

**THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AS AN ACCOUNTABILITY  
FORUM**

This book provides the first in-depth empirical study of the European Parliament's powers of scrutiny of the executive in the European Union (EU), focusing on the politically salient field of the Economic and Monetary Union. The expansion of executive decision-making during the euro crisis was accompanied by an empowerment of the European Parliament through legislative oversight. This book examines how the European Parliament exercises that oversight on a day-to-day basis and thus contributes to political accountability at the EU level. Building on an innovative analytical framework for the study of parliamentary questions and answers, Adina Akbik sheds light on the European Parliament's possibilities and limitations to hold EU executive bodies accountable more generally. Case studies cover the period 2012–2019 and include the European Central Bank in banking supervision, the European Commission, the Eurogroup, and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council. This book is Open Access.

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# The European Parliament as an Accountability Forum

OVERSEEING THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY  
UNION

**ADINA AKBIK**

Leiden University, Institute of Political Science



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To Alex

Because you tell me stories that have their own parliaments  
and councils

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To come back to my opening about PhD theses, I do have a message for all doctoral students out there struggling to define or complete their dissertations: it gets easier the second time around.



## Abbreviations

AGS	Annual Growth Survey
ALDE	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
AMR	Alert Mechanism Report
BEPGs	Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
CRD	Capital Requirements Directive
CRR	Capital Requirements Regulation
CSRs	Country-Specific Recommendations
DBPs	Draft Budgetary Plans
DG	Directorate-General
DG ECFIN	Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
DG EMPL	Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
EBA	European Banking Authority
ECA	European Court of Auditors
ECB	European Central Bank
ECOFIN	Economic and Financial Affairs (Council)
ECON	Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (EP)
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists Group
EDIS	European Deposit Insurance Scheme
EDP	Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFC	Economic and Financial Committee
EFDD	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group
EFSSF	European Financial Stability Facility
EIP	Excessive Imbalances Procedure
EMPL	Employment and Social Affairs
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union

ENF	Europe of Nations and Freedom
EP	European Parliament
EPC	Economic Policy Committee
EPP	Group of the European People's Party
ESM	European Stability Mechanism
EU	European Union
EWG	Eurogroup Working Group
FOLTF	Failing or likely to fail (applicable to banks in banking supervision)
Greens/EFA	The Greens/European Free Alliance
GDP	gross domestic product
GUE-NGL	Confederal Group of the European United Left-Nordic Green Left
IDR	in-depth review
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JSTs	Joint Supervisory Teams
MEP(s)	Member(s) of the European Parliament
MIP	Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure
NCA(s)	National Competent Authorities
NPLs	non-performing loans
Q&A	questions and answers (in legislative oversight)
REGI	Committee on Regional Development (EP)
RRF	Recovery and Resilience Facility
S&D	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
SGP	Stability and Growth Pact
SRB	Single Resolution Board
SRF	Single Resolution Fund
SRM	Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM	Single Supervisory Mechanism
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union