

Money in Politics

In politics, money is often the name of the game. Politicians enrich themselves while in office, spend campaign money to finance their reelection, and accept lucrative "golden parachute" jobs after leaving office. *Money in Politics* argues that these different forms of capital are part of a common system and should be analyzed in a single framework. The book advances a comparative theory that shows how self-enrichment, campaign spending, and golden parachute jobs are connected to each other. This theory explains when and how money enters politics, ultimately illuminating that a change in one form affects the other types and revealing the consequences this has for democracy. The book uses a wide range of evidence from countries around the world, including causally identified quantitative studies, qualitative cross-national comparisons, and original survey experiments. Enlightening and instructive, this book shows that we can only fully comprehend the role of money in politics when we view it as a common system to be analyzed and critiqued.

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Money in Politics

Self-Enrichment, Campaign Spending, and Golden Parachutes

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