1 Multilingualism
Past and Present

The first chapter provides an introduction to the field of multilingual development explaining its scientific and societal relevance. The discussion begins with an overview of current globalization and migration processes (Section 1.1) where, based on Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data of the past ten years, international migration streams receive illustration and substantiation. The exposition distinguishes between foreign-born and foreign populations, but also details population inflows and the relevant source countries.

Section 1.2 then focuses on a selection of urban areas as the specific locus where the concomitant increase in linguistic diversity plays out most forcefully. This survey takes the reader from London and Hamburg, as European metropolises, to the Canadian migration centres of Toronto and Vancouver. It continues with New York City and San Francisco as two prominent urban centres located on the East and West Coast of the United States. We proceed along the Pacific Rim to Sydney and Melbourne in Australia and Auckland in New Zealand. The survey closes with an assessment of the multilingual textures of Singapore, Hong Kong, and Dubai. Data have been drawn from the relevant national and municipal censuses.

After that, in Section 1.3, the reader is invited to partake in a historical survey of multilingualism. It is argued that while multilingualism represents a very old, and perhaps even the most natural form of social organization, linguistic diversity has been curtailed through the development of asymmetrical power relations and identity issues across different social groups. History has seen such asymmetries culminate in nations, nation states, and national languages with widespread monolingualism as an important outcome. While certain parts of the world (e.g. the countries that make up the Western World) have witnessed a recent increase in (primarily urban) multilingualism, other parts are rapidly losing linguistic diversity, sometimes in conjunction with the promotion of monolingual ideologies. English as the current global lingua franca is completely undisputed in the special status it enjoys.

Section 1.4 problematizes the diverging academic and political assessments of monolingualism and multilingualism. It examines different views and

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ideologies, especially the idea that bilingualism and multilingualism are associated with certain cognitive deficits. Recent history has witnessed a radical reassessment of this deficit perspective, with current scientific work highlighting the positive aspects of a multilingual experience for cognitive development and reserve, educational attainment, as well as subsequent language learning processes. However, Section 1.4 also voices scepticism regarding the question of whether multilingualism can develop into the preferred ideology and social form of organization, as the linguistic texture of modern societies is under strong pressure from forces pushing for homogenization, especially through the education systems.

Another important determinant of multilingual development is the status or prestige associated with different languages, as these form highly complex social value networks. This social hierarchy of languages and the special role of English is addressed in Section 1.5. The hierarchy is proof of extensive social power asymmetries that, as argued here, are the seeds producing monolingualism.

The chapter ends with a brief explication of key concepts such as additive and subtractive bilingualism, heritage speakers, dominance, cross-linguistic influence, as well as different language acquisition processes (Section 1.6). This is followed by a description of the intended readership as well as the structure of the book (Section 1.7), and a summary of the main issues (Section 1.8).

1.1   Globalization and Migration

Even though migration has been a hallmark of the human species from its very beginnings (Evans 2018a), there has been an unprecedented increase in global traffic and migration during recent decades. The reasons are obvious and include, inter alia, a sharp increase in human population, momentous political developments such as the fall of the Iron Curtain, fast and cheap air traffic, economic and demographic imbalances, labour shortages in boom regions, as well as warfare, famines, and related crises. Generally speaking, the source areas of population movements are characterized by economic and human hardship, while migration moves to areas of economic prosperity and stability. Target areas include Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, the Middle East, and Singapore, while there is a wide variety of source areas, inter alia several African countries, China, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Viet Nam, as well as several others. Notwithstanding this generalization, there is also substantial migration within Africa, China, India, the Philippines, as well as other territories and countries, especially from rural to urban areas.

The OECD has been monitoring international migration for a considerable period of time and makes a host of information publicly available. Crucial to

interpreting the OECD migration figures is the distinction between foreign and foreign-born populations. The OECD (2019: 340) defines these concepts as follows:

The foreign-born population can be viewed as representing first-generation migrants, and may consist of both foreign and national citizens. The size and composition of the foreign-born population is influenced by the history of migration flows and mortality amongst the foreign-born.

The concept of foreign population may include persons born abroad who retained the nationality of their country of origin but also second and third generations born in the host country.

These definitions are the result of diverging immigration statistics used by different countries. European countries, Japan, and Korea have a tradition of counting 'foreign' people, whereas settlement countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States count 'foreign-born' people (OECD 2019: 340). The latter group comprises both nationals and non-nationals of the target (host) country (first generation migrants). Great care needs to be exercised in the interpretation of these figures, since the OECD countries use different sources to count and estimate these population groups (population registers, residence permits, labour force surveys, and censuses; OECD 2019: 340).

1.1.1   Foreign-Born Populations

The data on foreign-born percentage of the population are shown in Figure 1.1 and provide a rough indication of the people with a migration background from 2008 to 2018.[1] Data are only presented for a selection of the foundational OECD countries. For ease of presentation, the individual country data has been bundled into bigger units that belong together regionally, culturally, and economically. Here, besides North America (Canada, United States) and Australasia (Australia, New Zealand), I group together the British Isles (United Kingdom, Ireland), Central European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands), Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), and Northern European (Scandinavian) countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden). Moreover, Luxembourg and

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[1] The percentages were calculated using the data on "Stocks of foreign-born population in OECD countries and in Russia" (OECD 2019: 341–342) and the respective population counts for each country as indicated in the OECD database on historical population (stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=HISTPOP, accessed on 17 March 2020). A few figures in the stocks of foreign-born population had to be interpolated due to missing data. This concerns Canada (1 cell), Ireland (4 cells), Italy (1 cell), and New Zealand (1 cell). Interpolation averages the annual changes in stocks of foreign-born population across the data points available. In such cases, the percentages were produced with the interpolated figures calculated against the populations counts.

4 Multilingualism: Past and Present

Figure 1.1 Foreign-born population as per cent of the population according to OECD figures (OECD 2019).

Switzerland are treated as one unit, as they are the only officially multilingual countries in the sample. All in all, the data offer an instructive overview of foreign-born population developments.[2]

One can gather from Figure 1.1 that Luxembourg and Switzerland show the highest number of foreign-born people, totalling 30.7 per cent in 2018. They are closely followed by Australia and New Zealand with an aggregate percentage of 28.8, again measured in 2018 (29.4% and 25.9%, respectively). Luxembourg taken on its own boasts a share of 46.2 per cent of foreign-born people (2018); the value for Switzerland is 29.6 per cent (2018). The remaining four groups of European countries (British Isles, Central European, Southern European, Northern European) as well as the United States, in combination with Canada, range between 10 and 15 per cent, again in 2018. The figure for Canada alone is 21.2 per cent in 2018. Austria reported a population of 19.2 per cent foreign-born residents in 2018, and Sweden 18.4 per cent.

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[2] Technically this meant adding up the foreign-born populations as well as the overall population counts of the respective countries. Percentages were calculated on the basis of these aggregate values. The percentages calculated here diverge slightly from those given in OECD (2019: 341–342).

    All groups of countries shown in Figure 1.1 manifest an upward trend in their foreign-born populations, though for some it is more pronounced than for others. The increase is relatively noticeable for Luxembourg and Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the Scandinavian countries. One can also detect a slight upward trend for the other four groups.

1.1.2   Foreign Populations

While Australia and New Zealand do not offer separate statistics for their foreign populations, one does find figures for the other OECD countries included here. However, it is unclear to what extent these foreign populations overlap with the foreign-born populations. Consider Figure 1.2, for example, in the case of Luxembourg for 2018. The OECD data allow one to calculate a share of 46.2 per cent of the population in the category 'foreign-born' and 47.4 per cent in that of 'foreign', that is, an aggregate of 93.6 per cent of the population is non-indigenous in a technical sense (OECD 2019: 341, 363). The relevant graph in Figure 1.2 under-reports as it was averaged with the data from Switzerland. There, the foreign population was at 24.1 per cent in 2018.[3] In neighbouring Germany, the corresponding figures are 15.9 per cent for foreign-born and 12.8 per cent for foreign populations, that is, a combined total of 28.7 per cent (OECD 2019: 341, 363).[4] Here, the distinction between foreign and indigenous is still meaningful, while for Luxembourg it appears difficult to maintain. The OECD report warns that their statistics may "underestimate the number of immigrants" (OECD 2019: 340).

    Apart from the combined values for Switzerland and Luxembourg, the other group values hover between 5 and 10 per cent, with there being a slight increase over time. Some of these countries reported shares of foreign populations above 10 per cent in 2018 (Austria 15.8%, Belgium 12.2%, Germany 12.8%, Iceland 10.7%, Ireland 12.2%, Norway 10.7%). These differences disappear in the averages.

[3] The population of Switzerland is much bigger than that of Luxembourg. In 2018, the OECD data listed a population of 8,513,227 for Switzerland and 607,950 for Luxembourg.
[4] These percentages again represent my own calculations based on the stocks of foreign population provided by the OECD data (OECD 2019: 363–364) and the historical population data (stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=HISTPOP, accessed on 17 March 2020). As with foreign-born populations, the percentages diverge slightly from those listed in OECD (2019: 363–364). Figures for Canada are only available for 2011 and 2016. I interpolated the remaining values, but there may be a more fundamental problem here. Figures for Greece had to be interpolated for 2018. Figures for Australasia are zero due to missing data.

6   Multilingualism: Past and Present

Figure 1.2 Foreign population as per cent of the population according to
OECD figures (OECD 2019).

1.1.3   Foreign Population Inflow

It is also revealing to consider the development of the inflow of foreign popula-
tion over time (2007–2017), measured in per cent of the entire population.[5] The
relevant graphs for the groups of countries distinguished here can be found in
Figure 1.3.

   At around 0.4 per cent, the figures for the United States and Canada are quite
stable and the lowest of all. The United States generally reported higher figures
than Canada (0.8% vs. 0.3% in 2017, with similar values in the earlier years).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, we find Luxembourg and Switzerland
with relatively high inflow rates of around 2 per cent. The values for
Luxembourg range between 3 and 4 per cent. The Central European countries

[5] Percentages were calculated using the foreign population inflow data offered in OECD (2019:
   295) and the historical population data available at stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?Data
   SetCode=HISTPOP, accessed on 17 March 2020. According to OECD (2019: 294), popula-
   tion flows were estimated on the basis of population registers, residence and/or work permits,
   and specific surveys such as household or passenger surveys. Given the scope of international
   population flows, figures need to be interpreted with care.

Figure 1.3 Population inflow as per cent of the population according to OECD figures (OECD 2019).

experienced an increase in the period considered here. The 2015 peak in this group of countries is primarily attributed to Austria and Germany (2.3% and 2.5%, respectively), apparently as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis. Australia and New Zealand portray stable inflow rates hovering at around 1 per cent. To be sure, this population inflow is subject to complex political decisions and economic demands.[6]

1.1.4 Source Countries

Table 1.1 lists the seven top-most important source countries for a selection of OECD member states in the category of foreign-born residents.[7] This small selection of source countries already reveals substantial diversity. In addition,

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[6] Furthermore, OECD (2019: 314) provides data on the outflow of foreign populations. Although a comparison with the inflow data is interesting, this is beyond the current concern.

[7] The ranking is based on the "Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth," as listed in OECD (2019: 343–360). The ranking generally uses the 2018 figures except for Canada, where due to missing data the 2016 figures are given. Equally, the ranking for Ireland represents stocks of foreign-borns in 2016 due to missing data for 2018. The New Zealand ranking uses 2013 figures, which are the only ones provided in OECD (2019: 354).

Table 1.1. *The top seven source countries of foreign-born populations in a selection of OECD countries (OECD 2019).*

Australia	Canada	Germany	Ireland	New Zealand	UK	US
United Kingdom	India	Poland	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	India	Mexico
China	China	Turkey	Poland	China	Poland	India
India	Philippines	Russia	Lithuania	India	Pakistan	China
New Zealand	United Kingdom	Kazakhstan	Romania	Australia	Romania	Philippines
Philippines	United States	Romania	United States	South Africa	Ireland	El Salvador
Viet Nam	Italy	Syria	India	Fiji	Germany	Viet Nam
South Africa	Hong Kong	Italy	Latvia	Samoa	Italy	Cuba

some pairings of target and source country enjoy a considerable time depth, as, for example, India for the United Kingdom, China for Canada, or Mexico for the United States. Poland is a very important source country in Europe, while Chinese immigration is strong in North America and Australasia. Hong Kong was the seventh most important source region for Canada in 2016. The United Kingdom appears to be an attractive destination for Germans.

Table 1.2 offers lists of the seven top source countries in the category of foreign populations for the same target countries, except Australia and New Zealand, as the OECD data are silent on these.[8] Instead, the relevant source countries for Japan and (South) Korea are listed here, as they are quite informative regarding the East Asian population movements. Evidently, China is a very strong export country here, but also Viet Nam and the Philippines. Korea attracts many immigrants from Viet Nam, Uzbekistan, and Cambodia. Brazil is an important source country for Ireland and Japan (and less surprisingly also for Portugal). Interestingly, amongst the top seven source countries for foreign populations we also find China for Finland, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain (based on 2018 figures provided in OECD 2019).[9]

The above surveyed global migration has also important consequences for the attested number of languages in specific locales. Especially attractive target locations are major conurbations, and it is here where we currently find the greatest language diversity. Again, there are specific preference pairings of migrant groups and target cities, but on the whole, major urban areas like Vancouver, London, Sydney, or Hamburg have become home to people from nearly all 193 member states of the United Nations.[10] Since many – if not most – of these states are multi-ethnic and multilingual, the number of languages travelling globally and now residing in certain urban areas is much higher than the number of recognized nationalities. Some cities have turned into modern Babels.

1.1.5   Summary

The preceding survey has shown that many Western European countries have in fact become immigrant countries. The relevant OECD figures reveal trends that are similar to those for the traditional settler and immigrant countries of Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The population inflows remain relatively stable with the exception of certain crisis-induced

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[8] The ranking uses the data provided in OECD (2019: 365–381). The figures for 2018 were used, except for Canada (2016) and Ireland (2016), due to missing data.
[9] Some of the information is not included in Table 1.2.
[10] Retrieved from www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-un-membership, accessed on 23 March 2021.

Table 1.2. *The top seven source countries of foreign populations in a selection of OECD countries (OECD 2019).*

Canada	Germany	Ireland	Japan	Korea	UK	US
China	Turkey	Poland	China	China	Poland	Mexico
India	Poland	United Kingdom	Korea	Viet Nam	Romania	India
Philippines	Syria	Lithuania	Viet Nam	Uzbekistan	India	China
United States	Italy	Romania	Philippines	Cambodia	Ireland	El Salvador
United Kingdom	Romania	Latvia	Brazil	Philippines	Italy	Guatemala
France	Croatia	Brazil	Nepal	Indonesia	Portugal	Philippines
Korea	Greece	Spain	Chinese Taipei	Nepal	Pakistan	Cuba