“In this brilliant, erudite, and broad-ranging work, Lankina provides a novel ‘genealogical’ perspective on Russian politics, demonstrating how the Russian Empire’s urban middle class continues to influence patterns of political and economic development. In so doing, she questions established understandings of the communist experience and reveals the critical role played by families in the reproduction of forms of social stratification over the long run.”

Mark R. Beissinger, Henry W. Putnam Professor of Politics, Princeton University

“This fascinating book challenges our view of the Soviet period as a rupture in Russia’s historical development. The author shows that social hierarchies from the late imperial period thrived under communism and also continue to influence human capital, values, and democratic processes in Russia today. In addition to rigorous statistical evidence, she weaves in anecdotes and interviews that make her arguments more vivid and compelling. Anyone interested in historical legacies, social inequality, and democratic development needs to read this meticulously executed book.”

Volha Charnysh, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

“The Estate Origins of Democracy in Russia is an exemplar of the new historical political economy. No dilettante, Tomila Lankina does the work of both historian and social scientist in this magisterial work. This is a model for interdisciplinary scholarship.”

Scott Gehlbach, Professor, Department of Political Science and Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago

“Tomila Lankina conducts a unique in-depth study of roots and mechanisms of societal resilience and reproduction in Russia for over a century of major transformations. She masterfully combines the use of statistical datasets, extended case studies, macro-sociological interpretations, and micro-historical narratives and offers a novel interdisciplinary framework for a comparative analysis of long-run societal dynamics and its political implications. This book successfully brings society back into our understanding of political developments in Russia and beyond.”

Vladimir Gel’man, Professor, European University at St. Petersburg, and University of Helsinki

“Tomila Lankina has written a deeply original and meticulously researched study of historical sociology with profound implications for how we understand politics in today’s Russia. The Estate Origins of Democracy in Russia challenges the widespread scholarly consensus that communism fundamentally altered Russia’s social structure. Instead, Lankina demonstrates important continuities – most significantly, the persistence of the Russian pre-revolutionary middle class through decades of communist rule, and its reemergence in its aftermath.”

Jeffrey Kopstein, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine
“A richly textured study of historical continuities in the face of revolutionary change. Lankina’s meticulous account of the pre-communist origins of Russia’s post-communist society sheds new light on the logics of persistence and resilience in Russian social structure that shape political possibilities in the present day. *Estate Origins* is a rewarding read for anyone interested in the social requisites of democracy.”

**Bryn Rosenfeld, Assistant Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University**

“Elegantly crafted, beautifully written, richly illustrated, and rigorously evidenced, this book provides an axial twist to Soviet and Russian history and an exemplary, landmark study of the resilience and reproduction of social structures, social identities, and social distinctions, and their significance for politics. Lankina’s masterpiece is Tolstoyan in its epic breadth of coverage, evocative powers, and intimate unpacking of the lives and times of Russia’s *meshchanstvo*.”

**John Sidel, Sir Patrick Gillam Chair in International and Comparative Politics, London School of Economics and Political Science**
The Estate Origins of Democracy in Russia

A devastating challenge to the idea of communism as a “great leveler,” this highly original, rigorous, and ambitious book debunks Marxism-inspired accounts of its equalitarian consequences. It is the first study systematically to link the genesis of the “bourgeoisie-cum-middle class” – imperial, Soviet, and post-communist – to the tsarist estate institutions that distinguished between the nobility, clergy, urban merchants and messchane, and peasantry. It demonstrates how the pre-communist bourgeoisie, particularly the merchant and urban commercial strata but also the aristocracy and clergy, with their high human capital, survived and adapted in Soviet Russia. Under both tsarism and communism, the estate system engendered an educated, autonomous bourgeoisie and professional class, along with an oppositional public sphere and persistent social cleavages that continue to plague democratic consensus. This book also shows how the middle class, conventionally bracketed under one generic umbrella, is often two-pronged in nature – one originating among the educated estates of feudal orders and the other fabricated as part of state-induced modernization.

Tomila V. Lankina is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She has previously authored two books and has published widely in leading disciplinary journals on democracy, authoritarianism, mass protests, and historical patterns of human capital and democracy in Russia and other states.
The Estate Origins of Democracy in Russia

From Imperial Bourgeoisie to Post-Communist Middle Class

TOMILA V. LANKINA

London School of Economics and Political Science
To my father, Vladimir Ivanovich Lankin
And to the memory of Yuna Petrovna
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Preface

The Soviet system represented the best concealed, longest, and most sustained form of institutional, social, and economic plagiarism in modern history.\(^1\) It collapsed not merely because of the inherent failings of state-directed economic production; the Orwellian fossilization of the bloated party elite detached from society; or mass popular dissatisfaction. It met its dramatic end in 1991 when it was forced to shed the facade that concealed the organic, self-reproducing, and resilient society of pre-Bolshevik Russia. The best that could be taken from this society had been shamelessly appropriated. Thus, entire industries, knowledge-producing infrastructures, professional organizations, and other tangible resources – the “hardware” – along with professionals, from engineers, to schoolteachers, to scientists in universities and research centers, to cultural figures, and farmers – the “software” – became Soviet in name. Once so formally appropriated into the hydra of Soviet institutions, social groups discreetly continued to nurse their dense networks and latent structures of survivalist knowledge – the “good” and the “bad” ones. These structures facilitated the production of human capital as well as societal backwardness; social mobility and advancement as well as the conservation of pre-communist social stratification and inequalities; and institutions and ties driving societal activism as well as those that crowd out oppositional, activist engagement.

The angle on social persistence presented here differs from most historically informed accounts of Russia’s politics. A synthesis of these accounts would read something like this. The Revolution of 1917 represented a profound rupture with the ancien régime. The Bolsheviks ruthlessly obliterated key features of the past socioeconomic order – from the system of estates to agrarian institutions and illiteracy. Relying on brutal coercion, Soviet leaders secured rapid industrialization. To this end, they built entire cities from scratch, often in

\(^1\) A metaphor I deploy to capture Bolshevik claims to constructing a new society rather than building upon old regime foundations.
inhospitable lands. Entire populations were moved at random. The Gulag only exacerbates the dislocation and displacement, uprooting the society of the past. Many of those who managed to survive and thrive in the relatively permissive years of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s were exterminated in the purges of the 1930s. Gradually, the Soviets succeeded at building a new society, one in which the party represented the embodiment of the new elite; in which a new Soviet intelligentsia emerged due to the revolutionaries’ educational policies; and in which agrarian populations and factory workers, while exploited in collective farms and on the shop floor, enjoyed hitherto unprecedented levels of social mobility. Even now, thirty years after communism’s collapse, Russia’s political development continues to be strongly influenced by communist legacies. These make their presence felt in anything from voting patterns in the new single-industry “mono-towns,” to public expressions of traumas associated with the Gulag, and the political and economic behavior of the former communist nomenklatura, KGB operatives, and party elite. Recent historical works on the Gulag have continued to cognitively program the reader with the assumption of cataclysmic destruction wrought by the communist project and not of the latent continuity between the pre-communist past and the post-communist present.

As a child growing up in the Soviet Union, I spent many summers with my grandmother and aunt, who lived in the Black Sea paradise of the Crimea. I have always felt that my grandmother had been somehow different. One observation was that I never saw her indulging in the semechki with other women on the bench outside her modest Soviet flat. Those of us who grew up in Russia – and perhaps many a westerner gone native – would know the semechki as the simple – and messy – snack of roasted, unprocessed, savory, sunflower seeds. Evading the semechki and bench-time gossip, my grandmother spent much of her leisure time playing the piano – Chopin’s waltzes and Shatrov’s melancholy On the Hills of Manchuria (Na sopkakh Man’chzhurii) were her favorites – and obsessively pursuing her hobby of assembling newspaper clippings about interesting discoveries, facts, and events in the realms of politics, society, and art. These, she kept saying, will be passed on to us, the next generation. Was it a pure lottery of nature that my grandmother ended up being different from many other babushkas on the bench outside her house? Or was there something peculiar about her background that nurtured certain behaviors, professional choices, and retirement preoccupations? Aside from the subtleties of how she comported herself, nothing would mark her out as anything but a quintessential Soviet citizen, a member of the Soviet intelligentsia. Born in 1913, she grew up in the Soviet Union, pursued humanities training in a Soviet higher educational institution, worked as a teacher, married, had children, suffered the mysterious disappearance of her husband in the 1930s, and lived modestly until she died in the 1980s in a Soviet flat. Some of the other relatives were more like the babushkas on the bench; others, like my mother, had an air of difference. I too occasionally treat myself to the semechki.
In pursuing research for this book, I have come to recognize just how typical my family is—not in the sense of its sovietness but in the sense of the threads that connected the distant, pre-Soviet past with the life paths of future generations. Like with my family, for many Soviet citizens an invisible hand of history continued to nudge one’s social standing, education, tastes, and lifestyle choices; and this hand was not one of the many tentacles of the hydra of the communist state. Public policy may have pronounced the dawn of a new society, but past social stratification continued to be discreetly reproduced in the private sphere, in turn conditioning one’s eventual position in that of the public. The eclectic familial constellations of class and status were as much products of social change induced by Bolshevik upheaval as they represented longer-term spatially uneven patterns of imperial sociocultural demography, expansion, frontier settlement, and, crucially, state attempts to control, reward, classify, incorporate, conscript, and tax the imperial subject and citizen via the institution of the estate. Contingencies of birth, marriage, and one’s profession shaped these processes as did the long-term structural underpinnings of society. Much of the information about these past structures and possibilities has, of course, remained buried in one’s consciousness—and ever deeper as the communist decades went by. The bold revelations about the past, the memoirs, and historians’ archival research have, for many Russians, brought these unconscious and invisible threads into the realm of consciousness. The observation about the semechki ceases to be just that—a mere observation; instead, it has become part of the articulated family narrative of cultivated upbringing in early twentieth-century imperial Russia; of marriage alliances with those of noble ancestry; and of the stigma of illegitimate births.

This book situates the apparently random and contingent individual stories of the stratum that came to be referred to as the new Soviet intelligentsia, and in post-Soviet Russia as the middle class, within the social-structural context of the Russian Empire. Contrary to widespread myths, communist Russia never abolished—but, in many ways, reinforced—the deep, caste-like inequalities in society. I argue that the system of estates that institutionalized social divisions into the categories of nobility, clergy, merchant, meshchane, and peasantry, among other distinctions, was intrinsic not only to the gelling of the modern social stratification but to the deep social cleavages that remained concealed behind superficial nods to egalitarianism. To understand why this is the case, I invite the reader to consider the repercussions of the Great Reforms of the 1860s (notably serf emancipation) and the Bolshevik takeover of 1917. Fundamentally different in nature, context, purpose, and intent, these watershed events facilitated the conversion of the stratification of an estates-based society into one that cleaved the superbly educated professional, entrepreneurial, and enlightened proto-bourgeoisie—or, in modern parlance, the middle class—from the large mass of illiterate and poorly educated citizens and, in the case of manorial peasants, subjects. In both cases, the decimation of material wealth—in the form of the abolition of serfdom in the 1860s and the
expropriation of land and possessions post-1917–would only push the materially well-off even further to embrace and colonize the modern world of education and the professions. In both the 1860s and 1917, the various social groups were not confronting the new era from an equal starting point—the institution of the estate advantaged some over others as Russia embraced modernity; and it continues to shape how Russians position themselves vis-à-vis the state and navigate possibilities for autonomous social action today.

The long journey that brought me to the topic of social persistence comes from my interest in and more than twenty years of research into the drivers of subnational developmental and democratic variations in Russia and beyond. Already in the early 1990s, it became evident to political geographers and political scientists that territories that had been subjected to broadly similar policies of Soviet state-driven developmentalism exhibited pronounced differences in voting patterns, civic activism, and protest; these have endured as the post-communist decades went by. They also feature stark socioeconomic differences and contrasts. Conventionally analyzed with reference to urbanization or per capita income differentials, these variations have serious real-life repercussions for the daily lives of ordinary people. Some localities boast modern health clinics, a superb educational system, and nationally prominent universities and centers of research excellence that provide opportunities for jobs and careers; in others, such possibilities are few and far between, and the youth have few options beyond the local community college followed by factory or farm work. Russia thus has its own equivalent of America’s Appalachia or Italy’s South—territories apparently left behind in a perpetual cycle of underdevelopment. The political landscapes that characterize the territorial “haves” and “have-nots” also vary—some habitually endorse the “party of power,” whatever that may be, while others are islands of democratic resilience.

I locate these contemporary patterns in the social-structural legacies of the imperial caste-like institution of the estate. In some modernizing enclaves, the aristocracy, the clergy, the muscular merchant class, the proto-bourgeois urban estate of the meshchane, and segments of the peasantry that had enjoyed greater freedoms even before emancipation reforms capitalized on their comparative freedoms, social ties, and human capital to seize new opportunities in industry, education, and the professions. Because the Bolsheviks reinforced the positional advantage of the empire’s educated strata, mass literacy and social uplift campaigns failed to obliterate the deep social divisions that derived from the constellation of estates and concomitant variations in rights, responsibilities, and freedoms. If anything, the Soviet regime has succeeded in creating an inferior “second-class” middle class within the middle class—in the form of a peasant pursuing technical college education; the factory worker taking an evening university course; or a collective farmer finally allowed to escape to the city. The phenomenon of the “second-class middle class” has plagued political scientists’ attempts to make sense of politics today, for few scholars have
ventured to understand the fine-grained texture of Russian society and go beyond conventional survey research categories. Why do 65–75 percent of citizens endorse Putin in a developed country that enjoys high levels of overall education? Why is the protest movement or civic activism confined to a small minority of “sophisticated urbanites” even as public services crumble and corruption mounts?

My findings have implications for understanding the endurance of patterns of social stratification in modern society and democratic variations within and among nations. They question recent materialist accounts of inequality and policy suggestions for eliminating it. The material foundations of inequities in democracies and autocracies, developed or developing, are of course intricately connected to the intergenerational transfer of educational-professional endowments. The latter, however, are not simply and straightforwardly amenable to the “great leveler” effect as described by Walter Scheidel or the redistributive formulae of Thomas Piketty. Key elements of inequalities that my research exposes are the historical underpinnings of the social cleavage between the professionally incorporated worker—the “organization man and woman”—in a modern knowledge economy and the lower-skilled strata not so incorporated and increasingly “left out” and “left behind”—cleavages that, as we know, have posed grave threats to democracy and liberalism across the globe. Professionals, not classes in a Marxist sense; society, not capital—these are the categories that I work with in this book.

I am indebted to many colleagues, students, friends, and family who have helped to make this book happen. I received immensely valuable comments when I presented early versions of the research at the German Association for East European Studies (DGO) Economy and Society Group “Shaping Eastern European Societies and Economies: Culture, Religion and Historical Legacies” conference in Berlin in 2018 and at the graduate colloquium at the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich in 2018. As the manuscript acquired the contours of a rather imperfect book, I subjected it to the scrutiny of leading academic experts on post-communist and comparative politics. Sam Greene at King’s College London generously offered to host a book workshop in June 2019. Mark Berenson, Sam Greene, Henry Hale, Alexander Libman, Ed Morgan-Jones, Ola Onuch, Elizabeth Plantan, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Bryn Rosenfeld, and Katerina Tertychnaya served as lead discussants on each chapter, providing sharp, critical, and, at times, brutally searching comments. Archie Brown, Zeynep Bulutgil, Ian Burgoyne, Yelena Burlina, Volha Charnysh, Vladimir Gel’man, Anna Getmansky, Janet Hartley, Otto Kienitz, Jeff Kopstein, Boris Kozhin, Marcus Kreuzer, Anna Lankina, Rada Lankina, Álvaro Morcillo Laiz, David Pearce, John Sidel, Wolfgang Teckenberg, Guzel Yusupova, Vlad Zubok, and participants at the University of Berkeley’s European Politics Working Group read drafts of the entire monograph, or parts of it, or helped with queries on theory and empirics, providing useful insights or comments that pointed to inconsistencies, gaps, and errors in my
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I want to add a special word of thanks to the archivists Mary Linn Wernet and Sharon Wolff, whose efforts in guiding me through and obtaining the Constantine Neklutin collection of materials from the Cammie G. Henry Research Center at Northwestern State University of Louisiana have been invaluable. Constantine added a face, a reality, a human drama, to the merchant in imperial and Soviet Russia. Without the Neklutin collection, this would have been a very different book, and I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Mary and Sharon for their patience in digitizing the materials for me and for their incredible efficiency in communications and responses to my incessant email queries. I also wish to thank Irina Kolbintseva, a descendant from the large Neklutin clan, for alerting me to this amazing archive and for sharing moving stories about the family’s adaptation in Bolshevik Russia.

The book is a product of many years of research, transcending the narrower preoccupation with the reproduction of social structures across regime types. During those years, I benefited from generous funding from the British Academy, Stanford University, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, the World Resources Institute, De Montfort University, and St. Antony’s and Balliol Colleges at Oxford University. I have been blessed with membership on the Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia (PONARS) network and with the comments from peers on my work during its various stages. I could not be more grateful to the London School of Economics (LSE), my home institution. At LSE, the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD); the Centre for International Studies; the Department of International Relations; and the Paulsen fund supplied my project with a steady stream of generous funding over the last decade. A grant from the LSE International Inequalities Institute steered my research toward a deeper exploration of questions of social stratification and why it matters for democracy. I am very lucky to have worked and collaborated with outstanding scholars like Alexander Libman and Katerina Tertytchnaya, whose data contributions and cutting-edge analysis and insight into the political economy of Russia’s regions and society are found in our coauthored
work, which I cite throughout the book. I am fortunate to have among my LSE colleagues eminent historians of Tsarist and Soviet Russia. The manuscript benefited from conversations with my colleague and friend Vladislav (Vlad) Zubok; from the discussions I have had with Dominic (Chai) Lieven—not least his anecdotes about the escape of his family of Baltic German nobles from revolutionary Russia; and from the insights of the historian of imperial Russia Janet Hartley. Yulia Netesova, Daniel Fitter, and Kohei Watanabe provided superb research assistance. My PhD students Lana Bilalova and Marnie Howlett helped with data analysis. Giovanni Angioni was particularly indispensable as a critic and data analyst, also patiently helping me deal with glitches in formatting and data presentation. To all my students, I owe gratitude for learning from their projects. In Samara, I am grateful to Ul’yan Kulyanina and Zoya Kobozeva for their help with archival research and for their friendship and good company during my many weeks away from my family. Andrey Aref’yev was helpful with conducting interviews and archival work. Archie Brown, my doctoral supervisor, remains a good friend and discerning commentator on my work, as is his wife Pat. Yuna Petrovna, Natasha Lankina, and Vadim Lankin helped gather material that went into this book. My siblings and family scrutinized the book at its various stages and put up patiently with my disappearances into the home office—den, while my son Fyodor, a toddler when I began the project, over time started contributing ideas and suggestions too. Our nanny Lydia not only helped keep the noise down but became an amazing substitute Russian babushka who took charge of the house as I brought the book to completion. The inspiration for the book came from long conversations with my father Vladimir Lankin, who opened my eyes to the details of our family ancestry. These conversations made me realize that the imperial bourgeoisie, whether of the haute or kleiner Mensch variety, and its reincarnation as the white-collar strata in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, has remained a neglected subject in both historiography and political science. My sisters Rada and Anna and brother Yegor provided friendship and support, as did my parents-in-law Michael and Diana Burgoyne, whose English humor has been the finest armor against the idiosyncrasies of my Russian character and who have given me the best family I could have hoped for in my adoptive country. Tragically, Yuna Petrovna did not live to see this project completed, but her joyful and life-affirming spirit lives on in the wisdom of the matriarchs found in the pages of this book. Most importantly, having a family of my own opened my eyes to alternative ways of perceiving the long course of Russia’s politics. The love and support of my husband Ian, and the wonderful gift and inspiration of our son Fyodor, did as much for bringing this project to fruition as the many hours of research and writing.
Notes on Transliteration

The book uses the US Board of Geographic Names (BGN) and the Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for British Official Use (PCGN) system of Russian transliteration. Exceptions to this usage are when terms employed are conventionally transliterated otherwise (e.g., perestroika, not perestroyka) or names of specific authors publishing in English usually transliterated otherwise (e.g., Nikolai, not Nikolay Petrov). This system renders more accurate transliteration of words like svoi (one’s own in plural) as distinct from svoy (one’s own in singular). I depart from this system only in transliterating ё as yo as opposed to yё and by transliterating ъ the same ways as ь (’) rather than “. For the letter “е,” “ye” is used instead of “e” if “e” is at the beginning of a word, after vowels, and after “й,” “ъ” and “ь.” In citations of other work, the original transliteration is preserved. The transliteration rules are reproduced in the table here.

a – a  к – k  х – kh
б – b  л – l  ц – ts
в – v  м – m  ч – ch
г – g  н – n  ш – sh
д – d  о – o  щ – shch
e – e/ye  п – p  ъ – ‘
ё – yo  р – r  щ – y
ж – zh  с – s  ъ – ‘
з – z  т – t  э – e
и – i  у – u  ю – yu
й – y  ф – f  я – ya

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Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABNY</td>
<td>Amalgamated Bank of New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACWA</td>
<td>Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CheKa</td>
<td>Extraordinary Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>delo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPE</td>
<td>Department of Public Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>ed. khr.</td>
<td>edinitsa khraneniya</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENC</td>
<td>effective number of candidates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Esery</td>
<td>Party of Socialist Revolutionaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>fond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td>Alliance of Young Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFA</td>
<td>Golubkov Family Archive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GULAG</td>
<td>Chief Administration of Camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ispolkom</td>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadety</td>
<td>Party of Constitutional Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDIE</td>
<td>Kazan District Inspectorate of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFPA</td>
<td>Kobozeva Family Photographic Archive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komsomol</td>
<td>All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOMUCH</td>
<td>Committee of Members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRF</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWG</td>
<td>Khardina Women’s Gymnasium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. (ll.)</td>
<td>list, listy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVD</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narkompros</td>
<td>People’s Commissariat of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Neklutin Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>New Economic Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKVD</td>
<td>People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ob.</td>
<td>oborotnyy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obkom</td>
<td>Oblast Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dramatis Personae


Annetta Yakovlevna Bass, director of leading modern art museum, descendant of well-off merchant family; family engaged in tea trading; cosmopolitan, European education for children. Education: prestigious school, metropolitan university.

Professor Vera Gol'msten, director of Samara Museum; daughter of Russified Swedish doctor from St. Petersburg. Metropolitan intelligentsia working in Samara. Property: unknown. Education: prestigious lyceum in St Petersburg, university, higher academic accolades (doctorate).

The Grinbergs, famous medical dynasty; well-off merchants; active in the civic life of the Jewish community in Samara. Property: landmark mansion rented out to a leading Samara bank. Education: European, other.

The Kavetskiys, estate unknown, possibly Polish nobles, leading medical dynasty; active as medical elite and in the enlightenment sphere of Samara. Property: residence on Dvoryanskaya. Education: prestigious imperial gymnasium and medical schools.

The Kobozev-Kashin family, meshchane and peasants working and trading in Samara City. Family includes a proprietor of a hair salon, domestic maids, a store manager (prikaźchik), and traveling salesman for the Brothers Krestovnikov merchant enterprise. Property: stone and wooden two-story house; country house (dacha). Education: possibly accountancy courses.

Olen'ka Konovalova, Samara meshchane, grain traders and rentier. Daughter marries into the Volodkoviches family of Polish nobility in Samara. Property: two-story house with ground floor rented out to
Dramatis Personae

tenants; family ran prosperous grain business before loss of breadwinner. Education: gymnasium, musical conservatory.

The Neklutin family, merchants, owners of large flour mills in Samara. Prominent in urban governance as members of City Duma and elected gorodskoy golova. Property: mansions in Samara; one of the first owners of automobile. Education: gymnasium, technical school, university. Intermarried with leading merchant clans; Constantine Neklutin marries educated meshchanka.

The Sherstnev-Plotnikov family, merchants and meshchane. Active in city governance, ancestor member of City Duma and mayor (gorodskoy golova). Property: multiple mansions on Polevaya Street, Khlebnaya Square, and elsewhere. Education: unknown.

Valerian Dmitriyevich Tikhovidov, veterinarian, born into a family of school instructors in Samara. Marries Miss Kokh, of respectable family of Volga German settlers. Estate unknown, possibly clergy. Property: houses in Samara and Stavropol’-on-the-Volga. Education: seminary and higher.

Appearances

Dmitri Shostakovich, composer of cultivated Russian-Polish ancestry; son Maksim patient of Doctor Grinberg.

Aleksey Tolstoy, related to the writer Leo Tolstoy; famous writer of noble ancestry native to Samara; pupil in Samara real’noye uchilishche. Family property: mansion in elite quarter of Samara.

Others: teachers at art school, Jewish school, Khardina gymnasium; other gymnasium proprietors and teachers; Samara Museum employees; pupils on archaeological courses; professoriate of Samara University; engineers, enlighteners, moonlighters in shadow economy.