

ENDING INCOME INEQUALITY

Income inequality in America has been on the rise for decades, but policy and legal thought has yet to catch up. Both parties in the United States have been hesitant to intervene in the market to address this problem, while the income tax system has been touted as a better and more efficient way to tackle income inequality. However, the tax system itself has failed to keep pace with the widening gaps in income. *Ending Income Inequality* challenges arguments made by legal scholars in the field of law and economics, who have supported the tax system over redistributive legal rules. By examining specific areas of the law such as minimum wage, collective bargaining, antitrust law, intellectual property, and housing regulation, the book argues that using legal rules, in addition to income taxes, is a promising path to reverse rising inequality.

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Ending Income Inequality

A CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF REDISTRIBUTION

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For Jan and David

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