

## Introduction

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This book traces how a discourse of honor and shame helped create the imperial state in China. Through examining changing claims to honor, it studies Warring States articulations of new social roles and networks, early imperial redefinitions of the state's power and its agents' status, and how groups not employed by the state asserted a status that matched or exceeded that attributed to the bureaucracy. Such groups also denounced as shameful the elite pursuits of wealth or high office that motivated those who constituted the formal state and political elites. These groups included scholars, hermits, bravoos, writers, and locally powerful families, and, while not formally part of the state-defined public realm, in practice they became essential to the functioning of the imperial order. The roles that they played, and the language in which these were justified, came to define a non-state public realm which remained in permanent tension with the imperial government. Thus the evolving language of honor and shame allows us to move beyond a focus on the court and bureaucracy to achieve a more complete picture of Han imperial state and society.

### Honor and Shame

Honor and shame are correlated social phenomena routinely studied together.<sup>1</sup> Honor is generally understood as a person's value perceived by the self and his or her group. Consequently, it expresses a society's perception of what defines a superior person. This includes both "honor as precedence," i.e., the recognition that one is a member of the social elite, and "honor of virtue," i.e., the recognition that one's deeds merit esteem. As Julian Pitt-Rivers has argued, in an accepted social order "the sentiment of honor inspires conduct which is honorable, the conduct receives recognition and establishes reputation, and

<sup>1</sup> *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, ed. J. G. Peristiany (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965); *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean*, ed. David D. Gilmore (Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association, 1987); *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, ed. J. G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Julian Pitt-Rivers, *The Fate of Shechem or the Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

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reputation is finally sanctified by the bestowal of honors.”<sup>2</sup> Thus there is a self-reinforcing loop between the individuals’s self-perception, his or her actions, and the responses of the group.

By contrast, shame is the affective response to humiliation or rejection; it is the person’s perception that he or she is held in contempt by others, which elicits powerful emotions manifest in blushing, the inability to speak, or a desire to disappear. As a self-conscious state of mind based on one’s understanding of a situation, shame has a strong cognitive dimension. It therefore evolves over time along with ideals of honor. Thus critics of the idea that there is a distinctive “honor–shame complex” that marks the Mediterranean have argued that variants in the uses of these terms are so great that they potentially appear anywhere and are regularly interlinked.<sup>3</sup> Having a sense of honor requires having a sense of shame, since only someone who knows shame can be honorable, and only someone with a sense of what is honorable will feel appropriate shame.

This linkage is demonstrated by the fact that the two terms could become synonyms:

As the basis of repute, honor and shame are synonymous, since shamelessness is dishonorable; a person of good repute is taken to have both, one of evil repute is credited with neither . . . As such, they are constituents of virtue.<sup>4</sup>

An example is the Latin *pudor*, which meant “shame,” but also indicated what we would call a sense of “honor,” and even takes on such senses as “moral conscience” or “personal integrity.”<sup>5</sup> In early Chinese society the words for “shame” also indicated honor.

### The Social Roles of Honor and Shame

Given that honor and shame define a society’s ideals, or its image of the highest forms of humanity, and that they vary across space and time, they are useful for

<sup>2</sup> Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” in *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean*, p. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Michael Herzfeld, “Honour and Shame: Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Moral Systems,” *Man* 15 (1980), pp. 339–351; Herzfeld, “‘As in Your Own House’: Hospitality, Ethnography, and the Stereotype of Mediterranean Society,” in *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean*, pp. 75–89; Unni Wikan, “Shame and Honour: A Contestable Pair,” *Man* 19 (1984), pp. 635–652.

<sup>4</sup> Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” p. 42.

<sup>5</sup> Carlin A. Barton, *Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 14–15, 18–19, 199–200, 202, 207 n. 32, 211, 217, 221, 224, 229, 230–231, 235, 236–239, 241–243; Albert S. Gérard, *The Phaedra Syndrome: Of Shame and Guilt in Drama* (Atlanta, GA: Amsterdam, 1993), pp. 22–25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 35–36; Charles Segal, *Language and Desire in Seneca’s Phaedra* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 73–74, 76, 93–94, 133, 181, 195–196; and Florence Dupont, *Les monstres de Sénèque* (Paris: Belin, 1995), pp. 241–243. See also Mariko Asano-Tamanoi, “Shame, Family, and State in Catalonia and Japan,” in *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean*, pp. 111–114.

historical enquiry. Earlier anthropological, historical, and philosophical work on the honor–shame complex has suggested a range of useful subtopics for investigation, which all figure in the honor–shame discourse in early China.

First, the question of what is honorable or shameful usually varies from group to group within a society. In the Mediterranean world the definition of honor was disputed among the Church, the nobility, the urban population, and prosperous members of rural society. For the first, honor was owed to God and expressed in morality; for the second it was owed to the king and to military arms, and expressed in violent self-assertion (notably dueling) and conspicuous generosity; for the third it was defined through self-improvement in character and material conditions; and for the last it was defined through a simplicity of character that underlay virtue. Members of this final category, formally the lowest stratum, might claim to be superior to merchants, who were greedy and duplicitous, or to aristocrats, who were sexually loose.

Such debates between status groups or intellectual traditions were also crucial for social change. Since different groups espoused distinct forms of honor and shame, the emergence of new groups – e.g., middling families in early modern England – to political influence was often marked by the emergence of a new code of honor.<sup>6</sup> In such changes the question of honor or shame was particularly important, because the powerful emotions underlying them were crucial in motivating heroism or resolve that were essential in driving people to challenge dominant elites.

Discussions of honor were also often central to the structure of royal courts, where the spatial arrangement of members and the actions they performed indicated degrees of honor. More broadly, rituals that structured and ranked members of a society often invoked honor as an ordering principle. Thus Pierre Bourdieu argued that in Kabyle society rites of passage marking transition into more honorable status *created* the hierarchical divisions whose crossing they purported to enact.<sup>7</sup> Such ideas were also prominent in early Chinese writings on ritual.

<sup>6</sup> J. G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” in *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, pp. 3–10; Julio Caro Baroja, “Religion, World Views, Social Classes, and Honor during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries in Spain,” in *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, pp. 91–101; Caro Baroja, “Honour and Shame: A Historical Account of Several Conflicts,” in *Honour and Shame*, pp. 81–137; J. G. Peristiany, “Honour and Shame in a Cypriot Highland Village,” in *Honour and Shame*, pp. 177–179; Pitt-Rivers, *The Fate of Shechem*, ch. 2, “Honour and Social Status in Andalusia”; Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” in *Honour and Shame*, pp. 141–170; Maria Pia Di Bella, “Name, Blood, and Miracles: The Claims to Renown in Traditional Sicily,” in *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, pp. 151–165. The idea that each “status group” had its own code of honor was articulated by Max Weber. See Ludgera Vogt, *Zur Logik der Ehre in der Gegenwartsgesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), pp. 67–70. The “symbolic reproduction” of social hierarchies through differential shaming is discussed in Sighard Neckel, *Status und Scham: Zur symbolischen Reproduktion sozialer Ungleichheit* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1991).

<sup>7</sup> Emmanuel Leroy Ladurie, “The Court Surrounds the King: Louis XIV, the Palatine Princess, and Saint-Simon,” in *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, pp. 51–78; Pierre Bourdieu, “The

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The honor–shame complex also reproduced a society’s ideals *within* individuals, who incorporated them as sentiments that guided conduct. This interplay between social practices and individual character fostered social cohesion, and meant that such practices did not appear as external constraints. This supports Norbert Elias’s argument that the *socio-genesis* of a collectivity and the *psycho-genesis* of its members explain each other.<sup>8</sup> It also suggests the importance of the honor–shame complex for the disciplining of the body. Preserving and displaying honor required acquiring predispositions such as the “class taste” expressed in physical signs (e.g., clothing and bodily carriage), in knowing how to act (*savoir faire*), and in discriminating judgment. All of these were forms of the “social capital” that are central to elite power.<sup>9</sup>

Another recurring aspect of the honor–shame complex is its association with a bellicosity that distinguishes young men as warriors. Sometimes this heroic honor defies the more orderly honor of the king, challenging his claims to fix status and determine justice (as in the conflicts between Achilles and Agamemnon). This tension between warrior and ruler in claims to honor figures prominently in the discussion in Chapter 1 of the social order in Spring and Autumn China.

The honor–shame complex distinguished groups as well as individuals. Dead heroes underlay lineage honor, and their descendants aimed to further this glory. Honor could also belong to a city, an empire, or a nation-state. Men were expected to confront death to defend the honor of the political unit to which they were most loyal. Those who died for their city were no longer totally devoted to their kin (as in Pericles’ funeral oration), and those who died for a “world empire” were no longer fully loyal to their city

Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society,” in *Honour and Shame*, pp. 193–241; Bourdieu, “Rites as Acts of Institution,” in *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, pp. 79–89; Vogt, *Zur Logik der Ehre*, pp. 79–81.

<sup>8</sup> Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” pp. 21–22, 38; Raymond Jamous, “From the Death of Men to the Peace of God: Violence and Peace-Making in the Rif,” in *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, pp. 186–188; Danielle S. Allen, *The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. xi–xii, 333 n. 3; Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process, Vol. 1: The Development of Manners*, tr. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Urizen Books, 1978), “Preface,” ch. 1; Elias, *The Civilizing Process, Vol. 2: Power and Civility*, tr. Jephcott (New York: Pantheon, 1982), chs. 1–2; Vogt, *Zur Logik der Ehre*, pp. 85–86.

<sup>9</sup> Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” p. 25; Bourdieu, “Rites as Acts of Institution,” pp. 85–86; Bourdieu, *La distinction: Critique sociale du jugement* (Paris: Minuit, 1976); Vogt, *Zur Logik der Ehre*, pp. 104–152. This last discusses on pp. 117–121, 128–129, Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus” as the linkage between honor and taste. See also Thomas J. Scheff, *Microsociology: Discourse, Emotion, and Social Structure* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), esp. chs. 1, 5; Scheff, *Emotions, the Social Bond, and Human Reality: Part/Whole Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Scheff, *Goffman Unbound: A New Paradigm for Social Science* (London: Routledge, 2006).

or region.<sup>10</sup> The larger and more abstract the entity to which they were committed, the more the appeal to “honor” became central. In this context an elite’s devotion to honor was often contrasted with others’ devotion to money and material gain or the limited interests of their family or village. Thus honor often became the fundamental value of those devoted to larger states or empires. In China this was articulated in the idea that serving the empire entailed transcending loyalty to one’s region, and abandoning petty men’s devotion to material objects. Honor, rather than wealth, was supposed to motivate the state’s servants.<sup>11</sup>

Another recurring aspect of the honor–shame complex was the idea that the man of honor (here necessarily a man) was defined by an absolute “integrity” which entailed physical self-containment and impermeability to external forces or substances. Such a man, necessarily head of his household, was impervious to any attack, insult, or threat, and could not be influenced by bribes or flattery. This self-enclosure contrasted with women, whose bodies were liable to penetration from the outside and to leaking fluids from within, and whose behavior was shaped by external threats or seduction.<sup>12</sup> This vision of an honor defined by integrity and impermeability to external influences was also a major feature of early Chinese thought.

In another field, philosophers articulated theories of the fundamental role of “recognition” or “honor” in human life. The most influential example was Hegel’s argument in the “master–slave parable” in *The Phenomenology of the Spirit* (1806) that the emergence of human self-consciousness depended on a struggle for mutual recognition in which each person put his life at stake.

<sup>10</sup> On the funeral oration’s and public funeral’s role in establishing the Athenian city-state, and the city’s rivalry with aristocratic families, see Nicole Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City*, tr. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). On citing martyrs or the war dead to give tangible form to abstract entities or causes, see Mark Edward Lewis, *Sanctioned Violence in Early China* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), pp. 3–4.

<sup>11</sup> Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” pp. 35–37; Vogt, *Zur Logik der Ehre*, pp. 80–84, 108 n. 41, 157–162, 175–180; Bernhard Giesen, *Die Intellektuellen und die Nation: Eine Deutsche Achsenzeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993); Elisabeth Badinter, *Les passions intellectuelles, Vol. I: Désirs de gloire (1735–1751)* (Paris: Fayard, 1999); *Vol. II: Exigence de dignité* (Paris: Fayard, 2002); *Vol. III: Volonté de pouvoir* (Paris: Fayard, 2007). The contrast between the “honor” of the noble man and the lesser individual’s devotion to money is also a recurring theme in Marc Fumaroli, *Chateaubriand: Poésie et terreur* (Paris: Fallois, 2003), pp. 66–80, 302–310, 719–760. On the late Warring States and early imperial commitment to the transcendence of both region and material wealth, see Mark Edward Lewis, *Writing and Authority in Early China* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), chs. 7–8; Lewis, *The Construction of Space in Early China* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), ch. 4, esp. pp. 192–212.

<sup>12</sup> J. K. Campbell, “Honour and the Devil,” in *Honour and Shame*, pp. 141–169; Gail Kern Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), chs. 1, 4, 5; Klaus Theweleit, *Male Fantasies, Vol. 1: Women, Floods, Bodies, History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); *Vol. 2: Male Bodies: Psychoanalyzing the White Terror* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).

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This has been elaborated by several thinkers into theories of “recognition” or “honor” as the basis of society and law.

Others have highlighted the importance of honor in the constitution of a distinctive political or public space, which was also an aspect of early China. In *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt argued that a true political realm was created by people who prefer “immortal fame to mortal things.” The ultimate model for this was Homeric Greece, where Achilles chose eternal glory at the price of early death. The highest form of Arendt’s model, however, was the later *polis*, where the public realm of free, adult, male citizens was marked by an agonistic competition for glory.<sup>13</sup> Later Arendt applied this model of an honor-based political realm to the possibility of founding a *republic* of equals through mutually binding promises. The classic example was the Roman republic, but this model was adopted by the American “founding fathers” into their own ideal of a republic. Thus John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and others described the revolutionary as the person driven by the “passion for distinction” who desired to be seen in the “light of the public realm where excellence can shine,” and whose chief reward was “the esteem of the world.”<sup>14</sup>

This model in which appeals to honor or glory helped to fashion non-state public spaces that facilitated social change has also been formulated in the recent works of Giorgio Agamben. Unlike Arendt, from whom he borrowed much but ultimately diverged, Agamben found the intimations of

<sup>13</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), chs. 1–2, esp. pp. 8–9, 13, 17–19, 24–37, 41, 49, 55–59, 73, 77, also 81, 173–174, 178–181, 187, 193–199, 205–206, 211, 218. On this book, see Margaret Canovan, *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), ch. 4. On the problematic idealization of classical Greece in German philosophy and archaeology, see E. M. Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935); Suzanne L. Marchand, *Down from Olympus: Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750–1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Helmut Kuhn, *Die Vollendung der klassischen deutschen Ästhetik durch Hegel* (Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1931); Jacques Taminiaux, *La nostalgie de la Grèce à l’aube de l’idéalisme allemand: Kant et les grecs dans l’itinéraire de Schiller, de Hölderlin et de Hegel* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967); Johann Chapoutot, *Le nazisme et l’antiquité* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2012).

<sup>14</sup> Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*, paperback ed. (New York: Penguin, 1963), pp. 69–72, 119–126, 131, 135, 194–214, 237–238, 244, 275–276. On linking Arendt’s theory of a political realm defined by its concern for honor with Axel Honneth’s theory of universal, mutual recognition as the only moral basis of a modern society, see Tatjana Noemi Tömmel, *Wille und Passion: Der Liebesbegriff bei Heidegger und Arendt* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013), ch. 8. On Arendt’s model as the basis of a theory of “republicanism” in history, see J. G. A. Pocock’s *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 550–551. In addition to this explicit citation, her ideas are echoed on pp. 52–53, 65, 75–76. On the importance of honor in Republican thought, see pp. 37–41, 49–80, 122–123, 132–134, 137–138, 141–142, 144–145, 154–157, 219, 228, 232, 243, 248–253, 255, 258, 286–287, 289–290, 298–299, 311–313, 323, 452, 455, 465, 471, 474–475, 467, 469–460.

a “community to come” – in part defined by ideas of glory and honor – in paradigms of “profane” messianism derived from Abrahamic religions. Honor/glory no longer constituted a political sphere, but rather a community existing outside formal law or rules. Agamben, inspired by Walter Benjamin, uses de-theologized messianism to discuss the possibility that people could produce something truly new, and he gives a central place in this theory of radical change to appeals to glory.<sup>15</sup>

Agamben’s rethinking of the ideal community on the paradigm of messianism began with *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*. In Paul’s messianic time conventional power was rendered “inoperative,” while a new community arose through surrender to the glory of a supreme being from whom this community in turn became highest “in praise, in name, and in honor.”<sup>16</sup> Later, *The Kingdom and the Glory* elaborated how, with the suspension of legal governance, the community’s functioning hinged on the constant acclamations and rituals of praise that all creatures owed to God’s glory. Those charged with thus glorifying the sovereign in turn became highest in “honor” as God’s servants, the earthly equivalents of the angels. God, in turn, is glorified by the honor due his ministers. *Opus Dei*, elaborated this model of governance through praise and glory, in which *leitourgia*, “public work,” i.e., honorable donations to the Greek or Roman city by its elite, became *liturgy* in which the faithful pursued the “work of God” through honoring Christ. Finally, in *The Highest Poverty*, Agamben traces how the monastic ideal, culminating in St. Francis, created a model in which the imitation of Christ created a “form of life” devoted to the honor of God.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Leland de la Durantaye, *Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), ch. 10. On Benjamin as a model for Agamben’s de-theologized messianism, see Kurt Anglet, *Messianität und Geschichte* (Berlin: Akademie, 1995); Sigrid Weigel, *Walter Benjamin: Die Kreatur, das Heilige, die Bilder* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2008), ch. 1–3, 5–6; Weigel, *Body- and Image-Space: Re-reading Walter Benjamin*, tr. Georgina Paul (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 139–157; Richard Wolin, *Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California, 1994), esp. chs. 2, 4; John McCole, *Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 61–67, 82–88, 106–110, 172–176, 287–295; M.-C. Dufour-el Maleh, *La nuit sauvée: Walter Benjamin et la pensée de l’histoire* (Brussels: Ousia, 1993), pp. 55–74; Howard Caygill, *Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 149–152; Daniel Weidner, ed., *Profanes Leben: Walter Benjamins Dialektik der Säkularisierung* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010). On the relation of Agamben and Arendt, see Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben: *Parallelen, Perspektiven, Kontroversen*, ed. Eva Geulen, Kai Kauffmann, and Georg Mein (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2008).

<sup>16</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*, tr. Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 95–121. See also Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), pp. 62–103; Jacob Taubes, *Die Politische Theologie des Paulus*, 3rd ed. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2003).

<sup>17</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, tr. Lorenzo Chiesa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), chs. 5–8; Agamben, *Opus Dei: An Archaeology of Duty*, tr. Adam Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 14–17, 27–28, 31–32, 44–49, 53–54, 65–86, 102–117; Agamben,

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These theories of communities organized around the glory of God and honor of his worshippers were not realized in the Catholic or Orthodox churches. However, the church and its models of honor *did* play a central role in the transformation of the Mediterranean world at the end of classical antiquity, and Agamben thus offers an interesting theory of social transformation through appeals to forms of glory that allowed for new forms of power outside the political realm.

Wilhelm Korff also argued that ideas of honor derived from Christianity constituted a new public space defined by the rejection of the limited, material interests of private individuals. Adapting Aquinas's reading of Aristotle, he posited that honor was central to the "social nature" of humans, for whom status and prestige were the primary rewards for public-minded behavior. Such altruistic honor emerged in the Christian tradition as one element of the transformation of late antiquity and the Middle Ages. Thus, like Agamben, Korff articulated a model of changing patterns of honor to restructure the social order.<sup>18</sup>

Other scholars have argued that new definitions of honor played an important role in altering the social order to create modernity. Kwame Anthony Appiah's *The Honor Code* discusses three examples of abolishing institutions or modes of behavior – dueling, footbinding, and the Atlantic slave trade – that for centuries had been accepted as legitimate, or defended as essential to honor. He defines honor as "being entitled to respect" within a group, which he names the "honor world," whose members are "honor peers." Different groups of people espoused different "honor codes," and as new groups emerged to greater influence, their honor code could supplant that of the established elite. Such processes often featured denunciations of the "shamefulness" of what had for centuries been honored.<sup>19</sup>

Such appeals to honor and shame have been particularly important, because their emotional underpinnings inspired the courage necessary for people to openly challenge the values and behavior of dominant elites. As Tamler Sommers has argued, appeals to universal "dignity" or right to "recognition" cannot lead people to risk their own lives or take the lives of others. People who live without honor, he argues, will not take risks even for what they value.

*The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life*, tr. Adam Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 9–11, 23–24, 40–43, 49–51, 82–85, 96–97, 105–106, 116–117.

<sup>18</sup> Wilhelm Korff, *Ehre, Prestige, Gewissen* (Cologne: J. P. Bachem, 1966). See also Georg Simmel, *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung: Gesamtausgabe, Band 11* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), pp. 480–489; Pierre Manent, *Histoire intellectuelle de libéralisme: Dix leçons* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1987), esp. ch. 1; Manent, *La cité de l'homme* (Paris: Fayard, 1994).

<sup>19</sup> Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010).



Honor and shame, however, have been matters of life and death in most human societies.<sup>20</sup>

Another exposition of the revolutionary possibilities of altering honor language is Deirdre McCloskey's *Bourgeois Dignity*. Previously McCloskey had elaborated the importance of rhetoric in economics, and the significance of "bourgeois virtues" in defining the merchant class. In *Bourgeois Dignity* she combined these earlier arguments into a theory that the most important factor in enabling modern economic growth was the establishment of a new rhetoric celebrating markets, enterprise, and innovation as matters of honor. This emergence of a new "honor code" for a new "honor world," in Appiah's terms, was crucial in creating modernity.<sup>21</sup>

The above discussion has treated honor and shame as an integrated complex, but some features distinguish shame. Many societies have recognized that shame has a uniquely *physical* character, associated primarily with the face. Blushing is the most important, but averting the eyes and the inability to speak are also aspects of shame. This physical aspect figures in ancient Rome, where accounts of blushing were prominent, and in China, where the notion of "face (*mian* 面)" and its loss had already emerged by the late Warring States period. As "face" is understood in China as the deference owed to a person, and as something that must be recognized by others, it fits into the universe of the honor–shame complex, without exactly matching the sense of "honor."<sup>22</sup>

One final issue is the lingering belief in "shame cultures" where actors are motivated solely by others' judgments. Scholars have demonstrated that all cultures rely on the individual judging him- or herself, and also that shame and

<sup>20</sup> Tamler Sommers, *Why Honor Matters* (New York: Basic Books, 2018), pp. 35–36, 43–44.

<sup>21</sup> Deirdre N. McCloskey, *Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can't Explain the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); McCloskey, *The Rhetoric of Economics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985; 2nd rev. ed. 1998); McCloskey, *The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

<sup>22</sup> Carlin A. Barton, "The Roman Blush: The Delicate Matter of Self-Control," in *Constructions of the Classical Body*, ed. James I. Porter (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), pp. 212–234. On "face" in China, and its borrowing elsewhere, see Erving Goffman, "On Face-Work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interactions," *Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes* 18 (1955), pp. 213–231; Michael Carr, "Chinese 'Face' in Japanese and English (Parts 1–2)," *Review of Liberal Arts* 84–85 (1992–1993), pp. 39–77, 69–101; David Yao-fai Ho, "Face, Social Expectations, and Conflict Avoidance," in *Readings in Cross-cultural Psychology*, ed. John Dawson and Walter Lonner (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1974), pp. 240–251; Ho, "On the Concept of Face," *American Anthropologist* 46:1 (1976), pp. 867–884; Huang Shuanfan, "Two Studies of Prototypic Semantics: *Xiao* 'Filial Piety' and *Mei Mianzi* 'Loss of Face'," *Journal of Chinese Linguistics* 15 (1987), pp. 55–89.

For modern studies of shame that emphasize the face, see Micha Hilgers, *Scham: Gesichter eines Affekts*, 4th ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), chs. 1–2, 11–13; Léon Wurmser, *The Mask of Shame* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni, *In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Erica L. Johnson and Patricia Moran, *The Female Face of Shame* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).

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guilt are difficult to distinguish. Moreover, Douglas Cairns shows that the empirical discussions of its formulators, Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, contradict their conclusions. He argues that this is another case of Western exceptionalism deriving from the Christian idea of sin (explicitly cited by Benedict) and seeking to demonstrate the superiority of an individualist West over a collectivist Orient. The consensus of recent scholars is that shame is a universal sentiment that is always linked to internalized values and self-evaluation. The idea of a distinct notion of guilt is a theological or legal concept. As Mori Mikisaburō has shown, without acknowledging it, the “shame” versus “guilt” distinction has no analytic purchase on the case of early China.<sup>23</sup>

### Terminology

As with any word in any language, no second language possesses a single term that exactly maps onto the English “honor.” Thus J. E. Lendon in his study of honor in the Roman Empire attaches an appendix, “The Latin and Greek Lexicon of Honour.”<sup>24</sup> He demonstrates how in both tongues many words suggest aspects of our own concepts, and how these words overlap while remaining distinct. Ancient Chinese similarly has no single word that would

<sup>23</sup> Douglas A. Cairns, *Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp. 27–47; Heiner Roetz, *Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), pp. 174–184; Johanna Stiebert, *The Construction of Shame in the Hebrew Bible* (London: Sheffield Academic, 2002), pp. 6–16; Ewan Fernie, *Shame in Shakespeare* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 8–16; Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” in *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, pp. 6–8; Hugh Lloyd-Jones, “Ehre und Schande in der griechischen Kultur,” tr. H. G. Nesselrath, *Antike und Abendland* 33 (1987), pp. 1–28; Werner L. Gundersheimer, “Renaissance Concepts of Shame and Pocaterra’s *Dialoghi della vergogna*,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 47 (1994), pp. 34–56. Bernard Williams tries to establish a rigorous distinction of shame and guilt, and uses the concept of “shame culture,” but he argues that, as formulated by Mead and Benedict, the concept cannot apply to any real culture. See Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), ch. 4, esp. pp. 83–84, 94–100. Mori first correctly proves that early China was not a “shame culture,” since the *Analekts* and the *Mencius* clearly show that self assessment was based on internalized standards. However, since he knew that Japan was a “shame culture” (since Benedict had said so) but derived from China, he argued that China had been a “guilt culture,” but under the influence of Confucius it lost the idea of a moral divinity or Heaven (not true), and turned into a “shame culture.” This was strengthened in Japan because its “warrior culture,” in contrast with China’s “scholarly culture,” insisted on the violent defense of honor through a moralized obligation of vengeance. As discussed in Chapter 5, he was also wrong on this aspect of China. Finally, he argues that with the disappearance of religion in the West (writing in the late 1960s), all cultures would become “shame cultures.” When one recognizes that Benedict’s distinction was meaningless, this tangled argument becomes unnecessary. See Mori Mikisaburō 森三樹三郎, “Na” to “haji” no bunka: *Chūgokujin to Nihonjin* 名と恥の文化: 中國人と日本人 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1971), Part 5.

<sup>24</sup> J. E. Lendon, *Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the Roman World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 272–279.