Index

absolute generality, see quantification
abstract, see platonism versus aristotelianism
Access Problem, 137, 139–40
see also platonism versus aristotelianism
Anscocme, E., 39, 119
aristotelianism, see platonism versus aristotelianism
Aristotle, 172
Armstrong, D., 123–4, 126, 130, 132–3, 135, 204
ascription, 98–100, 185–8
see also predicate-reference; predicates
assertion, 160, 189–91
attributes, see predicates; properties
Audi, P., 206
Bach, K., 169
Bacon, A., 165
Baldwin, T., 192, 199
Barker, S, 153
Baxter, D., 131
belief, 160–2, 183, 198–9, 201–2
see also identity theory of truth; propositional content; propositions
beliefs, 209–10
Belnap, N., 196
Benacerraf, P., 137
Bergmann, G., 132
Blanchette, P., 12
Bolton, G., 6, 85, 87, 89, 94, 95
Bradley’s Regress, 109–10, 129–37
see also copula; instantiation; properties; relations
Bradley, F. H., 129
Brentano, F., 13
Button, T., 46, 90, 94, 96
Camp, J., 196
Campbell, J., 198
Candlish, S., 192, 193, 199
Cartwright, R., 192
case, 13, 20, 104–6
Chierchia, G., 123
complement clauses, see ‘that’-clauses
concept horse paradox
categorial differences, 114–7
categorial similarities, 117–9
and predicate semantics, 4, 114
the property horse is not a property, 3–4, 98, 111–3
see also Fregean realism; predicate-reference; properties
concepts, see concept horse paradox; properties; sense
concrete, see platonism versus aristotelianism
content, see propositional content
converse relations, see relations copula, 32–4, 66, 86, 107–10
see also Bradley’s Regress; instantiation;
properties; relations
correspondence theory of truth, see identity theory of truth
Crary, A., 120
cumulative type theory, 31–3, 32
see also sense-substitution
Davidson, D., 81, 82
dependence, 204–9
see also identity theory of truth; truthmaking
Devitt, M., 81, 82, 125
Diamond, C., 120
disquotation, see predicate-reference; term-reference
Dodd, J., 121, 130, 192–5, 199–200, 202, 205
Dolby, D., 16
Dorr, C., 78–9, 165
Dumfman, V., 71, 86
Dummett, M., 39, 44, 54, 70–1, 76–8, 80, 86, 137, 151, 197
Evans, G., 88
eexistence, see objects; properties; states of affairs
extensional contexts, 73–5, 149–50
see also hyper-intensional contexts; modal contexts

facts, see states of affairs
Fine, K., 141, 146–7, 155, 205, 206
Fish, W., 198
Foster, J., 198
Freg, G., 3–4, 11–12, 18–19, 23, 26, 29, 47, 70–1, 77, 88, 111–2, 114–5, 123, 125–6, 133, 135, 137–8, 157–8, 162, 165, 177, 184, 192–3

Fregian realism
about relations, 141–2
about states of affairs, 148–52
as Fregean nominalism, 92–3, 96, 109, 117–9, 125

loose talk, 79–80, 112–3, 115–7, 154–5, 184, 194–5, 203

statement of, 3, 70

versus traditional realism, 81–2
see also concept horse paradox; objects; predicate-reference; properties; propositions; relations; states of affairs
functions, see properties; relations

Furth, M., 70, 71, 77

Gaskin, R., 39, 71, 109, 131
Geach, P., 39, 119, 121
Geurts, B., 33
Goodman, J., 136, 202
Gray, A., 33
Groenendijk, J., 33

grounding, 204–9
see also identity theory of truth; truthmaking
Grover, D., 163, 196

Hacker, P. 119
Hale, B., 8, 9, 25, 81, 98–102, 114, 133, 137
Hanks, P., 172, 189–91
Heck, R., 70, 71
Heim, I., 165
Hirsch, B., 1
Hofweber, T., 38, 123, 167, 169, 183
Hornby, J., 193, 197, 199, 202, 203
Horwich, P., 204, 210

Hume’s Principle, 157

hyper-intensional contexts, 74–5, 150, 163–5, 201–3, 208–9
see also extensional contexts; modal contexts

idealism, 197–9
see also identity theory of truth

identity theory of truth
account of falsehood, 199–201

as direct realism, 197–9

core of, 197–9

individuation problem, 201–3

and prosentential theory, 196

and redundancy theory, 184–5, 194–5, 210

robust/immodest distinction, 193–5

statement of, 6, 192

versus correspondence theory, 192, 203–7

versus truthmaking, 203–7
see also propositional content, propositions, states of affairs

immanence, see platonism versus aristotelianism
Ingram, D., 205

instantiation, 109–10, 129–37, 140, 179–80
see also Bradley’s Regress; copula; properties; relations

Jago, M., 153, 204
Jenkins, C., 206
Johnston, C., 193, 200, 210
Jones, N., 43, 67, 71, 114, 138, 139, 162
Jonston, C., 153
judgment, see belief; identity theory of truth; propositional content; propositions

Künne, W., 161, 163, 167, 172, 183, 196, 202
King, J., 162, 163, 169, 172, 183, 185–8
Klein, U., 34
Krämer, S., 86, 90, 114
Kratzler, A., 165
Kremer, M., 120

Langacker, R., 33
Larson, R., 104
Levine, J., 60
Lewis, D., 125, 130–2, 152, 155, 204, 206
Liebesman, D., 59
Liggins, D., 205
Linnebo, Ø., 31, 90, 96, 101, 102, 114
Location Principle, 139
see also platonism versus aristotelianism

logical properties, see sense
Long, P., 46–7
Lowe, E.J., 137

MacBride, F., 9–10, 38, 39, 82–4, 86, 102–7, 129–30, 131, 137, 192
Magidor, O., 29
Martin, M., 198
Mates, B., 88
May, R., 70, 71
McDaniel, K., 3, 137
McDowell, J., 19, 193, 196–7, 202
McKeon, R., 172
McKinsey, M., 162, 169
Index

meaning, see sense
Melia, J., 205
Mendelsohn, R., 78
mereology, 155
see also states of affairs
Merricks, T., 160, 172, 199, 204
Methven, S., 46, 193
Mull, J.S., 60
modal contexts, 74, 78–9, 150
see also extensional contexts;
hyper-intensional contexts
Molmann, F., 169
Montague, R., 41
Moore, A., 117, 120–1
Moor, G.E., 192, 194
Morriss, M., 121
Mulligan, K., 206
multiple-relation theory of judgment, 178, 179
see also nonsense; propositional content
Neibel, J., 169
necessitism, 116
neutralism, see quantification
nominalisation, see predicates
nominalism, 58–9, 71–2, 81–96, 108–9
see also Fregean realism; properties; universals
see also concept horse paradox; Fregean realism
Noonan, H., 71
objects
characterisation of, 1, 8, 25
first-order existence, 2, 125
incomparability with properties, 79–80, 114–9
see also quantification; singular terms;
term-reference
Oliver, A., 10–11, 17, 47, 130, 131
ontological commitment, see objects; properties;
relations; states of affairs
ontological pluralism, 3
ostichnominalism, see universals
Parsons, J., 127, 137
Parsons, T., 47, 112
Partee, B., 32
particulars, see objects
Paul, L., 137
Peacock, H., 125, 130
platonism versus aristotelianism, 137–40
Porter, M., 104, 179
predicate-reference
and semantic role, 73–5
as having a satisfaction condition, 5, 71–5, 121–2
as mixed-level, 51, 58–9, 99–100, 117–8
as pure reference, 106–7
disquotation problem, 50, 55–9
dyadic-predicate-reference, 141–6
fineness of grain, 72–5
intentionality of, 55, 72, 87–8, 90, 96
versus semantic value, 87–8
see also predicates; properties; relations;
term/predicate distinction
predicates
as incomplete, 24–5
complex, 39–40
first-level, 23–6, 29–30, 55–8, 73–4, 80
nominalisations of, 37–9, 112–3, 123–9
second-level, 26, 30–1, 41, 76–80, 142, 151, 201–3
see also predicate-reference; term/predicate distinction
predication, 24, 49, 177–82, 188–91
see also predicate-reference; predicates; properties
Prenective View, see propositional content
Price, M., 50
Priest, G., 130–1
Prior, A., 85–6, 91, 161–3, 166
Problem of Bare Particulars, 137–8, 140
see also instantiation; platonism versus aristotelianism
Problem of Universals, see properties; universals
properties
as satisfaction conditions, 5, 75–9, 91–2, 96
as unsaturated, 132–3, 135
characterisation of, 1–2, 8, 75–9
functional model of, 157–8, 164–5
incomparability with objects, 79–80, 114–9
individualization of, 77–8
second-order existence, 1–3, 117, 125
see also concept horse paradox; predicate-reference; predicates; quantification
propositional content
characterisation of, 159–60
paratactic theory, 161, 165
Standard View, 160–1, 165–6, 168–82, 185–91, 196, 198–9
and truth, 172, 184, 195–6
unity of, 178–82, 200–1
see also identity theory of truth; propositions; states of affairs
propositional functions in extension, 158
propositions
as objects, 12, 160–1, 171–82, 185–91, 195
as propositional contents, 171, 183–5
as sets of possible worlds, 174–5
as truth conditions, 6, 159–62, 182–5, 192
as ways for the world to be, 163, 209–10
characterisation of, 159–60
constituentism, 177–82, 185–91
contents of, 171–82, 185–91
individualism of, 164–5, 176, 201–3
and logical properties, 11–12, 19
unity of, 178–82, 200–1

see also
quantification; sentences; states of affairs; ‘that’-clauses
prosentences, see quantification
prosentential theory of truth, see identity theory of truth
quantification
absolute generality, 6–7, 90, 95–6, 139
first-order, 2, 83, 88–90, 139, 162–3, 175–6
meaningful instance requirement, 59–60, 65
neutralism, 83–92, 94–7
non-nominal, 85–7
second-order (predicate-position), 2–3, 77–8, 83–92, 94–7, 123, 155–7
second-order (sentence-position), 151, 162–5, 176–7, 195–6
second-order semantics, 94–7
set-theoretic semantics, 87–91
see also objects; properties; propositions; relations; states of affairs
Quine, W. V. O., 1, 6, 19, 77, 81–3, 85, 87–8, 163
Ramsay, F. P., 22, 36–48, 158, 160, 196, 210
Ramsay, F. P., 162, 195
Raven, M., 206
Rayo, A., 31, 85, 90, 94, 96, 164
Read, R., 120
realism, see Fregean realism; nominalism
redundancy theory of truth, see identity theory of truth
reference, see predicate-reference;
sentence-reference; term-reference
Reference Principles
(RP), 8–11, 98–100, 169
(RP), 11, 22, 169
(RP), 14–18, 22, 62
(RP), 62–9, 100, 102, 169–70
(RP), 101–2
(RP), 103–4
relations
as satisfaction conditions, 141–2
Index
converse pairs, 141–7
mixed-level, 72, 134–5, 161–2, 180, 198
representation, see identity theory of truth;
predicate-reference; propositional content; sentence-reference;
term-reference
Rieppel, M., 50, 86, 99
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., 126–8, 204, 206
Rooth, M., 32
Rosefeldt, T., 10, 89, 169, 183
Rumfitt, L., 25, 163, 165, 172, 196
Russell, B., 29, 31, 152–5, 162, 178, 179, 192, 194, 199–200, 207
Russinoff, S., 71
Ryle, G., 121
Sainsbury, M., 83
satisfaction, see predicate-reference
saying/showing distinction, 119–22
see also Fregean realism; nonsense
Schaffer, J., 206
Schneider, B., 205
Seargent, D., 133, 135
Segal, G., 104
semantic role, see predicate-reference;
sentence-reference; term-reference
semantic value, see predicate-reference;
sentence-reference; term-reference
sense, 11–12, 18–22, 32–3, 64, 66–7, 103, 193
see also nonsense; predicates;
sense-substitution; sentences; singular terms
sense-substitution
definition of, 13
examples of, 14–18, 26–5
motivation for, 11–14, 28
premises concerning, 65–8
see also Reference Principle;
simple-substitution
sentence-reference, 149–52, 167
sentences, 47, 149, 160, 166–8, 170
see also sentence-reference; ‘that’-clauses
Sider, T., 1
Siegel, S., 198
Simons, P., 38, 41, 206
simple-substitution
definition of, 10–11
failures of, 10, 168–70
in a formal system, 89
see also Reference Principle;
sense-substitution
singular terms, 23–5, 73
see also objects; term-reference;
term/predicate distinction
Index

Smith, B., 206
Soames, S., 162, 172, 188–9
Speaks, J., 162, 163, 172
Stalnaker, R., 164, 202

Standard View, see propositional content

Stanley, J., 121

states of affairs
as 0-adic properties, 6, 148–9
as truth conditions, 6, 147, 149–51, 192, 199
as ways for the world to be, 153–4, 199–200
demands on reality, 202–3
facts as obtaining states, 6, 154–5, 192
individuation of, 150–1, 156, 201–3
negative and disjunctive states, 152
second-order existence, 152
structure of, 128–9, 147, 155–8, 200–1,
204–5
see also quantification; sentence-reference;
sentences; properties; propositions

Sternefeld, W., 34
Stokhof, M., 33
Strawson, P. F., 107–10, 149, 172
Strawson, P. E., 132

subsentential monism, see term/predicate
distinction
substitution, see sense-substitution;
simple-substitution

Sullivan, P., 21, 25, 40–1, 119–20, 151, 158,
192, 202

Tallant, J., 205
term-reference
and disquotation, 50, 52–5, 120
intentionality of, 55, 89–90
name/bearer prototype, 54
and semantic role, 73, 103
versus semantic value, 167–8
see also objects; singular terms; term/predicate
distinction
term/predicate distinction
defence of, 33–4, 48
impossibility of co-reference across, 51–2,
59–61
impossibility of substitution across, 28–32
Ramsay’s alternative scheme, 40–5
subsentential monism, 45–7

see also predicates; sense-substitution;
singular terms

‘that’-clauses, 160–2, 165–70, 185
see also propositional content; propositions;
sentences

thinkables, 197–9
see also identity theory of truth;
propositions
traditional realism, see Fregean realism;
properties; universals
transcendence, see platonism versus
aristotelianism
tropes, 206–7
see also properties; truthmaking
truth, see identity theory of truth; propositional
content; propositions
truthmaking, 126–9, 203–7
see also identity theory of truth

Turner, J., 3
Turner, R., 123
Tye, M., 198
type-shifting principles, 32–3
see also sense-substitution

universals, 123–9, 135–6
see also properties
Uzquiano, G., 94

Vallicella, W., 131, 133
van Cleve, J., 127–8
van Inwagen, P., 75

Walsh, S., 90, 94, 96
Whitehead, A., 29, 31
Whorf, B., 34
Wiggins, D., 71, 86, 98, 107–10
Williamson, T., 6–7, 31, 85, 87, 90, 94, 96, 121,
141–4
Winter, Y., 33
Wittgenstein, L., 47, 119–21, 151, 158, 162, 163,
178, 192, 199

Woods, J., 206

world, 153, 197
Wright, C., 8, 71, 76, 82, 85–7, 98–101, 112, 114,
133, 137

Yablo, S., 85