 2005 to 2019 (%)  
   **267**
List of Tables

9.1 Stock ownership, corporate governance regimes, and macro regimes 274
12.1 Explanations of public knowledge investment 369
13.1 Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016 398
13.2 European Social Survey: Support for redistribution 403
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