In the late 1990s, the issue of diamonds contributing to conflict began to receive global attention. In response, the Kimberley Process, an international agreement drawn up in 2003, was implemented to reduce the trade of conflict diamonds and provide a way to certify the global diamond trade. This study looks at the political economy of resource-wealthy states in Africa to understand responses to the Kimberley Process, asking why some African states have higher levels of compliance and co-operation than others. Using cross-country comparisons to explain differing state policies and outcomes, Nathan Munier explores whether domestic, private economic actors matter in how international agreements operate. In doing so, he asks why states that regularly ignore international agreements will use scarce resources to raise their level of compliance with the Kimberley Process. Focusing on the domestic political economy of states, in contrast to past theories of state responses to international agreements, Munier finds that economic dependence and the preferences of private actors are essential in understanding the variation of state responses to international agreements.

Nathan Munier is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Tokyo International University where his research areas focus on international political economy, international agreements, African Politics, conflict resources, and migration. He is the author of articles in journals including Resources Policy, Review of African Political Economy and African Security.
The Political Economy of the Kimberley Process

NATHAN MUNIER
Tokyo International University
Contents

List of Tables  vi
Acknowledgments vii

1 Diamonds after Blood? Explaining State Responses to the Kimberley Process in Africa 1
2 The Domestic Political Economy of International Agreements 29
3 From Passiveness to the Presidency: The Changing Nature of Angola’s Responsiveness to Conflict Diamond Regulation 60
4 Diamonds, Dependence, and De Beers: Monopoly Capitalism and Compliance with the Kimberley Process in Namibia 78
5 The One Who Controls the Diamond Wears the Crown: The Politicization of the Kimberley Process in Zimbabwe 95
6 The Limits of Cooperation after Conflict? The Case of the Kimberley Process in Sierra Leone 123
7 No Private Companies = No Compliance: The Crisis of the Kimberley Process in the Central African Republic 138
8 Understanding the Nature of the Kimberley Process and International Agreements 158

Works Cited 173
Index 199
Tables

1.1 List of countries in the Kimberley Process and sanctions  page 8
1.2 Country indicators  24
3.1 Diamond production in Angola  75
4.1 Diamond dependence in Namibia  83
5.1 Zimbabwe official diamond production, 2004–2017  97
6.1 Sierra Leone official diamond production, 2004–2017  128
7.1 Central African Republic official diamond production, 2004–2017  152
Acknowledgments

There are many institutions and individuals I want to thank here. Western Illinois University, where I received my BA and MA degrees, has an excellent political science department that allowed me to grow as a scholar. The members of my master’s thesis committee, Vincent Auger, Daniel Ogbaharya, and Julia Alberaccin, deserve special recognition for their ongoing support. The University of Nebraska–Lincoln, where I received my PhD, has an outstanding political science program and I have many fond memories of both researching and teaching there. Specifically, I would like to thank the members of my doctoral dissertation committee: Ross Miller, Alice Kang, Courtney Hillebrecht, and Wayne Babchuk. Tokyo International University has provided an exceptional intellectual environment and support to complete this manuscript. I would like to thank the journals Review of African Political Economy and Resources Policy for giving permission to use parts of previously published articles in Chapters 4 and 5 of this book respectively. Finally, Alma Jeftic, my sova (owl), my everything.