

## Index

ACLP Index (Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi&Przeworski), 48-51, 216-19 comparative results for eight countries, 217-19 democratic and nondemocratic provinces in Argentina, 50 dichotomous nature, 219 limitations to measure hybrid regimes, 219 Alberta, Canada, 218, 232, 242-43 Progressive Conservative Party, 242-43 resource rents, 242-43 uncompetitive politics, 242-43 Alfonsín, Raúl, 15 level of democracy of his administration, 7 Alperovich, José governor of Tucumán, 55, 63, 65 Alvarez, Michael, 27, 36, 43, 44, 49, 51, 82, 220, 221 Aragonés de Juárez, Nina, 117 governor of Santiago del Estero, 64 wife of Governor Carlos Juárez, 64 Argentina, 215 comparative subnational democracy, 230 democracy and authoritarianism in the history of, 14-15 electoral alternation in provinces, 49-51 federal transfers, 139 federalism, 15 fiscal federalism, 142-47 as a cause of rentierism, 149 determinants of secondary distribution, 175 history of, 19 fiscal federalism rents low tax collection in provinces, 147-49 provincial patronage spending, 147-49

cooptation of opponents, 202-3 economic autonomy/dependence, 193-94, 197, 202 economic dependence of businesses, 197-98 endogenous (manipulable) institutions, espionage, 65 government control of media, 61-64, 200-201, 202 powerful governors, 57 relationship with national government, statism, 195 weak check and balances, 203-4 weak judicial control, 203-4 weak legislative control, 203 weak private sector, 198-200 impact of least democratic provinces on national regime, 3, 250 large differences in subnational democracy, level of democracy in provinces, 15-16 literature on subnational effects of fiscal federalism, 128 low level of subnational democracy compared to other federations, 229, 230 low-quality macroeconomic statistics, 159 malapportionment, 4, 17-18, 250 multidimensional description of provincial regimes, 67, 89 non-democratic subnational regimes according to ACLP Index, 218, 219 party system denationalization, 244 powerful provincial governments, 6, 17

hybrid provinces

281



282 Index

Argentina (cont.)	Catamarca, 5, 98, 203
provinces, 15, 229	economic dependence on provincial state,
fiscal aspects, 17	195–96, 197
influence in national politics, 17	federal intervention of, 5, 29
representation in national legislature,	fiscal federalism rents, 12
17	natural resource rents, 147, 158, 198
provincial democracy	own tax revenues, 142
level and evolution, 53-56	pro-incumbent electoral reforms, 59
rentier provinces	public employment in, 139, 194, 195
deliberate hindrance of economic	unlimited reelections (governor), 58
development, 199-200	causal mechanisms, 20, 150-54
Dutch desease, 199	economic autonomy, 195, 204-5
studies of subnational regimes in, 9	evidence, 192–205
two dimensions of provincial regimes	repression effect, 193
incumbency advantage and repression,	spending effect, 192, 195, 204-5
80-85	taxation effect, 152, 153, 193
weakness of its political institutions, 140	Chaco, 98
assymetric distribution of population and	changes in subnational democracy, 53
economic production, 149	Chavez, Rebecca Bill, 197, 204
and fiscal federalism rents, 149	Cheibub, José Antonio, 44, 49, 51, 220
Australia, 215	Chubut, 98
regions, 229	natural resource rents, 147, 158
subnational democracy, 231	Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires. See
authoritarianism	Federal Capital
concept, 30	Cobos, Julio, 161
not applicable to Argentine provinces, 29,	Comparative Subnational Democracy Index
30	(CSDI), 10, 206, 215–16, 220
,0	advantages and disadvantages, 216
Báez, Lázaro, 198	comparison with Subnational Democracy
Bates, Robert, 13, 118, 120, 121	Index (SDI), 215
Bavaria, Germany, 218, 226, 231, 232	incumbent vs. largest party criterion, 222
Beder Herrera, Luis, 193, 200	indicators, 223–27
Bollen, Kenneth, 23, 28, 36, 37, 43, 68, 73,	operationalization
80, 103	aggregation of indicators, 227–28
Brazil	conceptualization, 220–21
subnational democracy, 8, 9	measurement, 221–27
Buenos Aires province	results for eight countries, 229–33
and fiscal federalism, 19	sources, 235
federal transfers to, 164	validity, 233–34
industrial development, 198	validity, reliability, and measurement error,
lack of legislative supermajorities, 59	232–33
malapportionment, 17	Coppedge, Michael, 4, 23, 27, 37, 81, 114
	Córdoba
own tax revenues, 142, 143, 146	
CARA Control Conitol	industrial development, 199
CABA. See Federal Capital	lack of legislative supermajorities, 60
Calvo, Ernesto, 18, 47, 59, 114, 144	own tax revenues, 142
Canada, 215	Cornejo, Alfredo
non-democratic subnational regimes	governor of Mendoza, 59
according to ACLP Index, 218	Corrientes, 98
regions, 229	different electoral schedule, 47
subnational democracy, 231	federal interventions of, 29
Cao, Horacio, 64, 139, 151, 194, 197	CSDI. See Comparative Subnational
Casas, Sergio, 193	Democracy Index (CSDI)



Index 283

Dahl, Robert, 1, 4, 31, 44, 45, 62, 112, 118,	cases of (since 1983), 29
150, 238	removal of incumbents of hybrid regimes, 57
De la Rúa, Fernando, 15	federal transfers, 12
Diamond, Larry, 5, 26, 28, 32, 112, 113, 119	and Dutch desease, 199
Diario de la República, El (San Luis),	and vertical fiscal imbalances, 19
62, 204	Argentina, 139, 145–46
Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto, 18, 139, 144, 149,	as fiscal federalism rents, 111, 116, 121,
175	
double simultaneous voting system	129, 133, 134, 140–42 automatic vs. discretionary, 147
Formosa, 60	in favor of demographically small provinces,
Duhalde, Eduardo, 15	145-46
	large differences among provinces, 143
economic autonomy/dependence, 113, 119,	non discretionary, 147
139, 151, 192, 193, 195, 196, 200, 202,	rentier effects of, 154
203, 205, 240	to rentier provinces, 12, 193
different tactics to generate, 197	to the Argentine provinces, 147
SEEP evidence on, 201	fiscal federalism, 11
economic dependence. See Economic	and fiscal theories of regimes, 118
autonomy/dependence	and malapportionment, 144, 249-50, 250
electoral and legislative hegemony, 57	and rentierism, 12-13, 19, 111, 129, 137-
Formosa, 57	38, 139, 140, 239-40
La Rioja, 57	other countries, 149-50, 242
San Luis, 57	and rentierism (stylized model),
Santa Cruz, 57	142
Santiago del Estero, 57	Argentina, 18–19
electorally undefeatable incumbents, 57	Argentina
endogenous (manipulable) institutions, 60–61,	favors demographically small provinces,
114, 247	158
electoral rules, 47, 57–58	Buenos Aires province, 142–43, 144
in hybrid provinces, 57	
	Córdoba, 144
Entre Ríos, 98	definition, 138
electoral competitiveness in, 44	La Rioja, 142–43
espionage, 64	perverse effects, 247
Catamarca, 64	redistribution across provinces, 134, 139
Formosa, 65	reforms to reduce rentier effects, 248–49
in hybrid provinces, 64–65	Santa Cruz, 142–43
Santiago del Estero, 63–64, 117	Santa Fe, 144
Tucumán, 64-65	fiscal federalism rents, 12, 13, 137
	and natural resource rents, 129, 147, 158,
Federal Capital (CF or CABA)	240, 243
creation of Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos	and resource rents (royalties), 242-43
Aires (CABA) in 1996, 48	as a cause of subnational rentierism in
different electoral schedule, 47	Argentina, 144, 147-49
federal transfers to, 165	as a type of fiscal rent, 20, 129, 134, 240
lack of legislative supermajorities, 59	as an archetypical rent, 135
own tax revenues, 146	benefitting low-population provinces,
federal intervention, 40, 48, 51, 217, 246	144–46
altering provincial electoral schedule, 47,	causal mechanisms, 150–54
156	evidence, 192–205
and democratization, 245–46	comparison with nontax revenues, 241
definition, 29	effect mediated by agency, 140
in Catamarca, 203, 246, 245–46	expansion from national to subnational
in Santiago del Estero, 64, 117, 245–46	level, 240
111 Januago del Estero, 04, 11/, 245-40	10 101, 240



284 Index

Gibson, Edward, 4, 23, 60, 114, 115, 144, 241 fiscal federalism rents (cont.) boundary control, 115 expansion from natural resources to fiscal rents, 240 democratization of Santiago del Estero, 117, in the Argentine provinces, 139 Giraudy, Agustina, 24, 60, 114, 115, 241 independent of levels of provincial development, 144-46 Hagopian, Frances, 5, 113, 114, 119 indicators, 156-58 Hidalgo, Mexico, 232 negative effect on subnational democracy, hybrid (provincial) regimes, 239 20, 111, 116, 163-65, 169-71, 172-73, 182, 184-87, 240 and party system denationalization, 245 conditional on level of development, double simultaneous voting system, 60 elimination of term limits, 58 endogenous institutions, 60-61 potential endogeneity, 174-76, espionage, 64-65 174 robustness, 174 government control of media, 61-64 judiciary independence, 61 sensitivity analysis, 182 to rich provinces (Santa Cruz and Tierra del malapportionment within, 59 Fuego), 143, 146 national party protection, 245 pro-incumbent electoral reforms, 59 fiscal rents, 129-33 and fiscal federalism rents, 134 ruled by PJ, 244 hybrid (subnational) regimes, 10, 20, causal concept, 133 conceptual background, 129-32 29-30, 43 definition, contextual, 133 and authoritarian regimes, 29-30 definition, maximal, 132 comparison with oher countries, 206 measurement challenges, 35, 43, 104 definition, minimal, 132 necessary-and-sufficient conditions subtle tactics to undermine democracy, conceptual structure, 133 29-30, 101, 152 Flores, Uruguay, 232 hybrid regimes Formosa, 1-2, 60, 65 competitive authoritarianisms (Levitsky and deliberate hindrance of economic Way), 30 development, 199-200 electoral authoritarianisms (Schedler), democratic decline since 1983, 54-55 illiberal democracies (Zakaria), 30 fiscal federalism rents, 12 semi-authoritarianisms (Ottaway), 30 semi-democracies (Mainwaring, Brinks and incumbency advantage, 84 judicial independence, lack of, 204 Pérez-Liñán), 30 own tax revenues, 142 unlimited reelections (governor), 58 Idaho, USA, 232 Fox, Jonathan, 114 India, 215 regions, 229 FpV. See Frente para la Victoria subnational democracy, 8, 9, 231 Frente Cívico (Santiago del Estero), 61, 117, 203, 245 indices of subnational democracy (based on Frente Cívico y Social (Catamarca), 51, 195, Campaign Advantage index by province, Frente para la Victoria (FpV), 89-90 Fair Elections index by province, 89-90 55, 161 Government Discrimination index by Germany, 215 province, 94-96 non-democratic subnational regimes Hard Media Control index by province, according to ACLP Index, 218 regions, 229 Horizontal Accountability index by subnational democracy, 8, 231 province, 94



Index 285

Incumbency advantage index,	federal intervention of Santiago del Estero,
80–86	117, 245
Judicial Control index by province, 93	governor of Santa Cruz, 58, 61, 63,
Legislative Control index by province, 93	201, 203
Media bias index by province, 90–91	level of democracy of his (national)
Media independence index by province,	administration, 7
96–97	president, 15, 161, 198, 250
national distribution of first- and sec-	Kyrgyzstan
ond-level indices, 86–89	subnational democracy, 9
Pluralistic media index by province, 90–91	
Police repression index by province, 94–96	La Rioja, 3
Punish opponents index by province, 96–97	deliberate hindrance of economic
Repression index, 80–86	development, 200
results (map), 79	electoral reforms, 60
second-level indices by province, 96-97	federal transfers to, 165
Soft Media Control index by province, 92	fiscal federalism rents, 12
Totalitarian Control index by province, 94	judicial independence, lack of,
two dimensions (Incumbency advantage and	204
Repression) inducted trhough factor	legislative supermajorities, 59
analysis, 80–82	own tax revenues, 142, 143
Insfrán, Gildo, 1-2, 60, 65, 116, 199-200, 204	pro-incumbent electoral reforms,
inter-governmental revenue-sharing system.	59
See Fiscal Federalism	public employment, 139
Iraq	rentierism and economic dependence, 193,
subnational democracy, 8	197
items of subnational democracy (SEPP),	unlimited reelections (governor),
98-102	58
distribution by subdimension of democracy,	least democratic provinces, 7
101-2	Formosa, 51–53, 65, 79, 98, 104, 231
national distribution, 98-101	Jujuy, 7, 98
	La Pampa, 98
Juárez regime, 64	La Rioja, 51–53, 98, 104, 231
Juárez, Carlos	Misiones, 7, 98, 231
governor of Santiago del Estero, 5,	Salta, 7, 98
55, 117	San Luis, 7, 51-53, 79, 98,
Jujuy	104, 231
government control of media,	Santa Cruz, 7, 51–53, 79, 98,
63, 201	104, 231
Incumbency advantage, 84	Santiago del Estero, 7, 51–53, 79, 98,
	104, 231,
Key, V.O., 4, 114	least democratic regions (CSDI)
Kirchner, Alicia	Argentina, 231–32
governor of Santa Cruz, 57, 193	Canada, 231–32
Kirchner, Cristina Fernández de, 3	Germany, 231–32
electoral coattails, 56	India, 231–32
national challenge to Catamarcan incum-	Mexico, 231–32
bent in 2011, 195	
president, 15	Uruguay, 231–32 USA, 231–32
support to Governor Insfrán, 65	Ledesma, Claudia
support to Governor Zamora, 118, 245	governor of Santiago del Estero, 61 wife of Governor Gerardo Zamora, 61
Kirchner, Néstor, 3, 57	Levi Margaret 12, 118, 120, 125



286 Index

Lifschitz, Miguel most democratic provinces, 7 Buenos Aires, 7, 98 governor of Santa Fe, 60 Córdoba, 7, 98 Limongi, Fernando, 44, 49, 51, 112, 220 Linz, Juan, 30, 32, 112, 238 Entre Ríos, 7 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 8, 32, 112, 238 Federal Capital, 7, 51-53, 79, 98, 104 Mendoza, 7, 51-53, 79, 98, 104 Santa Fe, 7, 79, 98 Macri, Mauricio, 250 Mahdavy, Hussein, 13, 121, 123, 129 Tierra del Fuego, 51-53, 79, 98 Mainwaring, Scott, 14, 15, 23, 32 Movimiento Popular Neuquino, 50, 98 malapportionment Munck, Gerardo, 23, 26, 28, 39, 40, 216 amplifying national influence of hybrid provinces, 4 natural resource rents, 122 Argentina, 4, 17, 144 as a type of fiscal rent, 129, 240 within hybrid provinces, 59 effect on subnational democracy, 243 Maza, Ángel, 193 to subnational governments, 140, 242 McMann, Kelly, 6, 8, 9, 106 natural resource royalties, 149, 158, 249 economic autonomy approach to subnaeffect on subnational democracy, 165, tional democracy, 113, 151, 192 hybrid regimes, 30 in Argentine provinces, 147, 158, 196 survey of experts (with Nikolai Petrov), 11, indicators, 158 24,68 Neuquén, 98 measurement error, 35, 103, 104, 158, 160, natural resource rents, 147, 158 218, 219, 232, 258-59 non-rentier provinces Mendoza Buenos Aires, 198-99, 202 Córdoba, 198–99, 202 electoral competitiveness, 44 federal transfers to, 165 Federal Capital, 198-99 lack of legislative supermajorities, 59 large private companies in, 198-99 Menem, Carlos, 3, 57 Mendoza, 198–99, 202 federal intervention of Catamarca, 5, 245 Santa Fe, 198-99, 202 federal intervention of Santiago del Estero, North Dakota, USA, 232 level of democracy of his (national) O'Donnell, Guillermo, 5, 28, 32, 112 administration, 7 president, 250 Partido Justicialista (PJ), 14, 15, 59, 98, 202, Mexico, 215 244, 245 non-democratic subnational regimes Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal, 14, 15, 23, 26, 32 according to ACLP Index, 218 Peronism. See Partido Justicialista (PJ) regions, 229 subnational authoritarian enclaves, 5 subnational democracy, 9 subnational democracy, 5, 8, 9, 231 PJ. See Partido Justicialista (PJ) Porto, Alberto, 18, 143, 144, 175 Survey of Experts on State Politics, 11, 39 Przeworski, Adam, 14, 27, 43, 44, 49, 51, 112, Mickey, Robert, 4, 114, 115, 241 modernization theory, 13, 112 220, 222, 225 as an alternative explanation for subnational democracy, 158 Remmer, Karen, 128, 152, 167 effects of development on subnational rentier state, 12, 112, 151 democracy, 243-44 definition, 130 Moore, Mick, 13, 118, 120, 131, literature on the, 123-25, 128-29 national and subnational, 128-29 138, 152 Morrison, Kevin, 13, 116, 124, 129, 151, structural persistence of, 248 24 I rentier theory of subnational democracy, 11-14, 111, 137 nontax revenue, 127



Index 287

outlier (negative) in terms of democracy, 182 as a structural theory, 116 press freedom (lack of) and intimidation of expansion from national to subnational level, 128-29 journalists, 64 expansion from resource rents to all fiscal pro-incumbent electoral reforms, 59 public employment in, 139 rents, 126-28 high level of abstraction, 126-28 rentierism and economic dependence, 196 unlimited reelections (governor), 58 statistical test, 155-56 statistical test with SEPP-based indices, Santa Fe industrial development, 199 178-79 statistical test with Subnational Democracy lack of legislative supermajorities, 59 Index (SDI) data, 156 own tax revenues, 142 Santiago del Estero, 5 Río Negro, 98 democratic decline since 1983, 54-55 Rodríguez Saá brothers, 62, 161, 196 Rodríguez Saá Jr, Alberto, 62 different electoral schedule, 47 Rodríguez Saá, Adolfo, 57 economic dependence of businesses on the governor of San Luis, 5, 197, 204 provincial state, 197-98 Rodríguez Saá, Alberto federal intervention not leading to governor of San Luis, 57, 197 democratization, 117-18 Rodríguez Saá, Feliciana, 62 federal interventions of, 29 Ross, Michael, 11, 112, 120, 121, 123, 125, fiscal federalism rents, 12 judicial independence, lack of, 61 126, 150, 152 Russia outlier (negative) in terms of democracy, 181 subnational democracy, 9 pres freedom (lack of) and intimidation of journalists, 63-64 Saadi family, 51, 195 pro-incumbent electoral reforms, 59 public employment, 194-95 Saadi regime, 202, 246 Saadi, Ramón rentierism and statism, 194-95 governor of Catamarca, 64, 202 rotation in power after federal intervention, Saadi, Vicente governor of Catamarca, 64 statism and rentierism, 197 Saxony, Germany, 231 San Juan, 98 changes in subnational democracy, 54 Schiaretti, Juan San Luis, 5 governor of Córdoba, 60 SDI. See Subnational Democracy Index (SDI) corruption, 46 government control of media, 62, 201 Sikkim, India, 232 incumbency advantage, 84 Smith, Alastair, 121 industrial promotion and development, 46 unearned resources, 127 outlier (negative) in terms of democracy, Snyder, Richard, 5, 17, 23, 114, 124, 144 177-78, 182 Somalia pro-incumbent electoral reforms, 59 subnational democracy, 8 unlimited reelections (governor), 58 South Africa Santa Cruz, 3 subnational democracy, 9 constitutional reforms to eliminate term South Dakota, USA, 51, 232 limits, 58 spying. See espionage economic dependence of businesses on the structural and agency explanations state, 198 complementarity, 117-18 federal transfers to, 165 evidence from Santiago del Estero, fiscal federalism rents, 12, 143 117-18 government control of media, 201 subnational authoritarianism, 29-30, 117 incumbency advantage, 84 not applicable to regional regimes in judicial independence, lack of, 61 national democracies, 29 pioneering studies on, 23 natural resource rents, 147, 158



288 Index

subnational democracy temporal trends, 54-57 agency-based theories, 114-15 theories of, 112-16 theories of fiscal bargains, 120-22 aggregation rules for indicators, 39-40 Subnational Democracy Index (SDI), 10, 24, and contingency, 114-15 and economic autonomy, 112 48, 238 and fiscal federalism rents, 138-40 aggregation of indicators, 47-48 comparison with ACLP Index (Alvarez, and statism, 112-13, 125-26 and term limits, 58 Cheibub, Limongi&Przeworski), 48-51 causal indicators, 44 comparison with Comparative Subnational comparative level in eight countries, 229-31 Democracy Index (CSDI), 215 comparative perspective, 215 cross-sectional and temporal variance, 53-54 components and subcomponents, 33 cross-temporal correlations (autocorrelation), 55 conceptualization, 24, 25-26, 27-29 cross-sectional and temporal variance, dimensions of contestation and power concentration, 45 cultural theories of, 113-14 incumbent party criterion, 45 diffusion theories of, 114 incumbent vs. largest party criterion, 44-45 dimensions and subdimensions, 30-32 indicators, 45-47 double simultaneous voting system, 60 Executive contestation, 45 effect indicators, 43-44, 221-22 Legislative contestation, 46 endogenous (manipulable) institutions, Legislature control, 47 57-58 Succession control, 46 Term limits, 47 endogenous institutions, 60-61 espionage, political spying, 65 results (map), 51-53 government control of media, 61-64 results by province, 51 institutional theories of, 114 sample, 48 judiciary independence, 61 summary statistics, 162 legislative supermajorities, 59-60 temporal coverage (1983-2015), 47 level vs. quality, 26-27 temporal trends, 54-57 literature on, 9 subnational rentier state, 12, 20, 134, 137, measured through the ACLP Index (Alvarez, 147, 150 Cheibub, Limongi&Przeworski), 49-51 Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics measured with indicators of electoral com-(SEPP), 11, 67 petitiveness, 43-44 aggregation measurement, 24-25 from experts' scores to provincial scores, measurement challenges, 33-36, 43 from items to indices, 72-77, 255-57 modernization theories, 112 national-subnational interactions, 114-15 Campaign Advantage index results, 89-90 normative relevance, 2, 250 Fair Elections index results, 89-90 objective and subjective indicators, 42-43 Government Discrimination index results. advantages and disadvantages, 38 94-96 Hard Media Control index results, 92 objective indicators, 36-37 operationalization, 10-11, 24 Horizontal Accountability index results, 94 press freedom, 61-64 Incumbency Advantage factor, 80-86 pro-incumbent electoral reforms, 59-60 indices of subnational democracy design, 72-74 resoure curse theories, 122-25 results of objective and subjective measures first- and second-level, 74-77 compared, 103-4 interpretation, 78 state-society balance theories, 118-19 Judicial Control index results, 93 subjective indicators, 38 Legislative Control index results, 93 subnational-specific theories of regimes, measurement error, 70, 73, 78, 258-59 Media Bias index results, 90-91 114-15



Index 289

Media Independence index results, 96-97 methodological design, 68-70, 251-54 Pluralistic Media index results, 90-91 Police Repression index results, 94-96 precedents, 68 Punish Opponents index results, 96-97 Repression factor, 80-86 results, 77-80 comparison with Subnational Democracy Index (SDI), 103-4 first- and second-level indices (national level), 86-89 incumbency advantage and repression dimensions, 80-85 individual items (national level), 98-103 Soft Media Control index results, 92 subjective indicators, 67-68 Totalitarian Control index results, 94

Tacuarembó, Uruguay, 232
term limits
elimination, 57, 58
Santa Cruz, 58
judicial challenge to, 61
relaxation, 202
Tierra del Fuego, 17, 140
complete name, 48
creation as a province in 1990, 48
democratic improvement since 1991, 55
federal transfers to, 165, 171
fiscal federalism rents, 143
outlier (positive) in terms of democracy,
171, 177–78
Tucumán, 98, 232

changes in subnational democracy, 54 democratic decline since 1983, 54–55, 63 federal intervention of, 29 press freedom and censorship, 63

UCR. See Unión Cívica Radical
Ulloa Igor, Rudy, 201
Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), 14, 15, 65, 161,
202
Uruguay, 215
non-democratic subnational regimes
according to ACLP Index, 218
regions, 229
subnational democracy, 230, 231
USA, 215
non-democratic subnational regimes
according to ACLP Index, 218
regions, 229
subnational democracy, 8, 9, 230
Utah, USA, 232

Vidal, María Eugenia governor of Buenos Aires, 59

Wibbels, Erik, 9, 113, 129, 143, 146, 147, 151

Zamora, Gerardo
authoritarian practices, 117, 118
candidate to governorship of Santiago del
Estero, 117, 245
governor of Santiago del Estero, 55
member of the UCR, 245
seeking reelection, 61
similarities with Governor Juárez, 117