

Introduction

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From 1147 to 1149 Friedrich Barbarossa participated in the ill-fated Second Crusade serving under his uncle Conrad III (1093–1152). Forty years later, as Holy Roman Emperor, Friedrich called for a new Third Crusade to the Holy Lands, which he led in 1189.¹ His soldiers came from across the empire's vast European domain, which at that time spanned from Flanders to Moravia and from the Baltic Sea down into northern Italy. For his battlefield acumen, his political astuteness and his resolute determination, Friedrich was arguably the greatest of the Holy Roman Empire's medieval emperors. Accordingly, recruitment for what he referred to as his 'army of the Holy Cross'² was described by one contemporary as being led 'by his own example, he inspired all the young men to fight for Christ'.³ The result, especially for its time, was the raising of a truly enormous force. According to some accounts, Friedrich's army set out with 20,000 knights and 80,000 infantry, a force so large that it took three full days to pass any single point.⁴ Yet it was not simply the scale of Frederick's undertaking which captured the attention of the medieval world; the political realignment after decades of confrontation between his empire and the papacy was transformative. As Christopher Tyerman conspicuously points out in his pioneering history of the crusades, not only did this 'translate imperial claims into political authority within Germany, it also represented the consolidation of a new European order'.⁵ Tyerman's depiction of the ground-breaking

¹ Graham A. Loud, *The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa: The History of the Expedition of the Emperor Frederick and Related Texts* (Farnham, 2010).

² Christopher Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades* (Cambridge, MA, 2006), p. 421.

³ Edgar N. Johnson, 'The Crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry IV' in Robert L. Wolff and Harry W. Hazard (eds.), *A History of the Crusades. Volume II. The Later Crusades, 1189–1311* (Madison, WI, 1969), p. 90.

⁴ Nor are these the largest estimates. Arnold of Lübeck's account from the early thirteenth century suggested Friedrich commanded 50,000 knights and 100,000 infantry. Christopher Tyerman, *God's War*, p. 418.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 417.

political developments of 1189 might apply as equally to another crusading German leader 752 years into the future. Of course Adolf Hitler's proposed vision of a new European order was categorically different in many respects, but the demonization of his enemy and the unity of a Christian Europe against a 'godless' enemy were recurrent themes. Not surprisingly, therefore, Hitler sought to cast his war against Bolshevism as a modern-day European crusade modelled on Friedrich I's reputation and exploits. As the Nazi dictator explained to Mile Budak, the Croatian minister stationed in Berlin, the war against the Soviet Union 'is a crusade such as previously took place only against the Huns and against the Turks. This struggle must bring together and unite the European peoples.'⁶ Consequently, Hitler's codename for the military campaign to crush Bolshevism in the east was Operation 'Barbarossa'.

There is no question that Hitler's conception of foreign countries was built upon racist stereotypes and xenophobic clichés characteristic of the propaganda disseminated by the pan-German organizations and nationalistic press of the pre-First World War era.⁷ Yet even Germany in Hitler's conception was not framed by conventional geographical or constitutional definitions. Instead Hitler emphasized the German nation as a unique and distinct *Volk* defined by narrow ethnic and cultural characteristics. This allowed ethnic Germans, even those living in Russia since the eighteenth century, to be considered 'German' because of their supposed shared values, common language and 'blood'. By the 1920s the notion of the *Volk* became infused with pseudo-scientific writings linking it to biology, allowing the German to become a separate racial unit who was both of a common physical origin as well as culturally and spiritually superior.⁸ Emphasizing his view of different 'peoples', which was often employed as a synonym for nations, Hitler stated in his unpublished second book, dictated in 1928:

If we start from the premise that all peoples are not the same, then the peoples' intrinsic value is not the same either. [...] The effect of this particular value can be very different and can occur in very different areas, but together they provide a benchmark for the overall valuation of a people. The ultimate expression of this overall valuation is the historical cultural image of a people, in which the sum of all the rays of its genetic qualities – or the racial qualities united in it – are reflected.⁹

⁶ Jürgen Förster, 'Volunteers for the European Crusade against Bolshevism' in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 1050–1.

⁷ Percy Ernst Schramm, *Hitler: The Man and the Military Leader* (Chicago, 1999), p. 52.

⁸ Richard Overy, *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia* (London, 2004), p. 549.

⁹ Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), *Hitler's Second Book* (New York, 2003), p. 32.

In Hitler's conception the state was less an administrative institution than an organism of the people's will, which needed to be strong, even ruthless, in order to protect itself against competing and predatory outsiders. There could be no private sphere of individual rights because the *Volk* had to be safeguarded through the absolute authority of the state. Accordingly, the state was justified to make almost any intervention in the lives of the *Volksgenosse* (a member of the *Volk*) to ensure survival and dominance.¹⁰ 'The higher the racial worth of a people', Hitler's second book explained, 'the greater overall value, which, in conflict and in the struggle with other peoples, it must then mobilize for the benefit of its life'.¹¹

As Richard Overy has observed, nations, in Hitler's view, were therefore coterminous with race and can be broadly divided into two categories. The first being 'higher nations', which were dedicated to self-preservation and exhibited superior culture as evidence of their racial pre-eminence. The second category was 'lower nations' which were contrastingly degenerate and marked by cultural sterility and biological inferiority. Importantly, the survival of nations was seen to be analogous to survival in nature, with the weaker being subjugated by the stronger, resulting in either cultural assimilation or physical annihilation. Under National Socialism non-Germans were, by definition, incapable of being or becoming full members of Hitler's racial state as they represented an impurity indicative, in the most extreme case, of the maligning influence of the parasitic Jew, which threatened all higher culture.¹² Such a danger existed when there was any kind of departure from, or diluting of, one's own culture. As Hitler explained:

The mixing of blood and the decline of the race are, then, the results that in the beginning are not infrequently introduced by a so-called *Ausländerei* [love for foreign things] – in reality an under-appreciation of one's own cultural value in comparison to that of foreign peoples. As soon as a people no longer values the genetically conditioned cultural expression of the life of its own soul, or even begins to be ashamed of it and turns to foreign ways of life, it renounces the power that lies in the harmony of its blood and the cultural life that springs from it. ... Then the Jew can move in, in every form, and this master of international poison concoction and racial debasement will not rest until he has completely uprooted and thereby corrupted such a people.¹³

¹⁰ Norman Rich, *Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion* (New York, 1972), p. 14.

¹¹ Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), *Hitler's Second Book*, pp. 32–3.

¹² Richard Overy, *The Dictators*, pp. 552–3.

¹³ Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), *Hitler's Second Book*, p. 33.

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Such a dire pronouncement forms an important intellectual context in understanding Hitler's conception of both his enemies as well as his allies. Indeed, distinguishing between the two was sometimes complicated by the eternal struggle between the nations that Hitler envisioned. Higher nations, typically identified by a supposed 'Nordic' culture and racial characteristics, were cautiously accepted as armed allies, while others, despite their common cause, goodwill and willingness to serve Nazi goals, were rejected as members of lower, degenerate nations. Nevertheless, as the Wehrmacht advanced in the east, incorporating millions of people into the German zone of occupation, Hitler's troops were frequently greeted as liberators.¹⁴ Older people contrasted their recent experience of Soviet tyranny with the affirmative, if distant, memory of a generally benevolent German occupation dating from the First World War.¹⁵ The suggestion has even been made that the black crosses adorning the vehicles of the German army (the *Balkenkreuz*) were interpreted by peasants as a sign of Christian liberation from Soviet atheism.¹⁶ Not only did some formations of the Red Army willingly surrender in the summer of 1941, but it was not uncommon that the soldiers requested to be rearmed to join the war against Stalin, communism or 'the Jews'. Hitler, however, would have none of it and commented emphatically:

No one but a German shall ever be allowed to bear arms! This is of the utmost importance; even if it may seem easier at first to mobilize the military support of some foreign subject peoples, it is wrong! Because one day it will backfire, absolutely and inevitably. Only the German may bear arms, not the Slav, not the Czech, not the Ukrainian!¹⁷

Whatever Hitler's long-term aversion to arming his subjected peoples in the east, the fact remains that in the opening weeks of Operation Barbarossa the Nazi leadership, as well as the army command, did not believe that the Wehrmacht was in need of such support. Thus, those who have admonished Nazi Germany's rejection of the

¹⁴ According to German command reports and intelligence estimates, around 90 per cent of the Ukrainian population exhibited a friendly disposition. Alex Alexiev, 'Soviet Nationals in German Wartime Service, 1941–1945' in Antonio Munoz (ed.), *Soviet Nationals in German Wartime Service 1941–1945* (2007), p. 13.

¹⁵ Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA, 2004), pp. 20–1.

¹⁶ Antony Beevor and Luba Vinogradova (eds.), *A Writer at War: Vasily Grossman with the Red Army 1941–1945* (New York, 2005), p. 38.

¹⁷ Rolf-Dieter Müller, *An der Seite der Wehrmacht: Hitlers ausländische Helfer beim 'Kreuzzug gegen den Bolschewismus' 1941–1945* (Berlin, 2007), p. 14; Gerd R. Ueberschär and Wolfram Wette (eds.), "Unternehmen Barbarossa" *Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941* (Paderborn 1984), p. 331.

disaffected non-Russian minorities,¹⁸ fail to understand Germany's own *Weltanschauung* (worldview) from which it cannot be separated. Much less than a lost opportunity, the denial of arms was simply irreconcilable with Nazi plans for the east. On 20 June 1941 Alfred Rosenberg, who would shortly become Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, told his colleagues that Germany was not waging a 'crusade' against Bolshevism in order to save 'the poor Russian', but 'to pursue German world policy and to safeguard the German Reich'.¹⁹

Even if one sets aside the ahistorical nature of the debate and seeks to explore the strictly military implications of arming the anti-Soviet contingents, the fact remains that little could probably have been expected. This is not to doubt the ability, resolve or size of the disaffected groups, but rather a commentary on the weakness of Germany's economic base. At over 3 million men the German *Ostheer* (eastern army) was already a patchwork force fielding equipment seized from all over Europe and still suffering notable shortages. Mobilizing hundreds of thousands, even millions, of additional 'eastern troops' therefore raises the question of how they would have been armed, equipped and supplied. A certain number could have been equipped from captured Soviet equipment (as those contingents raised in 1941 were), but sustaining them in the numbers required to make a difference on the eastern front would have posed numerous and unresolved problems.²⁰

While Germany's propaganda surrounding the 'crusade against Bolshevism' was certainly intended to generate political support for the war in the east, it was only the SS who had previously been active in recruiting foreigners for volunteer formations.²¹ The German Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht were both caught unprepared for the political, legal and administrative issues that foreign volunteers joining the war constituted. A hurried meeting was organized for 30 June 1941 between representatives of the Foreign Office, the Wehrmacht High Command,

¹⁸ See for example: Heinz Magenheimer, *Hitler's War: Germany's Key Strategic Decisions 1940–1945* (London, 1999), p. 116.

¹⁹ As cited in: Jürgen Förster, 'Volunteers for the European Crusade against Bolshevism', p. 1050.

²⁰ David Stahel, *Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 82–3.

²¹ See the unpublished PhD by Mark Philip Gingerich, *Towards a Brotherhood of Arms: Waffen-SS Recruitment of Germanic Volunteers 1940–1945* (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1991); Adrian Weale, *Army of Evil: A History of the SS* (New York, 2012) Chapter 19: Making up the Numbers: Foreign Volunteers and Criminals in the Waffen-SS; George H. Stein, *The Waffen SS – Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939–1945* (New York, 1984), pp. 121–7.

the SS main office and the NSDAP, which led to the 'Guidelines for the employment of foreign volunteers in the struggle against the Soviet Union'. These guidelines reflected the strict ideological nature of Germany's engagement with foreign citizens, even if they were willing to fight for them. Volunteers were divided into two groups, 'Germanic' and 'non-Germanic', with the former – designated as Danes, Finns, Flemings, Dutchmen, Norwegians and Swedes – to be incorporated into the Waffen-SS. The latter group, consisting of French, Croats, Spaniards and Walloons, were directed to fight in the Wehrmacht.²² All Czech and Russian émigré volunteers were to be rejected.²³

In total, some 29,248 'non-Germanic' volunteers had entered service with the Wehrmacht by January 1942, the great majority being Spanish (18,372), but the next largest category being Soviet citizens (4,250)²⁴ – explicitly against Hitler's instruction. This reflects the disconnect, already apparent in 1941, between the demands for manpower in the east and the extent to which local German commanders were prepared to turn a blind eye or even actively subvert official regulations.²⁵ After the Spaniards and Soviets, the Wehrmacht received 3,795 Croats, 1,971 French and 860 Belgian Walloons. In addition, there were some 12,000 'Germanic volunteers of non-German nationality' who had entered service with the Waffen-SS by the end of 1941. These included some 4,814 Dutchmen, 2,399 Danes, 1,883 Norwegians, 1,240 Flemings, 1,180 Finns, 135 Swiss and Liechtensteiners and 39 Swedes.²⁶ Significantly, the Waffen-SS also gained another 6,200 'ethnic Germans' from around Europe with the majority coming from Romania (2,500) and Serbia and Croatia (2,200), but smaller contingents from Slovakia, Hungary, Luxembourg,

²² Jürgen Förster, 'Volunteers for the European Crusade against Bolshevism', pp. 1051–2.

²³ In fact volunteer Russian émigrés did manage to serve in the east. See: Oleg Beyda, 'Iron Cross of the Wrangel's Army: Russian Emigrants as Interpreters in the Wehrmacht' in *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 27 (3) (2014), pp. 430–48; Oleg Beyda, 'A Different Russian Perspective or 'Their Long Defeat': White émigrés and the Second World War' in Tristan Moss and Tom Richardson (eds.), *New Directions in War and History* (Newport, Australia, 2016), pp. 72–87.

²⁴ Given the official restrictions and the tendency of under-reporting or no reporting at all, this figure is almost certainly far from the real number.

²⁵ The fact that anti-Soviet contingents were raised in 1941 in spite of official prohibitions demonstrates Jeff Rutherford's thesis about prevalence of 'military necessity' over simple ideology. See: Jeff Rutherford, *Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front: The German Infantry's War, 1941–1944* (Cambridge, 2014).

²⁶ On Western European volunteers generally see: Kenneth Estes, *A European Anabasis: Western European Volunteers in the German Army and SS, 1940–45* (Solihull, 2015); Martin Gutmann, 'Debunking the Myth of the Volunteers: Transnational Volunteering in the Nazi Waffen-SS Officer Corps during the Second World War' in *Contemporary European History* 22 (4) (November, 2013), pp. 585–607.




Figure 0.1 Foreigners and Ethnic Germans in the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS (January 1942).

Alsace and Lorraine.²⁷ Overall, some 47,000 volunteers of both the ‘Germanic’ and ‘non-Germanic’ classification had volunteered to fight with the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS by the beginning of 1942.²⁸

While the mix of foreign volunteers gave political credence to German propaganda about a European ‘crusade’ against Bolshevism, in practical terms they meant far less given the scale of fighting on the eastern front. The overwhelming bulk of foreign military support for the Wehrmacht came from the national armies of Finland and Romania with further noteworthy contingents provided by Italy, Hungary and Slovakia. Yet even

²⁷ On ethnic Germans generally see: Valdis O. Lumans, *Himmler's Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933–1945* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1993).

²⁸ Figures adapted from Bernhard R. Kroener, ‘The Winter Crisis of 1941–1942: The Distribution of Scarcity or Steps Towards a More Rational Management of Personnel’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Germany and the Second World War. Volume VII. Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 1027–8.

these nations, four of which were signatories of the Tripartite Pact, were held at arm's length. Only the Finns and the Romanians were brought into the military planning for Operation Barbarossa and that was mainly to ensure essential staging areas for German troops or to safeguard strategic assets against anticipated Soviet counterattacks. Even the racially acceptable Finns, imbued with 'Nordic culture' and an open loathing of Stalin's state, were denied precise information about the timing of the invasion, National Socialist war aims and, on Hitler's explicit instruction, any operational details not deemed absolutely necessary for successful local co-operation.²⁹ This was in spite of the fact that Finland mobilized a greater proportion of its small population than any of the other combatants, including Germany (476,000 men from 3.7 million inhabitants).³⁰ Moreover, Finland allowed over 30,000 German troops to concentrate on its territory as well as permitting the Wehrmacht to administer some 100,000 square kilometres of northern Finland.³¹ It is not surprising that Finland's leadership was reticent about any formal alliance with Nazi Germany and preferred the term *Waffenbrüderschaft* (brothers-in-arms).³² Indeed, only the day before Barbarossa began Finnish President Risto Ryri stated to a parliamentary delegation: 'Germany is the only state today that can defeat Russia, or at least considerably weaken it. Nor would it probably be any loss to the world if Germany were to be weakened in the fray.'³³ Given both their common enemy and shared expansionist goals (a 'Greater Finland' was based on the slogan 'Short Borders – Long Peace'³⁴), the mutual suspicion and distrust was to prove an ominous starting point for what Finland's commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, called the 'holy war against the enemy of our people'.³⁵

²⁹ Gerd R. Ueberschär, 'The Involvement of Scandinavia in the Plans for Barbarossa' in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 461–2.

³⁰ By no means did all of the men mobilized in Finland serve at the front. In total there were sixteen Finnish divisions with some 200,000 front-line troops. See *ibid.*, p. 463.

³¹ Manfred Menger, 'Germany and the Finnish "Separate War" against the Soviet Union' in Bernd Wegner (ed.), *From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 529 and 533.

³² See the excellent discussion in: Michael Jonas, 'The Politics of an Alliance Finland in Nazi Foreign Policy and War Strategy' in Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki (eds.), *Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations* (Boston, 2012), pp. 117–18.

³³ Olli Vehviläinen, *Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia* (New York, 2002), p. 89.

³⁴ Manfred Menger, 'Germany and the Finnish "Separate War" against the Soviet Union', p. 532.

³⁵ Vesa Nénye, Peter Munter, Toni Wirtanen and Chris Birks, *Finland at War: the Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941–45* (Oxford, 2016), p. 49.

Romania, under General Ion Antonescu, was ideologically far closer to Nazi Germany and shared Hitler's conception of the war in the east not only as a necessary conventional struggle against Soviet power, but as a reckoning with 'the Jews' who Antonescu referred to as 'Satan' in need of 'purification'.³⁶ Of course, Romania also shared Finland's bitter territorial grievances resulting from recent Soviet aggression and was prepared to commit its own 'Army Group Antonescu', consisting of the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies with some 325,685 men, to Operation Barbarossa.³⁷ Nominally Antonescu's army group was also given command of the German Eleventh Army, under Colonel-General Eugen Ritter von Schobert, but this was only for appearances as Hitler explained to his Romanian counterpart that 'he intended to let him appear before the Romanian people as the supreme commander in this region'. In practice, however, Schobert was in charge of the army group's operations, while Hitler reserved the right to issue instructions through Antonescu 'which referred to the Romanian Army'.³⁸ Indeed, while Hitler respected Antonescu for his strict, authoritarian rule as well as his fervent anti-communism and anti-Semitism, this did not redress his disdain for the 'lower nation' that he led. Speaking informally to his inner circle, Hitler remarked: 'Antonescu is of Germanic origin, not Romanian; he's a born soldier. His misfortune is to have Romanians under his command.'³⁹ Clearly, even Hitler's most enthusiastic and committed allies could still be dismissed as 'foreign' in spite of their willingness to sacrifice and fight in what the Vice-President, Mihai Antonescu, declared to be Romania's 'great holy war' against the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

While Finland and Romania played by far the largest roles in Operation Barbarossa, Italy under Benito Mussolini was personally Hitler's closest ally. Yet contravening the very essence of the German-Italian Pact of Steel (May 1939), Mussolini was only informed about the start of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941⁴¹ (although Italian military

³⁶ Dennis Deletant, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and his Regime, Romania 1940–1944* (London, 2006), pp. 116–17. On Romania's role in the Holocaust see: Dennis Deletant, 'Transnistria and the Romanian Solution to the "Jewish Problem"' in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization* (Bloomington, 2008), Chapter 4.

³⁷ Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafes and Cristian Craciunoiu, *Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945* (London, 1995), p. 45.

³⁸ Dennis Deletant, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally*, p. 80.

³⁹ Hugh R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), *Hitler's Table Talk, 1941–1944: His Private Conversations* (London, 2000), p. 49.

⁴⁰ Dennis Deletant, 'German-Romanian Relations, 1941–1945' in Jonathan Adelman (ed.), *Hitler and his Allies in World War II* (New York, 2007), p. 176.

⁴¹ Richard J. B. Bosworth, *Mussolini* (New York, 2002), p. 378, see footnote 181.

intelligence had concrete evidence of the impending attack by mid-May 1941).⁴² Japan was similarly left uninformed, which again exposed the hollowness of the Berlin-Tokyo-Rome Axis as well as Hitler's determination to make sweeping strategic decisions independently of his allies. Apart from a prudent desire to keep Italy's already overburdened armed forces off the eastern front, Hitler's active deception vis-à-vis Mussolini was encouraged by the low estimation he placed on Italian troops whom he disparagingly referred to as mere 'harvest hands'. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest Hitler saw his alliance with the 'Latin race' as a simple political convenience and that he would dispense with Italy after the victory over the Soviet Union.⁴³ Echoing the dysfunction of the German alliance system, Mussolini commented to his foreign minister shortly after Barbarossa began: 'I hope for only one thing, that in this war in the east the Germans will lose a lot of feathers.'⁴⁴ Publicly, of course, the Italian press spoke only of a united 'anti-Bolshevik crusade'.⁴⁵

Hitler's private scorn for his non-Nordic allies extended most particularly to the Hungarians where he followed the familiar pattern of praising the nation's pro-Axis leader, Admiral Miklós Horthy, while denigrating the 'racial stock' of his people. On two occasions in 1941 Hitler gave voice to his loathing for Hungarians, commenting first that they were 'as lazy as the Russian' and that even National Socialism could not rectify this.⁴⁶ On another occasion, Hitler referred to them as the most maligned of his allies: 'From a social point of view, the sickest communities of the New Europe are: first, Hungary, then Italy.'⁴⁷ Both of Hitler's comments came after Hungary had opted to support Operation Barbarossa with 45,000 men and in absence of any formal German request for assistance (although they certainly had a political agenda vis-à-vis Germany). Moreover, the Hungarian 'Mobile Corps' proved a highly valued element of the 1st Panzer Group and it was actually in better shape by early September 1941 than the other German mobile formations.⁴⁸ Evidence of Hungarian collaboration in the violent excesses of Nazi policy in the

⁴² MacGregor Knox, *Hitler's Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940–1943* (Cambridge, 2009), p. 76.

⁴³ Jürgen Förster, 'The Decisions of the Tripartite Pact States' in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV The Attack on the Soviet Union* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 1037 and 1039. See also: Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe* (London, 2008), pp. 115 and 321–3.

⁴⁴ Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.), *Ciano's Diary 1939–1943* (London, 1947), p. 365 (1 July 1941). See also comments on p. 354 (6 June 1941).

⁴⁵ Jürgen Förster, 'The Decisions of the Tripartite Pact States', p. 1039.

⁴⁶ Hugh R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), *Hitler's Table Talk, 1941–1944*, p. 33.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁴⁸ Jürgen Förster, 'The Decisions of the Tripartite Pact States', p. 1031.