1 The Avicennian Conception of Islamic Monotheism

The cornerstone of Islamic faith, regardless of its interpretation by different branches of Islam, is *tawḥīd*: there exists one and only one God Who is the ultimate ground of everything in the universe. 'There is no god but God' – or, as it is expressed in the Quran (37: 35 and 47: 19), *lā ilāh illa Allāh* – is the most fundamental claim that every Muslim must testify to and endorse (*šahāda*).[1] The message of divine unity is also conveyed in other Quranic verses with slightly different wording: the phrases '*mā min ilāh illa Allāh*' (3: 62 and 38: 65) and '*lā ilāh illa Huwa*' (2: 163, 2: 255, etc.), for example, are repeated respectively two and twenty-six times in the Quran, meaning, again respectively, 'there is no god but God' and 'there is no god but He'. The repetition of this notion is a sign of the unique and crucial role it plays in the web of Islamic beliefs. It should therefore come as no surprise that, from the Quranic perspective, denying the unity of God (*širk*) or ascribing to Him a partner (*šarīk*) is the only sin that God never forgives:

> Truly God forgives not that any partner be ascribed unto Him, but He forgives what is less than that for whomsoever He will, for whosoever ascribes partners unto God has surely fabricated a tremendous sin. (4: 48)

Thus understood, *tawḥīd* is the Islamic expression of monotheism; accordingly, *širk* – the opposite of *tawḥīd* – can be construed as the expression of polytheism. The verse just quoted therefore highlights that the fundamental message of Islam is the denial of polytheism and the endorsement of monotheism. Indeed, conjoining this observation with the content of other verses, it can be argued that, from the point of view of the Quran, to be a truly religious person in general is precisely to accept the uniqueness of God.

The Quran states that '*ʾinna al-dīn ʿind Allah al-islām*' (3: 19). If we interpret '*islām*' as referring exclusively to the religion of the followers of the prophet Muhammad, then the whole phrase must be understood as emphasising that, in the sight of God, the true religion is Islam and the followers of other religions (including Judaism and Christianity) cannot be considered truly religious people. Such an interpretation is implausible, however, because at least one significant figure – the prophet Abraham – lived before the time of the prophet Muhammad and yet the Quran describes him as a true believer in *islām* – that is, a *muslim* (3: 67). This shows that in the context of the Quran, *islām* and *muslim*

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[1]   In references to the Quran, 'x: y' refers to verse y of chapter x. Unless otherwise mentioned, all translations of Quranic verses – including the verses mentioned in the quoted passages whose other parts are translated by myself – are borrowed from Nasr (2015). On the notion of *šahāda* in Sunni and Shia Islam, see Ahmed (2016, pp. 137–9).

must have a broader meaning than the terms *Islam* and *Muslim* as they are
understood within the sociocultural categorisation of religions.[2] Indeed, the
literal meaning of *islām*, which seems to fit better into the Quranic context, is
submission (to God). On this construal, a *muslim* is a person who has truly
submitted to God and His commands; such wholehearted submission is plaus-
ible only if there is no god but He.[3] Indeed, the first and the most obvious
precondition of true and full submission to God seems to be to concede His
unity. That is why the Quran's description of Abraham as one who submits to
God is complemented by an emphasis that he was not a polytheist:

> Abraham was neither a Jew nor a Christian, but rather was an upright (person),
> one who truly submits, and he was not one of the polytheists. (3: 67)[4]

We may conclude that, according to the Quran, the true religion is *islām* in
the sense of sincere submission to God and a truly religious person is a *muslim*
in the sense that she/he endorses God's unity and sincerely submits her/
himself to God. Thus, being a *muslim* in its Quranic sense has no simple
connection to being a bearer of the sociocultural label 'Muslim'. Some people
might describe themselves as followers of the prophet yet have not truly
submitted to God: since they do not truly accept the core of monotheism and
do not believe that all power, knowledge, and goodness are entirely God's,
they would not be *muslim* in the Quranic sense even if they are labelled
'Muslims'. On the other hand, there might be people whom a sociocultural
mapping would classify as followers of other religions (e.g., Jews and
Christians), but who are true *muslims* in the Quranic sense. In the sight of
God, the true religion is *islām* and the core tenet of *islām* is the sincere
endorsement of monotheism and full submission to God:

> God bears witness that *there is no god but He*, as do the angels and the
> possessors of knowledge, upholding justice. *There is no god but He*, the
> Mighty, the Wise. (3: 18)

> *Truly the religion in the sight of God is submission.* Those who were given the
> Book differed not until after knowledge had come to them, out of envy among
> themselves. And whosoever disbelieves in God's signs, truly God is swift in
> reckoning. (3: 19)[5]

Given the centrality of monotheism in Quranic theology, it is by no means
surprising that, in the intellectual history of Islam, the first two goals in any

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[2] For a discussion of different senses of *islām* and for references to recent works on this issue,
see Ahmed (2016, chap. 1).
[3] See Cole (2019) and Donner (2019) for studies which support this understanding of the meaning
of *islām* in the Quran.
[4] My translation.   [5] Emphases are mine.

theological discussion have been to establish the *existence* and the *oneness* of God. Naturally, how these targets are approached hinges on how God is understood. Among the early Muslim theologians and philosophers there was no consensus on this question, and consequently there was no unique strategy for defending the monotheistic essence of Islam. For example, for the first Muslim philosopher, al-Kindī (d. 870), the two targets merge because, inspired by Plotinus, he understands God as the True One (*al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq*). So, for al-Kindī, the existence of God is tantamount to God's true oneness. To prove the existence of God, al-Kindī puts forward an argument based on a combination of a priori claims and factual observations, trying to show that the plurality we see in the world cannot be caused except by the True One.[6] By contrast, being more faithful to Aristotelian doctrine, al-Fārārbī (d. 950) understands God as the First Existent Who is the cause of all other things while It is Itself uncaused. So al-Fārārbī first shows – by appeal to a more or less Aristotelian argument based on the impossibility of infinite regresses – that there is such an existent, and then argues that the First Existent can have no duplicate.[7] From Avicenna (d. 1037) onwards, however, things change.

Avicenna believes that God must be understood in the first place as the Necessary Existent (*wāǧib al-wuǧūd*). In his various works, he provides different versions of an ingenious argument for the existence of the Necessary Existent – the so-called Proof of the Sincere (*burhān al-ṣiddīqīn*) – and argues that all the properties that are usually attributed to God can be extracted merely from God's having necessary existence.[8] In other words, being-a-necessary-existent is the most fundamental attribute of God which entails all His other attributes. Considering the centrality of *tawḥīd* to Islam, the first thing Avicenna tries to extract from God's necessary existence is God's oneness. However, to achieve this goal, at least in some of his works, he first establishes the *simplicity* of the Necessary Existent. So, in at least some places, he apparently sees divine simplicity as a bridge between divine necessity and divine unity. This does not mean that Avicenna has in practice abandoned the priority of *tawḥīd* over all other divine attributes: indeed, *tawḥīd* can be rendered as a general doctrine about divine unity which includes not only the uniqueness of God among all beings but also the internal

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[6] For al-Kindī's account of the existence and unity of God, see the third section of his *On First Philosophy* in *The Philosophical Works of al-Kindī* (2012, pp. 26–41). For secondary studies on this issue, see Marmura and Rist (1963) and Adamson (2007, chap. 3).

[7] See Menn (2011).

[8] I have borrowed the phrase 'the Proof of the Sincere' as the translation of '*burhān al-ṣiddīqīn*' from Legenhausen (2005). Two alternative translations, used by Adamson (2016, p. 126) and Rizvi (2019, sec. 3.3), are respectively 'the Demonstration of the Truthful' and 'the Proof of the Veracious'. See Legenhausen (2005, p. 44, n. 1) on the exact meaning of the term *ṣiddīqīn*.

simplicity of God.[9] These two components of *tawḥīd* represent, respectively, the extrinsic and the intrinsic unity of God.[10] The doctrine of *tawḥīd* can accordingly be understood as stating that (1) there are not multiple gods and (2) there is no multiplicity in the nature of God. So as long as Avicenna proves (1) and (2) before moving on to the other attributes of God, he is faithful to the idea of the priority of *tawḥīd* over the other divine attributes, regardless of whether (1) is proved by appealing to (2) or vice versa.

Avicenna's approach later became so prevalent that there are barely any post-Avicennian Muslim philosophers or theologians who demur from describing God as the Necessary Existent or from the possibility of extracting God's other attributes from God's having necessary existence.[11] All the disagreements concern either the details of the Proof of the Sincere or the details of the arguments for establishing some of God's attributes based on God's having necessary existence.[12] This indicates that for many centuries the philosophical theology of Islam has been centred on the Avicennian understanding of God. Of course this does not prevent post-Avicennian thinkers like al-Ġazālī (d. 1111) from criticising other aspects of Avicenna's conception of God (aspects beyond God's being the Necessary Existent) and considering Avicenna's image of God incompatible with the image of God in the Quran.[13]

The aim of the present Element is to provide a detailed account of Avicenna's arguments for the existence and unity of God. Understanding the Avicennian notion of *efficient causation* in the same manner that contemporary analytic metaphysicians understand the notion of *ontological dependence*, I offer and defend revised versions of the Avicennian arguments for the existence of a unique necessary existent in which the existence of every other thing is grounded. But before engaging with the subtleties of Avicenna's arguments and presenting my own reconstruction of them, it is worth mentioning a few general points about Avicenna's methodology. In particular, I should highlight the striking similarities between Avicenna's approach and Anselm's perfect being theology, with which analytic philosophers of religion are more familiar.

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[9] This of course does not include necessary existence, which, from Avicenna's point of view, is the characteristic attribute of God.

[10] Wisnovsky (2003, p. 148).

[11] On the notion of the Necessary Existent by post-Avicennian Muslim philosophers, see Benevich (2020).

[12] On the reception of the Proof of the Sincere by post-Avicennian philosophers, theologians, and mystics, see Davidson (1987, chaps. IX and X), Legenhausen (2005), and Morvarid (2008, 2021).

[13] See, among others, Marmura (1964) and Burrell (1993).

2 Avicennian Necessary Existent Theology versus Anselmian Perfect Being Theology

There are two different understandings of how the different attributes of God are related to each other. According to the first, which we may refer to as the *single-divine-attribute* (SDA) doctrine, there is a unique divine attribute which entails, either directly or indirectly, all the other divine attributes. On this approach, all the attributes of God are somehow dependent on a certain fundamental attribute of Him and can accordingly be extracted from it. As a result, God can be fully described by that specific attribute. Thus, if we prove the existence of something which possesses that specific attribute, we have established the existence of God. Richard Swinburne seems to be endorsing SDA when he writes: 'almightiness entails *all* the divine properties; and thus, since it is the nature of an almighty being to be almighty, an almighty being is characterised by these properties necessarily'.[14]

By contrast, according to the *multiple-divine-attributes* (MDA) doctrine, there is more than one fundamental divine attribute. These attributes cannot be reduced to each other either directly or indirectly, and God's having each of them must be investigated independently from the others. On this approach there is no unique attribute through which we can fully describe God.[15]

For analytic philosophers of religion, the most famous defender of SDA in the history of theology and philosophy is Saint Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109).[16] For Anselm, there is one fundamental divine property – that is, being-that-than-which-no-greater-can-be-thought – from which all other divine attributes can be derived. To consider some examples, for Anselmian theists, being omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent can be easily concluded from being absolutely perfect. Therefore, if we can prove the existence of an absolutely perfect being (or, more precisely, the existence of the being than which no greater can be thought), we have established the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being.[17]

However, Anslem is not the first philosopher to have developed a theological system based on SDA: Avicenna followed a similar approach. Although Anselm and Avicenna disagree on what the most fundamental attribute of

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[14] Swinburne (1988, p. 229), my emphasis.

[15] The phrase 'single-divine-attribute doctrine' is taken from Schlesinger (1988). The distinction between SDA and MDA is discussed by Hestevold (1993). The MDA approach is held by, among others, Wierenga (1989).

[16] Anselm was born around four years before Avicenna's death and died two years before al-Ġazālī.

[17] For defences of the Anselmian SDA doctrine, see, among others, Morris (1987), Schlesinger (1988), Franklin (1993), Rogers (2000), Nagasawa (2017), and Speaks (2018). For criticisms of this doctrine from different perspectives see, among others, Mackie (1982, chap. 3, sec. b), Hestevold (1993), Oppy (1995, chaps. 1 and 8), Sobel (2004, sec. II.4), and Diller (2019).

God is, they both endorse SDA. For Avicenna, the most fundamental divine attribute is necessary existence. Neither Avicenna nor Anslem believes that God has a definition in the Aristotelian sense, but they share the view that God can be identified through a unique fundamental attribute.[18] In the same manner as Anslem sought to prove all God's attributes from God's being-that-than-which-no-greater-can-be-thought, Avicenna maintained that all God's attributes can be drawn out from God's being-the-necessary-existent and put forward many ingenious arguments to establish that attributes like simplicity, unity, immateriality, atemporality, and unchangeability can be deduced solely from necessary existence.[19] For Avicenna, God's absolute perfection is entailed by His necessary existence. For Anslem, it is the other way around: God's necessary existence is entailed by His absolute perfection.

There is another notable commonality between Avicenna and Anslem: both try to establish the existence of God by presenting entirely a priori arguments aimed at proving the existence of a being which has the fundamental attribute they ascribe to God. Although there is no consensus among Avicenna scholars on whether his Proof of the Sincere is an ontological argument in the sense that Anslem's argument is, it seems indisputable that both of these arguments are free from a posteriori features. These strong methodological connections between the two philosophers thus tempt us to develop a modern systematic Necessary Existent theology which can be considered as the Islamic–Avicennian counterpart of the modern Christian–Anselmian perfect being theologies. The later sections respond to this temptation in a preliminary fashion by providing reconstructed versions of Avicenna's arguments for the existence and unity of the Necessary Existent.

It must be emphasised that my primary concern in the following discussion is the philosophical strength of the arguments I offer, rather than historical accuracy and textual fidelity. So although the kernels of all arguments are extracted from Avicenna's texts, I do not hesitate to compromise on certain details (even concerning claims to which Avicenna is proudly committed) where this might make my arguments more coherent and compelling for a contemporary reader. Were I asked to label my project, I would describe it as an instance of *analytical Avicennianism*. Inspired by John Haldane, who coined the term 'analytical Thomism' in the early 1990s, the term 'analytical Avicennianism' can be understood as

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[18] On the indefinability of God for Avicenna and Anslem, see, respectively, Kamal (2016, p. 197) and Logan (2009, p. 91).

[19] On how Avicenna tries to show that the Quranic attributes of God can be deduced from God's having necessary existence, see Adamson (2013, 2016, chap. 18).

referring to the general idea of bridging between Avicenna's philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy.

3 Basic Notions of the Proof of the Sincere

3.1 Is the Existence of God Self-Evident?

In the first chapter of the first book of *The Metaphysics of* The Healing, Avicenna argues that the existence of God is not self-evident and needs to be established through metaphysics rather than by any other science:

> The existence of God – exalted be His greatness – cannot be admitted as the subject matter of this science (i.e., metaphysics); rather, it is [something] sought in it. This is because, if this were not the case, then [God's existence] would have to be either admitted in this science but searched for in another, or else admitted in this science but not searched for in another. Both alternatives are false. For it cannot be sought in another science, since the other sciences are either moral, political, natural, mathematical, or logical. None of the philosophical sciences lies outside this division. There is [absolutely] nothing in them wherein the proof of God – exalted be His greatness – is investigated. [Indeed,] this is impossible . . . [God's existence] would then have to be either self-evident (*bayyin bi-nafsih*) or [else] something one despairs of proving through theoretical reflection. But it is neither self-evident nor something one despairs of demonstrating; for [in fact] there is a proof for it. Moreover, how can an existence which one despairs of demonstrating be legitimately admitted? It thus remains that the investigation [of God's existence belongs] only in this science.[20]

In this passage, Avicenna considers four different possibilities regarding the existence of God: (1) The existence of God must be proved in metaphysics. (2) The existence of God must be proved in sciences other than metaphysics. (3) The existence of God is self-evident and consequently needs no proof. (4) The existence of God is unprovable. He then rejects the three latter possibilities and concludes that the existence of God must be proved in metaphysics. It is interesting that he insists that the existence of God is neither self-evident nor can be admitted without any proof: this reveals that he does not consider belief in God a properly basic belief in the sense that contemporary reformed epistemologists like Alvin Plantinga do.[21] Since Avicenna rejects the idea that the existence of God can be accepted without any argumentative justification, a fortiori he would disagree with fideists who render religious faith completely

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[20] Avicenna (2005, chap. I.1, sec. 11). All translations from *The Metaphysics* are by Marmura. The phrases within parentheses and square brackets are, respectively, mine and Marmura's.

[21] On the view that belief in God is properly basic, see Plantinga (1981, 1983). See also McNabb (2019) for the general elements of the reformed epistemology of religious beliefs.

independent of theoretical reason.[22] The existence of God, Avicenna believes, can and must be proved by theoretical reason. He seems, then, to be a proud defender of an evidentialist theism according to which belief in God is justified because there is convincing rational evidence for it. Such evidence – in the absence of which belief in God would be implausible – cannot be provided in any science other than metaphysics, or so Avicenna says in the passage just quoted.

3.2 Proof through Reflection on Existence in Itself

In the last section of the fourth Class of his *Remarks and Admonitions*, Avicenna states that the firmest and noblest way to prove the existence of God is through reflection upon existence qua existence (i.e., existence in itself):

> Reflect on how our proof of the [existence] of the First, His unity, and His freeness from [accidental] attributes (*al-ṣifāt*) does not require reflection on anything other than existence in itself (*nafs al-wuğūd*). It does not require consideration of His creation and His action, even if such a consideration provides evidence for [the existence of] Him. This method [i.e., reflection on existence in itself] is firmer and nobler [than reflection on God's creation and action]. This is because our consideration of the state of existence bears witness to the existence of Him inasmuch as He is existence; and then He bears witness to [the existence of] other things which are after [or dependent on] Him in existence. Something like this is referred to in the Divine Book: 'We shall show them Our signs upon the horizons and within themselves till it becomes clear to them that it is the truth.' I say that this is a rule for a group of people. It [i.e., the Divine Book] then says: 'Does it not suffice that thy Lord is Witness over all things?' (41: 53). I say that this is a rule for the sincere people (*al-ṣiddīqīn*) who bear witness [to other things] from Him, rather than to Him [from other things].[23]

Here Avicenna distinguishes two different ways of arguing for the existence of God. The first is to reflect on God's creation and actions as a means to argue for His existence; the second is to reflect on existence itself to establish the existence of God. Avicenna believes that the latter approach is more solid and is the one followed by those who are sincere. Thus the Proof of the Sincere aims at establishing the existence of God – together with His unity and His transcendence from accidental attributes – through theoretical consideration of existence in itself.

The first premise of (most versions of) the Proof of the Sincere is therefore that *something exists*. As Avicenna puts it at the beginning of the version of this proof in the metaphysics part of his *The Salvation*, 'there is no doubt that there is

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[22] Tertullian, Pascal, Kant, Kierkegaard, James, and Wittgenstein are the most famous historical advocates of fideism. In more recent literature, various fideist approaches to the epistemology of religion are defended by, among others, Cupitt (1984), Evans (1998), and Bishop (2007).

[23] Avicenna (1957, vol. 3, chap. IV.29, pp. 54–5), my translation.

existence'.[24] Post-Avicennian philosophers routinely quote this sentence in their reflections upon the Proof of the Sincere,[25] and one might think that it expresses an a posteriori fact, albeit 'with an extremely thin empirical content'.[26] However, it can be convincingly argued that for Avicenna, the sentences 'there exists something' and 'there is existence' express facts that are entirely a priori: this is because these claims can be inferred from the proposition expressed by the sentence 'I exist', and the a priority of the latter is guaranteed by Avicenna's Flying Man Argument.[27] This thought experiment shows that even if a person consists solely of an immaterial (or bodyless) soul who has no contact with the physical world, she/he can still know that she/he exists. In other terms, the Flying Man Argument shows that even if we have no experience of or access to the physical world, we can still entertain our self-consciousness. So, from the perspective of every human being, 'I exist' can be known independently from any experience of the physical world: equivalently, such knowledge can be grasped a priori.[28] Finally, since the argument from 'I exist' to 'there exists something' or 'there is existence' appears deductively valid, and presumably the a priori status of the premise is transferred across the valid entailment, the two latter propositions would be a priori as well.[29]

In the next steps of the Proof of the Sincere, the different states of an existent are taken into consideration. To proceed, we must first look at a couple of distinctions which play crucial roles in Avicenna's proof.

3.3 The Distinction between Essence and Existence

One of Avicenna's main achievements is to establish the distinction between essence (*māhīya*, *ḏāt*, *ḥaqīqa*, and sometimes *ṭabīʿa*) and existence (*wuǧūd*). The essence of a thing is *what* that thing is. The whatness of a thing is independent from whether that thing exists. For instance, that a triangle is

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[24] Avicenna (1985, p. 566). Avicenna presented the Proof of the Sincere in different places in his *oeuvre*, including but not limited to the metaphysics parts of the following works: (1) *The Salvation* (1985, pp. 566–8) and (2) *Remarks and Admonitions* (1957, vol. 3, chaps. 9–15, pp. 19–27). There is no consensus on where Avicenna proves the existence of the Necessary Existent in *The Metaphysics of* The Healing. See De Haan (2016) in this regard.

[25] Mayer (2001, p. 23).   [26] Morvarid (2021).

[27] For the exact structure and implications of the Flying Man Argument, see, among others, Marmura (1986), Alwishah (2013), Adamson and Benevich (2018), and Kaukua (2020).

[28] It is worth noting that a priority is not the same notion as *innateness*. A proposition is innate if it is given at birth, but it is a priori if it can be known independently from all the experiences we might have of the extra-mental physical world. So there can in principle be non-innate propositions which can be known a priori after birth, as we grow up. For instance, Kant believes that mathematical propositions are non-innate but a priori. For a discussion of Avicennian non-innate a priori propositions and of the claim that 'I exist' is one such proposition, see Zarepour (2020c).

[29] The same line of argument has been put forward by Shihadeh (2008, p. 213, n. 57).

a three-sided geometrical figure or that a human is a rational animal do not depend on whether such things actually exist. Thus, generally speaking, essences of things are distinct and independent from their existences.

Although the distinction between essence and existence has a background in ancient Greek philosophy, it is likely that Avicenna's presentation of this distinction was mainly influenced by the distinction between thing (*šayʾ*) and existent (or, more generally, between thingness and existence) proposed by the early Muslim theologians (*mutikallimūn*).[30] The thing–existence distinction comes up in the theologians' discussions of certain Quranic verses regarding the nature of God and His creative power. On one hand, there are verses which cast doubt on the idea that God can be considered a thing, even though from the viewpoint of the Quran there is no doubt that God exists. For instance, the Quran says (42: 11) that 'no thing is [even] like a likeness of Him' (*laysa ka-miṯlihi šayʾ*) and warns (4: 36) people not to embrace polytheism by associating *things* with God: 'And worship God and do not associate any thing with him' (*wa-ʿbudū Allāh wa la-tušrikū bihi šayʾā*).[31] Some early Muslim theologians interpreted these verses as clarifying that God's existence does not imply His being a thing. More generally, it follows from these verses that thingness is not implied by existence, or so those theologians argued.

On the other hand, some verses describe the creative act of God as His addressing non-existent things and commanding them to come into existence. For example, it is stated that 'Our Word unto a thing (*šayʾ*), when We desire it, is only to say to it "Be!" and it is' (16: 40), and that 'His Command when He desires a thing (*šayʾ*) is only to say to it "Be!" and it is' (36: 82). These verses can in principle be understood as witnessing that thingness does not imply existence either. There can be things that do not exist yet can still be addressed and referred to. Some early Muslim theologians indeed interpreted these verses in this manner. Coupling these two groups of verses, some theologians concluded that *thingness* and *existence* are completely independent notions. Neither implies the other.

It has been argued that Avicenna's distinction between essence and existence is a rehabilitation of the early Muslim theologians' distinction between thingness and existence.[32] Put otherwise, essence is the Avicennian counterpart for the theologians' thingness. Although the details of this comparison are beyond

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[30] For the Greek background of the essence–existence distinction, see Cresswell (1971) and Corrigan (1996).

[31] See also 3: 64, 6: 151, 12: 38, 22: 26, and 60: 12. The translations of 42: 11 and 4: 36 are, respectively, Wisnovsky's (2003, p. 147) and mine.

[32] See, among others, Jolivet (1984) and Wisnovsky (2003, chap. 7). On Avicenna's own notion of *thingness* (*šayʾīya*) and its commonalities and differences with respect to his notion of *essence*, see Wisnovsky (2000).