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Introduction

The 2011 uprisings in the Arab world shared similar characteristics and produced radically divergent outcomes. The tens of thousands of protesters who took to the streets in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria clamored nonviolently for regime change. The urban poor, Westernized elite, Islamists, union activists, liberals, and leftists mobilized along cross-class, cross-regional, and nonpartisan lines. The commonalities in terms of motivations, grievances, protest size, as well as the peaceful nature of the popular mobilization, were unmistakable. And yet the popular movements triggered markedly different military responses. In Syria and Bahrain, the armed forces sanctioned bloodbaths to defend their leaders. In contrast, the military refrained from using violence in Egypt and Tunisia. Meanwhile, troops splintered in Libya and Yemen where some units defected wholesale whereas others stayed loyal and willing to uphold autocracy. In every case, the armed forces sat at the crux of the unfolding cataclysmic events and influenced the fortunes and misfortunes of democracy in the Arab region. But why was the military reaction to these upheavals strikingly dissimilar? This is the central question of this book. I maintain that coup-proofing structures military politics during endgame scenarios.[1] Specifically, I study the historical origins of civil–military relations in Arab autocracies and show that institutional

[1] David Pion-Berlin et al. were the first to use the "endgame" metaphor to describe a situation where civilian uprisings threaten autocrats' desperate grip on power, leaving the armed forces as the ultimate defense line of the status quo. See David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, "Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crises in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 4 (July 2010): 398; and David Pion-Berlin, Diego Esparza, and Kevin Grisham, "Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century," *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 2 (2014): 236. Endgames are typically short and can last for only a few days (e.g., Romania, December 1989) or a few weeks (e.g., Egypt, January/February 2011), or a few months (e.g., East Germany, September 1989/March 1990). In the wake of endgames, dictatorships transition to democracy, consolidate their autocratic order, or plunge into civil strife.

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legacies pertaining to coup-proofing informed the agency of officers during the 2011 turning point.

Iron laws in the social sciences are scarce, but the following axiom may qualify as such: no transition from autocracy to democracy is possible if the armed forces remain cohesive and loyal to the powers that be. Put differently, popular uprisings can only trigger autocratic breakdowns when militaries desist from defending the status quo. This, of course, breaks with much of the classical literature on revolutionary transformations. Marx, for example, asserts that proletarian triumph in the struggle pitting the bourgeoisie against the workers is made inevitable by contradictions inherent to capitalism. Increasing economic exploitation heightens class conflict and consciousness, and the ensuing polarization creates conditions favorable to the seizure of power by revolutionary movements. Guevara and Mao agree: revolutionary triumph over the forces of reaction is not only possible, but it is actually made ineluctable by the persecution of the masses, galvanizing popular resistance.[2] Interestingly, the analyses of Lenin and Trotsky are more nuanced in this regard. They maintain, respectively:

> No revolution of the masses can triumph without the help of a portion of the armed forces that sustained the old regime.[3]
>
> There is no doubt that the fate of every revolution at a certain point is decided by a break in the disposition of the army. Against a numerous, disciplined, well-armed and ably led military force, unarmed or almost unarmed masses of the people cannot possibly gain victory.[4]

In other words, Marx, Guevara, and Mao seem to imply that once the revolution is set in motion, there is little the status quo can do to uphold it. Lenin and Trotsky, on the other hand, suggest that revolutionary victory is a function of armed forces defection. Academics are also divided over the matter. Some, like Gurr or Hobsbawm, are closer to the Marxist notion of revolutionary triumph as historical inevitability. Others, like Russell, argue that the disloyalty of the armed forces is a necessary condition for autocratic breakdown.[5] The debate is fascinating, but it is also

[2] See D. E. H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 13.
[3] Cited in Zoltan Barany, "Explaining Military Responses to Revolutions," Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Research Paper (July 2013), 1, www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Explaining_Military_Responses_to_Revolutions.pdf (accessed April 5, 2015).
[4] Leon Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution* (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2008), 88.
[5] Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force*, 4 and 80.

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largely settled. Russell was right to contend that the "oppression cannot last" argument is empirically unwarranted. Tyranny can and does last for years and decades when the coercive apparatus is committed to the status quo. Nearly a century after the 1917 Russian Revolution, practically every upheaval, violent or nonviolent, has been an occasion to corroborate this rather pessimistic view. In 1979, the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran demonstrated spectacularly how dependent upon military defection revolutionary triumph really is. In contrast, the tragedy of Tiananmen Square, China, in 1989 proved how insufficient the most favorable revolutionary conditions (i.e., divisions within the ruling elite, media-backing, and widespread mobilization) can be in the absence of armed forces defection. From Southern and Eastern Europe to Latin America, South Korea, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, and, more recently, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, the countries of the Arab Spring, Venezuela, Algeria, and Sudan, each time a new democratic wave challenged authoritarianism, the central question has been the same: Will the military answer the call for repression, or will it be part of a "dissenting alliance"?[6] Like Lenin and Trotsky, modern transitology asserts that in order for transition to be possible, the military, or significant parts of it, at least, should be within the soft-liners' camp.[7]

In brief, it has become increasingly clear that military defection shifts the correlation of forces in favor of widespread civilian uprisings against autocrats, and that protests can quickly reach – and, more importantly, sustain – critical mass only if the military refuses to defend dictatorships. Note that the literature on social movements, revolutions, and civilian uprisings highlights the centrality of political opportunity structures in terms of generating revolutionary outcomes. Still, the literature typically neglects to study the military, despite the fact that the armed forces create, when they defect, the ultimate opening for the expansion and ultimate triumph of contestation. Doug McAdam, one of the few social movement scholars to put the state's capacity (or lack thereof) to repress at the center of his conceptualization of political opportunity structures, finds the tendency to obscure state repression in the related literature "puzzling."[8] Indeed, it is.

[6] Schmitter cited in Terence Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia," *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 5 (2009): 641.

[7] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 19–20.

[8] Doug McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing*

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The Arguments in Brief

(1) Civil–military relations in autocracies where leaders fear being overthrown by officers center upon coup-proofing, which is defined as the set of measures governments take to prevent putsches. In such regimes, the military's attitude toward popular uprisings and the prospects of democratic transition is structured by coup prevention tactics. When the tenures of democratic leaders end, they can retreat into private life or remain politically active in one capacity or another. In either case, their lives do not depend upon staying in office. The stakes for remaining in power are higher in nondemocratic regimes, because ousted leaders typically face death, imprisonment, or exile. Historically, autocrats have been far more likely to succumb to putsches than to popular revolutions or foreign invasions as Milan Svolik has shown.[9] In fact, Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza found that a greater number of autocrats lose power to military coups than to civil war, popular protests, and foreign invasions combined. Moreover, they discovered that only 20 percent of deposed autocrats avoid post-tenure punishment, whereas exile, imprisonment, death, or suicide await the others.[10] I develop this issue further in Chapter 1. For now, it is sufficient to pinpoint the implication of such facts, which is straightforward – no other priority supplants the need to avoid or foil coups in autocracies where the political reliability of the military is questionable. Dictators may want their troops to be competent as a fighting force to counter an international menace or, say, a secessionist movement. However, the organizational requirements of battlefield performance, such as devolving authority to field officers and decentralizing command to maximize their tactical leeway, may be deemed threatening politically. The same is true of fostering intra-military trust, which is crucial for cross-unit operations, and of recruiting and promoting officers on the basis of merit rather than loyalty or ascriptive characteristics.[11]

Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 26.

[9] Milan Svolik, "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 2 (2009): 478.

[10] Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, "Introducing Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 2 (March 2009): 274–275.

[11] On the trade-off between military performance and coup-proofing, see Caitlin Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015). See also Norvell B. De Atkine, "Why Arabs Lose Wars," *Middle East Quarterly* (December 1999), www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars (accessed September 12, 2018); and Bashir Zein al-ʿAbidin, *Al-Jaysh wa-l-Siasa fi Suria (1918–2000), Dirasa Naqdiyya* (London: Dar al-Jabia, 2008), 474;

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In prioritizing regime security over national defense, autocrats act politically, in the narrow, self-centered sense of the term. To be sure, when countries face major defeats and imminent collapse, autocrats may act in accordance with the objective needs of national security to avoid officers' wrath or loss of power to invaders. For instance, a series of military setbacks in the first years of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) forced Saddam Hussein to reverse the most damaging aspects of coup protection. As a result, the Iraqis performed better after 1986 and nearly collapsed the Iranian armed forces in a run of aggressive campaigns in 1988. Such extreme cases, however, are an exception to the rule. In truth, autocrats can blunder heavily in the strategic realm or lose major international wars and still remain in power. This is especially true of military strongmen and civilian bosses leading weakly institutionalized personalist dictatorships, as Jessica L. P. Weeks has shown.[12] Think of Stalin as a case in point: his Winter War against Finland in 1939 was supposed to deliver a quick victory after a short campaign. Though Finland eventually surrendered, the war proved a disaster for Soviet troops, who lost more than 125,000 to the Fins. Later on, Stalin misjudged Hitler's intentions and failed to anticipate Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. The Soviet military initially collapsed because it was taken by surprise and also weakened by previous purges. Stalin had proved strategically inept between 1939 and 1941, and yet he survived, because he had coup-proofed his regime effectively. Similarly, Gamal ʿAbdul Nasser of Egypt lost twice to Israel on the battlefield, in 1956 and 1967. In the Six-Day War, the Egyptian military suffered its biggest defeat in history and was, in essence, wiped out in Sinai. Yet Nasser was still very much in power when he died in 1970. Israel also routed the Syrian armed forces in 1967 and in 1982. The Iraqi military was dealt a heavy blow and forced to retreat from Kuwait by the American-led international coalition in 1991. The Libyan armed forces were expelled from Chad in 1987. Yet the regimes of Hafez al-Asad, Saddam Hussein, and Muʿammar al-Qaddhafi weathered these spectacular debacles. Autocrats can also face armed insurgencies and lead their countries straight into civil war and still remain in office. As I write these words in 2020, strife is still ongoing in Syria yet Bashar al-Asad remains firmly ensconced in Damascus. In contrast to conventional and civil wars, successful putsches are a quick one-way ticket

and Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 207.

[12] Jessica L. P. Weeks, *Dictators at War and Peace* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 75.

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out of power, and coup-plotters are far more dangerous adversaries than foreign powers or insurgents.[13]

It is thus inevitable that coup-proofing structures military politics in dictatorships with a history of civil–military conflict, because it forms the essence of authoritarian survival politics, even when threat environments are multifaceted and dangers stemming from civil war, secession, or conventional war are also lurking. To coup-proof, autocrats seek to either make militaries loyal to the regimes they serve, or unable to challenge them, or both. The loyalty of soldiers is cultivated through material and/or ideational incentives. Incapacity to threaten autocrats' tenure is guaranteed by keeping the armed forces small and ill-equipped; playing divide-and-rule tactics to foster division within military ranks; counterbalancing the military with the police or paramilitary forces; or a combination of these maneuvers in order to render armed forces "coup-proofed to death."[14] All coup-proofing tactics share the same aim: rendering successful putsches unfeasible. However, they shape civil–military relations – and by extension officers' political agency – in fundamentally divergent ways. When coup-proofing centers upon the manipulation of ascriptive loyalties, officers who belong to the autocrat's in-group are likely to be loyalists irrespective of rank, and willing to snuff out the threat of ethnic others. The same is not necessarily true when coup-proofing relies upon the provision of material incentives to the top brass, but not to their subordinates. Put differently, one coup-proofing tactic is more likely than another to foster politically significant, generational cleavages inside the armed forces. In a similar vein, counterbalancing typically fosters unity in officer corps against a backdrop of shared animosity to the police or other institutional rivals. In contrast, divide-and-rule tactics disseminate hostility and mistrust among officers. These are very different dynamics to study as we ponder military politics during popular uprisings. In essence, my argument is this: because these variances mold civil–military relations differently, probing the military's political behavior requires investigation of

[13] To quote Talmadge in this regard: "Coups are, in a sense, the ultimate offense-dominant weapon: they occur quickly and afford tremendous and potentially total rewards to first movers. As such, the best defense is prevention, which is exactly what the military organizational practices geared toward coup protection provide. By contrast, other threats, even internal ones, are usually relatively more defense-dominant and do not require the same level of constant vigilance." Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army*, 19.

[14] Florence Gaub, "An Unhappy Marriage: Civil-Military Relations in Post-Saddam Iraq," Carnegie Report, January 13, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/13/unhappy-marriage-civil-military-relations-in-post-saddam-iraq/im00 (accessed February 20, 2016).

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control mechanisms and what scholars variously refer to as coup-proofing's "unintended effect,"[15] "by-product,"[16] "downside,"[17] "paradox,"[18] "adverse effects,"[19] or "unintended consequences."[20]

The bare-bones reality in this regard is that what works to foil military conspiracies against the status quo may not work when danger stems from the streets. For instance, while counterbalancing is effective from a coup-proofing perspective, it is likely to encourage military defection in times of popular uprising. Sheena Chestnut Greitens argues in an excellent book centered upon East Asia that it is "impossible" for an autocrat to "create a coercive apparatus that is truly optimized to deal with a popular threat and an elite one."[21] According to Greitens, dictators resolve their coercive dilemma by bracing against dangers that seemingly pose the most acute threat to their rule. That, in the Arab world, was putsches. This is not to say that civil society never challenged Arab autocrats; it did. Think, for example, of the massive bread uprising (*intifadat al-khubz*) in Egypt in 1977, or the confrontation between Hafez al-Asad's regime and the various syndicates in Syria culminating in the general strike that the Syrian Bar Association declared in March 1980. Think also of the nationwide strike and bread riots in Tunisia, respectively in 1978 and 1983. These and other similar examples show that the Arab street was not invariably dormant or subdued. And yet it is a fact that until 2011, popular mobilization was unable to force regime change in Arab autocracies, except during the October Revolution of 1964 in Sudan, which overthrew General Ibrahim Abbud, and the April Intifada of 1985, also in Sudan, which toppled General Jaʿfar al-Numeiri.[22] Historically, the

[15] Pion-Berlin, Esparza, and Grisham, "Staying Quartered," 245.
[16] Lee, "The Armed Forces," 642; Risa Brooks, "Political–Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes," *Adelphi Paper 324, International Institute for Strategic Studies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 40.
[17] Philip Roessler, "The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa," *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (2011): 315.
[18] Jonathan M. Powell, "Coups and Conflict: The Paradox of Coup-Proofing" (PhD diss., University of Kentucky, 2012), http://uknowledge.uky.edu/polysci_etds/3 (accessed March 3, 2016).
[19] Terence Lee, "Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1989 China and 1998 Indonesia," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, no. 1 (2005): 83.
[20] Aurel Croissant and Tobias Selge, "Should I Stay or Should I Go: Comparing Military (Non-) Cooperation during Authoritarian Regime Crises in the Arab World and Asia," in *Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring*, ed. Holger Albrecht, Aurel Croissant, and Fred H. Lawson (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 123.
[21] Sheena Chestnut Greitens, *Dictators and Their Secret Police, Coercive Institutions and State Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 32.
[22] Strictly speaking, a coup ousted al-Numeiri in 1985, but the loyalist military leadership acted under extreme pressure from the street. I provide additional information on the 1985 military politics in Sudan further below in this introduction.

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survival of Arab dictators depended far more on coup prevention than on optimizing the armed forces to deal with popular threats. To use the words of Milan Svolik, the problem of Arab rulers was essentially that of *authoritarian power-sharing* (i.e., countering the challenge of regime insiders) not of *authoritarian control* (i.e., bracing against popular masses).[23] This changed abruptly in 2011. The ruling elite did indeed face a coercive dilemma that year, albeit one different from what Greitens probes: Arab autocrats needed to convince coercive agents hailing overwhelmingly from the popular and lower middle classes – and thus suffering from the economic repercussions of the post-1990 neoliberal turn – to slaughter fellow countrymen mobilizing against the same policies that they, the coercive agents, were also aching from. Wherever autocrats were able to draw upon shared ideational aversions this challenging task proved possible; the opposite was also true. Contra Greitens, I show in this book that some coup-proofing tactics are versatile in the sense that they can be used effectively against menacing elites *and* popular challenges when the threat environment changes. Other tactics are less adaptable. The fact is fortune does not always serve autocratic whims and events sometimes take unanticipated turns. A strongman becomes vulnerable if, having prepared his coercive apparatus to thwart coups, he is unexpectedly challenged by the streets; or having braced for popular mobilizations he suddenly faces a military putsch. This is where the institutional design of the coercive apparatus comes into play.

(2) Coup-proofing tactics are path-dependent. The scholarship on contemporary civil–military relations often ignores their historical origins.[24] Consequently, the literature on coup-proofing tends to overlook the durability of its patterns. This is problematic, because once mechanisms for surveillance and control of the armed forces have been established, they tend to endure and may shape military politics for years, and sometimes decades, to come. Consider ethnic stacking, for instance. An autocrat who counts on his co-ethnics to uphold his regime alienates other groups and heightens ethnic tensions, within both state institutions and the society at large. Consequently, the autocrat becomes more dependent upon his group, and more likely to reproduce the same patterns of ethnic dominance and exclusion as long as he retains power. Otherwise, he could lose the loyalty of the in-group, having previously

[23] Milan Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2.

[24] Notable exceptions include Zoltan Barany, *Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); and Brian Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army: Civil–Military Relations, 1689–2000* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

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alienated the out-group – a position in which no ruler would want to find himself.

What is true of ethnic stacking is also true of other coup-proofing tactics, such as promoting the material interests of officers or counterbalancing. If the police, or, say, the Republican Guard, functions as an autocratic regime's coercive pillar, then the risk of alienating these institutions would be too great to incur, lest regime survival be at stake. When existing arrangements serve the interests of powerful actors who yield coercive power, they are likely to endure. This is not to say that such arrangements are set in stone. They are not, and autocrats can and do innovate: by adding additional tactics to the coup-proofing system inherited from their predecessors, or by dropping parts of it. Furthermore, a young autocrat who inherited power may purge barons from his father's generation and supplant them with his own cronies. But personnel replacement should not be equated with institutional transformation when the organizational structure of the regime remains untouched. The fact is there is typically more continuity than change in coup-proofing systems. Autocrats tread carefully with coup-proofing, and often lack the incentive and/or capacity to change the configurations upon which they rely for survival. This means that coup-proofing at a specific time and place is the product of current necessities as much as institutional legacies.

In his study of democratic transition in Latin America, Bruce W. Farcau shows how events unfolding in the 1940s, namely, the participation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in World War II on the side of the Allies, and its subsequent transformation into a faction known as the "Sorbonne Group," directly influenced military politics and the breakdown of authoritarian regimes in the 1980s.[25] Along similar lines, Hazem Kandil maintains that the legacies of six decades of power struggle pitting the military, security, and civilian wings of the Egyptian power elite against one another structured the collapse of the Mubarak regime in 2011.[26] I show this contention to be true in Egypt and other countries of the Arab Spring as well.

(3) Armed forces are not unified actors and need to be disaggregated along vertical and horizontal lines. To be sure, generals cherish the projection of an image of the armed forces as a hierarchical organization

[25] Bruce W. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 87–106.

[26] Hazem Kandil, *Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt* (New York: Verso Books, 2012), 220. See also Kevin Koehler, "Officers and Regimes: The Historical Origins of Political–Military Relations in Middle Eastern Republics," in *Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring*, 52.

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whose leaders speak for all its members. Behind the facade of discipline and unity, however, officers' relations with superiors, subordinates, and peers are often fraught with tension, if not outright animosity.[27] In this book, I highlight vertical and horizontal differences within officer corps, and analyze the ways in which they structure the agency of the armed forces, during nonviolent revolutions and beyond. Intergenerational (i.e., vertical) friction is particularly important to investigate, for several reasons. First, the moral authority of senior officers (i.e., generals, lieutenant generals, major generals, and brigadier generals) over their subordinates (i.e., colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, first lieutenants, and second lieutenants) is reduced when the former order the latter to slaughter civilians. Field officers and soldiers may be ready to die to the last man when foreign armed forces invade their country – think of the beleaguered German military facing impossible odds in 1944, and yet fighting on two fronts against the Allies and the Russians until Hitler's surrender and suicide in 1945. Opening fire on women and children is a different matter, however, and senior officers who issue repression orders cannot always assume unconditional obedience from their subordinates.

Lest we forget, generals give directions from afar, but rarely do they lead fighting units operationally. This means that if the military elite decide to resort to force against popular uprisings, mid-ranking and junior officers will have to perform the dirty work of repression, and they may be reluctant to slaughter the countrymen they have sworn to protect.[28] Samuel E. Finer notices, in this regard, that professional militaries chafe at being used for the "sordid purposes"[29] of politicians. Police operations that require killing unarmed fellow nationals symbolize this type of purpose par excellence – hence the severe strain they put upon relations between loyalist generals and not-so-loyalist subordinates. Second, mid-ranking and junior officers are further removed than the top brass from circles of power, and tend to be more sensitive to social grievances and more readily alienated from the ruling elite or welcoming of democratic aspirations. Finally, officers sometimes have professional incentives for supporting change. If successful, civilian uprisings have the potential to drastically reshape the political arena by bringing about the

[27] See Alfred McCoy, *Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 10; and Pion-Berlin, Esparza, and Grisham, "Staying Quartered," 232.
[28] In the words of McCoy, "Whether war, peace, or martial rule, generals keep to their tents while lieutenants form the line and suffer its fate." McCoy, *Closer than Brothers*, 7.
[29] Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2006), 23.

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