Cambridge Elements

Elements in the Philosophy of Mind
edited by
Keith Frankish

The University of Sheffield

THE METAPHYSICS
OF MIND

Janet Levin
University of Southern California
The Metaphysics of Mind

Elements in the Philosophy of Mind

DOI: 10.1017/9781108946803
First published online: February 2022

Janet Levin
University of Southern California

Author for correspondence: Janet Levin, levin@usc.edu

Abstract: This Element presents and discusses the major contemporary theories of the nature of mind, including Dualism, Physicalism, Role Functionalism, Russelian Monism, Panpsychism, and Eliminativism. Its primary goal is to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the theories in question, including their prospects for explaining the special qualitative character of sensations and perceptual experiences; the special outer-directedness of beliefs, desires, and other intentional states; and – more generally – the place of the mind in the world of nature, and the relation between mental states and the behaviors that they (seem to) cause. It also discusses, briefly, some further questions about the metaphysics of mind, namely, whether groups of individuals, or entire communities, can possess mental states that cannot be reduced to the mental states of the individuals in those communities and whether the boundaries between mind and world are as sharp as they may seem.

Keywords: mind–body problem, Dualism, Physicalism, consciousness, belief

© Janet Levin 2022
ISBNs: 9781108925075 (PB), 9781108946803 (OC)
ISSNs: 2633-9080 (online), 2633-9072 (print)
Contents

1 Introduction 1
2 Dualism 5
3 The Type Identity Theory 14
4 Role Functionalism 20
5 Does Consciousness Have a Place in Nature? 27
6 Intentional States 39
7 Russellian Monism 49
8 Eliminativism 54
9 Some Further Questions 60

References 63