Introduction

In August 1847, the *Virginius* reached the quarantine station on Grosse Île, not far from Quebec City. Well over half its 476 passengers – all of them Irish – died either en route or on Grosse Île, mostly from typhus.[1] Seven months later, in March 1848, the *Arabian* arrived in Georgetown, British Guiana. Its 268 passengers were Africans who had been 'liberated' by the Royal Navy from slave ships, deposited in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and just a few weeks later sent aboard the *Arabian* for passage across the Atlantic to work as indentured labourers on the Guyanese sugar plantations. Well over a third of them already showed symptoms of dysentery before the ship left Freetown. Within a fortnight of arrival, a fifth of them were either already dead or hovering at death's door.[2] Nine months later, in December 1848, the *Earl Grey* ended its trip from Plymouth to Sydney. Its 217 passengers were teenaged Irish orphan girls. In stark contrast with the unlucky passengers of the *Virginius* and the *Arabian*, only two of the girls had perished during a much longer voyage. But the *Earl Grey*'s surgeon-superintendent, Dr Henry Douglas, had tainted the reputations of fifty-six of them, alleging they were violent and disorderly, petty thieves, liars, and prostitutes. Douglas rid himself of them as soon as he could, dropping them off far to the north in Moreton Bay (later Brisbane), where, like the girls who sailed on to Sydney, they were apprenticed as domestic servants.[3]

These three voyages are superficially connected in the misfortune that plagued their passengers – though misfortune turned into disaster in only the first two cases. Those passengers also had in common a prior victimhood. Some of the Irish girls on the *Earl Grey* had been orphaned by the Famine that the *Virginius* passengers were trying to escape, while the

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[1] Extract from report of the medical examiner at Grosse Île enclosed in Earl of Elgin to 3rd Earl Grey, 8 December 1847, P[arliamentary] P[apers] 1847–48 [932], p. 5.
[2] PP 1847–48 (399), pp. 174, 182.
[3] PP 1850 [1163], p. 2: Henry G. Douglas to Edward Thompson, Colonial Secretary, New South Wales, 7 October 1848.

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health of the *Arabian*'s passengers had been badly compromised by their prior ordeals in the holds of slave ships. Another thing all these passengers had in common was that they were part of an unprecedented wave of emigrants roaming the globe at mid century. This vast movement of mostly poor emigrants, an outsized number of them Britons or British imperial subjects, was a new phenomenon. A final thing these humble emigrants had in common was that they were shipped across vast expanses of ocean through the agency of the British imperial state. This was a state that aimed to turn them into workers who could make a more 'productive' contribution to the globalising economy it sought to shape in ways that redounded to British advantage.

Managing Mobility tells the story of the British imperial state's involvement in the huge mid nineteenth-century migrations around and beyond the burgeoning British Empire. We know that the Empire grew enormously between 1840 and 1860. An era that saw the advent of relative social peace and 'equipoise' at home – as the Hungry Forties gave way to the Prosperous Fifties[4] – was one of remarkable imperial violence and expansion that witnessed rampant annexationism and the ruthless suppression of rebellion in India, two wars against China, and murderous settler expansionism in southern Africa and the Antipodes.[5] By the latter year, Britain was well on its way to ruling over a quarter of the earth's surface, and more than a quarter of its people. We also know that these decades witnessed an unprecedented movement of people around the Empire and around the world. Over the eighteenth century, half a million people emigrated from the British Isles; between 1815 and 1914, more than 20 million did. The volume of emigrants grew dramatically from the mid century forward. It was the Potato Famine of the late 1840s and early 1850s, killing around a million people and forcing two million more to flee Ireland, that accelerated British emigration from mid century, and made it disproportionately Irish. Of the 50 million or so European emigrants who crossed oceans between 1850 and 1914, a quarter of

[4] See e.g. H. C. G. Matthew, *Gladstone 1809–1898* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 114–15; R. McKibbin, *The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880–1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 40–41; B. Hilton, *A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? England 1783–1846* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 628–29; T. K. Hoppen, *The Mid-Victorian Generation, 1846–1886* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 130–31.
[5] D. Peers, 'State, power, and colonialism', in D. Peers and N. Gooptu (eds.), *India and the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 42; D. Peers, *India under Colonial Rule* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 39; C. A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 133–35; C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 136–47.

them were Irish, English, Scottish, or Welsh. Most of those emigrants settled in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and especially the United States, a magnet of opportunity that drew some 60 per cent of the total number.[6] Their volume grew as the century progressed – 216,000 in the 1820s, three times that many in the 1830s, over twice as many again in the 1840s (to almost 1.5 million), almost doubling yet again in the 1850s (to over 2.6 million), and peaking in the 1880s (at over 3.2 million). Well over two million emigrants continued to leave Britain in every decade until the 1930s, when the Great Depression drastically curtailed emigration the world over. More emigrants left Britain than any other European country in every decade from Waterloo to the Wall Street crash – with the sole exception of 1901–10, when more Italians (3,615,000) than Britons (3,150,000) left their home country.[7]

We tend to think of the United Kingdom as a nation (like others in the global north) in which the volume of immigrants coming in routinely exceeds the volume of emigrants leaving. Between 1945 and 2000, however, the balance was roughly even, with net immigration exceeding net migration by only 6 per cent (roughly 8.5 million versus 8 million). Moreover, while the United Kingdom is now, on balance, an immigration state, throughout the nineteenth century Britain routinely lost far more residents than it gained. More people likely left Britain in the 1850s alone than the number of foreigners who settled in Britain during the thirteen-plus decades between 1800 and 1945.[8] As the United Kingdom remained the most densely populated and urban country in Europe throughout the nineteenth century, this routine people-shedding provided an unobtrusive but important safety valve that helped to quell

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[6] J. Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 129; J. G. Williamson and K. H. O'Rourke, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of the Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 119–20; J. Darwin, 'Orphans of empire', in R. Bickers (ed.), *Settlers and Expatriates: Britons over the Seas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 329.

[7] B. R. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics* (3rd ed., Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 124–25. Estimates for the UK are based on international passengers to and from UK ports (including Irish ports), 1815–76; intercontinental citizen passengers to and from UK ports, 1876–1919; and intercontinental migration of UK and Commonwealth citizens for permanent residence, 1920 forward.

[8] P. Panayi, *An Immigration History of Britain: Multicultural Racism Since 1800* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2010), p. 40; J. P. Smith, 'Persistence and privilege: Mass migration from Britain to the Commonwealth, 1945–2000', in C. D. Pedersen and S. Ward (eds.), *The Break-Up of Greater Britain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2021), pp. 252–53; N. L. Green, 'The politics of exit: Reversing the immigration paradigm', *Journal of Modern History* 77 (2005), p. 269.

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Malthusian fears and deserves greater attention as a source of Victorian Britain's relative stability.[9]

While the United States absorbed much of Britain's Great Emigration, that Emigration also made for the explosive growth of the Empire's white settler colonies – what James Belich has memorably called the 'British West'. The settler population of Australia alone, for instance, grew from under 12,000 in 1811 to almost 4 million by 1901 – rising from one-tenth of 1 per cent of the US population in the former year to over 5 per cent of the US population in the later one.[10] The United States witnessed remarkable rates of demographic growth well into the twentieth century, in which immigration loomed especially large. But so too did Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa; their combined population reached nearly 40 per cent of that of the United States by 1920 – 24 million versus 62 million.[11] This settler population explosion of the nineteenth century facilitated, over the span of about three generations, a great land rush that led to the expropriation and exploitation of much of the world's best arable and pastoral land.[12] It was accompanied by chronic warfare with indigenous peoples that often slowed white encroachment – in New Zealand and southern Africa, for instance – while elsewhere it brought catastrophic indigenous population decline through exterminationist violence and the transmission of disease – in Van Diemen's Land and Queensland, for example.[13]

Mass emigration and indigenous death and dispossession were two of the most conspicuous traits of what Martin Daunton calls the 'first major episode of globalisation' that began at mid century and only came to an end with the guns of August 1914. They were closely connected to two more – greatly enhanced global trade flows and capital mobility, under-written by the 'sound money' of the gold standard that made the City of

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[9] A. O. Hirschman, 'Exit, Voice, and the State', *World Politics* 31, (1978) pp. 90–107.
[10] W. Vamplew (ed.), *Australians: Historical Statistics* (Broadway, NSW: Fairfax, Syme & Weldon, 1987), p. 288.
[11] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, pp. 83–85, 126.
[12] J. S. Weaver, *The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650–1900* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), ch. 3.
[13] See e.g. J. Belich, *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1986); A. Bank, 'Losing faith in the civilizing mission: The premature decline of humanitarian liberalism at the Cape, 1840–60', in M. Daunton and R. Halpern (eds.), *Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600–1850* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), pp. 364–83; A. E. Palmer, *Colonial Genocides: Aborigines in Queensland, 1840–1897, and Hereros in South West Africa, 1884–1906* (London: University of London Press, 1993).

London the centre of the financial universe.[14] While the British Free
Trade regime of the second half of the century created big advantages for
colonial primary products like wool and grain, the rapidly growing white
settler populations of the 'British West' also enjoyed prime access to the
City of London capital markets as their economies diversified along with
the growth of their populations. By the end of the century, white
Australians enjoyed an average standard of living considerably higher
than Britons, and not much below that of the richest country in the
world – the United States.[15]

The mass migrations that brought predominantly British white settlers
to the United States and to the 'British West' were by no means the only
ones that started at mid century and gathered pace as the age of sail
turned into the age of steam. The whole world was seemingly on the
move. Between the 1840s and the 1920s, some 55 million people left
Europe, mostly to the Americas. But over the same span of time, at least
50 million migrants from India and South China left their homes – most
of them bound for Southeast Asia, though some for Australia and islands
throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from Mauritius to Fiji – while
another 48 million traveled from North China, Russia, Korea, and Japan
to Central Asia, Siberia, and Manchuria. All three of these vast migra-
tions gathered pace over the second half of the nineteenth century, and
peaked in the 1910s and 1920s. Early on, in the 1850s, there was
significant convergence of these vast migrant streams – notably in the
movement of over half a million Chinese to the Americas and Australia,
most of whom paid their own way to seek economic advantage, and in
the third of all Indian overseas migrants in the 1840s and 1850s who
moved to destinations far from the Asian mainland, chiefly under con-
tracts of indenture.[16] By the early twentieth century, however, racial
politics had split in two the European and Asian migration streams.

[14] M. Daunton, 'Britain and Globalisation since 1850: I. Creating a Global Order,
1850–1914', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th series, 16 (2006), pp. 1–38.
Quoted from p. 1.

[15] G. B. Magee and A. S. Thompson, *Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods
and Capital in the British World, c. 1850–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), pp. 3–4; J. Darwin, 'Empire and ethnicity', *Nations and Nationalism* 16 (2010),
pp. 383–401; D. Meredith and B. Dyster, *Australia in the Global Economy: Continuity and
Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 2–6.

[16] A. McKeown, 'A world made many: Integration and segregation in global migration', in
D. R. Gabaccia and D. Hoerder (eds.), *Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims:
Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the
1930s* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 42–64; A. McKeown, 'Global migration, 1846–1940',
Journal of World History 15, pp. 155–89; A. McKeown, 'Chinese emigration in global
context', in D. Hoerder and A. Kaur (eds.), *Proletarian and Gendered Mass Migrations:
A Global Perspective on Continuities and Discontinuities from the 19th to the 21st Centuries*

Chinese migration was essentially barred by the white settler colonies and by the United States, as well, while demand for tropical labour shifted away from the sugar estates of the Caribbean to the tea gardens of Assam and Ceylon and the rubber plantations of the Malay Peninsula. Migration from China and India peaked in the decade before the onset of the Great Depression. But by then almost all of it was to the lands of Southeast Asia, which 4.9 million Indians and 3.8 million Chinese entered while another 4 million Indians and 2.9 million Chinese left between 1921 and 1930.[17]

European and Asian migration were only fully separated – for political as well as economic reasons – at the end of the nineteenth century. But it was already apparent by 1850 that the British Empire was being bifurcated by the emergence of a settler 'Angloworld' and a post-Emancipation plantation complex that at first focused on sugar and gradually spread to the production of many other tropical commodities. A temperate zone of white settlement and a tropical zone of Asian plantation labour became two separate and unequal foci of what Freddy Foks has memorably termed the 'emigration state' of Victorian Britain and its empire.[18] This emigration state was by far the most interventionist in its efforts to save the British Caribbean sugar complex, which was threatened first by emancipation in 1833 and then again, only fifteen years later, by that very state's imposition of a free-trade regime that obliged West Indian 'free' sugar to compete on the open market with sugar produced by enslaved people in Cuba and Brazil. Thus, just as hundreds of thousands of people were fleeing for their lives from Famine Ireland in the late 1840s and early 1850s, ships subsidised by the British imperial state carried 36,000 'liberated' enslaved people from the West Coast of Africa to the British Caribbean. There, it was hoped, they would make up for the labour shortage created when many freed Blacks abandoned sugar work, and at meagre wages that would make 'free' sugar more competitive in the world market. But 36,000 Africans were not nearly enough to meet the British Caribbean demand for new sugar workers. So, over the next twenty years, 18,000 Chinese and over

(Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 263–92; P. Manning, *Migration in World History* (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 151–54.

[17] U. Bosma, 'Beyond the Atlantic: Connecting migration and world history in the age of imperialism, 1840–1940', *International Review of Social History* 52 (2007), pp. 116–23; S. Amrith, *Migration and Diaspora in Modern Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 30–33.

[18] F. Foks, 'Emigration state: Race, citizenship and settler imperialism in modern British history, c. 1850–1972', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 35 (2022), pp. 182–83. See also W. L. Lai, 'Asian diasporas and tropical migration in the age of empire: A comparative overview', *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 5 (2009), pp. 28–54.

100,000 Indians were shipped halfway round the world to work on the plantations, the latter via an intricate state-supported network.

By the time the indentured-labour regime in Britain's tropical possessions came to an end after World War I, almost 1.5 million people had been recruited and shipped overseas to destinations within the British Empire. Indentured workers from India accounted for 85 per cent of the total. Over a third of them, some 450,000, traveled to Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, which, like its Caribbean counterparts British Guiana and Trinidad, was a valuable sugar colony ceded to the victorious British during the great wars with France (and its sometime allies Spain and the Netherlands) at the turn of the eighteenth century. But 490,000 more went to the British Caribbean, the prime destination for Indian indentured workers by the mid 1860s. Seventy-one per cent of them travelled to British Guiana and Trinidad. Under 7 per cent went to Jamaica, the pre-Emancipation leader in British colonial sugar production that (for political and financial as well as agricultural reasons) was unable to bring in enough indentured labourers to work its depleted soil and compete with the newer West Indian sugar-cane territories. As the British imperial sugar belt gradually extended to span the globe, moreover, indentured workers followed – to the newer sugar estates of Natal and Fiji (and also many foreign sugar territories such as Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Dutch Guiana), as well as the rubber plantations and tin mines of Malaya, and the railroads and gold mines of the Transvaal.[19]

It is important to note that state-sponsored Indian indentured migration came to only a small fraction of the massive internal Asian migration that was happening simultaneously. More people moved from (mostly south) India to work the tea plantations in Ceylon in the century after 1848 than traveled to the British Caribbean over the entire history of indentured migration, and far more still traveled to Burma to gather the rice harvest over roughly the same period. These tea and rice workers, moreover, did not generally travel on indentured contracts, but under the *kangany* debt-peonage system that was far more common than

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[19] M. Harper and S. Constantine, *Migration and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 150–51; P. Curtin, *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 180; R. K. Thiara, 'Indian indentured workers in Mauritius, Natal and Fiji', and S. Vertovec, 'Indian indentured migration to the Caribbean', in R. Cohen (ed.), *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 57–62, 63–68; K. Manjapra, 'Plantation dispossessions: The global travel of agricultural racial capitalism', in S. Beckert and C. Desan (eds.), *American Capitalism: New Histories* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), pp. 361–88.

indenture in the inner-Asian labour migration networks.[20] Admittedly, state-sponsored indentured labour migration counted for only a modest percentage of overall Indian labour migration. Nevertheless, recruiting and moving 1.5 million workers from India to the other side of the world, and closely supervising the terms of their labour, was a remarkable feat of 'imperial resource allocation'[21] for a Victorian British state – and its auxiliaries in India and the West Indian colonies – whose reach and powers were modest by post-1914 standards. Over the second half of the nineteenth century, this labour-allocation system evolved into what Radhika Mongia has vividly termed 'a massive, micromanaged, state-controlled enterprise' which, through a 'continual process of accretion', produced a 'gargantuan machinery of techniques and technologies to manage every aspect of Indian indentured emigration'.[22]

Just as indentured migration was becoming a conspicuous fact of Caribbean life, the British imperial state and its antipodean counterparts played a similarly outsized role in the growth of the free white settler population in the Australian colonies. There were almost two and half times as many settler Australians in 1850 (405,000) as there had been in 1840, and nearly three times as many in 1860 (1,145,000) as there had been in 1850. The majority of Australian immigrants in these decades relied on government support to pay for the lengthy and expensive trip. So too, of course, had the British convicts who had preceded them to New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land over the previous sixty years. Without convict transportation – and the statist bureaucratic and penal infrastructure that made convict transportation possible – the Anglo settlement of Australia, some 12,000 miles away from the British Isles, would have been inconceivable. Still, in a mere twenty years, between 1831 and 1851, ten thousand more free immigrants arrived in the Australian colonies than the total number of convicts who landed there over the entire seventy-year span of the transportation system (170,000 versus 160,000). The fares of over two-thirds of those free immigrants

[20] D. Northrup, *Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 1834–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 64–67; McKeown, 'A world made many', p. 59; Harper and Constantine, *Migration and Empire*, pp. 153–58; Bosma, 'Beyond the Atlantic', p. 117; E. D. Melillo, 'Empire in a cup: Imagining colonial geographies through British tea consumption', in J. Beattie, E. Melillo, and E. O'Gorman (eds.), *Eco-Cultural Networks and the British Empire: New Views on Environmental History* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), pp. 68–91.

[21] M. Kale, *Fragments of Empire: Capital, Slavery, and Indian Indentured Labor Migration in the British Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 4–5.

[22] R. Mongia, *Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of the Modern State* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), pp. 26, 60.

were subsidised from public funds.[23] It is true that, for brief stretches thereafter, the percentage of British immigrants who fully paid their own way to Australia exceeded the percentage of those whose ways were publicly subsidised – spectacularly so during the gold rush of the early 1850s. The number of British immigrants who were lured into Victoria's gold fields in 1852–53 alone, for instance, exceeded the grand total of all convicts who had preceded them to the southeastern corner of Australia. Nevertheless, government subsidies remained crucial in sustaining the flow of ultra long-distance emigrants to Australia. Over the entire span of the nineteenth century, subsidised passengers accounted for close to half of the 1.6 million people – ten times the total number of transported convicts – who made their way freely to Australia.[24]

The indentured migration of hundreds of thousands of Indians to the British Caribbean and the state-subsidised migration of hundreds of thousands of free Britons to Australia were, for their time, remarkably ambitious projects in social engineering. They would have been unthinkable without the sort of deep, broad, and sustained intervention that we do not typically associate with the early to mid Victorian state. Indeed, the two decades between 1840 and 1860 saw the heyday of a minimal British state that sought to legitimate itself through a staunch commitment to laissez-faire – drastically lowering taxes and spending, promoting free trade, and in other ways making itself deliberately less palpable to Britons at home. In keeping with these premises, it is generally taken for granted that the British state had precious little directly to do with the movement of British subjects round the world in these decades. Thus, for instance, the eminent migration historian Eric Richards asserts that the most important point about nineteenth-century emigration was 'its sheer spontaneity. It happened outside government control and beyond contemporary understanding. It was atomistic. Millions of people departed with astonishingly little framework or ideology'.[25]

There is much truth in this assessment, and it closely jibes with what is by now a well-established historical narrative of Victorian mass migration in which the role of government was modest and limited. In simplest terms, the story goes like this. At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the British government, like its continental counterparts, took a mercantilist view of immigration: a nation's people was a valuable resource that

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[23] K. S. Inglis, *The Australian Colonists: An Exploration of Social History, 1788–1870* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1974), pp. 16–17.

[24] E. Richards, 'How did poor people emigrate from the British Isles to Australia in the nineteenth century?' *Journal of British Studies* 32 (1993), pp. 251–55.

[25] E. Richards, *Britannia's Children: Emigration from England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland since 1600* (London: Hambledon and London, 2004), p. 149.

needed to be held on to no less than other forms of national wealth such as gold, so (admittedly not always effective) legal obstacles to their free exit were the norm in Britain as elsewhere. But decennial headcounts showed the British population growing at the unprecedented and alarming rate of 2 per cent per year between 1801 and 1821. Thanks to this explosive growth it was first in Britain that mercantilism gave way to Malthusianism, and that the authorities first made what would gradually become a more widespread European shift 'from wanting to hoard bodies to wanting to shovel them out', as Nancy L. Green has vividly put it.[26] 'Exit' via emigration seemed to offer one promising way of escaping the Malthusian trap of grinding poverty driven by overpopulation. Thus, in 1824 the British government led Europe in eliminating all legal impediments to emigration.[27] It also bankrolled a half-dozen migration experiments, chiefly orchestrated by Sir Robert Wilmot-Horton, permanent undersecretary at the Colonial Office for most of the 1820s, who viewed emigration as a potentially valuable weapon in the fight against overpopulation at home.

Wilmot-Horton's projects were modest in scale. All told, they cost £175,000 of public money, sent 10,500 humble Irish, Scottish, and English migrants overseas – mostly to Upper Canada, but also to the Cape – and furnished small land grants to some of them. This was a significant departure from the discouraging approach that the British imperial state had hitherto taken to immigration. But, at a time when postwar retrenchment and cheap government were the orders of the day,[28] there was little enthusiasm for the state to commit taxpayer money to a burgeoning migration, overwhelmingly to the United States, that most emigrants were willing to pay for themselves.[29] Between 1826 and 1830, an average of over 30,000 Britons annually found the means to

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[26] N. L. Green, 'The politics of exit: Reversing the immigration paradigm', *Journal of Modern History* 77 (2005), p. 287.

[27] A. R. Zolberg, 'The exit revolution', in N. L. Green and F. Weil (eds.), *Citizenship and Those Who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2007), pp. 41–44.

[28] P. Harling, *The Waning of 'Old Corruption': The Politics of Economical Reform in Britain, 1779–1846* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), chs. 5–6.

[29] H. J. M. Johnston, *British Emigration Policy, 1815–1830: 'Shovelling Out Paupers'* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 1–32, ch. 6; A. Lester, K. Boehm, and P. Mitchell, *Ruling the World: Freedom, Civilisation and Liberalism in the Nineteenth-Century British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. 72–73; Harper and Constantine, *Migration and Empire*, pp. 123–26, 290–93; C. Swaisland, *Servants and Gentlewomen to the Golden Land: The Emigration of Single Women from Britain to South Africa, 1820–1939* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1992), pp. 31–33.