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Methods in Conversation Analysis

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1.1 Introduction

Discussions of methodology have always been at the heart of Conversation Analysis (CA). From its earliest characterizations in Harvey Sacks's lectures, what would become known as CA was presented as a novel way of "*doing* sociology" (Sacks, 1972a, 1992, e.g., pp. 253, 300, 803), drawing upon new and distinct sorts of data and "using observation as a basis for theorizing" (1984, p. 25; see also Smith et al., 2021).[1] And in the years since, CA ways of working with data have extended far beyond their initial disciplinary origins, to inform novel ways of '*doing* linguistics' (e.g., Clift, 2016; Couper-Kuhlen & Selting, 2018; Couper-Kuhlen et al., Chapter 23, this volume; Fox et al., 2013), '*doing* psychology' (e.g., Antaki, 2011; De Ruiter & Albert, 2017; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Edwards, 2013), '*doing* medicine' (e.g., Elsey et al., 2015; Heritage & Maynard, 2006; Robinson & Heritage, 2014; Toerien, Chapter 28, this volume), and more. Furthermore, as conversation analysts have engaged with these other disciplines – that is, with their interests, with their data, with their methods – our own methodological toolbox has broadened, deepened, and diversified.

For scholars interested in using CA methods, actively engaging with the research literature itself should be a principal first step. Gene Lerner likens this process to that of learning to appreciate art, which one does in the first instance not by giving students a 'how-to-paint' manual, but rather by showing

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[1] In the 1960s, Sacks often referred to anthropology alongside sociology, as in: "My considerations here will be another instance of how it is I take it that we go about *doing sociology and anthropology*" (Sacks, 1992, p. 300, our emphasis). For discussions of CA within sociology, see, e.g., Heritage (1984b, 2008), Heritage & Stivers (2013), Maynard (2013), and Schegloff (1992a); and on CA within anthropology, see, e.g., Clemente (2013), Floyd (2021), and Moerman (1988).

them some great paintings. He suggests that students of CA should likewise look at some 'beautiful CA' as an essential component of their ongoing training, and he proposes Drew and Holt's (1998) work on figures of speech as one such example (see Clift & Mandelbaum, Chapter 6, this volume). This is the didactic approach taken, in part, by Wootton (1989), for instance, who uses Heritage's (1984a) analysis of *oh* as a case study demonstrating expert management of CA methods. A range of other exemplary studies from the literature could be cited here in this regard – i.e., beautiful illustrations of CA – and many readers will surely have their own favorite publications out of those that have appeared across the past sixty years.

Once students gain some familiarity with the literature, though, they can sometimes hit a roadblock in planning and developing their own research projects. CA publications canonically prioritize the reporting of findings about the nature of social interaction, such that, within the context of individual papers, there is often less space for discussion dedicated to the numerous methodological considerations relevant in arriving at those findings. Relying solely on illustrative analytic texts – particularly in their final published format – for methodological guidance can therefore leave occluded and obscured many of the details concerning how CA research in fact proceeds *on the ground*. For this reason, as in the case of Wootton (1989), cited above, a number of significant publications have aimed to deal explicitly in some capacity with CA methods – be it as part of more panoramic overviews of the field, including its history, epistemology, ontology, theory, and applications (e.g., Antaki, 2011; Clift, 2016, pp. 2–5, 35–63; Heritage, 1984b, pp. 233–292; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008, pp. 67–134; Psathas, 1995, pp. 45–54; Sidnell, 2011, pp. 20–35; Ten Have, 2007), or as individual articles or book chapters. As exemplary and useful as these methodological presentations have been, they are typically (i) only article- or chapter-length (e.g., Clayman & Gill, 2004; Drew, 2005a; Heritage, 2010; Hoey & Kendrick, 2017; Seedhouse, 2005; Sidnell, 2013; Toerien, 2014), (ii) pitched for specific disciplinary audiences (e.g., Drew, 2014; Drew et al., 2001; Gardner, 2004; McCabe, 2007), and/or (iii) couched within particular ongoing debates (e.g., Bolden, 2018; Clift & Raymond, 2018; Drew, 2018; Heritage, 2018; Maynard & Clayman, 2018; Raymond, 2018; Schegloff, 1998, 1999a, 1999b); and thus readers walk away with only a partial view of the more complete range and scope of CA methods. Moreover, these publications are often single-authored, such that the true breadth, depth, diversity, and ingenuity of CA methodological expertise cannot be fully explored or illustrated.

The Cambridge Handbook of Methods in Conversation Analysis – encompassing thirty-four individual chapters plus appendices, and nearly fifty individual authors from across six continents and more than two dozen countries – arose out of this international intellectual landscape, as an attempt to provide a space for in-depth consideration of a more comprehensive array of present-day CA methods. With the publication of this edited volume, the first

dedicated entirely to research methods in CA, we aim to take stock of the methodological state-of-the-art within the field. What sorts of 'doings' are researchers undertaking when 'doing CA' now some six decades on? Across the chapters assembled here, authors purposefully conceive of methods and methodology broadly in their discussions, sharing not only procedural and other best practices, but also suggested techniques, practical considerations, sage advice, and even mistakes made. The volume as a whole is an opportunity to bring these perspectives and experiences together and into active discussion.

In this chapter, we as editors set the stage by providing an overview of foundational principles that guide CA research. We offer these principles both on the basis of our own experiences as researchers, and from our discussions with other conversation analysts as they authored contributions for the present volume. We will begin by briefly sketching out some of the fundamentals of human social interaction in order to underscore CA's central focus, the study of social action, and describe some of the basic features of how interaction is procedurally organized (section 1.2). These basic features of interaction, which CA research has rigorously evidenced and which guide our examination of new data, are then shown directly to inform CA as a research methodology, geared toward the production of novel findings (section 1.3). Put another way, it is precisely due to the procedural infrastructure of action in interaction (section 1.2) that conversation analysts use and work with interactional data in particular ways (section 1.3). Throughout, we will cite specific chapters within the present volume where more detailed treatment of relevant points can be found. We conclude with advice for readers as they continue to explore the volume's contents (section 1.4).

1.2 Fundamentals of Social Interaction: The Centrality of Action

This section lays out some of the fundamental features of social interaction. We begin with reference to the omnirelevance and normative-moral accountabilities of social action (section 1.2.1), which are recipient-designed and collaboratively achieved (section 1.2.2). Social actions are moreover produced and understood multimodally and with an orientation to the potential for "order at all points" (Sacks 1984) (section 1.2.3), as well as temporally organized with regard to their progressive, sequential, and projectable realization (section 1.2.4).

To readers who are less familiar with CA research, the features of social interaction that we outline here may seem like theoretical 'assumptions' – especially in the context of the brevity of the presentation that is to follow. It must be stressed, however, that their origins are wholly empirical, as we will aim to illustrate through consideration of a short extract (section 1.2.5), which will foreshadow our forthcoming overview of CA methods (section 1.3).

In addition to the references included in the text here, readers looking for more comprehensive overviews of contemporary CA theory and findings will find Clift's (2016) *Conversation Analysis*[2] and the chapters in *The Handbook of Conversation Analysis* (2013), edited by Sidnell and Stivers, essential points of departure.

1.2.1 Social Action Is an Omnirelevant, Accountable Concern for Co-participants

Participants' conduct in interaction is accountably organized in terms of, produced to form, and understood in terms of, *social action* (Heritage, 1984b, 2008; Schegloff, 1995, 1996a, 2006, 2007). For this reason, the *formation* and *ascription* of action are principal topics of interest in CA (for recent overviews and discussion, see, e.g., Deppermann & Haugh, 2022; Enfield & Sidnell, 2017; Levinson, 2013). As Schegloff notes (in Čmejrková & Prevignano, 2017, pp. 55–56), recalling the field's origins:

> If you look at the earliest [works], ... they are not in the first instance about turns. If they "feature" anything, they feature "action" ... [C]entral to the bulk of CA work is "action," and what is getting done by some feature of the talk or other conduct.

Whether greeting a roommate as part of arriving home from work (e.g., Pillet-Shore, 2012, 2018), requesting or offering an item at the dinner table (Curl & Drew, 2008; Drew & Couper-Kuhlen, 2014; Mandelbaum et al., 2022; Mandelbaum & Lerner, 2023), (dis)agreeing with a partner's assessment of a movie (e.g., Ogden, 2006; Pomerantz, 1984; Schegloff, 1987b; Thompson et al., 2015), telling a joke to some friends (e.g., Sacks, 1974, 1978; Schegloff, 2001), hurling a racist remark at a stranger (e.g., Hoey & Raymond, 2024), or responding to one (e.g., Rawls et al., 2020; Robles, 2015; Tadic, 2024; Whitehead, 2015), social action is a paramount and omnirelevant concern for participants to interaction. Even the expression of cognitive (e.g., Betz & Golato, 2008; Drew, 2005b; Heritage, 1984a; Schegloff, 1991; Webb et al., 2018), emotional (e.g., Hepburn, 2004; Nishizaka, 2000; Peräkylä & Sorjonen, 2012; Weatherall & Robles, 2021), sensorial (e.g., Mondada, 2019, 2021b; Nishizaka, 2011), or other (changes of) state(s) which may initially seem wholly internal or individual nonetheless implement *social* actions in interaction.

The fundamentally social nature of action in interaction is likewise visible in the normative-moral accountabilities of its production and understanding

[2] For earlier monographic treatments of CA, likewise written in English, see, e.g., Hutchby and Wooffitt (2008), Liddicoat (2007), Psathas (1995), and Sidnell (2011); see also Couper-Kuhlen and Selting (2018) on CA within interactional linguistics. For recent monograph-length overviews of CA in languages other than English, see, e.g., Birkner et al. (2020) [German], Kushida et al. (2017) [Japanese], Raymond and Olguín (2022) [Spanish], Skovholt et al. (2021) [Norwegian], Takagi et al. (2016) [Japanese], Traverso (2016) [French], Vázquez Carranza (2019) [Spanish], and Yu (2022) [Mandarin Chinese].

in real time (e.g., Clayman et al., 2022; Deppermann & Haugh, 2022; Enfield & Sidnell, 2017; Garfinkel, 1963, 1967; Heritage, 1984b, 1988; Hoey, 2020; Mondada, 2019; Raymond, 2019a; Robinson, 2016). Action formation and ascription involves normative structures of reasoning and normative patterns of conduct which, as Robinson's (2016) review underscores, has implications not only "for interlocutors' understandings of 'what just happened,' but also, and importantly, for interlocutors' immediately subsequent conduct" (p. 9). In "Opening up closings," for instance, Schegloff and Sacks (1973) highlight the "sequential implicativeness" of actions: "By 'sequential implicativeness' is meant that an utterance projects for the sequentially following turn(s) the relevance of a determinate range of occurrences (be they utterance types, activities, speaker selections, etc.). It thus has sequentially organized implications" (p. 296, fn. 6; see also Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 2007). Interactants' have an omnirelevant, moral responsibility for adhering to these and other sorts of action relevance rules, and their violation is accountable (see, e.g., Antaki, 1994; Bolden & Robinson, 2011; Gubina & Betz, 2021; Heritage, 1984b; Kent & Kendrick, 2016; Raymond, 2018; Raymond & Stivers, 2016; Robinson, 2016; Schegloff, 2007; Whitehead, 2018; Zinken et al., 2021).

All conversation analysts, regardless of their specific focus, are in one way or another seeking to contribute some 'piece' to the social action 'puzzle': How is it that participants go about forming up particular actions "in such a way as to be recognizable as such" (Sacks 1972b, p. 332) by their co-participants, and how is it that these co-participants go about recognizing, understanding, and ascribing meaning to those actions – and, crucially, how do they *show one another* that they're doing so? Sometimes these actions are common ones we've heard of (e.g., "offer," "proposal"; Clayman & Heritage, 2014; Couper-Kuhlen, 2014; Curl, 2006; Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012), or modifications or specifications of these (e.g., "offer of assistance," Kendrick, 2021; "joint-activity proposal," Thompson et al., 2021); at other times they are actions without a vernacular name but which nonetheless reveal themselves during analysis (e.g., display/claim of "now-understanding" or of "just-now recollection," Koivisto, 2013, 2015; Küttner, 2018; see also Betz & Golato, 2008; Endo, 2018; Weidner, 2016; 'confirming an allusion,' Schegloff, 1996a; see also Heritage & Raymond, 2005, 2012; C. Raymond, 2017; G. Raymond, 2003; Stivers, 2005, 2022). Sometimes our action-based interests are very specific (e.g., *well*-prefaced actions in third position, Kim, 2013); at other times they are investigated as part of broader systems or families of actions (e.g., 'repair,' Schegloff et al., 1977; see also Hayashi et al., 2013; Jefferson, 2019; Schegloff 1992b; 'recruitment,' Kendrick & Drew, 2016; see also Drew & Kendrick, 2018; Floyd et al., 2020; Kendrick, 2021, Chapter 26, this volume). No matter the particular objective of the study, however, CA research inescapably deals with social action because the *participants themselves* are inescapably doing so – endogenously, within the interaction itself. It is they who are examining conduct-in-interaction for how it contributes to the accomplishment of some action(s), for what action(s) are thereby sequentially implicated, and for what

conduct might be used to deliver those implicated next action(s) (see also section 1.2.4 below). As these are primary and overarching concerns for conversationalists, so too are they for conversation analysts.

1.2.2 Social Actions Are Recipient-Designed and Collaboratively Achieved

The actions of everyday social life are not delivered in a contextual void or vacuum but, rather, are formulated *in situ* for their intended recipients. The concept of *recipient design*, fundamental in CA since the field's inception, refers to the "multitude of respects in which the talk [and other conduct] by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the co-participants" (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 727; see also Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 1992a). This feature of interaction is inextricably linked to its inherently 'inter-active' or 'co-constructed' nature, most famously exemplified in Goodwin's (1979) detailed analysis of a single 'sentence' – one that is emergently constructed as the speaker finds different potential recipients who are and are not gazing at him (see also Gardner, 2001; Rossano, 2012; Schegloff, 1982). As Goodwin insightfully shows, although the action(s) is/are coming out of the mouth of just one 'speaker,' the participants *together* construct the action(s) and their relevancy/relevancies, as these depend on the 'recipient(s)' operating on the emergent turn and action in myriad ways (Goodwin, 1981, 2018; see also Deppermann, 2018; Deppermann & Haugh, 2022; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987; Heritage, 1984b; Iwasaki, 2009; Lerner, 1991; Robinson, 2016; Raymond, 2019b; Schegloff, 1992b, 1996a).

Conversation analysts distance themselves, therefore, from theoretical models that posit any form of "ideal speaker-listener" (Chomsky, 1965, p. 30), or other frameworks which (intentionally or not) cast social interactants as "judgmental dopes" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 68) who perform no commonsense reasoning as they produce and interpret conduct *in situ*. Instead, we continuously find that the contextual particulars of any given moment in interaction render it a unique collaborative achievement among participants, which Nishizaka's presentation of single-case analyses (Chapter 26, this volume) makes especially clear (see also Gill et al., 2001; Schegloff, 1986, 1987a, 1988). Social actions in interaction are inescapably both context-*shaped* (in that they are influenced by the particular environment in which they are produced), as well as context-*renewing* (in that they establish the environment in which subsequent conduct will be produced and interpreted) (Heritage, 1984b, p. 242). Both assumptions are rooted in Garfinkel's (1967) observation that social action is irremediably indexical, that is, inextricably context-bound.[3] Interactional resources are elaborated in the specific environments of their

[3] For more extended discussions of indexicality and context (within CA), see Heritage (1984b, pp. 142–150), as well as Duranti and Goodwin (1992), Fox (1994), Heritage and Clayman (2010), Mandelbaum (1990/1991), Schegloff (1987), and Whitehead (2020), in addition to Whitehead et al. (Chapter 20, this volume).

occurrence by their recipients – so, for example, a head nod could be granting a request for more food in one situation, and understood as such by the requester (e.g., deSouza et al., 2021), or it could enact the buying of a Ming vase worth millions in another, and understood as such in that context by the auctioneer (e.g., Heath, 2012). Action production and recognition are thus manifestly collaborative, contextually bound processes for participants and must therefore be conceived of as such by analysts as well.

1.2.3 Social Actions Are Produced and Understood Multimodally, and with an Orientation to 'Order at all Points'

The accountable, collaborative production of social action in face-to-face interaction involves the use of diverse semiotic resources – not only those canonically understood to be part of 'language,' but also various gestural, embodied, and material resources (see, e.g., Deppermann, 2013; Goodwin, 2000; Keevallik, 2018; Mondada, 2016; Streeck et al., 2011). Actions are, to borrow Heritage's (1984b) phrasing, "observably and reportably – i.e., accountably – *brought into being*"[4] (p. 290), and all forms of behavior merit consideration. When conversation analysts use the term 'composition' – e.g., 'composition and position' (Clift, 2016, ch. 3) – we therefore mean to refer to this broader array of sense-making conduct and resources which are at interactants' disposal as they build multimodal 'action packages' (Goodwin, 2018; Hayashi, 2003) and 'gestalts' (Mondada, 2014a). These include, for example, gaze orientation (e.g., Goodwin, 1981; Rossano, 2012), manual gestures (e.g., Mondada, 2007; Lilja & Piirainen-Marsh, 2019), body positions and orientations (e.g., Kamunen, 2019; Schegloff, 1998), nonlexical vocalizations such as sighs (Hoey, 2014), clicks (Ogden, 2020), groans (Keevallik, 2024), and moans (Hofstetter, 2020), and complex combinations of these (e.g., Keevallik & Ogden, 2020; Kendrick et al., 2023; Mondada, 2014a), as well as different forms of engagement with, and manipulation of, material objects and physical space (e.g., De Stefani, 2019; Mondada, 2019; Nevile et al., 2014).

As opposed to assuming by default that some forms of conduct are inconsequential to participants' emergent formulations and interpretations of action, conversation analysts instead assume "order at all points" (Sacks, 1984, p. 22) – i.e., that "no order of detail can be dismissed, *a priori*, as disorderly, accidental or irrelevant" (Heritage, 1984b, p. 241; see also Clift, 2005). This necessitates, as we shall see, technological, transcriptional, and other tools and procedures that assist us in examining social interaction at different "order[s] of detail" (see, e.g., the following chapters in this volume: Hoey & Webb, Chapter 2; Ogden, Chapter 24; Oloff & Hepburn, Chapter 5; Robinson, Chapter 17).

[4] In the same paragraph, Heritage subsequently uses the phrasing "*talked* into being" (1984b, p. 290, see also p. 237). Although this is certainly the version that one finds quoted most often in the literature, we prefer his more multimodally inclusive "*brought* into being" (see also p. 60, as he discusses the phenomenological work of Alfred Schütz).

It is also from this foundational assumption that we get the omnirelevant CA dictum: *Why that now?* (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973, p. 299). As Clift and Mandelbaum (Chapter 6, this volume) describe, here "the 'why' captures the *action* that a bit of conduct is designed to accomplish; the 'that' deals with the action's *composition* [verbal, visual, material, etc.]; and the 'now' focuses on the *position* of the action." This is the question that participants are (un)consciously asking themselves as they interpret others' behavior, and it is the question they likewise expect – and indeed, "trust" (Garfinkel, 1963) – others to ask of their behavior when interpreting it. *Why that now?* applies for participants at all levels of granularity, at all moments in interaction, and from practices, to actions, to the links between them; and so it is a constant guiding question for conversation analysts as well.

1.2.4 Social Actions Are Temporally Organized – i.e., Progressively, Sequentially, and Projectably Produced and Realized

The multimodal practices used to implement social actions in interaction are temporally organized. This applies to all levels or dimensions of the participants' unfolding joint conduct, dimensions which mutually elaborate one another – i.e., from the particulars of an emergent *turn*'s construction (e.g., Drew, 2013; Fox et al., 2009; Goodwin, 1981, 2002; Jefferson, 2019; Mondada, 2014a, 2018; Schegloff, 1979, 1996b, 2013; Thompson & Couper-Kuhlen, 2005), to those of the emergent *sequence* (e.g., Davidson, 1984; Heritage & Raymond, 2021; Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, [1973] 1987; Schegloff, 2007; Thompson et al., 2015), to those of the emergent *activity* (e.g., De Stefani & Horlacher, 2018; Goodwin, 2000; Heritage & Sorjonen 1994; Levinson, 1992; Pillet-Shore, 2018; Robinson, 2013b), and beyond. Moreover, as intimated in section 1.2.2 above, these practices of action can be distributed across interactional participants (e.g., Fox, 1994; Goodwin, 2018; Lerner, 1996, 2004; Schegloff, 1991, 1992b, 1996a, 2007). Social actions themselves must therefore be understood as progressively and sequentially realized – again, as "*brought into* being" (Heritage, 1984b, p. 290), where that 'bringing' into being occurs *in real time*. It is this moment-by-moment unfolding of interaction that provides for the "publicly displayed and continuously updated" "architecture" (Heritage, 1984b, pp. 254–260; Raymond, 2019b, p. 183) or "infrastructure" (Schegloff, 1992b, p. 1299) of intersubjectivity through which participants collaboratively and accountably produce and recognize social action (for recent overviews and discussion, see, e.g., Deppermann & Günthner, 2015; Enfield, 2013; Kendrick et al., 2020; Mondada, 2018; Mushin & Pekarek Doehler, 2021; Raymond, 2019b; Robinson, 2016).

In his primer on *Sequence Organization*, Schegloff (2007) introduces the notion of *progressivity* in interaction as follows:

> In articulating a turn-constructional unit, each element – each word, for example – should come next after the one before; in fact, at a smaller level

> of granularity, each syllable – indeed, each sound – should come next after the one before it. So also with the several turn-constructional units that compose a multi-unit turn; so also with the consecutive turns that compose a spate of talk; so also with the turns that compose a sequence, etc. *Moving from some element to a hearably-next-one with nothing intervening is the embodiment of, and the measure of, progressivity.* Should something intervene between some element and what is hearable as a/the next one due – should something violate or interfere with their contiguity, whether next sound, next word, or next turn – it will be heard as qualifying the progressivity of the talk, and will be examined for its import, for what understanding should be accorded it (pp. 14–15, our emphasis; see also Heritage, 2007; Stivers & Robinson, 2006).

In other words, as Pillet-Shore (Chapter 21, this volume) concisely puts it: "Position matters." Whether it is an action's positioning within a sequence of turns or actions, or within some larger course(s) of action or activities, or some element's positioning within or respective to a turn or turn-constructional unit (TCU), social interactants consistently demonstrate keen attention to the temporal particulars of their conduct – their own and others'. This also means, as described above with respect to Goodwin (1979), that producers of action, in the midst of production, can respond to evolving contingencies and shift an action-in-progress, or its design, to something distinct 'on the fly' (e.g., Bolden, 2013; Bolden, et al., 2022; Drew, 2013; Drew et al., 2013; Ford, 2004; Fox et al., 2009; Iwasaki, 2009; Jefferson, 2019; Maschler et al., 2020; Mondada, 2021a; Schegloff, 1979, 2013; Schegloff et al., 1977). An action's realization in interaction must therefore be understood as a contingent achievement.

Intimately related to Schegloff's description of progressivity, above, is the notion of *projection* or *projectability*; indeed, Lerner and Raymond (2021) refer to progressivity and projection "as conjoined, interdependent features of conduct" (p. 278). Owing to their progressive, contingent development in time, social actions themselves can be projectable, as can trajectories of action, as can the compositional particulars used to implement those (trajectories of) action(s) (see, e.g., Goodwin, 2002; Hayashi, 2004; Heath & Luff, 2021; Lerner & Raymond, 2021; Robinson, 2013b; Schegloff, 2007; Streeck & Jordan, 2009; Svensson & Tekin, 2021). One of the most influential areas of research in this regard has been in turn-taking (Sacks et al., 1974), where an array of resources have been shown to be implicated in the projection of when a turn (and its action) might be recognizably complete, and thus when some sort of next action may be accountably due (e.g., Ford et al., 2004; Ford & Thompson, 1996; Iwasaki, 2009; Kendrick et al., 2023; Local & Walker, 2012; Tanaka, 2000, 2001; Wells & Macfarlane, 1998). This literature has also explored the means by which interactants demonstrably work to circumvent the projectable relevance of speaker transition, via such practices as rush-throughs (Schegloff, 1982; Walker, 2010), abrupt-joins (Local & Walker, 2004, 2012), pivots (e.g., Barth-Weingarten et al., 2021;

Betz, 2008; Clayman & Raymond, 2015; Pekarek Doehler & Horlacher, 2013; Schegloff, 1979; Walker, 2007), and gestural and embodied conduct (e.g., Kendrick et al., 2023; Mondada & Oloff, 2011). Projection is likewise oriented to at the sequential level (and beyond): A first pair-part action projects the delivery, optimally, of a type-fitted second pair-part action by the selected next speaker (Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 1990, 2007; Stivers & Robinson, 2006). Similarly, a pre-expansion sequential action can project a particular forthcoming base action – for instance, a pre-announcement accountably projects that some announcement is to come, and can also project what sort of responsive action will be due upon its completion and/or during its development (e.g., commiseration, laughter, etc.) (Terasaki, [1976] 2004; see also Couper-Kuhlen, 2012; Maynard, 2003; Schegloff, 2007, ch. 4; Selting, 2010). As conversationalists consistently show themselves to be attending not just to the particulars of their own and others' conduct, but also to how that conduct progressively, sequentially, and projectably unfolds in real time (i.e., the "now" in *Why that now?*), conversation analysts likewise keep the temporality of action at the forefront of our investigative attention.

1.2.5 Bringing It All Together: Finding Order in a Segment of Interaction

The preceding sections have aimed to lay out some of the fundamental features of how social action is collaboratively managed in real-time interaction: Participants demonstrably orient to social actions' multimodal compositional features, their temporal, progressional, and positional characteristics, as well as their collaborative and sequential foundations and implications – all of which they show to be produced and understood within a normative framework of accountability. In an effort to illustrate that these features of interaction are not merely theoretical or conceptual but, rather, manifestly and empirically embodied in participants' own joint conduct, let us consider a concrete segment of interaction – one which we will refer to at later points in the chapter as well.

The segment is drawn from a recently assembled corpus of recordings of English interaction made in the United States by Barbara Fox and Chase Raymond. Participants were recruited to video-record themselves engaging in some activity together, and in this sense, the data are naturally occurring (see section 1.3.1.1, below). The participants in the datum we will examine – pseudonymized as Julia and Lucas, seen in Figure 1.1 – are college students, romantic partners and roommates, and current residents of the state of Colorado. Julia is a lifelong resident of Colorado, while Lucas moved to the state from another (Wisconsin) to attend college.[5]

[5] The authors are grateful to the participants for their special permission to make this clip publicly available to readers. Access can be found here: www.cambridge.org/conversationanalysis