1 Introduction
National Styles and Strategic Culture

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This book examines a number of insurgency movements on the one hand and on the other hand polities repeatedly engaged in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The aim is to ascertain whether, in each case, one can identify a proclivity to resort to a particular pattern of fighting. We will ask whether a pattern exists and, if so, whether this is quite simply dictated by constants such as geography and climate or by the basic options available (a general, not a culture-specific 'tool kit' or instrumentarium for insurgents or COIN operations), or else whether one can speak of a cultural preference, a particular 'strategic culture' or 'national style'. These terms need explanations, and the following section will trace the origins of the notion that there are national or cultural peculiarities in 'ways of waging war' and survey its application in more recent times.

To simplify, our volume asks: Do national mentalities, martial preferences or strictures born of climate and geography compel a level of persistence in national style despite acknowledgement of lessons learned from others' experience in countering insurgents? An interesting aspect of national style and resultant strategic culture is examining the lessons each polity chooses to learn from its own and others' counterinsurgency experiences. Why are some lessons selected and not others? Were erroneous lessons drawn in order to serve a more comfortable fit within national narratives of war? Have counterinsurgency experiences been interpreted in a relatively consistent way?

These and many related questions will be surfacing intermittently throughout the book. But first things first, so let us begin by looking at the genealogy of the terms 'national style', 'Way of War' and 'strategic culture'.

Ways of War and 'National' Style

National Peculiarities

The idea that warring groups behave according to distinctive practices, with different traditions, with different styles, is not a new one. The

earliest example of comments on different styles of warfare can be found in the *Iliad*, which contrasts three times the chaotic, noisy Trojan army with the silent, cohesive Achaean Greek forces.[1] Classical writers took note of particular 'ways of war' practiced by Scythians, Persians, Huns, Saracens and Turks among others. In Aeschylus' *Persians* (dated 472 BCE, and thus very soon after the actual Graeco-Persian Wars), the contrast between the way of fighting of the Persians – relying heavily on their archers – and Greeks – who 'arm themselves with shields/and fight in close with spears' – is highlighted repeatedly.[2] Herodotus in his *Histories* had a Greek dismissively caricature the Persian, saying 'These foreigners have little taste for war, and [the Greeks] are the finest soldiers of the world. The Persians' weapons are bows and short spears; they fight in trousers and turbans – that will show you how easy they are to beat!' Elsewhere, he had a Persian concede that while the Greeks were 'pugnacious enough, and start fights on the spur of the moment without sense or judgement to justify them', they were easy for the Persians to vanquish.[3]

The notion that the peculiar fighting styles of a people were something eternal is an enduring characteristic, and linked with the climate, was made in the fourth century BCE by Aristotle, who unsurprisingly came to the conclusion that 'the Hellenic race' had the best balance of courage, passion and brain power, while other peoples had an excess of one and a deficit of the other.[4] Medieval students of Aristotle eagerly snatched up this notion of an inborn difference between races, turning it in a similar fashion to their own people's advantage. We need hardly be surprised that the French, at the latest since the early twelfth century pioneers in the development of medieval proto-nationalism, were also pioneers in appropriating this argument for themselves.[5] Italian-born Christine de Pizan, writing around 1400 for the French monarchy, pleased her countrymen by adoption when she wrote that

> Ancient chronicles and a long experience show that the French . . . are courageous and valiant in the use of arms . . . First, this [is] because of the long-standing glory

[1] Homer, *The Iliad*, III.2–8 and IV.428–38, and implicitly at XVII.356–65; see H. van Wees, 'Heroes, Knights and Nutters. Warrior Mentality in Homer', in A. B. Lloyd (ed.), *Battle in Antiquity* (London: Duckworth, 1996), 60.
[2] Aeschylus, *The Persians*, lines 239–40.
[3] Herodotus, *Histories*, V.49.3–4 and VII.9b, here in the translation of Aubrey de Sélincourt (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954), 358, 445; see also Hans van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London: Duckworth, 2004), 116.
[4] Aristotle, *Politics* VII.7, here in the translation of T. A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), 269.
[5] See Guibert of Nogent, *Gesta Dei per Francos* (c. 1107/1108).

and renown of this kingdom ... The second reason is the eventual influence of the planets and the French climate. One sees effectively ... that two qualities are necessary for the good fighter: intelligence and courage ... [I]n hot countries men are not very brave, as they are close to the sun, and the great heat weakens their blood; if they lack courage, they nevertheless do show extreme agility in all they undertake. Those who live in cold regions are by contrast sanguine, as they are far from the sun. They are courageous, but lack judgement. Those, however, who live in temperate regions, are at once courageous, audacious and prudent, as the climes are temperate.[6]

This conviction that the French were superior warriors to other nations became a commonplace in France. By the eighteenth century, French writers on strategy would claim that 'audacity, valour, impetuousness in [armed] clashes, the fury of the first moment are what particularly characterises the French nation' in the conduct of its wars.[7] By then, the French had even convinced their enemies of their particular national peculiarities. A Prussian officer wrote that the French were 'fiery, with a predisposition to be incited to become [extremely] enthusiastic'.[8] By the late nineteenth century, the French had even convinced themselves that they were incapable of a defensive strategy and that only the offensive was appropriate to their military genius, a genius that had been personified by Napoleon.[9]

More neutral notions of different styles in warfare were articulated in modern times by authors who had been struck by them in their own experience. The Welsh mercenary Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd leaned on the, by then, usual examples from classical antiquity as well as his own experience in the service of three different sovereigns, one French, one Austrian and one Russian, and in the fight against the Ottoman Turks to make claims about marked differences in warfare between one polity type and another.[10] Clausewitz himself in a famous passage emphasised that

[6] Christine de Pizan, *Le Livre des faits et bonnes mœurs du roi Charles V le Sage*, II.xxii, Eric Hicks and Thérèse Moreau (trans. and ed.) (Paris: Stock, 1997), 159f.
[7] F.-J. de Mesnil-Durand, *Fragment de tactique ou six mémoires*, 2 vols. (Paris: Jombert, 1776) quoted in J. A. H. Count de Guibert, *Défense du système de guerre moderne* (1779), reprinted in Comte de Guibert, *Stratégiques* (Paris: l'Herne, 1977), 496.
[8] Anonymous (a Prussian officer), *Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg und über den Gebrauch der leichten Truppen, mit Rücksicht auf den französischen Krieg* (Berlin: Christian Friedrich Himburg: 1799), 46f.
[9] G. G[ilbert], *Essais critiques et militaires* (Paris: Librairie de la Nouvelle Revue, 1890); G. G[ilbert], *Sept études militaires* (Paris: Librairie de la Nouvelle Revue, 1892).
[10] General H. H. E. Lloyd, *Continuation of the History of the Late War in Germany, between the King of Prussia, and the Empress of Germany and Her Allies*, Part II (1781), in J. Speelman (ed.), *War, Society and Enlightenment: The Works of General Lloyd* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 375–478.

the conduct of war differed depending on the period of history and the character of the polity concerned:

> The semibarbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kinds and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth century – all conducted war in their own particular way, using different methods and pursuing different aims.

Clausewitz then devoted several pages to the particularities in warfare and war aims of successive cultures and specific countries.[11]

In the late nineteenth century, the concept of a 'national Way of War' assumed biological-Darwinist dimensions. For the French, given their '*génie*' and their perception of what suited their particular *mentalité*, this meant embracing the offensive, nothing but the offensive, which contemporary strategists argued conformed best to the inherent French national Way of War, and led to what has been called a 'cult of the offensive'.[12] Oddly, all the other armies of Europe equally embraced the offensive, each for their own supposedly 'national' reasons, as in fact this desire to 'get their retaliation in first' (as one could say sarcastically), to be the most 'virile' and pugnacious in this battle for the survival of the fittest, had infected all of them. The result was the First World War, where the offensive strategies of all sides clashed in a bloody struggle which produced more victims in absolute terms than any previous war.

Writing after the great cataclysm, and building on the works of the naval historians Sir Herbert Richmond and Sir Julian Corbett, it was Captain Basil Liddell Hart who invented the term 'English/British Way of War'. Emerging from the First World War with its unprecedented numbers of casualties in its mass warfare, Liddell Hart like many others was driven by the commitment 'never again' to let this happen. It seemed to him on reflection that this war had been an aberration in English and British warfare. The result of his reflections, published in 1932, postulated that the 'historic Strategy of Britain' had been to keep away from conscription, from mass warfare, and above all, from any Continental commitment. Since the Elizabethan Age, he claimed, the proven successful strategy for Britain had been to keep off Europe's continental landmass and to offset land power by 'sea pressure on the enemy' and 'financial support to all possible allies'. And he concluded, 'I can see no convincing reason why we should have abandoned that practice, proved

[11] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (1832) M. Howard and Paret (trans. and ed.) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984[2]), VIII.3, 586–93.
[12] S. Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War' and J. Snyder, 'Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984' *International Security*, 9/1 (Summer 1984), 58–107, 108–46.

by three centuries' experience of warfare'.[13] He contrasted this with the 'fallacious' strategy of the French, which had led them to the stalemate of the trenches of Flanders.[14]

The formula of the 'Way of War' proved catching. An 'American Way of War' achieved particular fame with the magisterial 1973 study by Russell Weigley. Weigley made the claim that the truly American way, crystallising with the Civil War and so very different from any European aims to limit war, was to go for big battles with overwhelming firepower and massive casualties, which increasingly would affect the enemy rather than the Americans, as technology came in to replace manpower. He even interpreted the Cold War emphasis on nuclear weapons as a strategy of betting on massive firepower.[15] Weigley was inspired by Hans Delbrück's dual interpretation of the history of warfare as oscillating between the two extremes of a war aiming to defeat the enemy armed forces in a decisive battle (the *Niederwerfungsstrategie*, best translated as 'knock-out strategy') and a battle aiming to whittle away the enemy's strength in a long drawn-out war to exhaust his willpower (*Ermattungsstrategie* or 'exhaustion strategy'). Weigley used two translations of these terms, which would lend themselves to endless confusion. For *Niederwerfung* or knock-out blow, he used 'annihilation', not unreasonably, as this was a Clausewitzian expression that permeated German strategy literature in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Only, by it, Clausewitz meant the infliction of a decisive defeat, not the slaughtering of entire armies. For *Ermattung*, the moral and physical exhaustion of the enemy, Weigley chose 'attrition', again not unreasonably so. For Hans Delbrück had created a scandal by criticising General Falkenhayn's strategy of attrition vis-à-vis the French, in which Falkenhayn tried to win by causing more French than German casualties, while seeing soldiers on both sides as dispensable cannon fodder or *matériel* in this gigantic *Materialschlacht*. Delbrück's dualism was too reductionist, however, and it was difficult to classify both Frederick the Great's many short battles in his drawn-out, multi-year wars as 'attrition' (admittedly with comparable casualty figures in total) in just the same way as Falkenhayn's brutal, almost year-long assaults on Verdun resulting in more than 700,000 casualties. The latter seemed like both attrition and annihilation in the sense of mass killing, which was increasingly the connotation of this word in the genocidal context of the two world wars. Weigley, too,

[13] B. H. Liddell Hart, *The British Way of Warfare* (London: Faber and Faber, 1932), 13–41.
[14] Ibid.
[15] R. F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).

found it difficult to keep up the clear distinction between the two terms with which he began his narrative,[16] and other authors since have demonstrated their confusion about the terms.[17]

Nevertheless, many authors have taken up the 'American Way of War' formula for their own works.[18] The expression 'Way of War' has since also been applied many times over to other states and entities, talking about a British,[19] a Soviet or Russian,[20] a Canadian, an Arab, a European, a German, a Portuguese, an Afghan or a new Iraqi 'Way of War'.[21] Distinct differences from country to country in approaches to waging war do seem to exist at any one point, as open-eyed foreign observers will find

[16] B. M. Linn, 'The American Way of War Revisited', *Journal of Military History*, 66 (April 2002), 501–33.

[17] For example, M. Boot, 'The New American Way of War', *Foreign Affairs*, 41 (2003), 41–58.

[18] To cite just some titles, see E. Luttwak, 'The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance', *Survival* , (March–April 1979), 57–60; W. K. Maynard, 'The New American Way of War', *Military Review*, 73/11 (1993), 5–10; F. G. Hoffman, '*Decisive Force': The New American Way of War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996); R. B. Myers, 'The New American Way of War', *Military Technology*, 27/6 (2003), 64–75; A. K. Cebrowski and T. M. Barnett, 'The American Way of War', *British Army Review*, 131 (2003), 42–3; J. Laiq, 'High Explosive Hysteria: American Way of War', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 38/18 (2003), 1763–70; see also A. Echevarria, *Toward an American Way of War* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2004); T. Mahnken, *Technology and the American Way of War since 1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); M. B. Maitre, 'Echoes and Origins of a American Way of War', *Comparative Strategy*, 27/3 (2008), 248–66; Eugene Jarecki, *The American Way of War* (New York: Free Press, 2008); B. M. Linn, 'The American Way of War', *Magazine of History*, 224 (2008), 19–24; D. Tierney, *How We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires, and the American Way of War* (Boston: Little Brown, 2010); S. F. Kime, 'Return to the American Way of War', *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute*, 137/5 (2011), 40–3; F. G. Hoffman, 'Reassessing the American Way of War', *Orbis*, 55/3 (2011), 524–36; J. Kurlantzki, *The Ideal Man: The Tragedy of Jim Thompson and the American Way of War* (Hoboken, NJ.: Wiley, 2011); H. Rockoff, *America's Ecomomic Way of War: War and the US Economy from the Spanish-American War to the First Gulf War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[19] K. Nelson and G. Kennedy, *The British Way of Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856–1956* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010).

[20] N. Leites, 'The Soviet Style of War', in Derek Leebaert (ed.), *Soviet Military Thinking* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 185–224; R. Harrison, *The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001).

[21] J. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961–1974* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1997); R. Gimblett, R. H. Edwards and A. L. Griffiths, 'The Canadian Way of War: Experience and Principles', in *Intervention and Engagement: A Maritime Perspective* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2002); Layton, 'The New Arab Way of War', *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute*, 129/3 (2003), 62–63; S. Everts, *A European Way of War* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004); M. Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005); R. Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); S. J. Freedberg, 'The New Iraqi Way of War', *National Journal*, 39/23 (2007), 36–43; R. Johnson, *The Afghan Way of War: Culture and Pragmatism, a Critical History* (London: Hurst, 2011).

out quickly when comparing attitudes in their own countries to those of another when moving there for any length of time. Stanley Hoffmann, a French intellectual with Austrian parents who held a chair at Harvard, devoted many works to an 'American Style' of foreign policy making which he contrasted with that of France or other European countries with which he was familiar. Yet unlike some of the earlier authors, he did not claim that these were perennial and unchangeable features of the political cultures he knew.[22]

If there are distinctions between countries, are some of them, nevertheless, united by a more general albeit emphatically not universally human pattern? The concept of a 'Western Way of War' encapsulates this notion. It can be traced to the British historian Geoffrey Parker, who spoke about 'the Western Way of War, which . . . boasts great antiquity'. He described it as resting upon several principles. 'First, the armed forces of the West have placed heavy reliance on superior technology, usually to compensate for inferior numbers.' Secondly, 'Western military practice has always exalted discipline . . . in the twin forms of drill and long-term service'. Discipline was again required to compensate for numeric inferiority. Discipline was so important because Western 'wars were normally won by infantry'. Thirdly, Parker postulated that there was a great continuity in Western military tradition. This, Parker claimed, included the war aim of annihilating the enemy army – retro-projecting Clausewitz's views onto previous centuries: '[T]he overall aim of western strategy, whether in battle, siege, or attrition, almost always remained the total defeat and destruction of the enemy. And this contrasted starkly with the military practice of many other societies'. He thought that, in contrast to this, tribal warfare tended to produce far fewer casualties. To Parker, the fourth constant was a willingness to innovate, adapt and learn.[23]

It is in the nature of the basic configuration within which insurgencies occur, namely the predominance of a hated regime which controls most of a polity's resources (normally the state apparatus including, crucially, the armed forces). A Western 'Way of War,' as sketched by Parker, usually fits that of the (in the past, mostly, but not exclusively, 'Western') colonial power. Of these four factors, in the context of insurgency, the first

[22] S. Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles: On the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); and see J.-B. Duroselle, 'Les changements dans la politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945', in S. Hoffmann et al. (eds.), *A la recherche de la France* (Paris: Eds. du Seuil, 1963).

[23] G. Parker, 'Introduction', in G. Parker (ed.), *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, rev. ed. 2008), 2–9.

three rarely obtain, because insurgents tend to be confronted with *superior* government forces. In the context of insurgencies but also counterinsurgency, the principle of destruction can only apply to the 'enemy' narrowly defined, the leaders and militants of any insurgency, because what is being fought over tends to be the land, its resources and above all its (productive) population. To do these great harm would mean 'destroying the village to defend it' – admittedly something at least one Western power has been accused of in the past.

A similar interpretational pattern that can be found on the higher level of interstate relations is postulated by Thucydides fans among the International Relations theorists of the 'Realist' school, a name based on the claim that their own understanding of the world is 'realistic' as opposed to that of ideologically driven scholars supposedly describing interstate relations as they should be, not as they are.[24] Intrigued by what they perceive as the great 'modernity' of Thucydides' interpretations of the Peloponnesian War, these scholars have tended to connect the dots between him, then – completely omitting the millennium of medieval history – on to Machiavelli, then leapfrogging the intervening centuries straight on to nineteenth- and twentieth-century interstate relations and finally to twentieth-century international relations theory to illustrate a supposed continuity.[25] They tend to dispense with any requirements for a special understanding of the Hellenic world of Thucydides' times let alone its language, not to mention the centuries in between which this picture almost invariably leaves out.[26] One of them, Victor Davis

[24] H. J. Morgenthau, 'Six Principles of Political Realism', in R. J. Art and R. Jervis (eds.), *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, 8th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2007), 7–14.

[25] See the contributions by K. Hoekstra, 'Thucydides and the Bellicose Beginnings of Early Modern Political Theory'; S. Forde, 'Thucydides and 'Realism' among the Classics of International Relations', and R. N. Lebow, 'International Relations and Thucydides', in Katherine Harloe and Ned Morley (eds.), *Thucydides and the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[26] See, for example, D. Garst, 'Thucydides and Neorealism', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33/1 (March 1989), 3–27; S. Forde, 'Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli', *Journal of Politics*, 54/2 (May, 1992), 372–93; L. J. Bagby, 'The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations', *International Organization*, 48/1 (Winter 1994), 131–53; S. Forde, 'International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli and Neorealism', *International Studies Quarterly*, 39/2 (June 1995), 141–60; Ahrensdorf, 'Thucydides' Realistic Critique of Realism', *Polity*, 30/2 (Winter 1997), 231–65; D. Kagan, *The Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* (London: Pimlico, 1997); A. Eckstein, 'Thucydides, the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and the Foundations of International Systems Theory', *International History Review*, 25/4 (Dec. 2003), 757–74; J. Monten, 'Thucydides and Modern Realism', *International Studies Quarterly*, 50/1 (Mar. 2006), 3–25. For a transposition of the Western Way of War to the United States, see R. Kagan, *Dangerous Nation: America and the World, 1600–1898* (New York: Knopf, 2006).

Hanson, has claimed this great continuity for a 'Western Way of War' in the sense of Geoffrey Parker and has postulated such continuity not just since early modern times, but all the way back from Hellenic times to the present. He starts with Herodotus, who has a Persian mocking the Greeks for going off together with their adversaries

> to the smoothest and levellest bit of ground they can find, and hav[ing] their battle on it – with the result that even the victors never get off without heavy losses, and for the losers – well, the're wiped out. Now surely, as they all talk the same language, they ought to be able to find a better way of settling their differences: by negotiation, for instance or an interchange of views – indeed anything rather than fighting.[27]

This type of frontal confrontation in an all-out battle with high casualty figures is at the centre of what Hanson defines as a 'Western Way of War'. It is contrasted with a 'barbarian' (or Eastern) Way of War, for which Thucydides gives a summary, expressed by the Spartan general Brasidas in 423 BCE:

> These opponents of ours . . . fight in no sort of order, they have no sense of shame about giving up a position under pressure. To run forwards and to run backwards are equally honourable in their eyes, and so their courage can never really be tested, since, when every man is fighting on his own, there is always a good excuse for everyone saving his own skin. Otherwise they would join battle, instead of simply making a noise.[28]

These two passages not only seem to illustrate a 'Western' versus an 'Eastern' Way of War, but they also fit into a pattern of regular versus irregular warfare in an asymmetric conflict, portraying the respective preferences in fighting of counterinsurgency and insurgent forces, the former drawing on their conventional superiority, the latter generally on the avoidance of frontal clashes.[29]

Patrick Porter has noted that such a portrayal of cowardly barbarians – soon to become 'Orientals' in the definition of Edward Said – would be used as a cliché and anti-template for a self-portrayal of Westerners as brave, honest, straight-forward fighters – and proud of being so – in keeping with the Herodotus passage above,[30] culminating in Hanson's

[27] Herodotus, *The Histories*, VII.9b, here in the translation of A. de Sélincourt (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954), 445.
[28] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, IV.126, here in R. Warner's translation (London: Penguin, 1972), 341f.
[29] Exceptions, like Boudicca's Iceni's confrontation with the Romans in battle in 69 BCE, tend to end badly for the insurgents.
[30] Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes* (London: Hurst and Co, 2009).

narrative and resultant interpretations. Hanson, in turn, has been criticised by many authors, from classical scholars to specialists on more recent periods. Hanson either chose to ignore for his study (like the Middle Ages) or which he arguably misinterpreted (like the 'Age of Battles').[31]

Strategic Culture, National Style and Mentality

A more flexible concept was developed in the late 1970s in the term 'strategic culture', coined by Columbia University scholar Jack Snyder and defined by him as '[T]he sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation with each other with regard to nuclear strategy'. This, not other forms of war such as small wars, was at the time the preoccupation of most leading writers on strategy.[32]

Snyder was part of the first generation of strategic culture theorists who devised this concept as a supplement, or amelioration, to the explanatory shortcomings of the International Relations theories of 'Realism' and 'Neorealism'.[33] In Britain, Aberystwyth's professor Ken Booth propagated Snyder's concept of strategic culture further.[34] Snyder, Booth and the Anglo-American Colin S. Gray rejected the 'black box' theory espoused by Realism and Neorealism, that is, the assumption that the behaviour of states on the world stage is universally rational and could be predicted according to commonly understood survival patterns in a fight-for-survival world of anarchy.[35]

Moreover, Snyder claimed that 'once a distinctive approach to strategy takes hold of members of a strategy-making elite and those writing about strategy (jointly often referred to as the strategic community), it tends to persist despite changes in the circumstances that gave rise to it, through processes of socialization and institutionalization and through the role of

[31] Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 131–50; H. Sidebottom, *Ancient Warfare: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), passim; J. A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Boulder: Westview, 2003), 12–20 and passim.

[32] J. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1977), 8.

[33] J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and J. Glenn, D. Howlett and S. Poore (eds.), *Neorealism versus Strategic Culture* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004).

[34] K. Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed', in C. G. Jacobsen (ed.), *Strategic Power: The United States of America and the USSR* (London: Macmillan, 1990), 123.

[35] See K. N. Waltz, 'The Anarchic Structure of World Politics', in Art and Jervis (eds.), *International Politics*, 29–49.