The Inclusionary Turn in Latin American Democracies

Latin American states took dramatic steps toward greater inclusion during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Bringing together an accomplished group of scholars, this volume examines this shift by introducing three dimensions of inclusion: official recognition of historically excluded groups, access to policymaking, and resource redistribution. Tracing the movement along these dimensions since the 1990s, the editors argue that the endurance of democratic politics, combined with longstanding social inequalities, create the impetus for inclusionary reforms. Diverse chapters explore how factors such as the role of partisanship and electoral clientelism, constitutional design, state capacity, social protest, populism, commodity rents, international diffusion, and historical legacies encouraged or inhibited inclusionary reform during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Featuring original empirical evidence and a strong theoretical framework, the book considers cross-national variation, delves into the surprising paradoxes of inclusion, and identifies the obstacles hindering further fundamental change.

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The Inclusionary Turn in Latin American Democracies

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Acknowledgments

We are enormously fortunate to form part of the Berkeley Latin Americanist community. This intellectual community has been forged, nurtured, and sustained by two extraordinary scholars – David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier. This book is not a festschrift for them (we promised them we would not assemble one) but rather a volume addressing the politics of creating more inclusionary societies in Latin America. At the same time, the book is a celebration of the incredible intellectual community that David and Ruth have fostered over more than forty years.

We dedicate this book to them.

David and Ruth taught us the power and the purpose of big ideas. They taught us the importance of thinking, reasoning, and writing rigorously. They taught us that it is possible – indeed, essential – to combine deep normative commitments with exacting research and analysis. They taught us the value of intellectual generosity and the importance of intellectual friendship. They taught us the meaning of treating students as colleagues. Year after year, generation after generation of students, David and Ruth fostered an intellectual family – a group of people committed to understanding the politics of a region we all love. Thanks to their ongoing commitment to this community, generations of Collier students now form a large network of scholars and friends who continue to write together, look after one another, and enjoy each other’s company.

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teachers, mentors, colleagues, and friends. We think it is fair to say that no one has had as significant an effect on what we do, and how we do it, than have these mentors – and thus this volume bears their intellectual imprint. We believe we speak for all of the volume’s contributors, and for the dozens and dozens of other students whose lives David and Ruth have touched, when we say how fortunate we feel to have landed at Berkeley, to have worked with them, learned with them, laughed with them, and struggled and celebrated beside them.

This volume is a testament to the Colliers’ intellectual impact. Each chapter was written by a scholar who trained with them. That so many of David and Ruth’s students work on issues broadly related to democratic inclusion is no accident: most of us share the belief that, in a region as deeply unequal as Latin America, inclusionary processes are both normatively important and analytically consequential. We are deeply grateful to all who have contributed to this project, and humbled by what we have learned from their work. However, the Berkeley Latin Americanist community stretches far beyond this volume, and its influence is visible in these pages – reflecting many conversations that began in Barrows Hall and continued at universities and conferences far beyond. We extend our deepest gratitude to that broader community for their insight and friendship over the years.

A project of this size required that we gather more than once! The Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame graciously hosted us for a two-day workshop in 2014. That conference was both celebratory and foundational to generating the ideas that motivated this volume. We are particularly grateful to Tim Scully and the entire Kellogg team for welcoming us and making this event possible. As Tim said at that conference, addressing the Colliers: “We gather to celebrate the gifts you have poured into our lives and the lives of so many. You have used your gifts to support everything supportive of democracy, integrity, justice, fairness, and love.” We also thank Princeton University’s Program in Latin American Studies, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the Bobst Center for Peace and Justice (assisted by the wonderful Pat Zimmer, who took care of all the details) for hosting a second two-day workshop in 2016 at Princeton – where we rolled up our sleeves, worked through the core organizing ideas, and constructively and critically workshopped the chapters for this volume.

Two outstanding young scholars worked with us as research assistants. Jared Abbott (Harvard) ably pulled together the data that underpin the
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analysis in the introductory chapter, providing the foundation for illustrating the pace and characteristics of Latin America’s inclusionary turn. Beatriz Barros (Princeton) helped us to coordinate this massive volume and prepare it for delivery to Cambridge University Press. We thank them for their excellent research. Of course, all errors are our own.

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This volume went to press in a year filled with unexpected and world-changing events. We submitted the manuscript for the volume in late 2019, as protest and contestation were erupting throughout Latin America. Citizens were demanding greater recognition, access, and resources. They were fighting to defend democratic institutions while also demanding greater voice and equity. These struggles were an important reminder that inclusion is not finite or final. It requires ongoing vision, struggle, and vigilance.

By June 2020, when we were copyediting and proofing the manuscript, the world had fundamentally changed. As we go to press, we are now living through a global pandemic, with a devastating and rising death toll, especially for the world’s most vulnerable populations. A profound economic crisis is unfolding around the globe, and it is likely to have a significant and enduring impact on Latin America’s poor. Global protests, sparked by police violence in the USA, have amplified longstanding demands to address systemic racism and racial injustice. We may be at an inflection point. Yet, domestic policy responses to address these overlapping crises vary greatly, and will likely have divergent consequences for citizens of different countries.

These challenges underscore the underlying need for capable states and inclusionary policies. We hope this volume contributes to our understanding of Latin America’s inclusionary turn and the need to defend and deepen it.
Prologue: Reflections on Two Episodes of Popular Inclusion

Structuring and Restructuring Arenas of Participation

Ruth Berins Collier

INTRODUCTION

This book seeks to examine new patterns of popular inclusion. The idea of “new” patterns of popular inclusion invites comparisons with older patterns. What follows are some reflections on the macro-historical comparison of the two major episodes of popular – or lower-class – inclusion. The earlier episode, which occurred in the first part of the twentieth century, represented the advent of mass participation and was targeted at the formal working class. Indeed, the first inclusion created the formal working class with the passage of a labor code that legalized labor organizations, thereby separating out and privileging a segment of the popular sectors. The first inclusion was analyzed in Shaping the Political Arena (SPA) as labor incorporation (Collier and Collier 1991). The second inclusion is the recent episode, which is the focus of this volume and which I, with colleagues, began to explore in Reorganizing Popular Politics (Collier and Handlin 2009). In this essay I offer some reflections on this comparison, unabashedly drawing on my work.

On the one hand, one can view the first inclusion as “unfinished” or “incomplete” in that it was not all-inclusive but rather left some groups out. Whereas the first inclusion created and targeted the formal working class, the second extended recognition, political relevance, organization, policy attention, and rights to additional groups, particularly informal workers, peasants, and indigenous groups. On the other hand, the second inclusion should not be seen as “additive,” completing the unfinished business of the first. Rather it involved substantial changes in the structures of inclusion. Specifically, these inclusionary episodes initially structured and then restructured two arenas of participation: the
party-electoral arena and the interest arena. These remarks will focus on those two arenas.

The party-electoral arena is the site where recruitment to democratic government is contested. This arena is one of formal institutions in which political parties serve as the primary structures of representation of individual citizens. However party–organization linkage makes this arena a site also for collective representation and access to policymaking. The popular interest arena, that is, the interest arena for popular sector participation is the site of both state-targeted claim making (such as lobbying and protesting) and society-oriented problem-solving (through collective projects or negotiation with private actors, such as collective bargaining). It is the arena in which organizations represent citizens, although citizens can also act individually.

In this essay I compare the two episodes of inclusion by focusing on the economically most advanced countries of Latin America. I begin by situating these inclusionary episodes in world historical time – emphasizing that these were periods of momentous transition in the international economy, class formation, ideologies, patterns of organizing, and state restructuring. These factors had an impact on the structures of representation, specifically on the structures of the two political arenas of participation, on which I focus this essay.

I look at the way the initial incorporation founded and structured these two arenas and then raise some considerations and questions for analyzing the way these arenas are being restructured in the contemporary period. For each inclusionary episode, I consider four features of the nature of popular participation across the two arenas: (1) the form of popular organizations, (2) problems of collective action, (3) salient cleavages and issues, and (4) the nature of access to policymaking.

These comparative reflections highlight the fundamental changes and restructuring that the second inclusion represents – a move from popular sector participation structured around unions, corporatism, and productionist economic issues to a structure of participation that is more fragmented and pluralist, with multiple cleavages and a set of issues that now include a range of identity-based rights and consumption-based demands. An important question is the degree to which the changing structures of participation have effectively demobilized the popular sectors on important macro- and microeconomic issues, which remain salient in the politics of the elite. These are important areas of policymaking, with consequential economic, distributional, and political consequences. I conclude by engaging with the editors’ paradox of participation as a means to reflect
on the ongoing limitations on popular representation despite the gains achieved by the second inclusion.

THE FIRST INCLUSION: THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

World Historical Context: Industrialism and Its Political Implications

The inclusionary episodes were shaped by the world historic time in which they occurred. A number of features characterize those distinct eras, particularly the nature of the world economy, the “invention” and diffusion of organizational forms, the changing nature of the state, and domestic social structure.¹

The first inclusion occurred in the first part of the twentieth century at a time of economic industrialism, social class formation, and political innovation. With industrialization came the emergence of a proletarian working class, which asserted new claims along with cycles of protest and frames of political action based in socialist ideology. The period witnessed the transition to mass politics through the innovation of unions and of the mass party to which unions became affiliated as a core base of party support. Though spearheaded in Europe, these innovations developed counterparts in Latin America. The first inclusion was thus part of a much larger socioeconomic-political transition, also involving the transition to a new type of more interventionist state.

The period of economic growth starting in the last decades of the nineteenth century brought change in Latin American social structure. We can think of this change, in stylized form, as a shift from a two-class to a four-class social structure. Hitherto, social structure consisted primarily of an upper class of landlords, who held political power in the “oligarchic state,” and a popular class of peasants. With economic growth came the emergence of two new “classes” in the urban and export economy: an upper strata of “middle sectors,” who were owners, managers, and professionals and who challenged the dominance of the landed oligarchy, and a class of employed workers. As the new emerging classes had been excluded from the oligarchic state, both made new claims for power.

The political response to these claims came when political representatives of the middle sectors managed to come to power and oversaw labor incorporation. The new middle-sector governments introduced the

¹ Cameron (this volume) also discusses world historical time and its implications for different episodes of inclusion.
modern reformed state. The “new state,” as it was literally called in the case of Brazil, took on new responsibilities and interventions in the economy to develop the new and growing economic sectors. However, it also took on a new more interventionist role toward society. Particularly important for present purposes is the policy toward the often radical working classes, who had been influenced by anarchist and communist movements in Europe. The new governments saw the working class from two perspectives. On the one hand, they all sought to control the activism and demands of the working class. On the other, some of the new governments also sought to mobilize its political support in an ongoing political struggle against the rural elite. The result of combinations of these two goals was the policy of labor incorporation and the structuring of both the party and interest arenas to accomplish it.

Shaping the Political Arena: Unions and Labor-Based Parties in the First Inclusion

*Shaping the Political Arena* analyzed labor incorporation as a corporatist form of inclusion that introduced mass politics and was based on the participation and representation of the working class through legalized and formally recognized unions. The politics of labor incorporation founded the two political arenas of popular participation, and “shaped” those arenas by creating structures in each that were sticky and would endure (see also Collier and Chambers-Ju 2012).

**Popular Interest Arena.** In legalizing and even sponsoring unions, the state structured an interest regime of popular sector organizations that privileged unions as the predominant organizations of lower-class interest intermediation (Collier and Handlin 2009). When they arrived in power, one of the very first actions of governments that oversaw the first inclusion was the promulgation of new labor laws that officially recognized unions as legal organizations of workers, and thereby as legitimate political actors. This recognition was the common feature of the first inclusion across all cases. Other popular organizations of various types existed, such as neighborhood associations, but these were politically weak compared to state-recognized unions, which were legally granted a number of rights of representation. In particular, labor law established an industrial relations system and granted unions the right to bargain collectively and represent workers vis-à-vis employers, although in doing this the state shaped and limited the nature of their representation to different degrees, which ranged from little state structuring in Uruguay to highly structured...
and constrained unions in Brazil and Chile (Collier and Collier 1979). Unions also represented workers vis-à-vis the state in advocating policies affecting workers, including broad economic policy.

**Party-Electoral Arena.** The first inclusion also structured the party-electoral arena. It did not so much affect suffrage extension, which followed a different political dynamic, but it did shape the nature of the party system. Specifically, it had three important consequences for the type of party system: (1) it affected the effective number of parties, (2) it determined the partisan affiliation of unions and workers, and (3) it thereby also affected the position of unions as allied to either the government or the opposition. These outcomes shaped the nature of workers’ representation in the party-electoral arena.

The critical juncture of labor incorporation was the historical moment in which populist parties were founded (notably in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela). They were founded by political leaders who sought to mobilize support and who in most cases held power. Thus, where this mobilizational strategy was followed, the incorporating government oversaw the affiliation of the working class to the new populist party through the newly legalized unions. Furthermore, the populist party became the largest party in a party system that crystallized around a small number of one or two predominant parties. Through the populist party, the working class generally became part of a multiclass coalition. It was often subordinated within the party but nevertheless achieved some degree of representation and political influence through its attachment to the governing party and through its mobilizational capacity in electoral campaigns, voter turnout, and demonstrations for the party. This political position afforded unions access to policymaking; however, again to different degrees, their autonomy was compromised, often through leadership co-optation as well as more coercive forms of state intervention. A variant was seen in Colombia and Uruguay, where a traditional party of the nineteenth century, rather than a new populist party, undertook labor incorporation and appealed to working-class voters.

In other cases, where the incorporation period was not part of a strategy of political mobilization (mostly notably in Brazil and Chile among the cases analyzed in SPA), the working class and unions were not mobilized from above. Instead they “were left” to become affiliated to more classist parties, which were small but which grew in strength with industrialization. Without the formation of a large multiclass populist party, a more fractionalized, multiparty system developed, with a more classist, polarizing political dynamic. These classist union-affiliated...
parties represented workers as a minority party in the opposition. If these parties eventually gained enough electoral strength to govern, they were overturned through military interventions.

*Features of Popular Participation.* The politics of labor incorporation in the first inclusion was thus the political founding moment in which both arenas of participation were structured: a union-predominant interest regime and a union-affiliated party system. Workers were recognized as legitimate political actors, and their interests were intermediated through unions in both arenas. Unions acted in the interest arena vis-à-vis both employers and state, and they were important organizations in establishing the partisanship of workers and representing them in the party-electoral arena. Four features of popular participation across the two arenas may be highlighted: the types of organizations that predominated among the popular sectors (unions), their repertoires of collective action, the issues they took up, and their access to policymaking.

*Types of Organizations.* Unions are particular kinds of organizations with a number of advantages over other kinds of organizations. They have both members and dues, and thus important and stable personnel and monetary resources. Further, organization is centered in the workplace, where workers have face-to-face interactions, common conditions, and a shared target of grievances in the form of a common employer. At the same time, unions are hierarchically ordered and scale up to form peak organizations of national confederations. These features have facilitated collective action both among individuals within a union and across unions.

*Collective Action.* With these organizational advantages, unions have typically been able to engage in a wide repertoire of action. Their regular funding and a relatively permanent membership allow them to undertake many types of collective action, including costly strikes with the sanctioning power of shutting down productive activities, petitioning, lobbying, protesting, and, given their organic linkages to political parties, electoral campaigning. They can thus engage in collective action at all levels, from the firm to the national level, since they share many common interests concerning economic policy and where peak associations could coordinate collective action across locals.

*Cleavages and Issues.* The primary cleavage in the industrial era was a class cleavage, and economic issues were predominant. The primacy of this cleavage can be seen in the way political scientists typically modeled a single left–right, economic issue dimension. This model is consistent with the predominance of unions among popular sector organizations, and the
construction of citizens primarily in their productive capacity. It is reflected in the class labels analysts adopted for components of the popular sectors as formal workers, informal workers, or peasants. Unions emerged with a common framing around workers engaged in class struggle. Even when both class identity and the original notion of struggle or conflict are attenuated, unions act in opposition to employers. Their orientation is toward materialist issues, specifically productionist issues. That is, they are primarily focused on materialist gains at the point of production – vis-à-vis both employers in the workplace and public policies concerning wages and the benefits (such as pensions and health care) that accompany employment. They have also advocated positions on economic policy more generally because of its impact on workers, especially real wages, employment levels, and spending. They are thus centrally oriented toward both micro- and macroeconomic issues. Unions provided formal sector workers with a voice on the major issues of economic policy and distribution, although, again, with different degrees of effectiveness, given their varying levels of influence and autonomy.

Access. With the first inclusion, unions achieved policymaking access in both the interest and party-electoral arena. Further, union access or participation in policymaking was formally or informally institutionalized in both arenas. In the interest arena it occurred through corporatist structures defined in labor law that gave unions representational rights in mandated collective bargaining. In the electoral arena access occurred through the organic ties unions had with a political party, whether populist or classist. Unions delivered votes to candidates in exchange for some, though varying, influence in the party and sometimes for recruitment of unionists as party candidates or to appointed positions in the government. Access, of course, is voice and does not necessarily translate into influence. The downside of these arrangements has been well documented. In the interest arena, corporatist structures were often mechanisms of co-optation and control. In the party-electoral arena, populist parties often moved to subordinate unions within the party structure; and classist parties had limited influence because they typically did not govern and were also presented with the usual issue of balancing the interests of their core worker constituency vs. their power-political/electoral goals. Thus, these structures in both the party and interest arena must be seen as double-edged: they afforded some degree of access and voice as well as control or co-optation. The balance varied across countries and time.
World Historical Context: Postindustrialism and Its Legacies

If the early twentieth century can be characterized as one of industrialism, the late twentieth century in some ways can be characterized as postindustrialism. The terms are both evocative of important trends and misleading. They are misleading as global trends, of course, because only a part of the world industrialized in the early twentieth century, just as only a part can be said to be “postindustrial” in the current period. Nevertheless, those trends, which characterize the most economically advanced countries, gave rise to phenomena that either diffused to Latin America or had a significant impact on the region by changing the global socioeconomic pattern to which countries in the region had to adjust. It is in this sense that the label may be appropriate as a characterization of the historical period. Just as “ideologies,” or frames of action, and organizational forms, for instance, diffused from the economically advanced countries to Latin America in the early twentieth century, so did they also at the end of the century. Similarly, just as industrialization in Europe stimulated the export of primary products in Latin America and, in turn, incipient industrialization in the region, so did the reorganization of capital and economic opening in the advanced countries at the end of the century affect economies and policy throughout the world. At the same time, of course, many important trends late in the century occurred according to an internal dynamic in Latin American countries. One might point to four shifts, which occurred on both international and domestic levels.

The first change in Latin America was in social structure. If the early twentieth century saw a transition from a two-class to a four-class structure, by the end of the twentieth century social structure had become, through slow and incremental change, more complex and fragmented. The process of white collarization that has been widely noted in the advanced economies also occurred in Latin America. A heterogeneous “middle class” – as distinct from the “middle sectors” as urban business interests that had challenged the hegemony of landed interests – emerged and increased substantially with economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century. Similarly, and during the same period, the informal sector grew in size and in many countries has overtaken proletarian employees as components of the now more heterogeneous working
classes. The greater array of groups in this more fragmented class structure has less cohesion and has been less able to construct a common set of interests. These changes have had an impact on the pluralization of groups and interests that were newly included, the kinds of organizations through which they make claims, and way the two political arenas were restructured.

The second change is the globalization of the economy. Again, this change has both domestic and international aspects. Internationally, the global economy changed starting in the 1970s, with the end of certain Bretton Woods institutions like fixed exchange rates and the inability of the US economy to continue to support the postwar international arrangements. The response was a more globally integrated international economy, including trade, finance, investment, and a new international division of labor and location of production, as well as a change in the economic models away from state intervention and Keynesian demand-side models toward privatization and deregulation (or reregulation).

In Latin America, economic change responded to the incentives provided by the restructured global economy as well as to the more coercive or punitive constraints of the debt crisis and IMF conditionality that followed it in the 1980s. Change in Latin America was also seen as a response to the “exhaustion” of the easy phase of import substitution industrialization (ISI; O’Donnell 1973), which ran into problems of inflation and uneven growth. The result was a new economic model oriented to trade opening, widespread privatization, and the marketizing reforms of neoliberalism. This change has, perhaps, received the greatest attention, and Roberts (2014) has suggested that neoliberalism constitutes a new critical juncture in Latin American politics. The new models were more dependent on and sensitive to international finance and investment. Whereas the logic of ISI was compatible with class compromise, since labor represented both a cost and also a market for local production, the new model was more zero-sum given a globalized economy with foreign markets for domestic production, international competition, and export emphasis: labor became more uniformly viewed in a more one-sided way as only a cost to capital. The economic change led to a decline in union density, weakened unions vis-à-vis capital, and challenged their position as core constituencies of political parties.

Importantly, the change in economic model meant a change in the role of the state. Economically, the new role involved withdrawal from state industrial ownership (and employment in those sectors), subsidies, and promotion. The new, more market-oriented economic model produced a
shift in the weight of the union movement from the weakened industrial sector to the public sector. It also implied a market-friendly approach to social policy (favoring policies targeting the poor and labor flexibility rather than the market “rigidities” that stem from union power), and to some extent outsourcing social policy implementation to societal organizations. In this context, popular sector organizing and demand-making reflected this new approach to welfare and consumptionist, rather than productionist issues.

A third change, emphasized by the editors, is in the political regime. The domestic dynamic was the democratic transitions that brought an end to the military regimes characteristic of the region from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. Internationally, the end of the Soviet Union signaled the hegemony and relative stability of electoral democracy, a development that eased the earlier tendency toward polarization rooted in the opposition between economic elites and the anti-capitalist or even reformist positions advocated on the Left. These developments opened space for popular participation and underlay the move in many countries to new types of participatory structures, openness to popular demands, and even the willingness to tolerate governments of the Left. The hegemony of international norms concerning both markets and democracy also led to an emphasis on issues of governance and anticorruption, to some extent replacing the left–right economic issues that had been salient in the previous historical epoch.

A fourth change is the emergence and growth of new types of interest organizations beyond labor unions. The change can be analyzed in two phases. The first began in the 1960s in the advanced economies, when social movement organizations (SMOs) were formed around quite a different set of noneconomic, “postmaterialist” issues related to rights and risks. These rights issues concerned civil rights; human rights; women’s rights; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) rights; disability rights; animal rights; and so forth. Prominent among the risks were nuclear and environmental risks. As with the earlier diffusion of labor unions, these rights and risk organizations also diffused to Latin America. But perhaps the most important of these social movements in the region were specific to the Latin American agenda: those concerned with human rights, democratic regime transitions, and indigenous rights.

A second phase in the transformation of popular organizations started in the 1980s, when the major economic transitions of liberalization and globalization began. In Latin America, especially with the debt crisis and the so-called lost decade of no growth in the 1980s, the result was the
appearance of many kinds of materialist subsistence organizations in lower-class neighborhoods – such as communal kitchens and associations concerned with food distribution, neighborhood infrastructure, or development projects. Even beyond the immediate response to crisis, Latin America, like many world regions, saw a proliferation of new organizations. This international upsurge in organizing was consistent with market liberalizing orientations on the Right as well as with notions of deepening democracy on the Left. An orientation toward “civil society” – corresponding to a preoccupation with non-state actors on both the Right and the Left – was widely adopted, and such organizing was advanced by activists as well as international financial institutions. Civil society organizations (CSOs) proliferated widely – from professionalized NGOs, acting both domestically and internationally, to grassroots community organizations. These were more oriented toward providing or delivering services, such as health, education or information, and security.

Reshaping the Political Arena: Pluralization and Fragmentation of Interests, Organizations, and Parties

With these changes the second inclusion took a very different form relative to the first inclusion. It was not merely additive, in that additional popular sector groups – those left out of the first inclusion – were included. Rather, both the interest and party-electoral arenas were restructured. Primarily, the changes involved the inclusion of new groups under terms quite different from the corporatist structures that characterized the first inclusion. At the same time, some alteration of union corporatism also occurred. Thus, the major changes had to do with a pluralization of organizations, interests, and identities; a changing relationship between organizations and the state; and changes in linkages between popular organizations and political parties, which generally became looser and more instrumental. With this pluralization and fragmentation, the pattern of inclusion has become lumpy, or segmented (Etchemendy and Collier 2007; Silva 2017, 313), with many structures of inclusion coexisting.

Popular Interest Arena. The most obvious change is a pluralization of organizations and issues in the interest arena. Unions are no longer the predominant organizations for the popular classes, as a great variety of other kinds of groups have been organized around differently framed interests. The pluralization of organizations with different kinds of interests and demands has presented political leaders with alternative – even
competing – sources of allies and support constituencies. Etchemendy (this volume) and Schipani (2019) have analyzed the ways in which different kinds of coalitions can be constructed on the Left, and pluralization has given presidents more room for maneuver not only in constructing coalitions but also in playing one group against another.

As for the union sector itself, in some countries the benefits of unionization have been extended to new groups: for instance, in some countries domestic and rural workers have been included and new union rights have been granted to some previously excluded categories of workers, such as some civil servants. In general, however, unions have been weakened in most countries, as changes in economic policy led to a decline in union encompassingness in the private sector and to an economic model that no longer supports a class compromise to the same extent. Within this general pattern of weakening, there is some variation, with some strength still evident in Argentina and Uruguay, and to a lesser extent certain sectors in Brazil and Mexico. Across the region, the labor movement has come to be centered in the public rather than the private sector, with teachers emerging as the largest organized group in Latin America (Cook 1996; Chambers-Ju 2017). In many countries the formation of rival national confederations has meant greater organizational fragmentation. At the same time, some of the newer confederations are potentially more oriented toward the formation of alliances with the new types of organizations that have proliferated in the popular interest arena. Further, in a few cases the inherited corporatist patterns have shifted in favor of unions vis-à-vis the state, with the loosening of state control in several countries, a particularly interesting pattern of neo-corporatism in Uruguay and Argentina (Etchemendy and Collier 2007, Etchemendy 2019).

The relationships between the state and the new organizations remains an important area for research. These relationships do not replicate the corporatist structures of the first inclusion, or even the more recently altered state–union structures. In some cases the newer organizations have been state-supported, and many deliver state social programs. While these arrangements create some dependency on the state and therefore also a potential threat to their autonomy, in general there is no legal framework analogous to the labor code to constrain their structure, operation, and activities.

The result is a shift to an interest regime that is more pluralistic and fragmented in terms of interests and issues and types of “base
organizations” with different capacities for collective action and scaling, as well as different repertoires of actions.²

**Party-Electoral Arena.** The change in the party-electoral arena has also been quite dramatic, with change in both the parties themselves and the nature of linkages to organizations.³

The disruption of party systems in Latin America has been quite astounding. Although many “traditional” parties – those that had dominated the party system since the first incorporation – survived the military repression of the 1960–1980s, they fared less well in subsequent years. Increased electoral volatility, challenges to traditional parties, and the entry of new parties have become common themes in many world regions, even in well-institutionalized party systems, such as those in Western Europe. However, the trend started earlier in Latin America as a reaction to the austerity and neoliberal economic policies of the 1980s and 1990s, even though some of the anti-party, so-called neo-populist presidents of the 1990s (Collor and Fujimori) failed to alleviate the economic crisis or themselves pursued economic adjustment policies. By 2007, Lupu (2014, 561) reports, a quarter of the region’s traditional parties had broken down.

A continual process of new party formation has accompanied the breakdown of traditional parties. New parties gained significant support in all of the countries included in SPA except Uruguay.⁴ Since the 1980s, new parties – that is, new relative to entry in any prior election (not relative to “traditional” parties) – won at least 20 percent of the vote in three presidential elections in Argentina, two in Chile, five in Colombia (with two new parties in one of those elections), two in Mexico, four in Peru (with two new parties in one election), and three in Venezuela (again, with two new parties in one election).⁵

It should be noted that in these calculations, I used a definition of “new” that vastly understates the degree of new party formation. It excludes name changes, which are often indicative of some degree of organizational turmoil, and it includes as “new” only a party that passes

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² See Collier and Handlin (2009) chap. 3, where the restructured interest regime was conceptualized as a shift from the Union–Party Hub (UP-Hub), where hierarchically organized, party-affiliated unions predominated, to the Associational Network (A-Net).
³ See Pop-Eleches, Dunning and Novaes, Handlin, Palmer Rubin, and Boas (this volume) for a discussion of parties and party linkages in the current period.
⁴ For present purposes, I consider the Frente Amplio, founded in the 1970s before the military regime, a traditional party.
⁵ I am grateful to Scott Mainwaring for sharing his electoral data.
the 20 percent threshold the first time it presents any candidate. That is, it excludes a party that presented a candidate for some other office in a prior election and/or one that in a previous election won a small percent of the vote. With this definition in mind, it is noteworthy that presidential candidates of new parties were successful three times in Peru, twice in Colombia and Venezuela, and once in Mexico. Though technically excluded from this measure of new parties, to this tally could be added the Social Liberal Party of Bolsonaro, who won in Brazil as a candidate of a party that was formed in 1994 but received less than 1 percent of the vote in the prior legislative and the one presidential election in which it ran.

Mainwaring (2018) suggests that party fluidity is associated with negative outcomes such as shorter time horizons and accountability. Further research should elaborate the implications – for individual participation, for the stability of a party’s core support base, and for organizational politics – of party fluidity and its effects on the nature of representation. Two features of Latin America’s new party systems are important for the nature of popular inclusion: party linkages and the governing potential of those parties to which popular organizations have links. Needless to say, these linkages have changed dramatically. After the first incorporation, labor unions were essentially the only popular sector organizations that had linkages to parties, with the notable exceptions of party linkages of peasant unions in Mexico, Venezuela, and Bolivia. These were organic linkages to two types of labor-based parties, either populist parties or classist parties. With the second inclusion, this scenario has changed substantially. The organic linkages between unions and populist parties have generally loosened. This distancing has occurred even in Argentina, where the new linkage pattern of the CGT has been characterized as neo-corporatist (Etchemendy and Collier 2007), and in Mexico, where the CTM developed more instrumental linkages with the PRI once the party lost the presidency (De la Garza 2006). Nevertheless, substantial variation of party–union linkages exists, as laid out by Etchemendy (this volume). They range from particularly close ties in Uruguay to distant ties in Chile, often oppositional in Ecuador, and having substantial state-sponsorship and mobilization from above in Venezuela. In addition, some degree of fragmentation of peak labor confederations has occurred as new or dissident labor confederations have gained in strength in many countries and have often divided the partisan support of the union sector or aspired to avoid party linkages.
The proliferating types of newer popular sector organizations also have diverse types of linkages to a variety of parties. Most do not replicate the earlier organic linkages of unions, but instead have links that are contingent, instrumental, and strategic, or they have no links at all. Some support party-electoral candidates. Some primarily deliver services, often through government programs, a situation that facilitates a dependency on the government with potential implications for political action and representation (Collier and Handlin 2009, Palmer-Rubin 2019). However, a few associations have developed significant party linkages. In his chapter, Etchemendy points to various associations of urban informal workers in Argentina, community associations in Venezuela, and both urban and rural associations in Bolivia and Brazil (see also Schipani 2019).

These changes suggest a rich research agenda. What kinds of linkage strategies are pursued by different types of organizations, and what are the implications for political representation? To what extent are parties that appeal to the different types of popular sector constituencies “niche” parties in a fractionalized system and to what extent are they mass parties with majoritarian potential? What are the implications for organizational autonomy or dependence and for popular representation of newer types of linkages – for more strategic and shifting organizational support by organizations and for the increasing ability of candidates to cyber-connect with voters directly? These are the kinds of questions that were important for understanding the position of the formal working class in the first inclusion. They arise again in the second inclusion, not only for the newly included groups, but also for unions, for which these questions are being posed anew in the restructured party-electoral arena. In exploring these questions, it is interesting to keep in mind the suggestion of Mair (2013) that the representative function of parties may be in decline.

Features of Popular Participation. The lumpy or segmented structuration of the arenas of participation can in part be viewed in terms of multiple combinations of different (1) interests, (2) organizational types with different relations to both the state and popular sector constituencies, (3) access, and (4) repertoires of collective action.

Types of Organizations. As mentioned above, popular sector organizations have proliferated, and unions are no longer the predominant type of organization. Our survey of popular sector individuals in four Latin American capitals in 2002–2003 indicates that a large percentage has participated to some degree in the new associations that can be considered problem-solving (those that make demands on the state or may engage in
collective self-help activities, sometimes with government support), ranging from the lowest at about a quarter and up to two thirds of those surveyed (Collier and Handlin 2009, 79). These associations are very different organizational types compared to unions. Popular sector associations take a variety of organizational forms. Some are organizations of the popular sectors; others act on their behalf. Grassroots associations have participants rather than members, and participation may be irregular, episodic, or temporary. NGOs are staff-centered and may involve popular sector constituents as beneficiaries or perhaps followers rather than “participants.” Funding of both types is sought externally, rather than internally through dues; it is less reliable and gives the association an external constituency, in addition to one based in those it seeks to serve. Associations tend to be more horizontally interrelated in a network.

Collective Action. The organizational features of popular associations have implications for the capacity for collective action. On the one hand, organizational traits of popular associations, compared to unions, would suggest that they confront greater problems of collective action. They can’t rely on a stable membership or funding to support collective action. Because they are interrelated through networks, they do not have the same degree of coordinating and scaling capacity of the peak associations formed by unions (Collier and Handlin 2009, chap. 3). A typical problem, particularly of neighborhood associations, is that they make local distributive demands that make it hard to coordinate because, in a sense, they compete for resources. On the other hand, in earlier work we found that not only demand-making activities but also protest is a perhaps surprisingly common activity, even for those associations that provide distributions from state programs or receive state funding (Kapiszewski 2009, chap. 6). Patterns of collective action vary substantially across different types of associations and different countries, and further research on this topic is needed.

Occasionally, some impressive, large-scale protests have been mounted and coordinated across cities and types of organizations. Often, unions have played a prominent role in these. Many have been in reaction to shocks – particularly neoliberal policies, often price hikes, or “IMF riots” – or, more recently, to particular events (like the World Cup in Brazil) or scandals. Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil are notable for the high mobilizational capacity of popular sector groups, often involving coordination of both unions and other types of popular sector associations. In addition to these reactive mobilizations, Brazilian associations have engaged in proactive mobilization around quite different issues,
particularly at the time of the constitutional assembly, in an effort to establish formal provisions for social and institutional components of inclusion.

Also in need of further study is the role of online, cyber-coordinated collective action. Assessments have been divided, but relatively little systematic research on this topic exists. Social media may be effective tools for activities such as protesting, signing petitions, and fundraising, but they also may undermine organization by circumventing it. No doubt, these cyber-recruited demonstrations vary in the role of organizations. When organizations play a substantial role, the advantage of social media is to diffuse the protest beyond the organized constituency. In cases where organizations play a lesser role, there may be a trade-off, in which the very ease of coordinating individuals remotely, online, by sidestepping the need for organization in the initial stages, may lead to a politics of protest with little follow-up or capacity for engaging in a subsequent and sustained policymaking process.

Social media seem occasionally effective in convoking large numbers in opposition to often diffusely framed targets, such as, the system, the regime, leaders, and corruption. Large protests, augmented and intensified by social media, can even bring down governments, as they have in Bolivia, and massive demonstrations may have played a role in bringing down Dilma Rousseff in Brazil. These movements have at least raised some materialist issues of inequality, jobs, and economic regulation. They have also opposed specific policies, such as price increases and pension reform in Brazil. At the same time, they are an infrequent tool and we know little about the conditions of their convocatory success. In nearly all cases they are episodic and then disappear.

Access. As noted in the introductory chapter of this volume, some states have expanded formal access in the party-electoral arena by extending the suffrage or making it more effective. Similarly, a greater array of parties, particularly those on the Left, have been legalized and even allowed to win and retain the presidency for the first time in Latin American history. In addition to the individual vote, is the question of the access to policymaking afforded by party–organization linkages. The new panorama of popular sector associations with diverse party linkages have implications for the type of access to the policy process. What kinds of linkages grant policymaking influence and under what conditions do linkages lead to subordination? And to what extent do parties provide access to making venues for different kinds of popular sector interests and types of organizations? In his chapter, Palmer-Rubin offers a nice
typology of the new kinds of linkages and the quite different types of
access they afford (see also Garay 2009, Poertner 2018). It would also be
interesting to explore the variation that occurs across types of constitu-
cencies and issues; types of political parties; and types of party systems.

Access in the interest arena has also changed. Union rights that were
abrogated under the military or under emergency powers of governments
undertaking economic reform, have generally been restored. However,
the effectiveness of this institutionalized access in the form of the right of
collective bargaining has weakened with the change in economic model
from ISI to neoliberalism and with economic cycles. In addition, there
have been attempts to change the labor law in a negative way for union
power. Despite these attempts, in most cases relatively little has happened
in terms of retreats on collective rights, although adverse regulations
promoting worker flexibility have been broadly adopted. It was widely
recognized that the structures of the first inclusion could not only provide
access but also control and subordinate unions. Nevertheless, the value of
this access became more appreciated when it was abridged or weakened
in the period of economic reform. Even the left governments of the 2000s
displayed substantial variation in whether or not they empowered unions
or even addressed their material demands (Schipani 2019).

Channels of access of the new associations can take a variety of forms.
In his chapter in this volume, Etchemendy analyzes the more traditional
type of access achieved – or granted – through appointments of both
union and association leaders to ministerial or other key positions, as
does Schipani (2019). The new innovation in access for the new associ-
atations has been participatory policy councils, which institutionalize the
participation of popular organizations. These have been widely initiated
but have proved to be only rarely effective. They seem most effective in
Brazil and in certain policy areas, particularly local budgeting, “recognition
policies,” oversight functions, and distributive policy areas rather
than in redistributive or regulatory areas (see Goldfrank, this volume,
Mayka and Rich, this volume, and Mayka 2019). Another interesting
type of access is “state-sponsored activism” (Rich 2019), that is, access
that may be advanced by actors in the state bureaucracy attempting to
implement policy in a particular area. Both of these types of access deserve
further study across countries, across types of constituencies, and also
across policy areas, since these vary according to how costly they are both
economically and politically – how zero-sum they are and the extent to
which they generate opposition. Participatory budgeting, for instance,
may be the “easiest” case, since it involves divvying up a given pot of
funding for one-shot distributive goods, a pattern in which losers in one round can be winners in the next.

Cleavages and Issues. There is no longer a dominant cleavage that is salient in the interest arena, which is now characterized by multiple, at least partly cross-cutting cleavages, identities, and issues. Nevertheless, parties continue to be arrayed broadly on a right–left economic dimension, reflecting the ongoing importance of materialist issues. Indeed the subject of this volume is the “popular sectors,” a category of marginalization that the editors have defined in economic terms (see introductory chapter). It does not, for instance, include identity or rights groups (such as LGBT or feminist groups) unless they are also materially marginalized, as is the case for indigenous groups. To a substantial extent, then, the new popular sector organizations have tended to frame issues in two ways: as rights-based issues and as materialist issues that are largely consumptionist rather than productionist.

Issues related to identity and rights have become one of the hallmarks of the second inclusion, as is emphasized in the introductory chapter. Among the popular sectors, issues of indigenous rights have been the most prominent of these in several countries (Yashar 2005). These are multifaceted claims that include, inter alia, official cultural recognition, claims for political autonomy and representation, and bilingual education.

Unlike unions, the new popular sector associations tend to present materialist demands as consumptionist issues, that is, those having to do with programs that distribute income or in-kind services, such as health and education. Occasionally, they are expressed in a larger frame of inequality and have been presented most dramatically around specific events, such as price hikes or “moments” that have framed inequality in sharp relief. An example of the latter was the mobilization against the 2014 World Cup preparations in Brazil and the extravagant spending for projects that favored elite interests and rode roughshod over those of the poor. Although some Latin American countries made some headway against inequality, which had risen during neoliberal reform, it is a salient issue in countries throughout the world, and its importance cannot be underestimated. The key question is how this more macro framing can be presented politically in Latin America given the changing structure of the two arenas of participation.

More typically, consumptionist demands come in a more disaggregated form. Most of the new popular sector associations do not organize around inequality as such but around more specific demands. Organizations present policy-specific distributive claims, whether they
are disaggregated neighborhood claims, or health, nutrition, education, and so on. Their distributive, rather than redistributive and zero-sum nature, is a political advantage, as such demands are generally compatible with orientations on both the Left and the Right. Indeed, consumptionist programs, most prominently conditional cash transfers (CCTs), have been introduced by governments of both the Right and the Left (see Hunter, this volume; Garay, this volume).

An important question is the degree to which productionist issues have been demobilized for the popular sectors. They continue to be important issues at both the microlevel of the workplace and the macro-level of economic policy. Unions, of course, continue to mobilize around productionist issues at both levels. But in most countries unions are weaker than they used to be. Peasant organizations have also traditionally made productionist claims and continue to do so (see Palmer-Rubin 2019), but, like unions, they have often suffered under economic reform, as land policies have often atomized peasants and marketization has to some extent removed the state as an object of policy claims (Snyder 2001; Kurtz 2004).

A few types of organizations that are part of the second inclusion have also made productionist claims. In the rural sector, examples include, perhaps most prominently: the MST in Brazil; the cocaleros in the CSUTCB in Bolivia; and the colonizer peasants also in Bolivia. In addition, the demands of indigenous organizations typically include the productionist claims of property rights and control of land. In the urban economy too some groups have made productionist demands. For example, street vendors have associations in many countries, though those organizations tend to be very local, even street-based, but sometimes scale to the city level. Argentina has perhaps seen the most active pattern of productionist demand-making. Most active have been the *piqueteros*, who, along with other groups of informal workers such as the *cartoneros*, or recyclers, have formed the CTEP. Another interesting development in Argentina is the formation of worker cooperatives.

The politics of materialist issues, which continue to be critical, remain a key issue for research. There is an important asymmetry in productionist issues: they constitute the main interests and demands of the elite and capitalist classes, who pursued market reforms and have emerged from them in a stronger position, while the power of workers has been weakened. The popular sectors were always at a disadvantage in productionist issues; but, even relative to the first inclusion, it is worth asking to
what extent they have been demobilized on these critical issues, which affect their life conditions: income and work conditions, as well as national economic policy that affect them as workers. Other types of issues are certainly important, and consumptionist issues have certainly been a crucial approach to materialist demands, especially for the informal sectors. Nevertheless, the engagement and input of the popular sectors on economic issues remains important.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: THE PARADOX OF PARTICIPATION

In these reflections comparing the two inclusions, I have taken a somewhat different perspective from that of the editors in the introductory chapter, which focuses on state policies that provide rights, resources, and access to the popular sectors. Instead of state policy, I have focused on the changing infrastructure of participation available to the popular sectors for presenting claims. This emphasis on the structures of participation highlights the paradox of participation discussed by the editors: the expanded structures for participation that have been introduced in the second inclusion may not in fact increase the relative political weight of the popular sectors. Future research should elucidate three issues the editors raise in connection with this paradox of participation: class bias in institutional participation, the role of protest, and the problem of autonomy.

First, it is important to push further the idea that even as popular sector participation has increased in the second inclusion in terms both of who participates and the types of demands made, class bias in participatory behavior may not increase the relative weight or influence of the popular sectors. Class disparity in resources certainly affects the rate of participation to the disadvantage of the popular sectors. The resources are material (money), social (networks), and human (information, know-how, and time). Seawright (2009) has examined the representational distortion related to several forms of participation and demand-making. It may be interesting to consider the consequences of the fact that class bias in participation rates may not be uniform across institutions, and those in which it may be more pronounced are not necessarily those that are more central to policies important to popular sector interests. Indeed, a suggestion above is that differential class bias in institutions may favor local,
immediate, consumptionist, and relatively costless demands. At the same time, in assessing the effect of class bias, it is important to examine some countervailing forces: Rich (2019), for example, has elucidated a pattern of “state-sponsored activism,” in which bureaucrats within the state act to solve the collective action problems of popular sector groups and counteract their relative deficit in social and human capital. And Roberts (this volume) highlights the political limitations of the contemporary inclusionary turn.

Second, the role of protest as a form of popular sector participation and demand-making should be further examined. The editors suggest that protest may decline as an important form of demand-making as participation in the second inclusion becomes routinized and regularized. However, the role and types of protest may have changed. On the one hand, protest itself has, in a sense, become routinized. There is some evidence that many popular sector organizations engage in protest as a fairly regular activity in their repertoire of participation (Kapiszewski 2009, chap. 7). On the other hand, very large, even multicity protests have also emerged in a much less routinized and disruptive way, with new networks and forms of coordination being forged and created anew each time. Whereas the former may be quite specific in demands, the latter are often diffuse and multifaceted. The role for and effect of different types of protest is another interesting area for further research.

Third, as part of the paradox of participation, the editors raise the issue already discussed above: the greater pluralism that characterizes the second inclusion does not escape the dilemma of the challenge to autonomy, which had been posed by the corporatism that was characteristic of the first inclusion. As with unions, state benefits to the new types of organizations run the risk of dependence that can compromise their autonomy (see Collier and Collier 1991; and Collier and Handlin 2009, 88–91 and chap. 9). The new organizations may depend on the state for funding, for their basic activity of partnering with the state to deliver services, and for other forms of assistance. Similarly, organizational ties to political parties have sometimes become more distant, but variation in these ties exists. The issue of organizational dependence on both the state and parties and how forms of dependence may constrain organizations or shape their representational role are important issues that deserve more systematic attention.

Class representational distortion in participation, the role and use of different forms of protest, and forms of dependence are important themes
for further research. The changes reinforce the asymmetry in productionist issues, which in many cases have been substantially diluted in popular sector participation but remain central to capitalists, who have other channels of influence including structural power (Fairfield 2015). These issues are central in evaluating the nature of the second inclusion.

References


