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Introduction

Violence, both physical and nonphysical, is central to constructing any society, but it is often problematic in that it is a version of the problem that it sometimes claims to solve. This Element examines how the evolving state orders in ancient East Asia – from the late Shang through the end of the Han dynasty – wielded different forms of violence in their military, political, social, and religious orders to create and display their power, but also shows how their licit forms of violence were entangled in the "savage" or "criminal" violence whose conquest or suppression routinely justified their claims to power. At each stage, the East Asian case will be supplemented through examining comparable cases in the West – for example, "Bronze Age theocracies" of Mesopotamia and Egypt in comparison with the Shang; late Republican Rome in comparison with the Warring States; and late antiquity in comparison with the Han empires. Among the themes examined will be the emergence of the warrior as a human type; the overlap of hunts and combat in early political forms (and the relationship between treatments of alien species and alien peoples); human sacrifice of both alien captives and "death attendants" from one's own group (followers in life who were sacrificed to attend the ruler in death); the impact of military specialization and the increased scale of armies; the role of an ideal of self-sacrifice; how the violence of law (along with lawlike practices including vengeance) was both justified and hidden in order to keep the society functioning; the emergence of political orders based on private armies and resettled, tribal peoples; and the evolving forms of sacrifice as a basis of power.

This dualism of violence as a force that both destroys and preserves order is indicated in many languages. Thus, in early Chinese the standard term for "government" (*zheng* **tsyeng*政) was homophonous and graphically identical (before the standardization of significs) with "military offensive" (*zheng* **tsyeng* 征) and also with 正 (*zheng* **tsyeng*), which as a transitive verb indicated to "correct" or "rectify" – this could also indicate a form of violence (see the next section). Likewise the word *zui* **dzwojH* 罪 indicated both a crime and a punishment (although this is in part simply a feature of classical Chinese in which a noun could serve as a putative verb; the fact that in this case the operation is so routine that both senses are common indicates the clear overlap of the two senses). In Latin, the word *vis* "force" was related both to *violare* "to outrage, treat with violence," but also to *vir* "a true man" and hence to *virtus*, the "virtuous potency" which allowed a man to win glory and honor in public service. Similarly, the German *Gewalt* was derived from the old Germanic *waldan*, which meant "to reign, to control," but in later German came to indicate both "violence" and "authority."[1]

1. Willem Schinkel, *Aspects of Violence: A Critical Theory* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 19–21.

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Definitions

Most definitions of "violence" focus on the narrow sense of it as *intentional, direct physical harm*. In my book *Sanctioned Violence* this sense was pushed to the extreme of referring to taking life, specifically taking life to create or preserve social order through: (1) forcibly compelling, (2) defining social groups, (3) marking matters of highest significance (for which one would kill or die), and (4) serving in mythic or metaphoric thinking.[2] Many such definitions also list forms of violence, usually with some apology that these are inevitably incomplete, hence leaving a vague definition.[3]

However, some scholars studying violence in recent decades have argued for an "extended" definition that goes beyond wielding physical force to inflict harm. The weaknesses of the "narrow" definition are elaborated by Willem Schinkel.[4] First, even in common speech the term "violence" is applied to structures or forms of conduct that limit people or cause them to "suffer" from diminution of their prospects, even if there is no physical pain.[5] Second, among such nonphysical violence, constraints or abuses imposed upon people through language, within which people are thrust into categories that radically diminish them, are particularly important.[6] Third, narrow definitions routinely insist on the "legitimacy" or "illegitimacy" of violence, which are themselves imposed within the process of some political order defining what does or does not count in this category.[7] Fourth, the narrow definition of violence insists on the presence of an actor or agent, thereby occluding any idea of "structural violence" that is built into the process of maintaining differentiations within the social order but routinely unrecognized because "no agency can be pointed out

2. Mark Edward Lewis, *Sanctioned Violence in Early China* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), pp. 1–5.
3. Yves Michaud, *La Violence* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986), ch. 1; Xavier Crettiez, *Les formes de la violence* (Paris: La Découverte, 2008), introduction.
4. Schinkel, *Aspects of Violence*, p. 35. On pp. 68–82 he lists nine advantages for his extended definition of violence as what contributes to a "reduction of being."
5. See Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das, and Margaret Lock, eds., *Social Suffering* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Veena Das, Arthur Kleinman, Mamphela Ramphele, and Pamela Reynolds, eds., *Violence and Subjectivity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Michel Wieviorka, *Violence: A New Approach*, tr. David Macey (Los Angeles: Sage, 2009).
6. Among discussions of language as a form of violence, the most influential are those in Pierre Bourdieu's theory of "symbolic violence." See *Ce que parler veut dire* [*Language and Symbolic Power*] (Paris: Fayard, 1982); *La Distinction: critique social du jugement* (Paris: Minuit, 1984), pp. 535–585; *Raisons pratiques: Sur la théorie de l'action* (Paris: Seuil, 1994), ch. 4, 6; *Méditation pascaliennes* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), pp. 10, 92, 98–99, 116, 197–288. See also Schinkel, *Aspects of Violence*, pp. 188–191.
7. David Riches, "The Phenomenon of Violence," in *The Anthropology of Violence*, ed. D. Riches (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 1–27; the other essays in this volume; and Bettina E. Schmidt and Ingo W. Schroder, eds., *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2001).

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as its intentional source."[8] Finally, closely related to the fourth point, narrow definitions of violence focus on violence as an *act*, while obscuring the way that it often works as a protracted, and hence less immediately visible, *process*.

Among the extended theories of violence, the most useful, because its highly abstract nature provides a phenomenological kernel that works through all the others, is Schinkel's assertion that it represents a "reduction of being."[9] Any action or structure that limits or diminishes the capacities or potential of certain people is a form of violence, in this extended sense. For example, violence in the narrow sense against Blacks in the USA would refer to lynching; to murders by police; and to the robberies, assaults, and murders suffered at the hands of criminals in their communities. In Schinkel's extended sense, it would include all the institutions and practices that have impoverished and diminished Blacks: red lining, racial restriction covenants, routine denial of loans, ignoring job applications from people with Black-sounding names (when identical applications with white names result in interviews), exclusion from the benefits of the GI Bill, voter suppression, disproportionate subjection to stop and frisk, disproportionate frequency of arrest and prosecution, disproportionate imprisonment, the "war on drugs," extreme penalties for crack as opposed to powdered cocaine, and so on. It would also, under the rubric of "symbolic violence," include anti-Black discourse that posits their inferior intelligence, limited capacity to experience pain, and other supposed biological differences that justify discrimination.

Schinkel also invokes Wittgenstein's theory of "seeing an aspect," meaning that the speaker "sees something *as* something," without claiming to be exhaustive and uniquely true. Perceiving these phenomena *as* violence means seeing them from a new perspective, and making new connections, without insisting that the concept "violence" exhausts what could be said about them.[10] Schinkel's ideas have been developed by Roderick Campbell into a model of "moral economies" or "regimes" of violence in which different "local worlds" construct their own "hierarchies of being" that exalt certain groups into a higher category of existence, and diminish others to lower forms of being.[11] This improves upon Schinkel in that it emphasizes the dual aspect of creating such hierarchies, both the radical diminution of some (the victims) and the equally

8. Schinkel, *Aspects of Violence*, pp. 185–189.
9. Aspects of this definition and its superiority to rivals are elaborated in Schinkel, *Aspects of Violence*, ch. 1–3.
10. Schinkel, *Aspects of Violence*, pp. 5–12. The title of Schinkel's book places this "aspectual" approach at the center of attention.
11. Roderick Campbell, "Introduction: Toward a Deep History of Violence and Civilization," *in Violence and Civilization: Studies of Social Violence in History and Prehistory*, ed. Roderick Campbell (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2014), pp. 6–10, 17–18.

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radical inflation of others (the perpetrators). One must also keep in mind that the supposed exaltation or inflation of the condition of the perpetrators of violence often makes sense only within the society or the privileged groups who perform the violence. Thus people celebrated European colonialism as "civilizing" or "spreading law" to supposed savages, while it actually attained hitherto unimagined forms and degrees of cruelty.[12]

Campbell has applied this model to his own studies of Shang violence (see the next section), and I will demonstrate its usefulness in the analysis of later periods. However, I would first like to add the point, which will recur, that as a mode of generating power and status, violence in both the broad and narrow senses remains perpetually dangerous and unstable. This is because it is usually scarcely distinguishable from, or even worse than, what it claims to destroy or suppress (as in the aforementioned case of European colonialism). It consequently remains permanently riven with tensions or contradictions, and ceases to justify any structure of authority in the very moment of its failure, and to justify post facto any new structure imposed.

Violence in the Shang World and Other "Bronze Age Theocracies"

Campbell's recent monograph – *Violence, Kinship and the Early Chinese State: The Shang and their World* (Cambridge, 2018) – has been described by Lothar von Falkenhausen as "the best one-volume treatment of Shang civilization to have come out since K. C. Chang's still useful but out-of-date *Shang Civilization* (New Haven, 1980)." In this book, as the title suggests, the role of violence in defining the Shang world has a prominent place.[13] It argues that the polity based at Shang Anyang was distinguished by the tremendous scale of its violence: warfare, hunting, human sacrifice, other sacrifices, and tens of thousands of real and symbolic weapons that were buried with the dead. At the apogee of this structure was warfare, in which the king moved across his realm and those of clients or allies, securing peace through touring, hunting, gifting, offering sacrifices, and – when necessary – defeating an opponent in battle. The

12. See Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998). Nidesh Lawtoo, ed., *Conrad's Heart of Darkness and Contemporary Thought: Revisiting the Horror with Lacoue-Labarthe* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012) contains some of the most perceptive writings on "civilization" and its "darkness" seen through the lens of what has become the classic mythic text of colonialism.

13. Campbell, *Violence, Kinship, and the Early Chinese State*, "War and Sacrifice in the Second Millennium BCE," pp. 74–84; "Violence and Shang Civilization" (divided into "War, Sacrifice and the Polity" and "The Logic of Sacrifice"), pp. 178–211. See also Campbell, "Transformations of Violence: On Humanity and Inhumanity in Early China," in *Violence and Civilization*, pp. 94–118.

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inscriptional material suggests that his exercise of coercive power was "largely personal, direct, and intense, if sporadic and unsystematic." "Resources of violence" were dispersed among many local rulers and lineage heads who engaged in raids, campaigns, and rebellions, forcing the king to constantly negotiate alliances, and resort only when necessary to wars. More distant peoples who were not party to alliances were the target of more overt hostilities, including campaigns apparently fought to secure victims for large-scale human sacrifices. In this way a hierarchy of peoples – ranging from the Shang royal lineage itself, through its followers and allies, to the most distant and alien tribes – was marked out in the different forms of violence to which they could be subjected.

Followers of the Shang king formed kin groups based on shared residence and burial, but also on their role in state violence. Specifically, the units for military action seem to have been these kin groups, the oracle-bone graph for which depicted two men grouped under a banner, suggesting a military origin and role. The routine burial of weapons with these people may also have indicated their function as warriors. Moreover, inscriptions indicate that these lineages also provided the basic terms for defining identity within the Shang polity, with interlineage status based largely on genealogical relationship to the Shang king. All these people made offerings to their own lineage ancestors, but they also joined under the king who, as apex lineage leader, united them in the service of ancestral honor, sacrifices, and wars.[14]

The "hierarchy of being" articulated in the Shang "moral economy of violence" was most detailed in the patterns that culminated in human sacrifice. More broadly, it was embedded in a "hierarchy of ancestral authority" that extended from the lowest creatures, through lesser peoples, members of the Shang state, the elite, the king and his royal ancestors, up to the high god, Di, and associated powers of the land. The aforementioned expeditions and systems of alliance marked the king's claim to the four quarters of the earth, although he relied on the support of his allies. This structure, established in the violence of hunting and wars that pacified the outer realms, led up to the numerous human sacrifices marking royal burials. The combination of excavated tombs and inscriptional materials maps out at least three levels of sacrifice: (1) war captives who were decapitated, burned, or buried alive, and thus reduced to "nameless sacrificial capital"; (2) enemy leaders who were named (and whose function as named trophies marks their higher political status) in divinations on sacrifice, which stipulated to which ancestor they were offered as a trophy for

[14] Campbell, *Violence, Kinship and the Early Chinese State*, ch. 5, esp. pp. 154, 162–163, 174–177.

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his glory; and (3) "death attendants" who were buried intact and enjoyed a regular burial, except for being interred in someone else's tomb.[15] These would have been women, attendants, or officials of the deceased who more or less willingly followed their lord in death. The first two categories figured only in the largest tombs – those of the king and his highest allies – which indicates that they marked royal power, while the last type appear in a wider range of tombs. This dispersed ability to command human sacrifice, like the dispersed claim to military resources, shows the distribution of coercive capital through the segmentary structure of lineages that formed the unstable order of the Shang world.

This partial dispersal of military power, marked by the negotiation of alliances and general appearance of "death attendants" in elite tombs, is also indicated by the association of elite status with weapons and symbolic artifacts derived from them since the early third millennium BCE, and the consistent place of weapons as a percentage of grave goods since the second millennium. Indeed, in the Anyang period some elite tombs contained hoards of weapons sufficient to outfit a small army. Thus status and violence seem to have been symbolically intertwined since the third millennium BCE. Moreover, in the late Anyang period this practice seems to have extended even to nonelite tombs, suggesting that a wider range of the burial community could "join their ancestors equipped with what would have been markers of elite status in earlier times."[16]

In summation, Campbell argues that "war and sacrifice were two aspects of the same structuring institution, creating order and a measure of ontological security." Such warfare was not a breakdown of negotiated order, nor a continuation of policy by other means, but an enactment of authority, which gloried in wielding a range of elite insignia including ritual weapons, chariots, and monumental human sacrifice. The internal pacification achieved through Shang warfare was not simply the elimination of all military threats, but a creation of order out of "the anarchic forces of the world." Finally, this should not be understood as a "monopoly" of violence within a "state" order, but rather a set of "hierarchically structuring practices differentially participated in by all." While the Shang king was superior in the scale of the armies he could command and the human sacrifices he could offer up, a range of lesser elites participated in the violent structuring of the world through warfare, hunting, and sacrifice.[17]

15. For a comparative study of "death attendants," focusing on early dynastic Egypt, see Ellen F. Morris, "(Un)Dying Loyalty: Meditations on Retainer Sacrifice in Ancient Egypt and Elsewhere," in Campbell, *Violence and Civilization*, pp. 61–93.
16. Campbell, *Violence, Kinship and the Early Chinese State*, pp. 76–81.
17. Campbell, *Violence, Kinship and the Early Chinese State*, pp. 210–211.

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This pattern of a polity built around a divinely empowered king who actively wielded violence to shape the world also appeared in other "Bronze Age theocracies" that had emerged earlier in Mesopotamia and Egypt. The most valuable survey of this is William Hamblin's *Warfare in the Ancient Near East to 1600 BC*. In his introduction he states that for the ancient Near Easterners war "was the means by which the gods restored cosmic order through organized violence undertaken in their name by their divinely ordained kings."[18] Hamblin elaborates this theme over 500 pages, tracing the evolving technologies of organized violence, the shifting depiction (both written and visual) of kings and warriors, and the cultic practices, hymns, and laments for destroyed cities, in which are depicted these interactions between the gods, the divinely sanctioned (and sometimes divinized) rulers, and their priests.

This elaboration of the religious forms in which warfare, hunting, and sacrifice were intertwined is also significant in that, without articulating any theory of violence (as, for example, that which creates "hierarchies of being"), Hamblin's monograph elaborates how the performance of violence served to establish ranked structures ascending from a mastered nature, through defeated foes (artistically depicted as piles of corpses or mutilated body parts), through the armies of the conqueror, then the king himself (routinely larger than his soldiers and often dispatching the enemy chieftain with a blow, or enjoying with his queen the spectacle of his foe's head hanging in the garden), and finally the patron gods who made his victory possible. All these themes, and their repeated representation in the visual arts, have also been the subject of specialist monographs.[19]

The ancient Middle East and Western Europe resembled the Shang world in that the divinely ordained ruler as chief warrior emerged from a world in which weapons had for centuries or millennia been status goods (marked in burials),

18. Hamblin, *Warfare in the Ancient Near East to 1600 BC: Holy Warriors at the Dawn of History* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 12–13.

19. On Mesopotamia, the most valuable are Zainab Bahrani, *Rituals of War: The Body and Violence in Mesopotamia* (New York: Zone Books, 2008) – which uses ideas from Foucault and Agamben (see the section, "Violence under the Early Empires") to discuss artistic depictions of combat and royal violence – and Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, *The Forms of Violence: Narrative in Assyrian Art and Modern Culture* (New York: Schocken, 1985). Amelie Kuhrt, *The Ancient Near East c. 3000–330 BC* (London: Routledge, 1995), vol. 1–2, is a comprehensive survey which gives detailed treatments of the interlinking of war, ritual, and political authority. On the early Egyptian palettes depicting the king's violent dispatching of his foes – often with fields of bound and decapitated corpses – see Whitney Davis, *Masking the Blow: The Scene of Representation in Late Prehistoric Egyptian Art* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Ellen Morris describes these scenes as becoming "emblematic of pharaonic power for nearly 3,000 years." See Morris, "(Un)Dying Loyalty," pp. 63–65. For later Egyptian history, see Uroš Matić, *Body and Frames of War in New Kingdom Egypt: Violent Treatment of Enemies and Prisoners* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2019).

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and attacks on humans had been a standard practice (as shown by the evidence of wounds and the mutilation of corpses). The most valuable study of this theme was coauthored by an archaeologist and a doctor/paleopathologist who combined their specialist expertise to trace the evolving social role of violence in prehistory, culminating with the ideological construction of the ideal of the warrior and the hero.[20] This repeated use of funerary ritual to demonstrate the creation of power also shows how humanity has always defined itself in its relations to death, to the extent that some scholars use the appearance of death ritual as a marker of the separation of the human from an animal background, but that these rituals from the beginning served to perpetuate, or extend into the afterlife, power generated through violence.[21]

What this and related works indicate is that small-scale, organized violence in which most males participated was widespread, if not universal, among hunter-gatherers.[22] However, such violence gradually became the sphere of specialists, who wielded their mastery of violence to establish themselves above their erstwhile peers. At some point, through the assimilation of such men into temple-based religions that elevated their chief above all other people, the figure of the king emerged. This may have been linked to the emergence of the idea of sacrifice, as the violence of the hunt (in societies where hunting was no longer the standard mode of attaining food but rather a form of privilege) or that of intercommunal combat was rendered significant or even divine through ritual performances. Some theories have also found in the emergence of sacrificial cults traces of a period when men were as frequently the prey of animals as their hunters.[23]

20. Jean Guilaine and Jean Zammit, *Le Sentier de la guerre: Visages de la violence préhistorique* (Paris: Seuil, 2001), translated into English as *The Origins of War: Violence in Prehistory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). See also Arther Ferrill, *The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1985), ch. 1–3; John Carman and Anthony Harding, eds., *Ancient Warfare: Archaeological Perspectives* (Stroud, UK: The History Press, 2009); Bruce Lincoln, *Religion, Empire, and Torture: The Case of Achaemenian Persia, with a Postscript on Abu Ghraib* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

21. Jean-Pierre Mohen, *Les Rites de l'au-delà* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2010), begins by studying the emotions evoked by death, and the use of death ritual to confront these, but then devotes most of his work to showing how the full panoply of warriors, emperors, god-kings, and medieval monarchs perpetuated their status in funerary ritual, often like the Shang kings, using rites that diminished those around them.

22. The now classic treatment of this is Lawrence H. Keeley, *War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). This work is elaborated in Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Part 1. Gat, curiously, does not perceive the rise of specialized violence as a significant development, instead treating state-based violence as a direct extension of the earlier tribal form.

23. A useful popularization of this is Barbara Ehrenreich, *Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), ch. 3–5. The most influential scholarly discussion is Walter Burkert, *Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial*

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A classic articulation of the idea that religion and specialized violence (along with some economic capacity) fused in the city to produce monarchy is Lewis Mumford's *The City in History*. He argues that three defining functions of the city – sanctuary, village, and citadel – all existed prior to the city itself, but that these three fused and transfigured one another when brought together behind walls under the authority of a transformed hunting class led by a sacralized monarch. This walled-in settlement then became a "pressure cooker" where the intermingling of people allowed for constant innovation and the increasing specialization that formed self-styled civilizations.[24]

Several scholars have argued that this emergence of specialist warriors and monarchs was linked with the development of agriculture, that the emerging cities made possible by the Neolithic revolution provided the matrix for these developments, and perhaps that it was in the larger cities – where rulers relied on officials to measure taxable harvests and soldiers to enforce collection – that autocracy became possible. As states emerged around these cities, smaller tribal units in the hinterlands still violently defended their autonomy. This model of hunter-gatherers fighting to survive as warrior tribes of relatively equal *male* fighters in a world of expanding states with clear political hierarchies was articulated in articles by the anthropologist Pierre Clastres based on his studies in South America.[25]

The model of tribal resistance to state power is also elaborated by James C. Scott in two books. First, *The Art of Not Being Governed* examined the history of the hill peoples of Southeast Asia who resisted incorporation into the state societies around them. This resistance was based on practices that maintained mobility and fluidity as tribal groups: (1) remaining dispersed in rugged terrain, (2) using cropping practices that allowed mobility, (3) maintaining fluid ethnic identities, (4) following prophetic, millenarian leaders, and (5) keeping

Ritual and Myth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). This is summarized in "The Problem of Ritual Killing," in *Violent Origins: Walter Burkert, René Girard and Jonathan Z. Smith on Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation*, ed. R. G. Hamerton-Kelly (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 149–188. See also Philippe Descola, "Des Proies bienveillantes: Le Traitement du gibier dans la chasse amazonienne"; Florence Burgat, "La Logique de légitimation de la violence: Animalité vs. Humanité"; and Lucien Scubla, "Ceci n'est pas un meurtre: Ou comment le sacrifice contient la violence," in *De la violence II*, ed. Françoise Héritier (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005), pp. 19–44, 45–62, and 135–170.

24. Lewis Mumford, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects* (New York: MJF Books, 1961), ch. 1–2.

25. Pierre Clastres, *La Société contre l'état* (Paris: Minuit, 1974) and *Recherches d'anthropologie politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1980). The former was translated as *Society Against the State: The Leader as Servant and the Humane Uses of Power Among the Indians of the Americas* (New York: Urizen, 1977) and the latter as *Archeology of Violence* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1994). The last two essays in this volume give the best presentation of Clastres's model. On one aspect of this theory, see Severin Fowles, "On Torture in Societies Against the State," in *Violence and Civilization*, pp. 155–163.

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a primarily oral culture that allowed them to reinvent their histories and genealogies as they moved between the states. Second, *Against the Grain* traced a similar set of practices among peoples who resisted incorporation into sedentary polities at the time of the introduction of agriculture. Seeking to avoid the crowding, diseases, forced labor, and tyrannical rulers created through the adoption of plow agriculture and settling in cities, such peoples retreated as tribes to the peripheries where they were reconceived as "barbarians." These people, who would roughly correspond to the Qiang and other groups hunted and sacrificed by the Shang kings (indeed, Campbell argues that the word "Qiang" may have come to function as a more general rubric meaning "captive" or "slave"), sometimes maintained themselves in smaller tribes, sometimes were forced into the cities (perhaps to maintain urban populations constantly reduced by the new diseases created through crowding with animals), and sometimes were pressed into forming larger units to resist, units that could themselves destroy their state rivals.[26]

The East Asian pattern of political violence under the subsequent Western Zhou is unclear, because neither their capital nor any royal tombs have been excavated. However, we know that the Zhou had participated in the Shang state as an allied lineage, had at some point withdrawn, and had then emerged to reassert their power through military conquest. While their practice of establishing related lineages and allies in walled settlements distributed across conquered territories seems to have differed from the Shang, the building of the state as a confederation of warrior lineages, with the king predominant through having a more powerful army and supremacy in the sacrificial hierarchy, suggest the carrying forward of the principles that had guided the Shang. Moreover, excavated Western Zhou tombs show similar patterns of human sacrifice. Indeed, although human sacrifice declined after the twelfth century BCE, and critiques of the practice became prominent in the Eastern Zhou, it continued until the emergence of the empire and even increased in the late Warring States period.[27] Nevertheless, by the Eastern Zhou the pattern of

26. James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) and *Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). The model of the size of cities shaping the emergence of autocracy is articulated in David Stasavage, *The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020). Hamblin's volume already cited shows how "peripheral" peoples or "highlanders" were targets of conquest who sometimes (e.g., Akkadians, Persians) became conquerors. See *Warfare in the Ancient Near East*, pp. 6, 30, 71–72, 81, 84, 100, 109–111, 116–119, 156, 159, 213. For Campbell on the various possible meanings of "Qiang," see *Violence, Kinship and the Early Chinese State*, pp. 205–207.

27. Huang Zhanyue 黃展岳, *Gudai rensheng renxun tonglun* 古代人牲人殉通論 (Beijing: Wenwu, 2004); Campbell, "Transformations of Violence," pp. 103–109.

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