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THE PROBLEM OF BLAME

This book makes a case for the permissibility of reactive blame – the angry, harmful variety. Blame is a thorny philosophical problem, as it is notoriously difficult to specify the conditions under which an agent *is* deserving of blame, is deserving of blame in the basic sense, and furthermore why this is so. Kelly McCormick argues that sharpening the focus to reactive, angry blame can both show us how best to characterize the problem itself, and suggest a possible solution to it, because even reactive blame is both valuable and deserved in the basic sense. Finally, she shows how, despite the many facets of the dark side of blame, adopting an explicitly victim-centered approach highlights a powerful argument from empathy for retaining reactive blame and its attendant attitudes and practices.

KELLY MCCORMICK is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Texas Christian University. She has published a number of articles on blame, desert, and moral responsibility in journals including *Philosophical Studies*, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, and *The Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy*.

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Making Sense of Moral Anger

KELLY MCCORMICK
Texas Christian University

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For Susan & Anne

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Kelly McCormick
Frontmatter
More Information

Contents

Acknowledgments *page* ix

Introduction 1

PART I THE PERMISSIBILITY OF BLAME

1 The Problem of Blame 11
- 1.1 Reactive Blame 13
- 1.2 The Varieties of Nonreactive Blame 21
- 1.3 Quality of Will and Functional Accounts 28
- 1.4 The Problem of Blame 34
- 1.5 Conclusion 38

2 The Structure of Basic Desert 40
- 2.1 Basic versus Nonbasic Desert 44
- 2.2 Substantive Desert Theses and the Wrong Kind of Reasons 47
- 2.3 Virtues of the Fittingness Account 51
- 2.4 Circularity 55
- 2.5 Conclusion 57

3 Blame and the Reactive Attitudes 58
- 3.1 Strawsonian Blame 60
- 3.2 Narrowing the Class of Reactive Attitudes 64
- 3.3 The Case for Cognitivism 70
- 3.4 The Right Kind of Reasons to Blame 84
- 3.5 Conclusion 91

4 Solving the Problem of Blame 92
- 4.1 The Aims and Value of Blame 93
- 4.2 The Parity of Reasons Argument 101
- 4.3 Perceptual Models and the Evidentiary Status of the Negative Reactive Attitudes 114
- 4.4 Conclusion 122

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More Information

PART II PRESCRIPTIVE PRESERVATIONISM AND ELIMINATIVISM

5 The Methodological Burdens for Eliminativism 127
5.1 Terminological Stage Setting 130
5.2 Eliminativism and the Skeptical Spotlight 132
5.3 The Motivational Challenge 140
5.4 Necessity Arguments 149
5.5 Conclusion 151

6 Free Will, Responsibility, and Reference 152
6.1 Early Reference-Based Arguments against Elimination 154
6.2 An Elimination-Friendly Approach to Reference 162
6.3 Against a Discretionary Case for Eliminativism 171
6.4 A Discretionary Case for Preservationism 180
6.5 The Prospects for Eliminativism 188
6.6 Conclusion 191

7 Facing the Dark Side 192
7.1 Belief in Free Will, Just-World Beliefs, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism 194
7.2 Harming the Innocent? 200
7.3 The Dark Side of Eliminativism and an Argument from Empathy 205

References 211
Index 221

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Frontmatter
More Information

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