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1. Grand Strategy: Comparing across Time, Type and Space

The academic study of grand strategy in the field of international relations (IR) overwhelmingly focuses on the United States. The great scholarly debates often emphasize prescription – which kind of grand strategy the United States ought to pursue – rather than explaining, for example, why the United States pursues a particular strategy at a particular time.[1] The preponderance of research on other countries examines great power contenders, notably China and Russia.[2] That work is generally more analytic and explanatory, although there is a propensity to ruminate about what the United States should do in response.[3] Historians contribute significantly to the study of grand strategy. Their narratives are informative, contextual and often include a comparative component such as the study of leadership, of empires or of states in particular circumstances – such as great powers preceding or during wars.[4]

Neither group, however, provides a framework to systematically compare grand strategies across different dimensions. We attempt to address these lacunae in this Element. Our goal is to offer a framework that scholars can use to compare grand strategies in three dimensions – across type, time and space. Recognizing that the United States dominates the field, we do this by using it as our initial benchmark. Hence our subtitle: *American Grand Strategy in Comparative Perspective*. But, as we move through successive sections, we shift away from a focus on the United States to develop a framework in which it is just another – albeit important – state.

In section 2 we introduce a framework built on six questions that can be applied to the notion of comparison in all three dimensions: across *types* of grand strategy, across *time* in terms of the prevalent grand strategy within any state and

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[1] See, as examples, Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *America Abroad: Why the Sole Superpower Should Not Pull Back from the World* (London: Oxford University Press, 2016); Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, *Democratic Internationalism: An American Grand Strategy for a Post-Exceptionalist Era* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, November 15, 2012), www.cfr.org/report/democratic-internationalism; Barry R. Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014); Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (New York: Norton, 2005).

[2] On China, see Avery Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge – China's Grand Strategy and International Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future* (Santa Monic, CA: Rand Corporation, 2000); Sulmaan Wasif Khan, *Haunted by Chaos: China's Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018). On Russia, see Andrew Monaghan, "Putin's Russia: 'Shaping a Grand Strategy'," *International Affairs* 89, no. 5 (September, 2013): pp. 1221–1236.

[3] Michael McFaul, "The Grand Strategy of Vladimir Putin," *Hoover Digest*, no. 1 (January 30, 2004), www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7634.

[4] See, as examples, John Lewis Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy* (New York: Penguin Press, 2018); Paul Kennedy, ed. *Grand Strategy in War and Peace* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991); Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

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subsequently across *space*, meaning an examination (and possibly comparison) of individual state strategies, potentially whether those are great, regional or smaller powers.

These questions attempt to reveal both the similarities and the differences between different national grand strategies, as well as their sources of continuity and change in a dynamic global environment. While not exhaustive, they extend from rudimentary questions about the working definition and scope of a grand strategy to its underlying assumptions, its conception (in the customary language of the literature) of a grand strategy's "ends," "ways" and "means," and, crucially, its characterization of – and balance between – threats and opportunities. Surprisingly, these elements have not yet been rigorously compared to generate an analytic framework. Definitions and assumptions are contested, but there are few explicitly causal theories about grand strategies themselves, and we argue that comparison is a central part of that process.[5]

We then apply threads of this framework in the three dimensions in successive sections. Section 3 examines the types of grand strategies that states may potentially pursue, our analysis extending beyond most current typologies that confine the definition of grand strategies to a narrow national security orientation. It includes alternatives that address anthropogenic and naturogenic threats such as climate change and pandemics. This section is, admittedly, heavily focused on the United States and we acknowledge that many of the options may not apply to other states. Nonetheless, as we will discuss, even regional or smaller powers may adopt aspects of these strategies under specific circumstances.

Existing typologies present problems. The substance of grand strategies is often assumed to be limited to armed conflict. The overuse of shorthand labels obscures important nuances. Unilateralism and coercion, for example, are associated with realist forms of primacy and the label is shortened even further by references to the world's "goliath," "sheriff" or "policeman."[6] Multilateralism, international order and institution building are associated with notions of cooperative security, liberal hegemony and grandiose American conceptions of itself as an "indispensable power."[7] The result is often counterproductive for both scholarly and public debate

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[5] Paul C. Avey, Jonathan N. Markowitz and Robert J. Reardon, "Disentangling Grand Strategy: International Relations Theory and U.S. Grand Strategy," *Texas National Security Review* 2, no. 1 (November, 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/869.

[6] Richard N. Haass, *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1997); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World's Government in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005); Joshua Muravchik, *The Imperative of American Leadership* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1996).

[7] The term was first associated with Madeleine K. Albright in an interview on NBC-TV's "The Today Show" with Matt Lauer (Columbus, Ohio, February 19, 1998). But President Obama reiterated American indispensability in, for example, "President Obama: What

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where, for example, "Ending Never-ending Wars" has become shorthand for a grand strategy of restraint,[8] obfuscating questions about the forms and degree of any offshore military deployment.

Succinct labels are understandable in public debates where deliberative assessments are often sacrificed to soundbites. But they are less acceptable in scholarly debates because they obscure rather than add nuance and analytic insight. Nuance can help establish causal relationships and support strategic decision-making.[9] Consider this statement by Patrick Porter:

> Long before the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States formed a grand strategy of "primacy," often coined as "leadership." This strategy was interrupted only occasionally. By the 1960s, it had set the parameters for Washington's foreign policy debate. The strategy has four interlocking parts: to be militarily preponderant; to reassure and contain allies; to integrate other states into U.S.-designed institutions and markets; and to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons.[10]

Here, Porter conflates two significantly different approaches: primacy and "deep engagement." Two components of Porter's "four interlocking parts" are primarily associated with primacy (military preponderance and inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons). But the other pair (with their focus on allies and institution building) are more associated with deep engagement.[11]

Collapsing them into one is problematic because their underlying assumptions – and ways, means and ends – vastly differ, with significant theoretical and policy implications. In general, a primacist grand strategy is expensive (in terms of the "means" used) and relies preponderantly on overwhelming military power.[12] In contrast, deep engagement incurs, but also shares, material burdens and requires a greater range of policy instruments (from alliance diplomacy to

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Makes Us America," September 28, 2014, www.cbsnews.com/news/president-obama-60-minutes/. For examples that invoke this idea see Daniel Deudney and G. JohnIkenberry, *Democratic Internationalism: An American Grand Strategy for a Post-Exceptionalist Era* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2012), p. 1.

[8] See "About QI," Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft (undated), https://quincyinst.org/about/.

[9] Academics are often characterized as having little influence on policymakers. Yet, under Trump, while James Mattis served as Secretary of Defense, he was reputed to have read the work of, and met with, notable scholars working in the field of American grand strategy. On causation in studies of grand strategy see Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich, "Is Grand Strategy a Research Program? A Review Essay," *Security Studies* 28, no. 1 (2019): pp. 58–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1508631.

[10] Patrick Porter, "Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment," *International Security* 42, no. 4 (Spring, 2018): p. 9.

[11] Ibid.

[12] On the costs, particularly how much primacy contributes to the federal deficit, see Carla Norrlof and William Wohlforth, "Is US Grand Strategy Self-Defeating? Deep Engagement, Military Spending, and Sovereign Debt," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 36, no. 3 (2019): pp.

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aid, economic multilateralism and global and regional institution-building). These differences become starker when other grand strategies – such as sponsorship, restraint or isolationism – are factored in.

We then extend the analysis to comparison over time in section 4. Historians have wrestled with this issue. Hal Brands, for example, compares the relationship between presidents and the US Congress in the second half of the twentieth century.[13] John Gaddis has offered a series of comparative enduring "principles" that scholars should bear in mind.[14] But few approximate the requisites of Alexander George's structured-focused comparison or process tracing (what George called "the historian's methodology") to systematically compare a state's strategy over time.[15]

Utilizing the same set of questions, we compare the continuities and changes in American grand strategy over the course of the first three American presidencies of the twenty-first century – those of George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump. Our goal is to examine where they converged and contrasted. To do so effectively, we focus our attention on Europe because of its vital, long-standing strategic importance. President Trump's periodic hostile diatribes and confrontational policies concerning military (notably NATO), economic (regarding trade practices), and public health (the Coronavirus travel ban) issues signaled a growing impatience with America's traditional European allies. Nonetheless, we identify notable elements of both continuity and change across the three administrations.

In section 5, we expand across space to compare US grand strategy to that of two other states: China, already a great power competitor, and India, an emergent power with aspirations to become a great power. We examine two dimensions. The first is how each state has constructed a guiding architecture for their grand strategy.[16] The second concerns how each state, dynamically and interactively, responds to the other's grand strategy as they balance between shaping and adapting to emergent threats and opportunities.

Space limitations dictate that our empirical presentation can only be illustrative. We focus on an emergent, dynamic region – the vast expanse of

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227–247. On the benefits, see Daniel W. Drezner, "Military Primacy Doesn't Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)," *International Security* 38, no. 1 (Summer, 2013): pp. 52–79.

[13] Hal Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

[14] Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy.*

[15] Alexander George, "Case Study and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison" in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy*, ed. Paul Gordon (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43–68; Christine Trampusch and Bruno Palier, "Between X and Y: How Process Tracing Contributes to Opening the Black Box of Causality," *New Political Economy* 21, no. 5 (2016): pp. 437–454.

[16] Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy?* p. 3.

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the redefined Indo-Pacific, which successive administrations have characterized as the strategically most important region with regard to American interests in the twenty-first century. Here, however, American grand strategy becomes more of a context against which we examine those of the other two states – China and India – deliberately chosen because they reflect a variety of goals, instruments and resources. This comparison, albeit limited in scope, generates an interesting finding: Contrary to conventional assumptions about American grand strategy being determinative, China has in fact been the primary shaper of the region's dynamics, with India and the United States adapting in response.

In a brief conclusion (section 6) we turn to two overriding questions: how to think about a comparative research program in the field of grand strategy that does not begin with the United States as the dominant case, and what kinds of questions might both academics and policymakers focus on if they decide that a program in comparative grand strategy has its virtues.

2. Contrasting Assumptions and a Comparative Framework

The field of grand strategy is replete with problems that undermine its capacity to evolve into a conventional research program.[17] Definitions are contested and thus the choice of what to actually study is unresolved: Work is often prescriptive, rather than focusing on explanation;[18] there are few notable explicitly causal theories about grand strategy itself;[19] and the question of how to compare hasn't reasonably been debated, let alone settled.[20]

The focus of a research program should be on generating a series of generalizable formulations extending well beyond a very limited universe of cases. According to George Alexander and Richard Smoke, it should concentrate on diagnostics, not prescription.[21] Among the challenges facing scholars are answers to questions such as why states adopt and then change their grand strategies; if, when and how these change the nature of the international system itself; and what determines how domestic national security institutions actually implement strategic visions.

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[17] See Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 122–131. For a more digestible formulation of Lakatos's argument that addresses issues central to the field of international relations, see Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), particularly pp. 5–13.

[18] Barry Posen reflected the tendency toward prescription when expressing a common sentiment that "The [realist] theories that inform my strategic thinking, and the particular facts of the U.S. situation, suggest that US grand strategy can and should be quite 'restrained' " (Posen, *Restraint*, p. 23). Yet he does not explicitly discuss those theories and how they relate to his prescription. He uses an implicit causal logic rather than explicit theory as the basis for prescription.

[19] For an affirmation of the latter see Avey, Markowitz and Reardon, "Disentangling Grand Strategy."

[20] For a specific application to the field of grand strategy, see Balzacq, Dombrowski and Reich, "Is Grand Strategy a Research Program?"

We cannot address all these issues in the context of this short Element. But developing a comparative framework has utility for addressing aspects of them in a way that may encourage further debate. Answering questions like what drives a particular type of grand strategy would engender a rich field of inquiry. This work may guide us toward eventual diagnosis, rather than prescription.

In this section, we briefly offer a set of assumptions that we believe are foundational for future comparative research on grand strategy, a requisite if the field is to offer generalizable and testable theoretical propositions. We then outline a framework for future comparative work on grand strategy.

2.1 The Contrasting Assumptions of Comparative Grand Strategy

In constructing a case for comparative grand strategy, we begin by disputing the common view that all policymakers are exclusively rational in their calculations when making decisions, as well as how they calculate and what they calculate about. We assume, rather, that grand strategizing has subjective, cognitive, and cultural elements.[22] Decision-making by state elites about goals, threats, opportunities and the means of implementing a grand strategy are conditioned by a confluence of subjective and objective factors. Restated paradigmatically, Realists and Liberals have dominated the debate, Constructivists have played

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[21] Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 636. Work that emphasizes prescription is too voluminous to cite comprehensively here, but for recent important examples, see Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp- Hooper, “The Day after Trump: American Strategy for a New International Order,” *Washington Quarterly* 41 (2018): pp. 7–25; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing,” *Foreign Affairs* 95 (July–August, 2016): pp. 70–83; Ionut Popscu, “American Grand Strategy and the Rise of Offensive Realism,” *Political Science Quarterly* 134, no. 3 (2018-19): pp. 375–405; Barry R. Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 92 (January–February, 2013): pp. 105–116; Stephen M. Walt, *The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).

[22] For examples from other parts of the IR literature on cognitive and cultural processes of decision-making, see Richard Ned Lebow, *Nuclear Crisis Management* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984,); Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January, 1978): pp. 167–214; Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring, 1995): pp. 32–64.

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a marginal role, and Marxists have abstained although they offer trenchant criticism.[23]

How state elites interpret, and reinterpret, history helps define goals, prioritize threats and opportunities and marshal resources. A collective sense of historical injustice and victimhood, of the need to resurrect lost empire or even guilt, is adjudicated through domestic politics and sold to waiting publics. Such factors often prove as important as the pressures of the external environment in interpreting threats. Albanians and Kosovars still focus on the Serbian threat despite the passage of a generation since the end of the Balkan wars.[24] Turkey's leaders seek to rekindle the Ottoman Empire lost a century ago.[25] In several countries (such as Iran or Saudi Arabia) confessional politics and religious aspirations underpin strategic choices, a circumstance long unimaginable in most Western countries.[26]

Second, we therefore assume that domestic politics plays a far greater explanatory role in the formulation and implementation of a grand strategy. As we discuss in greater detail in section 3, some Realists acknowledge the effect of domestic economic capacity on a military budget, but little more.[27] Liberal proponents of deep engagement *plus* promote values such as democracy. Neoclassical Realists contend that the relationship between systemic and domestic factors is interactive,[28] but leave unresolved the question of causality in that relationship, arguing "that employing such an approach makes it difficult to say much about the causal role of power factors relative to other potential independent variables."[29]

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[23] For Constructivist exceptions, see Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. Krebs, "Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy," *Security Studies* 24, no. 1 (2015): pp. 5–36; Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Ronald R. Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of US National Security* (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 2015). For an assessment of the role of strategic culture, see Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Jeffrey S. Lantis, 'Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism" in *Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking*, ed. Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). On Marxism, see Perry Anderson, *American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers* (New York: Verso, 2015), especially p. 155.

[24] "Freedom and Fear: Kosovo Remembers War, 20 Years After," *RFI*, November 6, 2019, www.rfi.fr/en/contenu/20190611-freedom-and-fear-kosovo-remembers-war-20-years-after.

[25] Michael Colborne and Maxim Edwards, "Erdogan Is Making the Ottoman Empire Great Again," *Foreign Policy*, June 22, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/22/erdogan-is-making-the-ottoman-empire-great-again/.

[26] Michael Axworthy, *Iran (What Everyone Needs to Know)* (London: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 173–180; Crystal A. Ennis and Bessma Momani, "Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi Foreign Policy Strategies," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 6 (2013): pp. 1127–1144.

[27] The debated is linked in at least two ways: first, whether maintaining primacy is worth it (see, for example, Drezner, "Military Primacy Doesn't Pay") and second, whether the case for restraint based on the negative impacts on the US economy, such as increasing the nation's debt, is true: "[An] oft-expressed economic argument against the United States globally engaged grand strategy – that the military expenditures it entails is responsible for escalating debt – lacks grounding in empirical evidence and economic theory" (Norrlof and Wohlforth, "Is US Grand Strategy Self-Defeating?," p. 243).

We regard domestic factors as causative in defining the ways, means and ends of grand strategy. This assumption helps us interrogate how institutional factors influence the resilience of grand strategy in some countries, long after the geopolitical circumstances have demanded strategic adjustment.[30] Famously, France tried to maintain its colonialist power in Algeria and Indo–China long after domestic and international circumstances suggested that withdrawal would have been less costly.[31] The same was true of Britain, which failed to recognize that even victory in World War II would necessitate the decline of the role of the pound Sterling and the end of empire.[32]

Third, we assume that any coherent state can potentially develop a grand strategy utilizing different configurations of diplomatic, economic and/or military instruments.[33] Even some supra-state or nonstate actors – such as the EU, Taliban or ISIS – do so as well.[34] We do, however, exclude failed or fragile states – such as Libya, Somalia or Yemen – as possibilities. They lack the capacity to formulate and implement a grand strategy. We also reject states that are demonstrably not autonomous from their neighbors, such as Belarus which is reliant on Russia.

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[28] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman and Steven E. Lobell, eds., *The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the Broken Balance between the Wars* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[29] Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (October, 1998): p. 151. See also, Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (March, 2005): pp. 1–30.

[30] On domestic factors and strategic adjustment, see Peter Trubowitz, Emily Goldman and Edward Rhodes, eds., *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Interests and Institutions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

[31] Raymond Aron, *La tragedie Algerienne* (Paris: Plon, 1957).

[32] Peter Clarke, *The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008).

[33] Goddard and Krebs, "Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy."

[34] On the EU, see Jolyon Howorth, "The EU As a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48, no. 3 (June, 2010): pp. 455–474; Daniel Fiott and Luis Simón, "The European Union," in *Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Case*, eds. Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 263–283. For the case of the Taliban, for example, see Mohammed Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995); and Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: Norton, 2010). On ISIS, see Ahmed S. Hashim, "The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate," *Middle East Policy* 21 no. 4 (Winter, 2014): pp. 69–83.

Where a decision has to be made about whether a state qualifies for study, however, the burden should be on scholars to explore the details of whether and how a state can engineer its own security, rather than simply assuming it cannot. We begin by asking a question: Does a particular state demonstrate the requisite capacity to formulate grand strategic goals, an ability to make independent decisions and the means to implement them, even if this architecture does not resemble Western idealized notions of policy making? The utility of this approach is threefold: increasing the prospects of generalizability; a comparative capacity for establishing causality; and a greater ability for policymakers to recognize the interactive nature of any grand strategy.

Fourth, grand strategies do not have to focus exclusively on controlling or shaping the global system – that is, trying to impose their own worldview on their external environment.[35] They can also adapt to the exigencies of that system, or detach from it through an autarkic approach. All states with a grand strategy – great or small – attempt to combine both elements of controlling or shaping, and adaption or detachment – locally, regionally or globally – to varying degrees. The variation among the grand strategies of individual states is their capacity to balance these elements. The United States, for example, may seek to control or shape but, in practice, it also routinely adapts to systemic changes such as responding to the rise of what it characterizes as “revisionist powers” like China in the Indo–Pacific and Russia in the Arctic, Baltics and beyond.[36]

Smaller states, by necessity, often emphasize adaptation or detachment in their grand strategies. Critics of this assumption characterize this behavior as merely “strategic.” But, in practice, the distinction between grand strategy and strategy is often blurred.[37] It would be hard to classify North Korea’s behavior over seven decades as only “strategic” or tactical. It has shaped the northeast Asian region while remaining largely detached. Both Israeli strategies and

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[35] On the difference between shaping and controlling, see Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer, 2003): pp. 5–46.

[36] See Anne Applebaum, “Putin’s Grand Strategy,” *South Central Review* 35, no. 1 (Spring, 2018): pp. 22–34, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/690689/pdf; Monaghan, “Putin’s Russia”; McFaul, “The Grand Strategy of Vladimir Putin”; Robert Person, “Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,” *NSI*, May 3, 2019, https://nsiteam.com/russian-grand-strategy-in-the-21st-century/.

[37] For varied perspectives on this issue, see David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (January, 1997): pp. 5–26; Richard K. Betts “Should Strategic Studies Survive?,” *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (October, 1997): pp. 7–33; Colin S. Gray, “Approaching the Study of Strategy” in *International Security and War: Politics and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century*, ed. Ralph Rotte and Christoph Schwartz (New York: Nova, 2011); Lukas Milevski, *The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought* (London: Oxford University Press, 2016); Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (June,1991): pp. 211–239.

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tactics over the last decade and Iranian strategy since 1979 have at times shaped the Middle Eastern political, diplomatic and security environment.[38] None of these efforts seek to control the global environment like, for example, China's Belt and Road Initiative (see section 5). Nor are they comparable in terms of geographic scope. But their significance for the security environments in which they operate – locally and regionally in terms of their neighbors – should not be underestimated. Each region's security environment would alter considerably if there were regimes with different grand strategies in Iran, North Korea and Israel.

Our fifth assumption is that states can and do employ numerous instruments (means) to address a growing variety of perceived threats and opportunities (ends). Kinetic conflict and liberal-democratic values are still too limited in defining the boundaries of the ends of grand strategy, as are the instruments employed, in an evolving global environment. In our 2018 book *The End of Grand Strategy* we laid out an argument for a threefold typology of threats that grand strategy can and does seek to address: kinetic, anthropogenic (such as climate change) and naturogenic (such as viruses) threats. Combatting them uses far more instruments than the grand strategy literature acknowledges.[39] The World Health Organization's 2019 estimate of a quarter of a million deaths a year from the effects of climate change, for example, is clearly a conservative number.[40] Likewise, the US rhetoric regarding COVID-19 (describing it as a "war"), the transnational process of transmission, the invocation of National Defense legislation, the adoption of emergency measures including the use of the military, and the mortality rate (higher than the Korean and Vietnam wars combined), all legitimate the idea that combatting epidemics should be a goal of grand strategy, comparable to fighting a war.[41] Accepting that assumption, and with it a redefinition of national security, also expands the possible instruments that can be used in any grand strategy (the "means–ends" linkage).[42] The instruments of public health are analytically commensurate with the instruments of war. The ends–means linkage may extend much further. Generating

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[38] See Eitan Shamir, "Israel," and Thierry Balzacq and Wendy Ramadan-Alban "Iran," both in Balzacq, Dombrowski and Reich *Comparative Grand Strategy.*

[39] Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski, *The End of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), pp. 20–22.

[40] Jen Christensen, "250,000 Deaths a Year from Climate Change is a 'Conservative Estimate,' Research Says," *CNN*, January 16, 2019, www.cnn.com/2019/01/16/health/climate-change-health-emergency-study/index.html.

[41] Charlie Savage, "How the Defense Production Act Could Yield More Masks, Ventilators and Tests," *New York Times*, March 20, 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/us/politics/defense-production-act-virus.html.

[42] Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Redefining National Security for the Post-Pandemic World," *Project Syndicate*, June 3, 2020, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/redefining-national-security-for-world-after-covid19-by-anne-marie-slaughter-2020-06.