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Theorizing Post-Revolutionary Social Resilience

How does a society reproduce its latent structures of power, hierarchy, and status under the weight of the revolutionary, transformative, and, indeed, totalizing impulse of a visionary, utopian state? What underpins these “below the waterline” processes of resilience?¹ Moreover, how and why does it matter for political outcomes today, long after the demise of the successive orders that have sought in vain to trample over the innate logic of society? In his classic polemic on the historical method, Carlo Ginzburg eulogizes the power of the subtle trace, the clue, the hidden, and the concealed as key to the unmasking of the fundamental, the significant, and the essential.² Clues, he surmises, are seldom found in what is most visible, most public, and most conspicuous but rather are discreetly scattered where one is least prone to look for them. Yet the grand, the monumental, and the visible sphere of the totalizing revolutionary regime has constituted the overwhelming preoccupation of the scholar of communism. Public policy – the rules and regulations of the state, and not the institutions or the inner rationalities of society – has shaped the way we regard politics in communist and post-communist regimes.³ Scholars analyzing communist systems during the Cold War had, of course, no choice but to work with publicly available policy documents, statistics, and other official data concerning state building, institutionalization, and political socialization. These official records and accounts privileged the leviathan over the silent, societal, drivers of resilience.⁴

¹ “Power is like an iceberg; . . . most of it lies below the waterline,” Pierson, “Power,” 124.

² See the essay “Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm” in Ginzburg, *Clues*, 87–113.

³ A statist focus has dominated theorizing into development and state building in a variety of settings, prompting scholars to call for grounding analysis “in more macro- and/or more microscopic analyses of human context and behavior.” Boone, *Political Topographies*, 12. A related issue is the “decontextual revolution” in the social sciences. Pierson, *Politics in Time*, 167.

⁴ Such was the power of these narratives that leading Western sociologists identified the Communist Party as the Soviet Union’s most prescient “differentiator” based on membership or nonmembership. Tilly, *Durable Inequality*, 12. Western observers who interacted with the

The preoccupation with state institutions and the political elite – party apparatchiks, the nomenklatura, and other state functionaries,⁵ the political sphere – endowed these actors with an exaggerated aura of agency and importance. Ideological narratives about the inauguration of a new society became internalized in academic discourse on the communist project.⁶ These assumptions have continued to cast a shadow over analytical inquiry into post-communist countries. Societies with a legacy of Leninism have been regarded as receptacles, whether enthusiastic or passive, naïve or skeptical, of socialization in schools, the Komsomol, or other official societies and clubs;⁷ and the elites, in relation to where they had been positioned in the various agencies of the state or party apparatus.⁸ So deeply ingrained has been the revolutionary state-building paradigm as a starting point for analyzing the contemporary polity, economy, and society that efforts to transcend it have been few and far between, remaining scattered on the margins of the mainstream debates on post-communist transformations.⁹ Even as new paradigms emerged to analyze Leninist legacies and their present-day imprint on society, and as hitherto hidden data became available, the discreet adaptations of the many to the social order of the futuristic regime – indeed, the role that these many have played in foisting their own institutions, practices, and values onto the state – have often remained concealed behind the shocking and the traumatic, behind the stories of the terror, dislocations, and deportations.¹⁰ Mundane, parochial, and quotidian, these adaptations have frequently escaped the lens of the present-day historian, the sociologist, and the political scientist, driven as he or she is by the indignity to expose the state's totalism, the terror, and the inflicted trauma inscribed on the biography of the distinguished scholar, the grand aristocrat, or the metropolitan patrician *intelligent*.¹¹

Soviet intelligentsia were exposed to heterodox views and were aware of social continuities. The problem was how to use this information, since it could be dismissed as “unrepresentative” or “anecdotal”; one had also to be careful about exposing the identity of the interlocutor. I am grateful to Archie Brown for suggesting this qualification, pers. comm., November 30, 2020.

⁵ Prominent examples are Djilas, *New Class*; Rigby, *Political Elites*; Voslensky, *Nomenklatura*; Hough and Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed*.

⁶ For instance, E. H. Carr came to write about the Soviet project in the vein of “a great achievement” despite early reservations in the context of Stalinist repressions. Davies, “Carr’s Changing Views,” 102.

⁷ See studies ascribing agency to Soviet citizens but focusing on everyday Soviet realities rather than broader societal influences transcending communism. Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever*.

⁸ E.g., Hanley et al., “Russia-Old Wine in a New Bottle?”; Kryshatanovskaya and White, “From Soviet Nomenklatura”; Gelman et al., *Making and Breaking*; Libman and Obydenkova, “CPSU Legacies.”

⁹ See Tchuikina, *Dvoryanskaya pamyat'*; and Lankina et al., “Appropriation and Subversion.”

¹⁰ Consider the titles of the following influential books: Conquest, *Great Terror*; Applebaum, *Gulag*; Snyder, *Bloodlands*.

¹¹ See, for instance, Smith, *Former People*; Zubok, *Idea of Russia*.

Yet the possibilities of society's hidden logics of persistence and resilience have become increasingly hard to overlook as new data, archival revelations, and the advanced statistical toolkit of the social scientist have pushed against the artificial straitjacket of the revolutionary paradigm.¹² The new scholarship has raised awareness of the agency of the Gulag inmate, the professional, and the housewife to defy, obstruct, and sabotage the state's policy imperatives and the Moloch of its repressive apparatus.¹³ Moreover, we now know¹⁴ that somehow the past, pre-communist, patterns of development,¹⁵ of industry,¹⁶ and of *industriousness*,¹⁷ and of civic values and voting,¹⁸ transcended the ostensibly totalizing grip of the communist state.¹⁹

These new accounts – based on long-concealed “top secret” archival materials and the possibilities accorded to scholars by the advances in data accumulation and methods of social scientific analysis – beg for a new, overarching, revisionist take on the political implications of the legacies of social resilience in countries undergoing profound state-led attempts to overturn the social structure of the past. My book dissects but one, albeit highly consequential, facet of these legacies: the reproduction of social stratification behind the thin veneer of egalitarianism, with concomitant implications for the legacy of a group variously bracketed as the bourgeoisie or middle class – and prominently featuring in theorizing on democratic origins and resilience.²⁰ Dissecting how and with what consequences the relatively privileged, propertied, educated, and aspirational groups – the bourgeoisie-cum-middle class of the old regime – manage to reproduce their

¹² Both concepts capture adaptation: persistence alludes to the reproduction of the social structure despite the Revolution, and resilience to the modifying tactics, strategies, and behaviors that may include an element of change but are motivated by socially conservative impulses. I am grateful to Marcus Kreuzer for suggesting this clarification, pers. comm., November 15, 2020.

¹³ Examples are Alexopoulos, *Stalin's Outcasts*; Fitzpatrick, “Two Faces”; Shearer, “Soviet Gulag”; Hardy, *Gulag after Stalin*.

¹⁴ Gaddis's book title nicely captures the revisionism that emerged after the archives were opened to scholars with the end of communism in Europe. Gaddis, *We Now Know*. On the historical turn in the social sciences, see Capoccia and Ziblatt, “Historical Turn”; Wawro and Katznelson, “Designing”; Lankina et al., “Appropriation and Subversion”; Simpser et al., “Dead but Not Gone”; Kotkin and Beissinger, “Historical Legacies.”

¹⁵ Lankina et al., “Appropriation and Subversion”; Acemoglu et al., “Social Structure.”

¹⁶ Tomila Lankina and Alexander Libman, “The Jekyll and Hyde of Soviet Policies: Endogenous Modernization, the Gulag and Post-Communist Support for Democracy.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting and Exhibition of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 31 to September 3, 2017 (unpublished).

¹⁷ This term encapsulates the social-cultural underpinnings of the Industrial Revolution. de Vries, *Industrious Revolution*.

¹⁸ I refer to interwar democratic statehood in communist states. For a discussion, see Pop-Eleches, “Historical Legacies.”

¹⁹ As late as 1959, leading Sovietologists continued to describe the Soviet Union as a “totalitarian dictatorship.” See Inkeles and Bauer, *Soviet Citizen*, 124.

²⁰ The “bourgeoisie” label does not exclude the wealthiest groups or those occupying leading positions in the professions or industry. See Rosenfeld, *Autocratic Middle Class*, 61.

positional, intergenerational advantage vis-à-vis the less privileged working masses – indeed, their “bourgeois” values even under a most brutal leveling regime – speaks to debates and issues far beyond the communist experience in Europe, since it goes to the root of ongoing polemics concerning the drivers and democratic implications of inequalities in the globalized knowledge economies of the present.²¹ In the sections that follow, I provide a summary of the argument about the origins and resilience of social configurations in imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet Russia; discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the analytical framework; outline a research design; and explain how this account differs from earlier studies on the implications of the communist experience for post-communist social structures and democratic trajectories.

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This book explains post-communist Russia’s social stratification and relatedly its democratic fortunes with reference to the social structure predating communism. I locate the genesis of the bourgeoisie-cum-middle class, conventionally regarded as broadly supportive of democratic institutions, in the estate system of imperial Russia, which distinguished between the nobility, the clergy, the urban estates of merchants and the *meshchane*,²² and the peasantry. The estate – its juridical, material, and symbolic aspects – simultaneously facilitated the gelling of a highly educated, institutionally incorporated autonomous bourgeoisie and professional stratum and engendered social and interregional inequalities that persisted through the communist period and will plague subsequent democratic consolidation. Employing post-communist electoral and public opinion data, and analyzing them in conjunction with historical census records, I demonstrate that the pre-communist social structure has shaped Russia’s stark subnational developmental and democratic disparities as well as the overall national outcomes in democratic quality.

The statistical toolkit enables me to establish that the population share of one estate in particular – the urban *meshchane* – strongly covaries with a range of communist and post-communist period developmental outcomes, in education, in the extent of the saturation of the regional workforce with prestigious “bourgeois” professions, and in entrepreneurship – configurations considered

²¹ On materialist angles, see Piketty, *Capital*. Others contend, “the interests of a class most directly refer to standing and rank, to status and security, that is, they are primarily not economic but social.” Polanyi, *Great Transformation*, 160.

²² The term originates in the Polish *miasto*, city, and *mieszczane* from city residents, also found in other Slavic languages – *myastechko* as city, settlement in Belorussian, and *misto* as city, town, in Ukrainian – usually referring to smaller settlements. Hence, the derogatory Russian word *mestechkovyy* – one exhibiting limited and parochial interests, a symbol of “provincialism” and “narrow-mindedness.” The notion of *mestechkovost’* became inscribed in portrayals of *meshchanstvo*. Kobozeva, “Gorod i meshchane,” 49–50.

conducive to the building and institutionalization of a democratic political system. The nebulous, fluid, and highly mobile nature of this estate makes the sole reliance on imperial census data conceptually problematic,²³ as would attempts to rigidly delineate the fluid and fuzzy permutations of imperial-cum-Soviet-cum-post-Soviet bourgeoisie turned *Soviet* intelligentsia turned post-Soviet middle class. The challenge is compounded if we take on the task of going beyond an analysis of the *reproduction* of a broad status category and explore heterogeneity in Soviet-era *mobility* among and within the various segments constituting it.²⁴

The *meshchanin* or *meshchanka* of the 1897 census – the sole available comprehensive record that we have covering the empire’s entire territory – often moved between merchant and *meshchane* estate status; their material stature would often be on a par with the clergyman or noble of modest means. Equally, a *meshchanin* may have been a peasant previously but one who abandoned the rural dwelling and pursuits of the past, acquiring solid footing as an urban artisan, a clerk, or a teacher and marrying into the strata of a higher social estate and rank.²⁵ Religion and ethnicity would not be irrelevant for understanding the makeup of, and social heterogeneity within, this estate, as it absorbed many urban middling residents of “foreign” status and the upwardly mobile communities of Germans and Jews. Uniting these “mixed-title” men and women (*raznochintsy*) would, increasingly, be their education and occupational standing;²⁶ and the *meshchane* not only faithfully capture the splendid adaptation of the mysterious middling estate but also hint at the trajectories of the more privileged strata discreetly reinventing themselves as Soviet Russia’s *new* intelligentsia. For the many reincarnating merchants and *meshchane* in Russia’s provincial town, there would be the surviving aristocrat or two making a life as a university professor, a librarian, or an illustrator,²⁷ leaving a profound imprint on the cultural fabric of society. As Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson once observed, the preoccupation of the statistical method with high numbers often obscures the prestige, the gravitas, and the influence of a few influentials, out of proportion to their numerical weight in a community.²⁸

This book situates imperial Russia’s fluid estate structure – a *premodern* relic – within the autonomous professional, educational, and civic institutions of a *modern* society. I consider the Great Reforms of the 1860s – the abolition of

²³ On the over-time case-transformation dimension of the ontology of cases, see Abbott, *Time Matters*, 142.

²⁴ I thank Vladimir Gel’man for suggesting I discuss heterogeneity in social mobility trajectories. An important challenge is studying “objects moving through time and being qualitatively transformed.” Kreuzer, *Grammar of Time*, in press.

²⁵ On estate fluidity, see Mironov, *Sotsial’naya istoriya*, 1.

²⁶ See Wirtschafter, *Social Identity*, esp. 62–99.

²⁷ See accounts in Smith, *Former People*; Channon, “Tsarist Landowners”; Golitsyn, *Zapiski*.

²⁸ Elias and Scotson, *Established and Outsiders*, 11.

serfdom but also other progressive initiatives in education, local governance, and economic modernization – as an important moment that structured the social configurations post-1917. These reforms combined the significant uprooting of the economic foundations of the landed gentry’s wealth with the preservation of an archaic estates-based order that continued to privilege some over others while also facilitating the material advancement of the propertied and upwardly mobile free urban estates. Furthermore, the reforms only scratched the surface of the highly unequal system of educational access, as I shall explain, which was an important feature of the estates-based society. The gentry, deprived of key sources of income derived from the land, seized opportunities to procure a modern education and a salaried professional station in life, as did the merchant and the high-status *meshchanin* whose children competed for a place at classic gymnasia and technical schools. If we take the above-discussed perspective on the reforms, their consequences for the social structure would be far-reaching. Although, by the early twentieth century, rural Russia had experienced precipitous modernization, a chasm continued to cleave it from urban society. The latter resembled the towns and cities in the developed Western world much more so than the former, the pastoral small farm idyll of England or North America.²⁹ By the end of the nineteenth century, the modernity unleashed by the Great Reforms transformed urban Russia. Not only did it represent a hive of tightly knit institutions of urban governance, commerce, industry, the professions, and education, but these retained their autonomy or quasi-self-governing stature vis-à-vis the state. Yet the estate structure shaped, and became embedded in, these institutions, which not only aided but also constrained social mobility. As late as 1917, a web of juridical and symbolic privileges and barriers continued to lubricate the status of the estates at the top of the social pyramid, particularly nobles; the mobility of the up-and-coming merchant class based on guild criteria; and access to urban property, the trades, and services favoring the *meshchane*, while constraining those of other groups.³⁰ Rather than being atomized, the institutional arenas of this society of estates featured strong network ties,³¹ again aiding social fluidity but also delineating its possibilities in important ways.

The empire’s estate structure is central to understanding the origins, institutional underpinnings, and makeup of the nascent bourgeoisie and professional classes. When the Bolsheviks took power, in developed peripheral towns, not to mention the core metropolitan centers, they did not merely encounter a “bourgeoisie” as an abstract class category but as an institutional

²⁹ See essays in Clowes et al., *Between Tsar and People*. This chasm has been characterized as a cultural conflict between the “people” (*narod*) and the “educated minority.” Mironov, *Rossiyskaya imperiya*, 2:844.

³⁰ On estates, see Mironov, *Rossiyskaya imperiya*, 1:340–443.

³¹ See Kaplan, *Historians*; Frieden, *Russian Physicians*.

fact more characteristic of C. Wright Mills's modern organizational society than one of the halcyon days of the country gentleman, the small farmer, and the family business entrepreneur.³² Axing the imperial police or ministries and the regional branches associated with the core sites of imperial rule would alter, but not shatter, other institutional-bureaucratic arenas and cognate ties. The bourgeois who was incorporated into modern professional, civic, and advocacy institutions enjoyed both the tangible bureaucratic and the symbolic foundations of social distinction. Indeed, they also retained a modicum of autonomy from the state. These institutional artifacts of the modernization of the estates-layered imperial society, I argue, constitute the main drivers of within- and interregional variations in communist and post-communist social, economic, and political development.

Although the inheritors of tsarist Russia's mantle of the relatively privileged strata constitute the focus of my study, their adaptations could be meaningfully explored if contextualized in the overall social structure of imperial and post-revolutionary Russia. Does not the social label of choice – be it the middle, the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the professional, and the like – simultaneously circumscribe what the category *is* and what *it is not*, in relation to others? “We cannot have love without lovers, nor deference without squires and labourers,” observes E. P. Thompson in his dynamic and context-sensitive analysis of the making of the working class in England.³³ This perspective is far removed from the narratives about the Soviet Union's well-known Orwellian inequalities. These overwhelmingly focused on the spectacular ascent of the peasant and factory worker – the Khrushchevs, the Brezhnevs, the Gorbachevs of Soviet society – to the pinnacles of power through the party, managerial, and trade union routes.³⁴ Instead, my ordinary, silent, unsung custodians of the bygone, unequal, social order are the liminal, the descendant, the inheritor of what Harley Balzer quite poignantly referred to as the “missing middle.”³⁵ Balzer was, of course, referring to the understudiedness of this stratum of the educated, propertied, proto-professional, and entrepreneurial groups, in my analysis captured by the statistic of the *meshchane* but also straddling other “educated” estates.³⁶ These categories are understood here in an intergenerational sense as a *status group*. In the communist period, they came to be referred to as Soviet *intelligentsia*, loosely defined with reference to the occupation of a nonmanual job. In post-communist

³² Mills, *White Collar*. ³³ Thompson, *Making of the English Working Class*, 8.

³⁴ See Voslensky, *Nomenklatura*; Rigby, *Political Elites*; Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*; Timasheff, *Great Retreat*; Djilas, *New Class*; Fitzpatrick, *Education*; Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*; Hough and Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed*.

³⁵ Balzer, *Russia's Missing Middle Class*. See also Wirtschafter, *Social Identity*.

³⁶ Encompassing entrepreneurs, professionals, individuals engaged in artistic pursuits, and those deriving income from rent. For stylistic convenience, I refer to them also as the *estates-derived* or *estatist* stratum – capturing the origin among “educated estates” but also alluding to an *estatist* dimension of group construction and maintenance in a Weberian sense of shared values, lifestyle, and status.

Russia, I argue, their descendants constitute the bulk of the *new* bourgeoisie-cum-professional middle classes.³⁷

Social Persistence and Resilience across Distinct Political Orders and Regimes

Extant theorizing offers some signposts for us to construct an account of historical continuities but falls far short of explaining them in the context of profound revolutionary transformation. My main concern is to understand the *social-institutional* underpinnings of persistence and resilience in stratification across distinct political orders and regimes, and the implications of these patterns for long-term political outcomes. The temporal frame of the analysis straddles the pivotal moments of, and developments leading up to, the 1860s Great Reforms, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and the end of communism in 1991. Conventionally, these epochs have been analyzed within the paradigm of critical junctures. Eminent works in historical sociology conceptualize critical junctures as institutionally and politically fluid moments during which policy choices are highly contingent but, depending on the specific decisions adopted, could have enduring and often self-replicating effects, conceptualized as *legacies*.³⁸ This heuristic is not entirely without merit for our analysis and hence is theoretically embedded in the temporal framework adapted here: radical policy solutions for change – in intention, if not execution – are undeniably consequential for society, the economy, and political development. Yet a careful examination of these “junctures” reveals the many continuities – and nondecisions – straddling them and the broader social agency accounting for both the choices made and the successful obstructions of policies promulgated.³⁹

One key *nondecision* during the Great Reforms was a failure to create and implement the rudiments of a universal public education system that would have helped to socially elevate the hitherto unfree and otherwise underprivileged strata on the bottom rungs of imperial society;⁴⁰ another was

³⁷ The word “intelligentsia” in Soviet Russia “was often used interchangeably (and inconsistently) with *sluzhashchie* (officials, office workers), though ‘intelligentsia’ tended to refer to writers, teachers, doctors, lawyers, statisticians, and technicians, whereas *sluzhashchie* tended to be applied to clerical workers.” Lankina et al., “Appropriation and Subversion,” 254. The discussion draws on Rigby, *Political Elites*, 28, 31. On Soviet definitions, see also Zubok, *Zhivago’s Children*, 4–5; and Churchward, *Soviet Intelligentsia*, 3–4.

³⁸ Capoccia and Kelemen, “Study of Critical Junctures”; and Collier and Munck, “Critical Junctures.”

³⁹ For a critique and discussion of combining path-dependence and “punctuated equilibrium” models and sensitivity to contingency and adaptation of extant institutions, see Thelen, “How Institutions Evolve,” 212–13. Critical juncture theorizing does not preclude *antecedent conditions* shaping implementation or choices made during fluid periods of reform, but the focus is on high-level political dynamics. See Dunning, “Contingency and Determinism”; Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*.

⁴⁰ On educational access, see Lyubzhin, *Istoriya russkoy shkoly*, 2. The landed gentry’s obstruction of universal schooling – not least due to fears of losing skilled peasants to the urban

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the failure to reform the estates-based Petrine Table of Ranks in civil service.⁴¹ The latter reflected the hierarchy of the estates while also incentivizing the acquisition of a superb education as a way of advancing on the highly structured scale of pay, progression, and pension perks embracing both government service and large swathes of occupations from teaching to medicine.⁴² The Great Reforms thus combined features that helped further unleash the forces of a merit-based society with those of an antediluvian order where estate ascription continued to matter for one's station in life. Together, the reforms and the non-reforms created incentives and structural opportunities for further colonization of knowledge- and skills-intensive bureaucracies and modern professions by the habitually free – and educated – estates.

The privileged citizens of the estate order were in the best position to seize opportunities in education because of either a habitual emphasis on learning, in the case of the aristocracy and clergy, or the incentives, financial resources, and value proclivities that enabled it and were also characteristic of the urban merchant and *meshchane* estates. Moreover, within what I loosely refer to as the educated estates category, gradations in formal status to a considerable extent shaped one's station as a bourgeois. They influenced, say, whether he or she occupied the pinnacle of professional esteem in the elite occupations or joined the army of the modestly paid “semi-intelligentsia” as a nurse, teaching assistant, or *feldsher*,⁴³ the latter category, however, still vastly more privileged than the overwhelming mass of serf subjects in the largely illiterate society.⁴⁴ The embourgeoisement of Russia's imperial order would be thus grafted onto the institutional palette of estates. Put simply, an important legacy of the 1860s was the substitution of one type of inequality – serfdom- and estates-originating – for another, the human capital-derived one. The latter pattern anticipates characteristics of the knowledge-privileging demos of the present era.

Consider now the “juncture” of 1917. Here, compromise upon compromise diluted the many pivotal decisions that have preoccupied the scholar of the great revolutionary break.⁴⁵ Soviet historiography highlights the Bolsheviks' conscious and tactical choice to work with “old” specialists as it became clear

workforce – has been documented in various contexts. Iversen and Soskice, *Democracy and Prosperity*, 70.

⁴¹ The “layering” aspect of policy making, whereby “proponents of change work around institutions that have powerful vested interests,” has also been highlighted. Tarrow, “The World Changed Today!,” 10. In Russia, the nobility incurred losses due to land reform while retaining their advantage in other policy domains.

⁴² Mironov, *Rossiyskaya imperiya*, 2:433–39.

⁴³ Russian transliteration is *fel'dsher* – medical assistant or paramedic – from the German *Feldscher*. Emmons and Vucinich, *Zemstvo*, xi.

⁴⁴ On *feldshers* as “semi-intelligentsia,” see Ramer, “Professionalism and Politics,” 118; and on teachers as “low status” intelligentsia, Seregny, “Professional Activism,” 169.

⁴⁵ As recently as 2015, scholars have argued: “Communism not only leveled incomes in the region but, perhaps more importantly, destroyed the basis of status societies virtually everywhere it ruled.” Kopstein and Bernhard, “Post-Communism,” 382.

that the goals of swift industrialization and modernization were unattainable when deploying proletarian cadre alone.⁴⁶ Mervyn Matthews traces the origins of the entrenched system of inequalities in Soviet society to the early 1920s. Lenin, his credentials of being a “fervent egalitarian” notwithstanding,⁴⁷ endorsed the first raft of concessions to the old bourgeoisie to maintain the Bolsheviks’ tenuous grip on power. Stalin went on to codify, institutionalize, and enhance the privileges of the white-collar professional elite. Khrushchev only haphazardly and unsuccessfully attempted to undo Stalin’s class compromises before Brezhnev restored them with a vengeance.⁴⁸

The volumes of studies in the critical juncture vein that “forensicize” the policy-elite dynamics behind these compromises have relegated to the shadows the social construction of decisions eschewed or abandoned, the concessions made, and the ideology discreetly shelved. Such “eventful analyses”⁴⁹ – “*l’histoire événementielle*”⁵⁰ – that reduce the historical process to elite decisions, high politics, and national policy tend to background, if not outright ignore, the complexity of the realm of the social that does not neatly converge with overarching political superstructures. As recent critiques have noted, critical juncture perspectives assume the singularity of the historical process; regard change as intrinsic to pivotal decisions of key players; and take as given a relatively clean structural break between epochs that then freezes, as it were, continuity in structures, institutions, and practices unleashed by the pivotal event.⁵¹ Crucially, some caveats notwithstanding, these heuristics largely neglect the complex layering of interconnected processes that follow distinct and often conflicting *temporal logics*. Situating assumptions about change within important political and policy junctures ascribes causal primacy to the immediate time pegged to them while neglecting aspects of the historical process that exhibit very different characteristics in temporal scope, reach, and density of association with the present.⁵² Here, “calendric”⁵³ devices become a descriptive substitute, a justification for, and source of reification of an epoch. Even when not bracketed under the “critical” break rubric, this assumption is implicit in foundational works on 1917 and its consequences. The revolutionary event in these accounts is the starting point and 1991 the end

⁴⁶ Inkeles, “Social Stratification”; Bailes, *Technology*. ⁴⁷ Matthews, *Privilege*, 20.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 20. ⁴⁹ Kreuzer, *Grammar of Time*, in press.

⁵⁰ François Semiard’s phrase, cited to distinguish “the instant and the *longue durée*,” in Braudel, *On History*, 27.

⁵¹ For some of the critiques highlighting institutional resilience “even in the face of huge historic breaks” like revolutions, see Thelen, “How Institutions Evolve,” 209.

⁵² In framing the discussion, I draw on Kreuzer, “Varieties of Time”; and Zerubavel, *Hidden Rhythms*. On the dangers of reifying concepts and overdetermined analysis, see also Kreuzer, “Structure of Description,” 127.

⁵³ Kreuzer, “Varieties of Time,” 8.