

Introduction

... all the ills that come to men whose town is taken: soldiers put to the sword; the city razed by fire; alien hands carrying off the children and the women.

Homer, *The Iliad*

'*Badajoz is ours*', so began Lieutenant Dugald MacGibbon's letter to his father dated 7 April 1812. A British officer in the Portuguese service, MacGibbon, was among the thousands of British and Portuguese troops under the command of the Duke of Wellington who stormed the French-held Spanish fortress town of Badajoz late on the night of 6 April, at the height of the Peninsular War. In the breaches and before the castle wall, British troops encountered a deadly obstinate defence mounted by the French garrison. By 2.00 am, the town was in British hands, but not before 'four hours of the hardest fighting I have ever seen', wrote MacGibbon. The human cost was horrific, with 3,713 allied losses sustained in the assault.¹ Under customary laws of war, the British had the right to put the garrison to the sword and to sack the town. Yet, whilst mercy was extended to French soldiers, the Spanish inhabitants were not so fortunate: 'I do not believe a single Frenchman was put to death in cold blood, whilst the whole wrath of our people seemed to be directed against the Spaniards who remained with the Governor.' The four-hour storm was followed by a three-day sack, with Wellington's troops not only plundering houses, shops and churches but also assaulting, killing and raping Spanish civilians – civilians they were meant to be liberating. 'The scene of horror after our entrance beggars all description', MacGibbon confided to his father. 'The place was given up to plunder and the excesses of soldiers infuriated by their labours and the loss of their companions cannot be judged of by anyone who has not witnessed such scenes.'²

¹ Charles Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War* (7 vols, Oxford, 1902–30; repr., London, 2004–5), v, p. 595.

² National Army Museum, London (hereafter NAM), 9404–431, Lieutenant Dugald MacGibbon, letter to his father, 7 April 1812.

2 Introduction

Badajoz was one of three Spanish towns that the British besieged and sacked during the Peninsular War. In each case, the pattern was the same: the siege concluded with a general storm, followed by the sparing of French soldiers and the sack of the town. The first took place at Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812, less than three months before Badajoz, although on this occasion, the sack lasted only through the night of the storm, with few if any civilian deaths. The following year saw the third and final British sack: San Sebastian was stormed on 31 August, becoming another scene of plunder and atrocity, spanning at least several days, with the burning of the town adding to the scale of the tragedy and the ensuing controversy. Having walked through the still smouldering streets of the Basque city, a deeply affected Lieutenant-Colonel Augustus Frazer wrote to his wife: ‘The town is not plundered, it is sacked. Rapine has done her work, nothing is left.’³

Within the long tradition of British historical writing on the Peninsular War, these sacks have been considered the most shameful actions of the British army during the war, carrying a ‘special shame’ as it was done to friendly or allied towns and civilians.⁴ Of San Sebastian’s fate, writes Charles Esdaile in his history of the war: ‘What took place was quite simply a disgrace – a war crime, indeed.’⁵ The drunken and violent behaviour of British troops in the aftermath of the storms helped establish the popular reputation of Wellington’s redcoats as ‘scum of the earth’.⁶ More generally, Badajoz and San Sebastian invariably appear in the catalogue of the worst siege-related sackings and atrocities perpetrated by armies during the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars, alongside Bonaparte’s notorious sack of Jaffa in 1799, and the French sack of Tarragona in 1811 during the Peninsular War; and the earlier Russian sacks of the Turkish fortress towns of Ochakov and Ishmail in 1788 and 1790.⁷ Indeed, the British sacks hold a place within the long-term history of sieges and sacks, with the suffering of civilians at

³ Augustus Frazer, *Letters of Colonel Sir Augustus Simon Frazer Commanding the Royal Horse Artillery in the Army under the Duke of Wellington*, ed. Edward Sabine (Uckfield, 2001 [1853]), p. 244.

⁴ Oman, *Peninsular War*, v, p. 261.

⁵ Charles Esdaile, *The Peninsular War: A New History* (London, 2003), p. 470.

⁶ Edward J. Coss, *All for the King’s Shilling: The British Soldier under Wellington, 1808–1814* (Norman, OK, 2010), p. 234.

⁷ Gunther Rothenberg, ‘The Age of Napoleon’, in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Schulman, eds., *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven, CT, 1994), p. 93; Philip Dwyer, ‘“It Still Makes Me Shudder”: Memories of Massacres and Atrocities during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars’, *War in History*, 16 (2009), 385.

Badajoz sometimes likened to the horrors of the Wars of Religion, to ‘some of the worst atrocities of the Thirty Years War’.⁸

Yet surprisingly, the sackings themselves, and their enduring and notorious reputations, have attracted little historical study, a neglect that has begun to be addressed in only very recent years.⁹ The British sieges of the Peninsular War are well-worn ground for generations of military historians, routinely appearing in histories of the war, and the subject of a number of books.¹⁰ But the general focus has been on the operational side of matters, culminating in the dramatic storming of the towns. There has been much less interest in exploring what then transpired within the town walls; of post-storm plunder and British behaviour towards the French garrisons and Spanish inhabitants; of where this sits within the history of customary laws of war; and how British soldiers wrote about and remembered all this. Moreover, there has been little analysis of why the towns were exposed to the likelihood of sack in the first place, with the French defending rather than surrendering in the face of practicable breaches; nor of the British storms themselves within a broader historical and cultural framework.

Rethinking Sieges in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

This long-standing neglect of the British sacks of the Peninsular War is symptomatic of a broader neglect of the history of sieges in the Napoleonic Wars, and of the history of sack itself in European warfare. Throughout

⁸ Frederick Myatt, *British Sieges of the Peninsular War* (Stroud, 2008), p. 104.

⁹ On this recent scholarship, see Gavin Daly, “‘The Sacking of a Town Is an Abomination’: Siege, Sack and Violence to Civilians in British Officers’ Writings on the Peninsular War – The Case of Badajoz”, *Historical Research*, 92 (2019), 160–82; Daly, ‘Anglo-French Sieges, the Laws of War, and the Limits of Enmity in the Peninsular War’, *English Historical Review*, 135 (2020), 572–604; Coss, *King’s Shilling*, ch. 7; Bruce Collins, *Wellington and the Siege of San Sebastian* (Barnsley, 2017), ch. 12; Alice Parker, “‘Incorrigible Rogues’: The Brutalisation of British Soldiers in the Peninsular War, 1808–1814”, *The British Journal of Military History*, 1 (2015), 42–59.

¹⁰ Philip Haythornthwaite, ‘Sieges in the Peninsular War’, in Paddy Griffith, ed., *A History of the Peninsular War: Vol IX: Modern Studies in Spain and Portugal, 1808–1814* (London, 1999), pp. 213–30; Myatt, *British Sieges*; Ian Fletcher, *In Hell Before Daylight: The Siege and Storming of the Fortress of Badajoz* (New York, 1984); Charles Esdaile and Philip Freeman, *Burgos in the Peninsular War, 1808–1814: Occupation, Siege, Aftermath* (Basingstoke, 2015); Mark S. Thompson, *Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering in the Peninsular War 1808–1814* (Barnsley, 2015); Collins, *Siege of San Sebastian*. The best discussion of French siege warfare in the Peninsular War is Donald D. Howard, *Napoleon and Iberia – The Twin Sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 1810* (Tallahassee, FL, 1980).

4 Introduction

most of the history of European warfare, sieges were much more common than field battles.¹¹ One estimate is that in Western Europe between 1550 and 1714, sieges outnumbered battles by a ratio of 10:1.¹² They were a more complex phenomenon, too, concerning both military forces and civilian populations, and operating within fortified spaces and their immediate hinterlands over a lengthy period of time. Sieges have been described as the ‘oldest form of total war’.¹³ They were the most common type of warfare where civilians could be exposed to direct and indirect violence, and where they might play an active role in defence or take up arms themselves.¹⁴ Besieging armies could bring starvation and bombardment, and if the city was stormed there was the very real likelihood of sack. Sieges could make battlegrounds of city streets and family homes, blurring the conventional boundaries between military and civilian identities.

Moreover, as John Lynn has highlighted, sieges were more important than battles in the historical development of laws on the conduct of war (*jus in bello*).¹⁵ Unwritten customary laws of war, or ‘laws of arms’, whose roots reached back to the medieval period and beyond, governed the elaborate summons and capitulation negotiations of early modern European siege warfare, and the fate of stormed garrisons and towns.¹⁶ If a besieged town refused to surrender at the point of a practicable breach and fell to a general storm, then the besieging force had the right to deny quarter to the garrison and to sack the town, which invariably involved not only plunder and destruction but also the murder and rape of civilians. This ‘law of sack’ was as old as western civilisation itself, stretching back to the Homeric traditions of Troy.¹⁷

¹¹ John W. Wright, ‘Sieges and Customs of War at the Opening of the Eighteenth Century’, *The American Historical Review*, 39 (1934), 629.

¹² John Childs, ‘Surrender and the Laws of War in Western Europe, c. 1660–1783’, in Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan, eds., *How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender* (Oxford, 2012), p. 158.

¹³ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York, 1977), p. 160.

¹⁴ For the impact of sieges on civilians, see Alex Dowdall and John Horne, eds., *Civilians Under Siege from Sarajevo to Troy* (Basingstoke, 2017).

¹⁵ John A. Lynn, ‘Introduction: Honourable Surrender in Early Modern European History, 1500–1789’, in Afflerbach and Strachan, eds., *How Fighting Ends*, p. 102.

¹⁶ For overviews of the laws of war and early modern sieges, see Geoffrey Parker, ‘Early Modern Europe’, in Howard, Andreopoulos and Schulman, eds., *The Laws of War*, pp. 45–51; Lynn, ‘Introduction: Honourable Surrender’, pp. 102–7; Childs, ‘Surrender and the Laws of War’, pp. 155–60; Wright, ‘Sieges and Customs of War’, pp. 629–44; Randall Lesaffer, ‘Siege Warfare in the Early Modern Age: A Study on the Customary Laws of War’, in Amanda Perreau-Saussine and James Bernard Murphy, eds., *The Nature of Customary Law* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 176–202.

¹⁷ I have taken the term ‘law of sack’ from Dennis Showalter, ‘Matrices: Soldiers and Civilians in Early Modern Europe, 1648–1789’, in Linda S. Frey and Marsha A.

Yet despite this, the history of the laws of war as they applied to early modern European sieges has not received a great deal of historical attention, especially in terms of how such laws were interpreted and experienced on the ground by military and civilian participants, as opposed to the writings of military publicists.¹⁸ Moreover, as Philip Dwyer has noted of the long tradition of sacking towns, ‘there is surprisingly little literature on the phenomenon’.¹⁹ Josh Levithan has observed that the traditional treatment of the sack of towns within military history often amounts to a cursory and general statement ‘that the sack was well known and understood to be the inalienable right of assaulting troops, and that this has always been the case ... a long line of historians choosing each to throw up his hands in dismay and avert the gaze of history from a particular horror’.²⁰ Only in very recent years has the tradition of sack in early modern Europe begun to emerge as a distinct subject in its own right, most notably with Stephen Bowd’s book on sacks and massacres in the sixteenth-century Italian wars.²¹

With respect to the Revolutionary-Napoleonic era, whilst an incredibly rich body of scholarship has emerged over the past thirty years on armies and soldiering, and more recently on diverse civilian experiences of war, there has been relatively little work done in the context of sieges.²² ‘New

Frey, eds., *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Europe, 1618–1900* (Westport, CT, 2007), p. 77.

¹⁸ For coverage of laws of war as applied to early modern sieges, see note 16. On case studies of siege laws in practice, see Barbara Donagan, *War in England 1642–1649* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 299–388; Jane Finucane, ‘Before the Storm: Civilians Under Siege During the Thirty Years War (1618–1630)’, in Dowdall and Horne, eds., *Civilians Under Siege*, pp. 137–61; Simon Pepper, ‘Siege Law, Siege Ritual, and the Symbolism of City Walls in Renaissance Europe’, in James D. Tracy, ed., *City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 573–604; Jamel Ostwald, ‘More Honored in the Breach? Representations of Honor in Louisquatorzian Sieges’, in Anke Fischer-Kattner and Jamel Ostwald, eds., *The World of the Siege: Representations of Early Modern Positional Warfare* (Leiden, 2019), pp. 85–125.

¹⁹ Dwyer, “‘It Still Makes Me Shudder’”, 385.

²⁰ Josh Levithan, *Roman Siege Warfare* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2013), pp. 205–6.

²¹ Stephen D. Bowd, *Renaissance Mass Murder: Civilians and Soldiers During the Italian Wars* (Oxford, 2019). See also Idan Sherer, *Warriors for a Living: The Experience of the Spanish Infantry in the Italian Wars, 1494–1559* (Leiden, 2017), ch. 4; Lauro Martines, *Furies: War in Europe 1450–1700* (New York, 2013), ch. 3. On sack in medieval sieges, see Sean McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire: Cruelty and Atrocity in Medieval Warfare* (London, 2008), pp. 141–94.

²² A recent work on sieges outside the Peninsular War is Phillip R. Cuccia, *Napoleon in Italy: The Sieges of Mantua, 1796–1799* (Norman, OK, 2014). On civilian experiences of sieges, see David Hopkin, ‘Sieges, Seduction and Sacrifice in Revolutionary War: The “Virgins of Verdun”’, *European History Quarterly*, 37 (2007), 528–47; Katherine B. Aaslestad, ‘Postwar Cities: The Cost of the Wars of 1813–1815 on Society in Hamburg and Leipzig’, in Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Michael Rowe, eds.,

6 Introduction

Military History’, and its more recent shift towards the study of war and culture, has been relatively slow to recognise and explore the multifaceted importance of the siege in this era. No major studies exist on sieges and the laws of war for the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars, nor for the eighteenth century more generally. In the French context, Philip Dwyer has investigated, in a number of articles, massacres perpetrated by French troops against civilians during the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars; and in a recent essay, Fergus Robson has explored the violence and norms of French siege warfare in diverse comparative and spatial contexts during the Revolutionary Wars.²³ But much work remains to be done on military attitudes and violence to garrisons and civilians within the context of the sieges of this era.

Sieges remain the poor cousin to battle in understandings of Napoleonic warfare.²⁴ This neglect has largely arisen from the long-established view that sieges, as the classic set piece form of early modern warfare, had become antiquated and obsolete by the end of the eighteenth century. Certainly, by the time of the Revolutionary Wars, battle had well and truly supplanted siege as the central campaign preoccupation of military commanders and warring states. The high point of European siege warfare was roughly between 1680 and 1748, with the epicentre the wars of Louis XIV. From the time of Frederick the Great and the Seven Years War, however, sieges entered a slow decline: new military doctrines of mobility, speed and a cult of the offensive increasingly took hold; and critics pointed to the costs of maintaining fortresses, and to the time constraints, mechanical nature and highly specialised science of siege warfare.²⁵ Then, in the wake of 1789, came mass conscript armies living off the land, and the ideal of decisive battle. All this has led military historians of the Revolutionary-Napoleonic era, apart from specialists on the Peninsular War, to focus on the great battles and campaigns, and for historical surveys of siege warfare, such as Christopher Duffy’s classic study, to trail off at the end of the eighteenth century.²⁶

War, Demobilization and Memory: The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions (Basingstoke, 2016), pp. 220–35.

²³ Dwyer, “‘It Still Makes Me Shudder’”; Dwyer, ‘Violence and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: Massacre, Conquest and the Imperial Enterprise’, *Journal of Genocide Research*, 15 (2013), 117–31; Fergus Robson, ‘Siege Warfare in Comparative Early Modern Contexts: Norms, Nuances, Myth and Massacre During the Revolutionary Wars’, in Dowdall and Horne, eds., *Civilians Under Siege*, pp. 83–105.

²⁴ On this historic neglect, see Collins, *Siege of San Sebastian*, pp. 2–6.

²⁵ Jamel Ostwald, *Vauban under Siege: Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigor in the War of the Spanish Succession* (Leiden, 2009), ch. 9.

²⁶ Christopher Duffy, *The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1660–1789* (London, 1985).

Yet, this belies the frequency with which sieges still occurred in the Revolutionary–Napoleonic era, their strategic relevance in numerous campaign theatres, their centrality to combined military–civilian experiences of war, their importance to customary laws of war and their continuing hold on artistic and cultural imaginings of war. After all, to take the early careers of the age’s most illustrious military names: Napoleon first came to prominence at the 1793 siege of Toulon; Wellington’s first involvement in a major military operation was as a colonel in India at the 1799 siege of Seringapatam; and even Nelson, when venturing off deck, was literally marked by a siege, losing the sight in his right eye at the 1794 siege of Calvi. Scores of sieges were in fact conducted across the diverse European and colonial theatres of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, affecting hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians in the process. As David Bell has observed, the single most concentrated case of savage fighting in the Peninsular War was not a field battle or in the context of the guerrilla war, but rather with ‘uniformed troops involved in that classic form of Old Regime warfare, a siege’ – in this case, the siege of Zaragoza in 1808–09.²⁷ Indeed, of all the Napoleonic theatres of war, it was the Peninsular War where sieges were most frequent and important, with around thirty formal sieges during the conflict.²⁸ And it was in the Peninsular War, where the British army, for the first time in a century, was involved in a succession of major land-based sieges in Continental Europe – three of which ended in storm and sack.

British Case Studies: European and Global

This book is the first of its kind for the history of the Revolutionary–Napoleonic Wars. Combining military, legal and especially cultural history, it is about the storm and sack of besieged towns as seen through the eyes of the attacking soldiers. It takes up the British army under Wellington in the Peninsular War as its central focus, examining in detail the three siege case studies of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz and San Sebastian. It has two principal aims here: first, to analyse the storm and sack of these towns through the prism of the customary laws of war governing sieges; and second, to examine British soldiers’ experiences and memories of these events, through a close analysis of their writings, with insights drawn from cultural history and diverse disciplinary fields,

²⁷ David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare As We Know It* (New York, 2007), p. 281.

²⁸ Philip Haythornthwaite lists twenty-nine sieges for the Peninsular War; Haythornthwaite, ‘Appendix 5: A List of Peninsular War Sieges’, in Griffith, ed., *History of the Peninsular War*, pp. 419–23.

8 Introduction

ranging from romantic literary studies to combat psychology and the sociology of violence.

The book draws upon a wide range of source material, but the eyewitness accounts of British officers and common soldiers, both published and in manuscript form, constitute the central source base. This material is especially rich for the Peninsular War, historians blessed with a large corpus of soldiers' letters, diaries, journals and memoirs. Most of these were produced by gentlemen officers, who hailed from diverse social backgrounds, from the upper and lower gentry to the professional and commercial classes.²⁹ As to the rank and file, modern research has overturned the old stereotype of Wellington's redcoats as drawn from an almost criminal underclass: recruits were predominantly former agricultural labourers, artisans, craftsmen and tradesmen.³⁰ Whilst on-the-spot letter and diary writing was largely the domain of officers, with very few surviving letters from the lower ranks, common soldiers made an important contribution to the post-war memoir boom. Indeed, this epoch was a watershed in the history of personal war narratives.³¹ With such large numbers of young British men mobilised for war, never before had so many soldiers written of their experiences; and with expanding print culture and reading audiences, a great wave of military memoirs, written first and foremost by junior officers but also including men from the ranks for the first time, appeared before an eager reading public during the late Georgian and early Victorian periods.³² This body of sources provides an unprecedented level of access into exploring the contemporary behaviour, mentalities and post-war memories of a large cohort of British soldiers with regard to the storm and fall of besieged towns during Europe's long eighteenth century (c. 1660–1815).

The scope of this book, however, both geographically and temporally, extends beyond British soldiers and siege warfare in early nineteenth-century Spain. First, it places these case studies within the long-term history of customary laws of war and siege violence. Second, it contextualises these sieges within the spectrum of siege warfare across

²⁹ Gavin Daly, *The British Soldier in the Peninsular War: Encounters with Spain and Portugal, 1808–1814* (Basingstoke, 2013), pp. 25–7.

³⁰ Coss, *King's Schilling*, pp. 50–85; Kevin Linch, *Britain and Wellington's Army: Recruitment, Society and Tradition* (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 90–1.

³¹ Yuval Noah Harari, *The Ultimate Experience: Battlefield Revelations and the Making of Modern War Culture, 1450–2000* (Basingstoke, 2008), pp. 127–96.

³² On British military memoirs of the period, see Neil Ramsey, *The Military Memoir and Romantic Literary Culture, 1780–1815* (Farnham, 2011); Matilda Greig, *Dead Men Telling Tales: Napoleonic War Veterans and the Military Memoir Industry, 1808–1914* (Oxford, 2021).

the Peninsular War and Napoleonic Wars more generally. And third, it compares and contrasts these case studies with other British examples of storm and sack across different contemporary global and inter-cultural colonial contexts: the largely forgotten 1807 siege of Montevideo during the River Plate campaign of 1806–07, when British troops were fighting Spain as the old enemy; and British sieges in India, where Wellington himself either served or commanded, namely the 1799 siege of Seringapatam during the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War, and the siege of Gawilghur in 1803 during the Second Anglo-Maratha War. All too often, European warfare of the Revolutionary-Napoleonic era has been treated in isolation from its broader global dimensions – this book explores some of those intersections through the prism of British siege warfare.

Charting Change and Continuity

By exploring all the above, this book hopes to shed further light on historical debates about restraint and excess in war, and long-term changes and continuities in the nature of European warfare in an age of enlightenment, revolution and romanticism. There has been a growing recent interest in the cultural history of violence and massacre during the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars and the earlier American Revolutionary War.³³ In the context of Continental Europe, there has been much discussion over the degree to which the French Revolution and Napoleon gave rise to a new era in warfare, one characterised by ideology, nations-in-arms, people's wars, and the erosion of conventional distinctions between combatants and non-combatants. David Bell, in particular, has argued that this era planted the seeds of modern 'total war'. Focusing on the French military experience, Bell contends that strands of enlightenment thought on a final war to end all wars combined with radical revolutionary politics and nationalism to produce a new culture of war, one characterised by an abandonment of restraint relative to the more self-limiting warfare of the eighteenth century.³⁴ For Bell, this constituted a transformative qualitative shift in the nature of wartime violence, with a new found absolute enmity towards the enemy, whether

³³ See esp. Bell, *First Total War*. As noted, Philip Dwyer has examined French massacres in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars. On violence within the German context, see Mark Hewitson, *Absolute War: Violence and Mass Warfare in the German Lands 1792–1820* (Oxford, 2017). On the cultural history of violence in eighteenth-century Anglo-American warfare, see Wayne E. Lee, *Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500–1865* (Oxford, 2011); Holger Hoock, *Scars of Independence: America's Violent Birth* (New York, 2017).

³⁴ Bell, *First Total War*, p. 8.

10 Introduction

military or civilian. The massacres and inhumanity of both the Vendée and the Peninsular War, it is argued, were largely a manifestation of this development. The extent to which restraints were abandoned, including between whom and in what contexts, remains an important part of the debate that Bell's work has engendered.³⁵

On the question of sieges, historians to date have drawn differing conclusions. Bruce Collins, taking issue with Bell's general thesis on the violence of the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars, claims there was nothing new with regard to the siege-related sacks of this era, whether British or French: 'The sacking of defended cities did not essentially differ in the 1810s from such actions before the 1790s.'³⁶ On the other hand, Fergus Robson, operating within a very broad definition of 'siege', including the military pacification of rural insurrection, contends that French siege violence during the Revolutionary Wars witnessed new historical heights of intensification, where 'we can see the brutality of the wars of religion, and the routine sacking of enemy towns merge with more "modern" national and ideological enmities to make sieges more dangerous than ever for both soldiers and civilians'.³⁷

Without question, there was a pronounced and prolonged escalation in the scale of wartime suffering and violence during the Revolutionary-Napoleonic era. Notwithstanding the earlier impact of eighteenth-century wars, between 1792 and 1815 an entire European generation found their lives marked by war to varying degrees across time and place – through enlistment and conscription, fighting, taxation, requisitioning, armies living off the land, occupation, popular resistance, partisan warfare and repression. In the words of Michael Broers, the wars 'touched more people, in and out of uniform, than anything known or imagined hitherto'.³⁸

Yet at the same time, this coexisted alongside the ideal of 'humanity' in war, a core theme within the eighteenth-century 'Military Enlightenment', a body of reflective and reform-minded discourse on

³⁵ On this debate, see, for example, Michael Broers, 'The Concept of "Total War" in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Period', *War in History*, 15 (2008), 247–68; Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds., *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775–1815* (New York, 2010).

³⁶ Collins, *Siege of San Sebastian*, p. 238.

³⁷ Robson, 'Siege Warfare in Comparative Early Modern Contexts', p. 101.

³⁸ Michael Broers, 'Civilians in the Napoleonic Wars', in Frey and Frey, eds., *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Europe*, p. 132. For an overview of civilian experiences in the Revolutionary Wars, see Michael Rowe, 'Civilians and Warfare During the French Revolutionary Wars', in Frey and Frey, eds., *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Europe*, pp. 93–132.