Introducing Monetary Redress

1.1 Introduction

Keith Wiffin’s father died when he was eight years old (Wiffin 2020a). The loss led to his getting into trouble, and, in 1970, when Wiffin was ten, his mother approached Aotearoa New Zealand’s Child Welfare service for help with him and his three siblings. Wiffin was taken into state care that November and driven to the notorious Epuni Boys Home in Lower Hutt. There he would be physically and sexually abused for nine months before being moved to another residence. Wiffin would spend five years in care, including a further stint at Epuni. Wiffin is one of hundreds of thousands of people around the world who experienced systemic cruelty, abuse, and neglect while in state care. He is a survivor (or care leaver).¹

The mistreatment of survivors is the focus of a growing number of public inquiries, popular films and books, court cases, and scholarly works. Many public care institutions were systemically injurious and there is now a broad international consensus that states should bear remedial responsibilities. These responsibilities are discharged, in part, through monetary redress programmes. The first monetary redress programme for survivors of institutional abuse began in 1993. It emerged from a negotiated settlement between several churches, the Province of Ontario (Canada), and survivors of St John’s and St Joseph’s training schools (Shea 1999: 35–38). The programme paid CDN$14.5 million² to 565 survivors. More programmes quickly followed, first in Canada and then internationally. The speed of development is remarkable. A field of public policy wholly unforeseen during Keith Wiffin’s youth in the 1960s

¹ I use ‘survivor’ and ‘care leaver’ interchangeably. Both terms have their benefits and drawbacks. Some authors prefer ‘care experienced persons’, but that seems verbose to me. I avoid using the term ‘victims’ as it can connote an image of individuals who are passively defined by the actions of others.

² Appendix 1 provides a table of factors for converting currency values into 2021 US dollars.
became ordinary during the post-Cold War era. Now, in the ‘post-post-Cold War’ period of the 2020s, it is time to examine its practice critically.

The need for critical reflection arises because normalcy has not led to routinisation. Actual redress programmes differ greatly. Nor is there improvement in implementation. Some are better than others and programmes are better (or worse) in different ways. Monetary redress is ‘possibly the most contentious’ remedial measure used by states (Senate Community Affairs References Committee 2004: 225). There is reason for contention. Most claims are difficult to authenticate because good information about non-recent (historic)3 abuse is rare and its long-term effects are uncertain. Poor quality evidence contributes to programme delays and increases the burdens on survivors. It also raises questions about the authenticity of their claims.

These evidential concerns are aggravated by the high costs involved. The most expensive programme to date, Canada’s Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA), provided over CDN$5 billion in payments between 2006 and 2016. Yet, despite the large numbers involved, money is only part of what redress involves. Survivors emphasise the value of telling their stories and of having their experiences acknowledged (Jay et al. 2019: 59). As one interviewee related,

Almost everyone that we’ve talked to said, ‘But I’m really glad that I did it because I was able to actually tell people what happened and have them acknowledge it . . .’. What I have heard from a lot of people is the money didn’t matter, it was my ‘getting my day in court’. Sort of; it was important for them. (CDN Interview 7)

These good news reports are counterbalanced by survivors who were re-abused by redress. When Keith Wiffin first sought redress in 2003, he approached New Zealand’s Ministry of Social Development (MSD). With small prospects for success in court, Wiffin entered New Zealand’s nascent redress programme in 2008. He would be ill-treated by that ‘thoroughly disrespectful and contemptuous’ process for two years, before being sent a cheque for NZD$20,000 (Wiffin 2020b: 14). Unfortunately, Wiffin’s damaging experience is all too common. Other

3 I will not need a precise definition as to what makes an injury and any resulting claims non-recent. Generally, I use the term to refer to injuries that happened a sufficiently long time back so that the passage of time affects the prospect of successful litigation. Associated literature often uses terms such as ‘historic injuries’ or ‘historic claims’. I use ‘non-recent’ to avoid the implication that these injuries and claims are part of history and, by implication, not matters of present concern (Daly and Davis 2021: 1, fn 1).
survivors describe New Zealand’s process as ‘worse than the abuse itself’ because it was ‘disrespectful, drawn-out, and sometimes traumatising’ (The Royal Commission of Inquiry into Historical Abuse in State and Faith-Based Care 2020b: 25). Moreover, satisfaction with redress can be short-lived (Reimer et al. 2010: 47). Money is quickly spent, while memories of injury and its long-term consequences remain.

Contention over monetary redress encourages some people to think about replacing it with other remedial measures. I agree that monetary redress should operate as part of a holistic suite of remedial measures. But other remedies should not displace the survivors’ rights. Not only do survivors have a right to full compensation, they are ‘highly disadvantaged’ populations that are characterised by high rates of ill health, homelessness, unemployment, and illiteracy (Haase 2015: 7). To illustrate, a 2011 Australian study found that 40 per cent of ‘long-term homeless people’ in Melbourne were care leavers (Johnson et al. 2011: 9). In strained circumstances, redress can provide a lifeline of hope and survivors consistently emphasise the importance of money. A study in Northern Ireland found that compensation was the most frequently stated remedial demand, mentioned by 80 per cent of a study of forty-three survivors (Lundy 2020: 261). Similarly, a larger study of 564 Queensland survivors asked which forms of redress they had found helpful (respondents could select multiple answers): monetary redress was the most commonly mentioned remedy, cited by 59 per cent of respondents (Watson 2011: 38). By comparison, 44 per cent indicated that they found an apology helpful, while the next most popular form of assistance was face-to-face counselling (30 per cent). The results varied slightly by gender. A total of 66 per cent of male respondents specified money as helpful, compared to 56 per cent of female respondents. There was no variance between Indigenous and non-Indigenous respondents.

Money enables survivors to exercise agency (Dion Stout and Harp 2007: 27). And redress can provide life-changing amounts of money.

This study uses ‘Indigenous’ to refer to persons and peoples who are inheritors and practitioners of unique cultures and ‘have retained social, cultural, economic and political characteristics that are distinct from those of the dominant [settle] societies in which they live’ (United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs Indigenous Peoples, 2021). Some people object to the abstract concept of Indigenous, preferring to identify with a specific people or nation. But few sources provide data about redress at that more granular level. Using the more abstract concept also draws attention to the comparative and contrasting roles of Indigenous peoples and persons in different exemplar programmes.
However, the positive potential of these programmes is balanced by a range of legal and ethical questions. As previously mentioned, the psychological costs of participating in redress can be severe. In every programme with which I am familiar, survivors found the process of getting redress personally difficult. Redress programmes engage with deeply personal, even shameful, experiences. Jim Miller describes Canada’s redress process as ‘traumatic’ and quotes a participating survivor who said that the process made him relive it [the abuse] all over. I started crying. I couldn’t help it. It was like I was back there again and I had buried it. (Miller 2017: 180)

The challenges involved go beyond retraumatisation. For example, privacy demands complicate a programme’s work, affecting how it acquires information about survivors, how it stores that information, and how it disburses payments. Those (and other) large legal and ethical questions inform a range of more mundane policy design issues at the operative and logistical levels. As further illustrative examples, policymakers must decide who the relevant wrongdoers are and what the relevant wrongdoing is. Someone must decide if the programme’s remit should be set by what was illegal at the time of commission or whether to redress historically normal practices, such as corporal punishment. Should the programme focus on injurious acts that occurred when in care? Or should the scope include long-term damage that may (or may not) be linked to injurious care experiences? And who should deliver redress? Is it better to risk impartiality by using the well-resourced infrastructure of a permanent government ministry, or operate independently, at arm’s-length from the offending state? Should the programme be staffed by contract workers, by permanent civil servants, or by survivors themselves? Each of these questions, and others, is difficult to answer, and the decisions made will shape the participants’ redress experiences profoundly.

An Irish care advocate once related an anecdote to me underlining the magnitude of small details. Her story concerned the quality of refreshments provided at investigative hearings in Dublin. When a programme official offered her companion ‘a basic cup of tea that wasn’t decent’, she rejected the overture, insisting that she, and all other survivors, receive a

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5 Retraumatisation refers to the harmful results of recalling traumatic events and can include various psychological and physiological symptoms (Duckworth and Follette 2012: 3).
1.2 Major Themes and Argument

As a field of public policy, monetary redress for survivors of abuse in care is relatively novel, prominent, and politically sensitive. This section describes two overarching tensions that reappear in different ways in all redress programmes, and what I see as the best strategic response available – the need for flexible, survivor-focused programmes. These tensions and that strategic response shape the remainder of this book.

The first tension arises from an observation that constitutes my point of departure. I understand state redress programmes as a form of public policy. That perspective illuminates some key problems that these programmes confront. Monetary redress attempts to remedy intimate and grievous injustices, including childhood abuse and neglect, that affect who survivors are as persons. Yet redress policy works through impersonal bureaucracies. Filling out forms and getting redress in accord with regulations interpreted by public officials can be deeply unsatisfying. But the problem goes deeper, embracing the impersonal character of the responding state. In cases of non-recent injury, often the people who ran the institutions and committed the actual abuses are long past any accountability. They are either dead or so elderly and infirm that they cannot discharge their remedial obligations. The state’s vicarious responsibility is a distinctly inferior alternative. The state cannot experience guilt and remorse for past crimes; instead it is impersonated by non-offending officials. As an impersonal process, state redress struggles to satisfy survivors’ demands for accountability. The resulting tensions
between the demands of very personal injuries and impersonal public policy are significant and incurable.

A second theme, overlapping at points with the first, concerns tensions between the public and private. The study focusses on state redress because, as public policy, these programmes answer to distinct political demands. However, care institutions operated in interstitial spaces between the public and private. When taking on responsibilities for care (often becoming the survivor’s legal parent), states adopted a role usually associated with the private sphere. Moreover, the state’s involvement in care frequently responded to private concerns of personal morality, such as family separation, alcoholism, and poverty. A comprehensive remedy requires that the survivor’s life history, including their injuries, becomes publicly knowable and subject to public criteria, creating an objective representation of private suffering. Moreover, public values constrain the state’s response to private suffering, yet the values of good public policy, such as efficiency and transparency, often conflict with private remedial demands. To make an obvious point, money spent on state redress programmes must be spent in a way that satisfies the legal requirements for public expenditures, and those public regulations can hamper efforts to meet the private needs and wants of survivors. Redress unfolds within the existing institutional forms of the state. These institutions make redress possible while constraining what it can be. The resulting tensions spill over into another. The survivors’ injuries often flow from invidious forms of collective politics and public policy, yet there is a persistent tendency for redress programmes to convert the collective politics of systemically injurious care into a series of individual private transactions (James 2021: 376).

I argue that the best response to these challenges begins by recognising that trade-offs pervade every redress programme. The fact that redress always involves multiple trade-offs between important values means that the concept of a completely successful redress programme is analytically unhelpful. The non-ideal context of actual public policy involves institutional constraints and systemic wrongdoing, resource scarcities (examples include money and time), and the need to co-ordinate the uncertain judgements and reactions of other agents. These factors mean that every programme will fall short when measured against one or another reasonable value. I think that the best approach to the inevitability of trade-offs is to develop flexible redress programmes that respond to what survivors are able and want to do. Flexibility means different things for different parts of a programme. But, as a general rule,
survivors should be able to select the path (or paths) through redress that work best for them. Being responsive to the needs and wants of different survivors is what survivor-focused redress requires.

1.3 THE SCOPE OF THE BOOK

The diverse applications of monetary remedies for injury range across cultures and times, and from the constitutional demands of transitional justice to quotidian responses to everyday setbacks. This book addresses large and recent programmes of monetary payments made to discharge remedial obligations that states owe to individuals as a response to injuries that these individuals experienced while in care as young people. I will sketch the contours of the study by examining the component parts of that statement.

Redress means to repair, to rectify, or to correct. The term can be used quite generically – one might redress a fault in an engine or a problem with grammar. However, because they remedy injuries, the redress programmes that I consider engage moral demands. ‘Injury’ combines a sense of violation with that of a valid claim – to be injured is to be treated in a way otherwise than one has a right to expect. Examples of injurious acts include sexual, physical, and emotional abuse. Injuring someone in any of these ways creates a (presumptive) redress claim. Injurious acts can lead to consequential harms. I use ‘harm’ to refer to damage resultant from an injury. Some harms, such as psychological disorders, can emerge long after the original injury. When the discussion demands reference to both injurious acts and harms, I use more capacious terms such as ‘injurious experience’. Chapter 2 further attends to these conceptual matters.

Redress aims to rectify an injurious experience by discharging all, or part, of a remedial obligation owed by an offender to the survivor. A remedial purpose distinguishes redress programme from other public policies that respond to need or interest. Since offenders can offer various types of potential remedies, ‘redress’ can refer to a range of remedial measures. Monetary payments are one element within a transnational rectificatory policy genre that includes public inquiries and criminal trials; political apologies and memorials; medical care and psychological counselling; and access to personal records and help with family

6 The Latin origins of the word make this clear. Jus means a claim or right. In-jus is a violated claim.
reconnections. Monetary redress is part of a more complex policy realm. Later, I will argue that monetary redress programmes are best when part of a holistic suite of complementary initiatives. But the work of monetary redress is sufficient to occupy this study. While one cannot lose sight of the larger remedial picture, a narrower focus on monetary redress permits greater analytic depth.

Understanding state redress as a form of public policy highlights the distinct character of states as moral agents. States do things that individuals cannot, such as make laws. Equally, there are things that individuals do that states cannot—I previously mentioned the state’s lack of remorse. Moreover, a focus on redress as public policy directs attention to programmes implemented by the executive branch. Executive delivery is a distinguishing characteristic because these programmes displace the arm of government normally responsible for determining compensation—the judiciary. As Chapter 3 describes, monetary redress programmes develop out of the tort law’s failure to address non-recent abuse claims appropriately. That means redress programmes aim to satisfy legal demands through quasi-legal means.

Monetary redress programmes are a type of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The ADR genus encompasses a variety of proceedings (for an overview see Macleod and Hodges 2017). Redress programmes can be distinguished from their ADR counterparts because in a redress programme the state accepts the liability to pay certain types of claims prior to engaging with applicants. This is an important point. In most judicial and ADR proceedings, liability is the primary matter to be settled, by contrast, redress programmes ‘do not make findings of liability’ (Daly and Davis 2021: 443). Instead, redress involves the state accepting liability for claims that meet a set of prescribed conditions and then inviting applicants to demonstrate that they meet those conditions. This structure, in which responsibility is accepted at the outset of the programme, differs in an obvious and salient manner from proceedings in which a defendant’s liability (if any) is an outcome of the process, not a precondition of it. The discharge of state liability also distinguishes redress programmes from victims-of-crime compensation programmes wherein the state provides a form of public insurance to alleviate injuries for which it does not accept responsibility. Moreover, a focus on state responsibility limits the ambit of the study by excluding wholly non-state programmes. However, the study includes programmes wherein states work with NGOs to deliver redress.