# Contents

**List of Figures**  
*ix*  
**List of Tables**  
*xv*  
**Acknowledgments**  
*xvii*  

1 **Introduction**  
1.1 Area of Inquiry and Scope of the Book  
1.2 Brief Overview of the Main Arguments and Approach  
1.3 Preview of the Empirical Results  
1.4 Plan of the Book  

2 **The Implications of Mixed Judicial Selection on Decision-Making**  
2.1 Introduction  
2.2 The Difficulty of Striking Down Laws as Unconstitutional  
2.3 Legal and Political Context for Individual and Collective Choice  
2.4 Individual Choice and General Predictions  
2.5 Collective Choice and General Predictions  
2.6 Evidence to Support the Theory  

3 **Mixed Judicial Selection: Prevalence and Variation**  
3.1 Introduction  
3.2 Mixed Judicial Selection Comparatively  
3.3 Latin American Courts as a Focal Point  
3.4 Why Focus on the Constitutional Courts of Chile and Colombia?
Table of Contents

4 The Chilean Constitutional Tribunal in Political Context 62
   4.1 Introduction 62
   4.2 Brief History of Political and Economic Developments prior to the Military Coup 63
   4.3 Chile under the Junta (1973–1989) 67
   4.4 Chile’s Democratic Transition 70
   4.5 Political Institutions in the Democratic Period 75
   4.6 The Chilean Constitutional Tribunal 85
   4.7 Chapter Summary 100

5 The Colombian Constitutional Court in Political Context 102
   5.1 Introduction 102
   5.2 Brief History of Political and Economic Developments prior to the Constituent Assembly 103
   5.3 The Mounting Crisis 109
   5.4 Transition through the Constituent Assembly and the New Constitution of 1991 114
   5.5 Political Institutions under the 1991 Constitution 115
   5.6 The Colombian Constitutional Court 125
   5.7 Chapter Summary 133

6 Determinants of Legal Invalidation by Constitutional Judges 135
   6.1 Introduction 135
   6.2 Judges on the Chilean and Colombian Constitutional Courts 137
   6.3 Predictions Related to Individual Choice for the Chilean and Colombian Constitutional Courts 147
   6.4 Description of Data and Analysis 149
   6.5 Results 157
   6.6 Chapter Summary: Discussion and Implications 163

7 Determinants of Legal Invalidation by Constitutional Courts 170
   7.1 Introduction 170
   7.2 Case-Level Trends 172
   7.3 Predictions Related to Collective Choice for the Chilean and Colombian Constitutional Courts 176
   7.4 Description of Data and Analysis 182
   7.5 Results 187
   7.6 Case Examples Related to Court Composition 194
   7.7 Chapter Summary: Discussion and Implications 202
# Table of Contents

## 8 Weak Judicial Vetoes and Contentious Politics

- 8.1 Introduction 208
- 8.2 Evaluating the Strength of Signals Emanating from Constitutional Courts 211
- 8.3 Case-Level Trends across Two Dimensions 214
- 8.4 Analyzing Weak Judicial Vetoes on the Chilean and Colombian Constitutional Courts 217
- 8.5 Chapter Summary 227

## 9 Conclusion: Judicial Selection and Decision-Making

- 9.1 Main Findings 230
- 9.2 Generalizability and Broader Implications 233

## Appendices

- A.1 Comparative Overview of Constitutional Courts with Mixed Selection 239
- A.3 Colombian Constitutional Court Judges' Backgrounds and Coding (1993–2014) 266

## References 277

## Index 295