

Index

- African National Congress (ANC), 82
 agricultural biases, 12–13
 Akder, 157, 165–166
 Allison, 80, 84, 90
 Ameringer, 119
 ANC, *see* African National Congress
 Arab Spring, 22
 Argentina, 7n6
 democratic default, 9, 37, 70
 Arias Sanchez, Oscar, 116, 120
 aura of invincibility, 44, 97
 autocracies/autocrats, *see also* closed
 autocracies; competitive autocracies
 autocratic game proof, 48
 democracy compared to, 32
 food subsidy cost equations, 49–50
 future borrowing and, 24–25
 mass politics and, 24–26
 political limits of, 4
 political power of, 24
 voting and, 44–45
 autocratic default, 9
 dilemma of, 30–31
 hypothesis 1 for, 31
 hypothesis 2 for, 31
 1960–2009 data, 60t
 proof for decision, 50–51
 urban bias and, 26–27
 Aziz, 98
 Bates, 19, 29, 33, 84, 85, 89, 92
 Block, 33
 block mobilization, 116–117
 bondholder behavior, 7, 9
 Borensztein, 7
 bread riots, 2, 22–23
 Brexit, 173
 Bulow, J., 6–7
 Bumiputera, 95, 106–109, 112
 CACM, *see* Central American Common
 Market
 Callaghy, 91, 92
 Cañas, Alberto, 119
 capital openness, 70
 Carazo Odio, Rodrigo, 126–128
 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 149
 Carter, 71
 Carvounis, 165
 CBI, *see* Caribbean Basin Initiative
 Celasun, 157, 159–160, 167
 Central American Common Market (CACM),
 125–126
 Central Bank, Costa Rica, 131–133
 Chinn, 29
 citizen indirect utility equations, 49
 citizen preferences, 21–22
 Clark, 80, 84, 90
 closed autocracies, 15, 26, *see also* Zambia
 case study, 43
 revolt in, 22–24
 urban bias and, 10–11
 urban bias/imported food and, 57–58
 CODESA, *see* Costa Rican Development
 Corporation
 Cole, 33

- collective action, 18, 23
 age and gender in, 85
 of urban areas, 10
- Collier, 84, 85, 89, 92
- competitive autocracies
 legislature and, 11
 urban bias limits, 11–12, 43–45
- conditional loan programs, 25
- consolidated democracy, *see also* Costa Rica
 case study, 43
 agricultural electoral biases and, 12–13
 protest in, 35
 voting in, 35–38
- contentious democracy, *see also* Jamaica case study
 agricultural biases and, 13
 default in, 137–138
 rural bias limits, 45–46
 violence in, 45–46, 172
 voting in, 46
- Copelovitch, 70
- Costa Rica case study, 14, 41, 116
 autonomous institution deficits in, 131
 case selection, 119–121
 Central Bank losses in, 131–133
 discussion, 155–156
 employment in, 124, 127, 130, 136
 farmers in, 119
 GDP in, 125, 127, 132
 geopolitics as challenge, 122–123
 IMF reform conditions in, 127–129
 institutional cross-conditionality/1986
 elections and, 133
 Monge presidency in, 128–133
 pressure groups in Costa Rica, 120–121
 public sector wages in, 130–131
 rise of PLN in, 123–128
 term limits as challenge in, 121–122
 urbanization in, 120
- Costa Rican Development Corporation
 (CODESA), 128, 131, 135
- credit rationing, 8, 10n9, 25
- Cruces, J. J., 7
- Curtis, 37
- DAI, *see* Distortions to Agricultural Incentives
- debt, 1, *see also* sovereign debt
 debt restructuring, 7
 debt-to-GDP, 60, 62, 65, 72t
 repayment, 8
 shock triggers, 61
 sovereign default, 3
- default, *see specific topics*
- democracy, 10, *see also* consolidated
 democracy; contentious democracy
 autocracy compared to, 32
 rural-based agriculture in, 12, 33
 swingness in, 33, 35
 transition in Turkey, 159–160
 voting in, 32, 42, 44
- democratic default
 in Argentina, 9, 37, 70
 citizen view on, 37–38
 dilemma of, 38–43
 in equilibrium, 40
 food exports and, 75t
 food price policies and, 38–40
 hypothesis 3 for, 41–42
 hypothesis 4 for, 42–43
 international influences, 46–48
 1960–2009 data, 61t
 rates of, 55–56
 rural bias and, 32–54, 57–58
 theoretical predictions for, 116–118
 urbanization and, 56, 70
 voting in consolidated democracy and,
 35–38
- democratic game
 derivation of food subsidy cost, 52–53
 party vote share proof, 54
 probability of electoral victory function, 53
 proof for timing of, 51–52
- Democratic Party, Turkey (DP), 159
- dictatorships, 10, *see also* Malaysia case study;
 Zambia case study
 elections and, 43–45
 food trade and, 57–58, 69, 104, 172
 pure, 11
 revolt and, 18, 27, 30, 68
 urban-biased, 13
 urbanization and, 56–57, 67
- Distortions to Agricultural Incentives (DAI),
 76–77
- Dixit, 33
- DP, *see* Democratic Party, Turkey
- Dreher, 63
- Drury, 80, 97, 99
- Eaton, J., 6–7
- economic crisis, 59–61, *see also* fiscal crisis
 political reform and, 4–6
 economic reform, politics of, 4–6
- economies
 IMF on Turkish, 162–164

Index

193

- macroeconomics, 59–65
 - SEEs, 161, 167, 169
 - urbanization and, 62
- Economist*, 2
- Edelman, 125
- Edie, 116, 139
- Egypt
 - bakeries, 26
 - bread riots, 2
 - electoral system, 44n27
 - food subsidies in, 1–2
- elections, *see also* voting
 - agricultural electoral biases, 12–13
 - citizen revolts and, 13
 - Costa Rica institutional cross-conditionality and, 133–137
 - Costa Rican term limits, 121–122
 - dictatorships and, 43–45
 - Egypt, 44n27
 - Malaysia, 96–98
 - median voters, 36, 116–117, 119
 - probability of electoral victory function in democratic game, 53
 - pseudo-democratic elections, 44n26
 - UMNO, 110–111
- electoral autocracies, *see also* Malaysia case study
 - characteristics of, 12, 43, 45
 - voter mobilization and, 81
- employment, 4, 85, 102, *see also* unemployment
 - in Costa Rica case study, 124, 127, 130, 136
 - in Jamaica case study, 142, 146
 - in Malaysia case study, 107–108
- Engel's Law, 10, 20, 174
- equilibrium behavior, in mass politics, 30–31
- farmers, 4, 28
 - Costa Rica, 14, 119
 - empowerment of, 32
 - farming blocs, 63
 - GSE, 77
 - rural, 10, 21, 114, 119, 137, 166, 169, 172
- Faustian Bargain of urban bias, 29
- Federal Land Development Agency (FELDA), 100, 102
- fiscal crisis
 - 1978 in Turkey, 162–164
 - in developed world, 174
 - Jamaica case study background, 141–148
 - in Malaysia case study, 107–115
 - Turkey case study buildup, 160–162
 - in Zambia case study, 88–93
- fiscal footprint, 91, 142, 175
- food consumption, 21–22, 29–30, 49, 90
- food trade
 - agricultural pricing policies, 19–20
 - cost of subsidy program and status, 27–30
 - democratic default and food exports, 75t
 - democratic default and food price policies, 38–40
 - derivation of subsidy cost in democratic game, 52–53
 - dictatorships and, 57, 69, 104, 172
 - equations for subsidy costs in autocracy, 49–50
 - farming blocs, 63
 - food subsidies, 1–2, 26, 30, 173
 - food subsidy costs, 74–78
 - generalizability of, 15
 - IMF on subsidies, 88, 92
 - Malaysian food subsidies, 104
 - Malaysian rice production, 99–100
 - revolt and food crises, 22–23
 - rural-biased export cost regime, 28
 - rural-biased import cost regime, 28–29
 - sovereign default and, 172
 - urban bias and, 10–11
 - urban bias/imported food in closed autocracy, 57–58
 - urban-biased export cost regime, 28
 - urban-biased import cost regime, 28–29
 - urbanization and, 14, 66t
 - urbanization/sovereign default and, 66t
 - in Zambia case study, 85–89, 91–92
- foreign reserves/months of imports, 68
- Frankel, 34, 97
- French Revolution, 22
- Frieden, Jeffrey A., 4, 34
- garrison communities, 138
- GATT, 163
- GDP
 - change in, 61–62
 - in Costa Rica case study, 125, 127, 132
 - debt-to-GDP, 60, 62, 67, 72t, 79t
 - food imports over, 63, 66, 72t, 75t
 - GDP per capita, 60, 62, 79t
 - in Jamaica case study, 152
 - in Malaysia case study, 114
 - in Turkey case study, 168
 - in Zambia case study, 88
- Gerakan, *see* Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia
- Gersovitz, M., 6–7

- GNP, in Malaysia case study, 107, 108, 112, 114
 Gold Standard, 4
 Golden, 33
 González Vega, 126, 130
 Gourevitch, Peter, 4, 19
 government monopsony, 27112
 Great Leap Forward, 29
 gross subsidy equivalent to farmers (GSE), 78
- Hafner-Burton, 13, 46
 Haggard, 33
 Harding, 34
 Hawkins, 85, 89
 Hendrix, 33
 Hollyer, 64
 Huber, 139, 148–149, 154
 Hyde, 13, 46
- ICA, *see* Industrial Coordination Act, Malaysia
 Ilkkaracan, 167–168
 IMF, *see* International Monetary Fund
 India, rural bias in, 32–33
 Industrial Coordination Act, Malaysia (ICA), 106
 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 47, 63
 Costa Rica reform conditions, 127–130
 cross-conditionality of, 133–134, 136
 documents, 81
 on fiscal imbalance, 108
 on food subsidies, 88, 92
 Jamaica reform demands, 149–150, 152, 154–155
 on Malaysian policies, 98–99, 102, 107, 112–114
 pricing policies, 147
 on public wage restraint, 131
 reform demands of, 89–90
 on Turkish economy, 162–164
- Ito, 70
- Jablonski, 13, 46
 Jamaica case study, 14–15, 116
 case selection, 138–140
 challenges to, 140–141
 discussion, 155–156
 employment in, 142, 146
 fiscal crisis background, 141–148
 garrison communities in, 138
 GDP in, 152
 IMF pricing policies in, 147
- IMF reform demands, 149–150, 152, 154–155
 labor unions and, 151
 oil prices and, 142
 People's Production Plan in, 145–148
 Seaga presidency in, 148–155
 unemployment in, 150, 151, 153–154
- Jamaican Labour Party (JLP), 138–139, 141, 143–144, 148–149, 152–153
 Japan, rural-based agriculture in, 34
 Jeffersonian ideal republic, 166
 JLP, *see* Jamaican Labour Party
 JP, *see* Justice Party, Turkey
 Jupille, 37
 Justice Party, Turkey (JP), 165
- Kasara, 33
 Kaunda, Kenneth, 55, 82, 91
 ouster of, 93
 reforms of, 89, 93
 urban bias under, 83–88
- Kohlscheen, 9
 Kraay, 8, 33, 61
- Lall, 64
 Leblang, 37
 Lewis, 138
 Londregan, 33
- Magaloni, 11, 44
 Mahathir bin Mohamad, 108, 110, 112–113
 Malay party of the Alliance bloc (UMNO), 95–102, 104, 106–107
 coalition members, 113
 elections, 110–111
 support base, 115
- Malaysia case study, 14
 Bumiputera in, 95, 106–109, 112
 case selection, 94
 directed credit requirement, 105
 discussion, 115
 employment in, 107–108
 fiscal crisis/reform in, 107–115
 food subsidies in, 104
 GDP in, 114
 GNP in, 107, 108, 112, 114
 growth of urban base in Malaysia, 106–107
 IMF on Malaysian policies, 98–99, 102, 107, 111–112, 114
 Malaysian early history, 94–96
 Malaysian elections and political geography, 96–98

Index

195

- May 13 Incident, 96, 98
 NEP in, 98–101, 106, 109, 111, 113
 OBAs in, 109
 privatization in, 113
 rice production in, 99–100
 SMP in, 99–100
 Third Malaysian Plan in, 103
 unemployment in, 98–99, 102
 urban counter pressure in Malaysia,
 101–106
 Manley, Michael, 141, 154
 first term of, 141–145
 second term of, 145–148
 mass politics, 14, 173, *see also* collective action
 autocrats and, 24–26
 cost of subsidy program and food trade
 status, 27–30
 equilibrium behavior in, 30–31
 formalization of citizen preferences in,
 21–22
 political survival and, 17–31
 revolt in closed autocracy, 22–24
 theory, 35
 urban bias and autocratic default, 26–27
 urban–rural divide and, 18–20
 May 13 Incident, 96, 101
 median voters, 36, 116, 119
 Medicare, 37, 174
 Merdzanovic, 63
 Meyer, 35
 Milne, 110, 112
 Min, 33
 Moghadam, 167
 Monge, Luis Alberto, 128–133
 Mosley, Paul, 5, 60
 Mulgan, 34

 NAMBOARD, *see* National Agricultural
 Marketing Board, Zambia
 Narayanan, 113
 National Agricultural Marketing Board,
 Zambia (NAMBOARD), 85–86
 National Elections Across Democracy and
 Autocracy (NELDA), 68
 National Salvation Party, Turkey, 165
 Nehru, 8, 61
 NELDA, *see* National Elections Across
 Democracy and Autocracy
 Nelson, 38, 121, 136
 New Economic Policy, Malaysia (NEP),
 98–101, 106, 109, 111, 113

 Nokyo, 34
 Nooruddin, Irfan, 4

 OBAs, *see* off-budget agencies
 OECD, *see* Organisation for Economic
 Co-operation and Development
 off-budget agencies (OBAs), 109
 oil rents per capita, 68
 Olson, 18
 OPEC crisis of 1979, 107
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
 Development (OECD), 5, 164, 166, 169
 Ozal, Turgut, 158, 168

 Panizza, 7
 Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), 95
 Party of National Liberation, Costa Rica
 (PLN), 123–128
 Pathmanathan, 110–112
 Paul, Rand, 1
 Payne, 151, 153–155
 Peoples' National Party, Jamaica (PNP),
 138–139, 141, 143–148
 supporters, 153
 People's Production Plan, Jamaica, 145–148
 Pepinsky, Thomas B., 5, 45, 97, 101, 113
 Persson, 20
 PLN, *see* Party of National Liberation, Costa
 Rica
 PNG, *see* private non-guaranteed
 PNP, *see* Peoples' National Party, Jamaica
 political reform, 4–6
 political survival, 171
 mass politics and, 17–31
 sovereign default and, 16–17
 politics
 Costa Rica geopolitics, 122–123
 domestic and international markets,
 172–173
 of economic reform, 4–6
 as fiscal, 2
 political survival, 16–17
 of sovereign default, 3, 9–10
 urban–rural, 173
 PPG, *see* public and publicly guaranteed
Pressure Groups in Costa Rica (Arias
 Sanchez), 120
 private non-guaranteed (PNG), 70
 privatization, 113
 problem of authoritarian control, 27n14
 pseudo-democratic elections, 44n26
 public and publicly guaranteed (PPG), 70

- Rakner, 91
 Rasiah, 106, 108
 regime-contingent theory of sovereign default,
 3, 13, 32–33, 35, 42
 alternate accounts in, 67–69
 data and estimation for, 59
 discussion, 78
 food subsidy costs in, 74–78
 macroeconomic explanations in, 59–65
 motivation in, 55–57
 reform and, 123
 results from baseline specifications, 65–67
 rural bias and democratic default, 58
 temporal/systemic factors in, 70–74
 urban bias/imported food in closed
 autocracy, 57–58
 Reinhart, Carmen M., 3, 8, 59, 62
 relative rate of assistance to agriculture (RRA),
 76–77
 Republican People's Party, Turkey (RPP), 159,
 165
 revolt, 18
 in closed autocracies, 22–24
 dictatorship and, 18, 27, 30, 68
 elections and, 13
 food crises and, 22–24
 risk premia, 5, 8
 Robertson, 35
 Rodrik, 157, 159–160, 167
 Rogoff, Kenneth S., 3, 6–8, 59, 62
 Rose, A., 7
 Rosendorff, 64
 RPP, *see* Republican People's Party, Turkey
 RRA, *see* relative rate of assistance to
 agriculture
 rural bias
 democratic default and, 32–48, 58
 food export cost regime, 28
 food import cost regime, 28–29
 in India, 32–33
 limits, in contentious democracy, 11–12
 in Turkey case study, 166
 rural citizens, *see* urban–rural divide
 rural-based agriculture
 in democracies, 12, 33
 in Japan, 34
 in Turkey, 15
 Russian Revolution, 22

 Sadat, Anwar, 1
 Saiegh, 9
 Sano, 88

 Savastano, 8
 Seaga, Edward, 141, 143
 presidency of, 148–155
 Second Malaysia Plan (SMP), 99–100
 Seddon, 22
 SEEs, *see* State Economic Enterprises
 Sen, 32
 serial default, 71
 Shari, 106, 108
 Sheng, 107
 Signorino, 71
 Simmons, Beth, 4
 Simmons, Joel W., 4
 Singh, Charan, 32
 SMP, *see* Second Malaysia Plan
 Social Security, 37, 174
 Soil Products Marketing Organization
 (TOPRAK), 161–162
 sovereign borrowing, 5, 62
 over-borrowing, 175
 reputation-based arguments for, 7–8
 sovereign debt, 3, 6
 enforceability in, 16
 as puzzle, 15
 sovereign default, *see also* autocratic default;
 democratic default; regime-contingent
 theory of sovereign default
 causes and consequences of, 6–9
 conditions for, 6
 in contentious democracy, 137–138
 of Costa Rica, 14
 debt and, 3
 decision to, 171–172
 in developing countries, 9–10
 food imports/urbanization and, 66f
 food trade and, 172
 future borrowing and, 7–8
 of Jamaica, 14–15
 political survival and, 16–17
 politics of, 4, 9–10
 reputation damage with, 16
 serial default, 71
 Stasavage, 9, 27
 State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), 161, 167,
 169
 Steinberg, 38
 Stephens, 139, 141, 143–144, 146–149, 154
 Stone, 139–140, 144
 Stone-Geary utility function, 21
 Svulik, 11, 27n14, 69
 swingness, 151
 in democracy, 35
 in rural and urban voters, 41, 166

Index

197

- Tabellini, 33
 Tarrow, 35
 Tilly, 35
 Tomz, 7–9, 37
 TOPRAK, *see* Soil Products Marketing Organization
 Trebesch, C., 7
 Tunali, 167–168
 Turkey case study, 101
 case selection, 159
 conclusion, 169–170
 first fiscal crisis buildup in, 160–162
 fiscal crisis of 1978 in, 162–164
 GDP in, 168
 IMF on Turkish economy, 162–164
 military invention of 1980–1985 in, 167–169
 rural bias in, 166
 rural electoral advantage in, 164–167
 rural-based agriculture in, 15
 TOPRAK in, 161–162
 transition to democracy in, 159–160
- UMNO, *see* Malay party of the Alliance bloc
 unemployment, 25, 90
 in Jamaica case study, 150, 151, 153
 in Malaysia case study, 98–99, 101–102
 unionized labor, 19, 151
 United National Independence Party, Malaysia (UNIP), 82–85, 87, 93
 urban bias
 autocratic default and, 26–27
 closed autocracies and, 10–11
 Faustian Bargain of, 29
 food export cost regime, 29
 food import cost regime, 30
 food trade and, 10–11
 imported food in closed autocracy, 57–58
 under Kaunda, Zambia case study, 83–88
 limits, in competitive autocracies, 11–12, 43–45
 urban-biased dictatorship, 13
 urbanization, 14, 31, 117
 in Costa Rica case study, 120
 democratic default and, 56, 70
 dictatorship and, 56–57, 67
 economies and, 62
 food trade/sovereign default and, 66
 measures for, 63–64
 urban–rural divide, 18–20, 173
 urban–rural politics, 173
 US Agency for International Development (USAID), 123, 129, 135
- Van de Walle, Nicolas, 4
 Van Rijckeghem, 9
 Varshney, 32
 violence, 45–46, 172
 Voeten, 63
 Vogel, 132
 voting, 14, 18
 autocracies and, 44–45
 in consolidated democracy, 35–38
 in contentious democracy, 46
 in democracy, 32, 42, 44
 mass unrest and, 171
 Vreeland, 64
 vulnerability profiles, 5
- Wallace, 29
 Walter, S., 5–6
 Walton, 22
 WDI, *see* World Development Indicators
 Weder, 9
 Wilkinson, 46
 Wilson, 119, 122, 124–125, 128, 154
 World Bank, 1, 47, 60, 74, 123
 cross-conditionality of, 133–137
 loans from, 127, 152
 reform conditions, 130
 World Development Indicators (WDI), 60
 World Trade Organization (WTO), 63
- Yang Di Pertuan Agong, 110
- Zambia case study, 14
 case selection, 82
 copper revenues in, 84
 discussion, 115
 food policies in, 85–89, 91–92
 GDP in, 88
 post-electoral reforms, 93
 urban bias under Kaunda, 83–88
 Zambian early history, 82–83
 Zambian response to fiscal crisis, 88–93
 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), 83