Index

Note: Page numbers followed by n indicate numbered footnotes; page numbers in italic indicate tables or figures.

ACTFU (All-China Federation of Trade Unions), 216–219, 223, 225
Africa
BWI Africa Network on Multinational Corporations, 221
China–US rivalry, 132
Chinese ambitions, 123–125
historical great power competition, 116
US–China rivalry, 132
see also SACU (Southern Africa Development Community)
Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), 116
agricultural supply chains, 128, 214
AI (artificial intelligence)
China as internet strong power, 68
China’s “nationalist self-reliance”, 63, 64, 232–233
China’s prior-2017 openness, 65–66, 69
Chinese policy tool, 68, 72–73
Chinese state control, 16, 60–61, 67–69
data fragmentation and protectionism, 74–75
database consolidation, 75
financial support, 70–71
government procurement, 73–75
inter-agency coordination, 69–71
inter-firm relationships, 62
Internet Security Law (2016), 66
key projects, 70–71, 71, 75
Made in China 2025, 65, 232–233
multilevel value chain, 61–64, 62
provincial level projects, 69, 71–72
relational, captive supply chain, 63, 64
State Council’s “Outline” plan (2015), 65–66, 69
three-year action plan (2017), 69–70
vertical integration of China’s value chain, 60, 72–73, 75
Alibaba, 72–73, 149
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACTFU), 216–219, 223, 225
Amazon Web Services, 74
Android operating system, 30, 87
Apple
in China, 245
components, 79–80
operating system, 30
relocation from China, 38
sales, 83
supply chain, 224
trade and sales statistics, 36
see also iPhone
Apple Stores, 28
automation, 239
automobile industry
government pressure on production location, 64
producer-driven value chain, 27
SACU, 121
South Africa, 120, 126
Index

Index

automobile industry (cont.)
supply chain relocation, 206
supply chains, 183–184
backward participation
China’s supply chains, 139–140
definition, 2, 118
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 148
Biden administration, 243n17, 248
Bolton, John, 116
Botswana
protectionism, 128
trade, 122–123, 124, 125–126
trade diversification, 126
brand appeal, 27–28
brand marketing, 84
Brexit, 186–187
Building and Woodworkers International
(BWI), 216–218
Africa Network, 221
Bush, Jeb, 174n2, 182
buyer-value chain variables, 26–28, 79
Canada, Meng Wanzhou arrest, 67
CDMA patents, 88
China
African ambitions, 123–125, 132
Australian tariffs, 151
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 148
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, 50, 110, 112, 247–248n22
employment, 18, 142, 144–145, 235
income inequality, 144–145, 145, 215–216
job creation, 5, 142, 144–145, 152
Labor Contract Law (2008), 178
labour costs, 50
labor market, 46
Made in China 2025, 15, 27–28, 65, 148
middle classes, 140–141, 141, 141, 146
middle-income trap, 4
migrant workers, 216
nationalism, 147–148
poverty reduction, 140, 215
regional disparities, 145–146
self-reliance strategy, 4, 13, 63, 64–65, 137, 232–233
SOEs (state-owned enterprises), 146, 148
trade with Africa, 115
trade with SACU states, 119, 121–125, 122, 124
urbanization, 141–142
wage increases, 10, 144–145
wages, 140–141, 141
workers’ rights, 142
see also South Korea–China trade dispute;
Taiwan–China dispute
China’s global supply chains (GSCs)
backward participation, 139–140
challenges, 18, 144–149
forward participation, 138–139, 141–144
future prospects, 136, 149–151
GSC preservers, 149–150, 235
GSC reformers, 150, 235
GSC replacers, 150, 235
impact on labor in developed countries, 147
importance to China, 4–5, 18, 235
outward-oriented model, 18, 144
risks and benefits, 36–40
Chinese companies
concerns over geopolitical tensions, 241
handset manufacturing, 90–91
and labor rights, 221
Science and Technology Innovation Board
(STAR), 71
smartphone industry, 80–84, 83–84, 85
State Information Center, 75
stock market AI listings, 71
supply chain participation, 109
Taiwanese business relations, 85
tariffs, 23
see also United States–China trade war
Clinton, Hillary, 174, 174n2, 181–184
clothing industry, 121, 213, 220
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 246
see also Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
conflict see geopolitical conflict
Covid-19
adverse effect on labor, 239, 244, 244n15
Chinese phone tracking, 72–73
and Chinese supply chains, 151
economic uncertainties, 48
geo-political tensions, 240
and high-technology products, 143
Hong Kong protests, 105
Jack Ma donation, 132
Japanese businesses, 43, 56–58, 57
Japanese supply chains, 55–58
medical supplies, 39–40, 172, 187–188, 240
oil storage glut, 188
origin theories, 240n9
outbreak in China, 56, 150
outbreak in Japan, 56

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public awareness of supply chain interdependence, 240
and rise of nationalism, 209
SACU states, 129–132
smartphone industry, 95
supply chain disruption, 172, 187–188
supply chain risk-seeking, 209
US Africa relief grant, 132
US effects, 172, 187–188, 237
and US–China relations, 55, 241–242
Cruz, Ted, 174n2, 181
currency
Japanese yen and business plans, 46, 47
renminbi/yuan, 30, 37–38, 156
developing countries, 27, 73, 120–121, 244
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, 50, 110, 112, 243–248n22
distribution networks, 28–29
diversification
Japanese companies, 232
SACU supply chain, 126
South Korean supply chains, 200–201, 206
supply chains, 58–59, 240
US companies, 224–225
East Asia
electronics industry, 77–78
geropolitical shocks, 8
production network, 49–50
smartphone industry, 80–82
supply chain participation, 24, 49–50, 109
trade agreements, 246, 246n20
Ebola, 119
economic interdependence, and interstate relations, 3, 7–9
electronics industry
South Asian dominance, 77–78
Eswatini
and Taiwan, 118
trade, 122–123, 124, 125–126
trade diversification, 126
European Union, self-reliance, 224
forward participation
China’s supply chains, 138–139, 141–144
definition, 2, 118
garment industry, 121, 213, 220
gopolitical conflict
business level uncertainty, 46, 47
conflict escalation defined, 194

conflict initiation defined, 194
cost increases, 103–104
decisionmaking, 192, 195
definition, 96
and economic interdependence, 3, 7–9
hidden economic costs, 233–234
mitigation rules, 59
pacific effect of economic integration, 190
security issues, 112
shipping disruptions, 104–105, 112
smartphone networks unaffected by, 78, 85
state actions, 100–102
supply chain disruptions, 101–103
and supply chain topology, 98–100, 99, 111–114, 112
supply chains and de/escalation, 19, 189–190, 206
trade barriers, 100–101, 112
see also South Korea–China trade dispute;
South Korea–Japan trade dispute; Taiwan–China dispute; topology of supply chains;
United States–China trade war
Gereffi, Gary, 62–64, 79, 97
global supply chains (GSCs)
centrality to international relations, 5–6
complexity of interdependence, 12–13
concepts and measurement, 2–3
consumer influence, 120
data sources, 8–9
disaggregation, 176
disruptions from global shocks, 25, 58
distributional consequences, 19, 185–186
division of labor, 27
East Asia triangle, 24, 49–50, 109
economic significance, 5
economic and social benefits, 136
emerging threats, 15
future prospects, 244–249
gerographical diversification, 58–59, 224–225, 232
governance patterns, 63, 63
hierarchical nature, 176–177
industry diversification, 126, 200–201, 206
inward-oriented models, 10–11, 13, 65, 107, 148, 150, 232–233
“just in time”, 214–215, 239–240, 245
lead firms, 2, 79
modular governance, 63, 97
outward-oriented models, 10–12, 18

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294  

Index

global supply chains (GSCs) (cont.)  
outward-oriented vs. inward-oriented states, 10–14, 136, 229–230, 248–249  
political agency, 9  
political backlash against offshoring to China, 147  
political foundations, 9–14  
political pressure, 64  
political underpinnings, 9–14, 247  
reshoring vs. diversification, 240  
and rules of origin, 183–184  
smile curve, 173–177  
termology, 2  
uncertainty factors, 46, 47–48  
vertical specialization, 96–98  
vulnerability, 25  
see also China’s global supply chains (GSCs);  
reshoring; resilience  
Google, 245  
Android operating system, 30, 87  

H&M, 28–29, 38, 221  
high-technology products  
China’s capability, 143–144  
China’s dependence on foreign technology, 148–149  
Covid-19 effects, 143  
Made in China 2025 strategy, 15, 65  
US trade deficit, 26  
US–China balance of trade, 106  
HiSilicon, 87, 93, 149  
Hon Hai, 82, 84–85, 84, 89  
Hong Kong  
Covid-19 protests, 105  
extradition bill protests (2019), 104  
legal action, 113  
National Security Law (2020), 44, 56  
shipping and transport disruptions, 104–105  
supply chain impact, 112  
supply chain participation, 109  
Huawei  
components, 2, 31, 58, 79–80, 149  
import substitution, 93  
Meng Wanzhou arrest, 67  
Philippines agreement, 111  
sales, 83  
supply chain, 82–84  
US sanctions, 44, 55, 58, 93–94  
vertical integration, 73  
Huawei Business Group, 73  
Humphrey, John, 62–63  

ICT, 28, 30, 31  
income inequality  
China, 144–145, 145  
and global supply chains, 177–178  
global trends, 179, 237  
and globalization, 186–187  
India  
product relocation, 93, 206, 243  
self-reliance, 224  
Indonesia, supply chain relocations, 107, 206  
industrial action, 20, 216  
IndustriALL, 216–217, 220–221  
intellectual property (IP), 24–25, 66, 88, 136, 161–162  
see also Section 101 case (USTR)  
international institutions, 11  
International Labour Organization (ILO), 216  
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), 216–220  
International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations (IUUF), 216–217, 220  
Internet Security Law (2016) (China), 66  
inward-oriented model, China, 13–14, 65, 107, 148, 150, 232–233  
iPhone  
Chinese exports to US, 29–30, 29, 31  
launch, 87  
sales, 83  
supply chain, 27, 82, 224  
trade statistics distortion, 33–34  
iron and steel industry, 208  

Japan  
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, 50, 110, 112, 247–248022  
droughts, 110  
East Asia production network, 49–50  
economic impact of US–China trade war, 41  
exports to China, 119–140  
free trade agreements, 58  
labor market, 46  
military, 199  
South Korean military sharing agreement, 200  
supply chain activity, 138  
see also South Korea–Japan trade dispute  
Japanese companies  
business-level uncertainty, 16, 45–48, 46, 54, 212  
Covid-19 impact, 43, 55–58, 57
Index

domestic production expansion, 54
FDI (foreign direct investment), 44
government support for reshoring, 55, 243, 247
impact of US–China trade war, 15–16,
44–45, 48–49, 52–54, 98
iPhone parts, 33–34, 34
procurement sources in North America, 52
relocation from China, 38, 50, 54, 232, 243
sales destinations of affiliates in Asia, 50–51,
51
smartphone industry, 31, 80–82, 92
stock market volatility, 45, 53
supply chain diversification, 232
supply chain participation, 109
tariff concerns, 16, 45–47
trade policy uncertainty, 44–45
Jasic Technology, 220
’just in time’, 214–215, 239–240, 245
Kaine, Tim, 174n2, 183
Kasich, John, 174n2, 182
Kyrgyzstan, Chinese oil refinery, 221

labor activism
challenges from supply chain reshaping, 224–225
Chinese state restrictions, 221–223
for Chinese workers, 212–213, 220–221
cooperation with Chinese workers, 217–219
and Covid-19, 225
disguised collective action, 222–223
eyear campaigns, 213–214
global unions, 216–221, 225
ignored by academic scholarship, 214
local organizations, 225
monitoring Chinese companies, 221
reliable would-be allies, 223
supply chain advantages, 214
supply chain campaigns, 211–213, 238–239
transnational cooperation, 211
labor costs, 176–178, 184, 212
labor market
business plans, 46
Covid-19 adverse effects, 244, 244n15
globalization effects, 178, 178n6
labor rights
Chinese state suppression, 216
failed by trade agreements, 184
global framework agreements (GFAs), 220–221
growing Chinese unrest, 213–216
industrial action, 20, 216
lack of accurate information, 222
limited consumer influence, 120
race to the bottom, 212
weakened by supply chains, 177
Largan Precision, 85
Lesotho
services sector, 126
trade, 122–123, 124, 125–126
diversification, 126
wool and mohair farmers, 128–129
LG Electronics, 83, 84, 206
Li Keqiang, 66
Lighthizer, Robert, 236n5, 237n7
Ma, Jack, 112
Made in China 2025, 13, 65, 107, 148, 150,
222–223
MediaTek, 79–80, 86–87, 91
medical supplies, 39–40, 172, 187–188, 240
Meng Wanzhou, 67
middle classes, China, 140–141, 141, 141, 146
middle-income trap, 248, 4
migrant workers, 185
Chinese international, 115, 220, 225
internal Chinese, 216
Milanovic, Branko, 179
Mizuno, 221
mobile phones, 86–87
see also smartphone industry; smartphones
Namibia
community garden project, 128
import restrictions, 128
intermediate goods and services trade, 122–123, 124
services sector, 126
trade diversification, 126
national security, 59
nationalism, 10, 11, 147–148, 209, 231, 236
near-shoring, 245
Nike, 28, 35
North Korea
China alliance, 208–209
nuclear weapons, 47, 204
US anti-missile system (THAAD), 191, 201, 209
O’Malley, Martin, 174n2, 183–184
OPPO, 30, 53
outward-oriented model, 10–12, 18, 144
outward-oriented vs. inward-oriented models,
10–14, 136, 229–230, 248–249

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Index

296

Perry, Rick, 174n2, 182
pharmaceutical supplies, 39, 172
see also medical supplies
Philippines, Huawei telecommunications agreement, 111
populism, 10, 171, 178, 231, 236, 244
producer-driven value chains, 26–28, 79
production networks see global supply chains (GSCs)
prospect theory, 191–192
Qualcomm, 30, 79–80, 87–88, 245
race to the bottom, 178, 212
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 246, 248n20
reshoring
Chinese concerns, 247–248
diverisory shifts, 100–101, 106–107, 112
Japanese companies, 38, 50, 54, 232, 243
resulting from US–China trade war, 38–39, 54, 93, 106–107, 149–150, 242–243
Samsung, 206
US companies, 3n4
resilience
definition, 8n18
smartphone supply chains, 78, 92–95, 224
supply chains, 43, 58–59, 245–247
see also diversification; reshoring
retail networks, 28–29
ROK (Republic of Korea) see South Korea
SACU (Southern Africa Development Community)
agricultural supply chains, 128
automobile industry, 120–121
China’s trade growth, 123–125
clothing and apparel industry, 121
commodities exports vs. manufactured goods, 125–126
Common Monetary Area, 117–118
customs union, 117
intermediate goods and services trade, 121–125, 122, 124
invesor pressure for political and economic reforms, 127–128, 234
political impact of supply chains, 127–129, 131
services sector, 126–127
supply chain trade, 117, 121–125, 122
trade diversification, 126
trade with US and China, 17–18, 119, 122
Samsung components, 79–80
manufacture-driven value chain, 2, 82, 84, 84
market dominance, 89
overlapping supply chain, 85
sales, 83
supply chain relocation, 206
Sanders, Bernie, 174, 186–187, 237
SARS, 58
Section 301 case (USTR)
anti-tariff coalitions, 164–169
exclusion requests, 165–166
fears of Chinese retaliation, 164, 165
goods-producing firms, 168, 171
importance of IP protections, 161–162
investigation launch, 158
opposition to China trade war, 166–168, 171–172
production networks, 159–160, 171–172
public submissions, 162–164
“revise Chinese trade practices”, 161–162, 171
services firms, 168, 171
summary of submissions, 163–165, 164
supply chain concerns, 164–165, 164
US opposition coalitions, 160, 164–170
US “trade competition”, 160–161, 171
Xi reaction, 66
semiconductor industry, 75, 193, 198–199
see also HiSilicon; TSMC
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, 50, 110, 112, 247–248n22
services sector, SACU, 126–127
shipping industry
geopolitical supply chain disruptions, 104–105, 112
labor activism, 214
smartphone industry
industry platforms, 86–87
lead firms, 82–85, 83
path-dependent development, 94–95
platform leaders, 79–80
producer-driven value chain, 28

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Index

product fragmentation, 86–87
production in East Asia, 17, 80–82
supply chain complementarity, 17, 78, 85, 92–93, 233
supply chains, 3, 80
technological evolution, 86–87
US–China trade war impact, 93–95
see also Samsung
smartphones, Chinese Covid-19 tracking, 72–73
Solvay, 221
South Africa
automobile industry, 120, 126, 129–130
intermediate goods and services trade, 122–123, 124
land confiscation, 128
protectionism tensions, 129
regional hegemony, 117
services sector, 126
South China Sea, 8114, 111
South Korea
Asian financial crisis, 196–198
exports to China, 139–140
Japanese military sharing agreement, 200
potential conflict escalator, 191
supply chain activity, 138, 200–201
US relations, 199
see also South Korea–China trade dispute; South Korea–Japan trade dispute
South Korea–China trade dispute, 201–206
background, 203
China’s sanctions, 201–205
escalation as policy option, 202–204, 207–208
escalation risks, 208–209
iron and steel industry, 208
non-escalation option, 204–205, 209
and North Korea, 204
outcome, 205–206
South Korean supply chain dominance, 201–202, 204
South Korea’s supply chain diversification, 206
South Korea’s WTO petition, 205–206, 208–209
supply chain trade, 201–202, 202
supply chain trade by industry, 202
threat of military action, 204
trade specialization (TSI) index, 203
traditional trade, 201
US anti-missile system (THAAD) deployment, 191, 201, 205, 209
South Korea–Japan trade dispute, 194–201
background, 47, 194
future prospects, 246n20
Japan’s supply chain dominance, 195–198, 196
militarization considerations, 199, 208
outcome, 200–201, 238
potential gains from de-escalation, 208
potential risks of escalation, 207–208
semiconductor industry, 193, 198–199
South Korean supply chain adjustments, 200–201
South Korea’s escalation option, 198–199
supply chain trade, 195, 196–197
threat to military intelligence-sharing agreement (GSOMIA), 200, 207–208
trade specialization (TSI) index, 197
traditional trade networks, 194–195
US interest, 199–200, 207–208
WTO case, 200
South Korean companies
handset design houses, 89, 91
iPhone parts, 33–34, 34
smartphone industry, 31, 80–82, 83–84, 84, 88–89
supply chain diversification, 200–201, 206
vertically integrated chaebols, 88
Southern Africa Development Community see SACU (Southern Africa Development Community)
Taiwan
Chinese business relations, 85
and Eswatini, 118
“New Southbound” policy, 109
supply chain participation, 109, 109–110, 113
supply chain reshoring, 243
Taiwan–China dispute
cyberattacks, 108
nonviolent security actions, 108
shipping and supply line disruption, 108
supply chain impact, 108, 112
Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, 108
trade barriers, 108
Taiwanese companies
Chinese business relations, 85
handset ODMs, 91
smartphone industry, 80–82, 83–84, 84, 89–90
subcontracting, 89–90
supply chain relocation, 106–107
Index

Index

Tencent, 72–73, 149
Terminal High Altitude Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system, 191, 201, 205, 209
textile industry, 121, 213, 220
Thailand, production relocation, 38–39, 54, 232
Tianjin Kylin Corporation, 74
topology of supply chains
case studies summary, 112
diversionary shifts, 100–101, 107, 112
definition, 96
disruptions, 101–102
diversionary shifts, 100–101, 106–107, 112
effects of geopolitical disputes, 17
and geopolitical conflict, 98–100, 99
legal action, 100, 112, 113
security actions, 100–102, 113
state and external events, 98
variability, 97–98
TPP see Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
TPP-11, 246
trade agreements
Asia-Pacific region, 246, 246n20
corporate beneficiaries, 186
Japan, 58
see also Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
trade specialization index (TSI), 191, 203
trade unions
ACTFU (All-China Federation of Trade Unions), 216–219, 223, 225
global cooperation with Chinese unions,
217–219
global unions, 216–217
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
corporate interests, 184
distributional consequences, 185–186,
237
expansion, 58
labor unions opposition, 181
political opposition, 174, 177, 181–182,
186–187, 237n7, 237
political party platforms, 19, 174
political support, 182–183
provisions, 173
research parameters, 180
supply chain absent from debate, 176,
182–184, 187
US public opinion, 180–181
US withdrawal, 174
transport workers, 218–219
Trump, Donald
and Chinese competition, 178
on medical supplies, 172
protectionism, 153
on supply chains, 224
TPP opposition, 174, 182
trade policy, 156–157, 157, 182
on US reshoring, 135
on US workers, 185
TSMC, 85, 90, 93–94
UNI (Global Union), 216–218, 220, 225
UNI Graphical, 218
UNICLO, 28–29, 38
United States
Africa policy, 116
anti-missile system (THAAD) deployment,
191, 201, 205, 209
Covid-19, 172, 187–188
domestic effects of US–China trade war, 42, 98
East Asia production network, 49–50
Export Control Reform Act (2018), 106
globalization’s effects on US labor market,
178, 178n6
and Hong Kong, 44, 56, 104
household savings, 23
iPhone imports, 29–30, 29
and Japan–South Korea trade dispute,
199–200
job losses, 178n6, 179, 185–186
job outsourcing, 177
labor market, 46
manufacturing jobs, 237
migrant workers, 220
National Defense Strategy (2018), 67
and the Philippines, 111
presidential campaign (2015–2016), 174
steel industry, 183
tariffs, 23
trade with Africa, 115–116
trade with SACU states, 119, 121–125, 122,
124, 125–126
United States companies
corporation tax, 184
outsourced manufacturing and assembly
tasks, 35
procurement sources of Japanese affiliates,
50–51, 51–52
reshoring, 38, 48
supply chain diversification, 224–225
supply chain participation, 109
US–China trade war concerns, 105–106,
Index

United States Trade Representative (USTR) Labor Advisory Committee, 181 see also Section 101 case (USTR)

Vietnam smartphone industry, 82, 93 supply chain relocation, 54, 107, 206

Walmart, 27–29, 38, 218 workers’ rights see labor rights

World Health Organization (WHO), US attack, 152

World Trade Organization (WTO), South Korea’s petitions, 200, 209–206, 208–209

Xi Jinping AI industry, 66–69, 71 China’s self-reliance, 137 and Covid-19, 151 internal opposition towards, 247n21 self-sufficiency, 149, 248 socialism with Chinese characteristics, 147 on supply chains, 151

Xiaomi, 30, 83–84, 84

ZARA, 28–29

ZTE, 58, 83, 148–149