

After Authoritarianism

Transitional justice – the act of reckoning with a former authoritarian regime after it has ceased to exist – has direct implications for democratic processes. Mechanisms of transitional justice have the power to influence who decides to go into politics, can shape politicians' behavior while in office, and can affect how politicians delegate policy decisions. However, these mechanisms are not all alike: some, known as transparency mechanisms, uncover authoritarian collaborators who did their work in secret while others, known as purges, fire open collaborators of the old regime. *After Authoritarianism* explores these mechanisms in depth and shows their contrasting effects on the quality and stability of new democracies. While transparency mechanisms, such as truth commissions and lustrations, enhance democratic processes, mechanisms firing open collaborators such as purges frequently hurt new democracies. Using a highly disaggregated global transitional justice dataset, the book shows that mechanisms of transitional justice are far from being the epilogue of an outgoing authoritarian regime, and instead represent the crucial first chapter in a country's democratic story.

MONIKA NALEPA is the Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Her first book, *Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe*, received the Best Book Award from the Comparative Democratization section of APSA and the Leon Epstein Outstanding Book Award from the Political Organizations and Parties section of APSA. With a focus on postcommunist Europe, her research interests include transitional justice, parties, and legislatures, and the political economy of regime change.

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After Authoritarianism

Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability

MONIKA NALEPA
The University of Chicago



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE
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University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314-321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India
103 Penang Road, #05-06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781316513439

DOI: 10.1017/9781009072540

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First published 2022

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Nalepa, Monika, 1976– author.

Title: After authoritarianism : transitional justice and democratic stability /
Monika Nalepa.

Description: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2022. |

Series: Peid political economy of institutions and decisions |

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2022019317 (print) | LCCN 2022019318 (ebook) |

ISBN 9781316513439 (hardback) | ISBN 9781009073714 (paperback) |

ISBN 9781009072540 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Authoritarianism. | Transitional justice. | Democratization. |

Political purges. | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE / General

Classification: LCC JC480 .N36 2022 (print) | LCC JC480 (ebook) |

DDC 320.53–dc23/eng/20220701

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2022019317>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2022019318>

ISBN 978-1-316-51343-9 Hardback

ISBN 978-1-009-07371-4 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Pamięci Mojej Babci, Józefy Nalepy

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Acknowledgments

Writing a book as an associate professor means incurring debts to everyone – from your students to your advisors, from your parents to your pets.

I will start with thanking students who worked with me in the Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability Lab over the years, but especially Milena Ang, Genevieve Bates, and Ipek Cinar. Without their constant input, diligent work, and at times unrelenting criticism, the vision that I had in graduate school of collecting data on all transitional justice events in the world would never have materialized.

These three founding members of the lab trained more graduate and undergraduate students, showing them the same attention and respect showing them the same attention and respect whether they worked with us for a month or a year. It is thanks to the community that the Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability Lab has become that this project continued uninterrupted through the pandemic months. Special thanks are due also to Hope Dancy and Zikai Li, who joined the lab while it was entirely virtual and not only stuck with it but took on leadership roles.

Among the undergraduate students, I am especially grateful to Viivi Jarvi, Karen “Ken” Krmoyan, Moksha Sharma, and Jordi Vasquez.

Alas, even at the University of Chicago, researchers cannot sustain themselves on ideas alone. None of these hardworking individuals would have been supported for their efforts were it not for the generous sponsors from within the University of Chicago and beyond. Among the latter, my sincerest gratitude goes to Brian Humes, the National Science Foundation Program Director for Political Science, who steered the project toward funding in 2017 and answered countless questions along the way. I am also grateful to Tim Nokken for helping me revise and spend my budget.

At the University of Chicago, I am grateful first and foremost to the Center of International Social Science Research (CISSR), and especially its director, Jenny Trinitapoli. CISSR under Trinitapoli was about so much more than funding research: She created a community of scholars united in their pursuit of truth in social science and offered friendship and support for this project, including babysitting a second-grader in the final stretch of manuscript preparation. The Pearson Institute and the College Curriculum Innovation Fund – both at the University of Chicago – also funded the students working in the lab over multiple years. Equally critical for the project’s success was the support of my two writing buddies – Anne Meng and Jennifer Gandhi.

Beyond these two, I am grateful to Scott Gehlbach, Scott Gates, John Huber, and Krzysztof Krakowski for reading the manuscript in its entirety at an early stage for a book manuscript workshop in June 2019. I also appreciate greatly feedback on early chapter drafts from participants in the Center for the Study of Democracy, the Committee for Quantitative Methodology Colloquium, and the Political Economy Lunch Group at the University of Chicago, the Political Science Colloquium at Washington University in St. Louis, the Comparative Politics Workshop at Vanderbilt University, and the Asian Online Political Science Seminar Series. I am especially grateful for comments to Jeff Statton, Pablo Montagnes, Noam Lupu, John Brehm, Anthony Fowler, Susan Stokes, Aziz Huq, and Tim Ginsburg.

At some level, I feel as if I started writing this book twenty years ago as a student and research assistant of Jon Elster. Jon’s role was critical in two regards. The first was theoretical by questioning how any transitional justice mechanism could possibly do new democracies any good. Having arrived from a country suddenly intoxicated with the desire to settle scores with its past, this seemed a very provoking thought. Jon’s second input was empirical. While working on his *Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective*, Jon asked me to collect data on transitional justice in several East European countries. When I asked him how he would like the data organized, he replied “frankly, I was hoping you would propose something, Monika.” And so the adventure began – thinking of what is the best way to summarize transitional justice procedures in a way that is practical for a comparativist. Years later, that strategy of tracking down transitional justice became the Global Transitional Justice Dataset.

Sara Doskow at Cambridge University Press made the publishing process as smooth as it could possibly be and found thoughtful and construc-

Acknowledgments

xxi

tive reviewers. I am grateful for their insights that made the manuscript considerably stronger.

I could not have written this book at a better place than the University of Chicago, among what I believe is the strongest group of political economists in the world. I am particularly grateful to Maggie Penn, Konstantin Sonin, Robert Gulotty, John Patty, Austin Wright, and Justin Grimmer, some of whom no longer work here but with whom I was lucky to interact while at the University of Chicago.

As intellectually stimulating as the University of Chicago is, its intensity can be crushing to the soul without the respite of family life. In marrying Suyash Agrawal ten years ago, I won the relationship lottery. There is nobody else I would rather come home to. He is always the first and last to hear my ideas. The harshest critic is of course my daughter, Maja, but she also gives the warmest hugs. Finally although she will never let me sleep past 5:30 am, I would be one grumpy professor without the goofiness of Geneva. If only every author had such a tight pack.