A THEORY OF BIOETHICS

This volume offers a carefully argued, compelling theory of bioethics while eliciting practical implications for a wide array of issues including medical assistance-in-dying, the right to health care, abortion, animal research, and the definition of death. The authors’ dual value theory features mid-level principles, a distinctive model of moral status, a subjective account of well-being, and a cosmopolitan view of global justice. In addition to ethical theory, the book investigates the nature of harm and autonomous action, personal identity theory, and the “non-identity problem” associated with many procreative decisions. Readers new to particular topics will benefit from helpful introductions; specialists will appreciate in-depth theoretical explorations and a novel take on various practical issues; and all readers will benefit from the book’s original synoptic vision of bioethics. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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A THEORY OF BIOETHICS

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Acknowledgments

In working on this book we have accumulated many debts of gratitude. David thanks Kathleen and Zoe for their love and support. He also thanks the Department of Philosophy at George Washington University and the Department of Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), where he held a part-time position during work on this project, for their collegial, supportive work environments. Joe likewise thanks the Clinical Center Department of Bioethics at NIH for its encouragement and intellectually vibrant work environment.

Both of us are grateful to various people. Almost all chapters of *A Theory of Bioethics* were workshopped in the Department of Bioethics, greatly improving the argumentation, scholarship, and presentation of our ideas. Each of the following individuals helpfully commented on one or more draft chapters: Bernardo Aguilera, Jake Earl, Sophie Gibert, Frank Miller, Annette Rid, Ben Schwan, Robert Steel, Camila Strassle, Alex Voorhoeve, David Wasserman, and Dave Wendler. We are exceptionally grateful to David Benatar, who read the entire book for Cambridge University Press and provided us with a remarkable amount of helpful feedback. We also thank David Elliot for the cover design, Stephanie Sakson for copyediting, and Hilary Gaskin of Cambridge University Press for editorial oversight of this project. Meanwhile, we acknowledge a special debt to Christine Grady, Chief of the Department of Bioethics, for her extraordinary moral support for this project and for making it possible to publish the book in an open-access format.

Disclaimer: Work on this project was supported, in part, by intramural funds from the Clinical Center of NIH. The views we express in this book are our own and do not represent the views of the NIH, the Department of Health and Human Services, or any other US government agency.