

INTRODUCTION

1 PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*, OR WHAT IS JUSTICE?

The primary manuscripts that preserve Plato's text give to the dialogue that is now his most widely read the title and subtitle Πολιτεία ἢ περὶ δικάτου.¹ The title is attested as early as the time of Aristotle, who refers to his teacher's work by that name on a number of occasions.² The subtitle, like that for each of Plato's works, appears also in the catalogue of his dialogues arranged in tetralogies by Thrasyllus in the first century (D.L. 3.57–61), although the practice of affixing subtitles is likely to have originated with booksellers already in the fourth century.³ The standard translation of Πολιτεία in English and other modern languages has been influenced by the title of Cicero's *De re publica*, written in emulation of its Greek predecessor. But "Republic" is not an entirely satisfactory rendering of the title of Plato's dialogue. The word πολιτεία designates that arrangement, whatever form it might take, that a people chooses to adopt in order to live together in a community (which, for a Greek, is a polis). That is the sense the word has when Plato puts it into the mouth of Socrates at the beginning of *Timaeus*, written some years after *Republic*. There Socrates refers to a summary of the presentation that he gave to his companions the previous day as "concerned with the political system (περὶ πολιτείας) and its citizenry that seemed to me would be the best."⁴ The material covered in the summary includes several of the distinctive ideas for which *Republic* is most famous: the division of society into classes according to natural ability; the philosophically rigorous program of education for the Guardians, who are to repudiate the possession of private property; the equality of men and women with regard to their capacity to contribute to the state; the abolition of the "nuclear family," so that spouses, siblings, parents and children are to be considered as common to all those of the appropriate age; eugenic management by the state of mating among the citizens and the production of children; official monitoring of children to determine who is worthy of elevation to, or demotion from, the ranks

¹ *Republic* was not necessarily Plato's most widely read dialogue in antiquity; see Baltzly et al. 2018: 1–9.

² *Pol.* 2.1261a6, a9, 1264b28, 4.1291a11, 5.1316a1, 8.1342a33, *Rhet.* 3.1406b32.

³ Rijksbaron 2007: 15–23. The sequence of the dialogues according to Thrasyllus' arrangement is the basis for the order in which they appear in medieval manuscripts and in the Oxford Classical Texts edition.

⁴ *Tim.* 17c1–3. The summary occupies 17c–19b.

of potential Guardians. This represents a mere fraction of the contents of *Republic* as we have it, drawing material only from Books Two, Three and Five.⁵ It is not, however, intended as a synopsis of the entire work, only of those portions that are concerned with what Socrates in *Timaeus* considers the optimal arrangements for society.⁶ Nor does the subtitle do justice to the range of topics treated in *Republic*. For, while the framework around which the dialogue is constructed is the search for a definition of justice – which is not found until Book Four – *Republic* presents Plato’s thinking at the time of composition, not only in the areas of political philosophy and ethics, but psychology, aesthetics, epistemology and metaphysics as well.

The question of when that time of composition was has been subject to disagreement among scholars for more than two centuries.⁷ The matter is complicated by the fact that *Republic*, being a substantial and wide-ranging work, is likely to have occupied Plato over a period of time, as well as by a conviction on the part of some scholars that Book One was written much earlier than the remaining books and was originally intended as a stand-alone work that ended, like some of Plato’s other early dialogues, in aporia, that is, without arriving at a satisfactory answer to the question that the dialogue hoped to address. The view taken here accords with that for the most part held today, that *Republic* was conceived and written as a unified whole at some time in the middle period of Plato’s creative output, most likely when he was in his fifties.⁸ That is, its composition

⁵ Thrasylus’ catalogue refers to *Republic* as consisting of ten books, but that division is almost certainly not original with Plato. There seem also to have been ancient texts of the work in six books, which would give an average book length of less than 15,000 words, still shorter than *Timaeus* (24,000 words) or *Gorgias* (27,000). Sedley (2013: 70–3) argues that this was the earlier arrangement, perhaps even going back to the author. He suggests that in those texts the first book ended at 369a; compare Tucker (1900) and Emlyn-Jones (2007), who treat as a unit everything up to 369b6 and 368c4, respectively. These figures are the “Stephanus numbers” by which the text of Plato is regularly cited, referring to the pages and page divisions in the three-volume edition of Plato published by Henri Estienne under his Latinized name in 1578 (Boter 1989: 247–51); *Republic* appears in his second volume.

⁶ In any event, Plato signals to the reader that the conversation that Socrates had “yesterday” with his companions in *Timaeus* is distinct from the conversation recorded in *Republic*. The latter is narrated, to an unidentified audience, by Socrates the day after the festival in honor of Bendis on 19 Thargelion (see 327a1n.), whereas *Timaeus* is set at the time of the Panathenaea (*Tim.* 21a2, 26c–e), not necessarily in the same year, on 28 Hecatombaion.

⁷ For the contentious history of attempts to date Plato’s dialogues, see Thesleff 1982, with a comprehensive listing of the proposed chronologies at 8–17 (= Thesleff 2009: 154–63); Ledger 1989; Brandwood 1990, summarized in Brandwood 1992.

⁸ The length of *Republic* is comparable to that of the large-scale histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, the latter unfinished, which occupied their authors

seems to belong in the 370s BC, after the group of early dialogues that includes *Euthyphro*, *Apology* and *Crito* but before those works that we have good reason to believe were written in the last two decades of Plato's life, which ended in 348/7 BC. Those late works include *Laws*, *Philebus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Timaeus* and the incomplete *Critias*. The assignment of these dialogues to the last period of Plato's career is based on a number of factors, namely perceived developments in Plato's thinking and a cluster of stylistic features that distinguishes them from earlier works. Among those late features are an avoidance of certain kinds of hiatus, increasing preference for "rhythmical" clausulae, the distribution of reply formulae such as $\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\eta}\nu$; and $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$ and abandonment of the narrative mode found in *Republic* in preference for an exclusively "dramatic" form of dialogue.⁹ In the introduction to *Theaetetus*, itself in dramatic form, Euclides tells Terpsion that he made a written record of the conversation between Theaetetus and Socrates in dramatic form in order to eliminate the distraction of repeated "he said" and "I said" (143b–c). This may be taken as an indication that Plato was no longer interested in using the narrative form and that, therefore, *Theaetetus* belongs with those dialogues that can be dated after *Republic*.¹⁰ As we have just seen, *Timaeus* refers to material found in *Republic* and, since the latter is not generally characterized by those features that mark the latest works, it is reasonable to conclude that composition of *Republic* preceded that of all those works that are stylistically related to *Timaeus*.

We can be confident, then, that *Republic* was written at a time before Plato composed the last group of his dialogues. That still leaves a fairly long period, perhaps as much as a quarter-century, in which he might have written and revised or even completely overhauled his dialogue on justice. As it happens, a number of scholars have been attracted by the theory that our Book One was originally a self-contained dialogue that was later revised and reused to serve as the introduction to the monumental *Republic* that we now have. The theory originated with Karl Friedrich

over a period of many years. Unlike Plato, however, those historians wrote nothing else. In addition to his many other works, Plato composed the even longer *Laws*, which Aristotle tells us explicitly (*Pol.* 2.1264b26–7) was written after *Republic*, so it is not necessary to assume, as some have, that composition of *Republic* extended over decades.

⁹ See Brandwood 1990: 153–66 (hiatus), 167–206 (clausulae), 55–86 and 96–109 (reply formulae), summarizing the work of earlier scholars.

¹⁰ Finkelberg 2019: 5–9. The dramatic form is found as well in a few early dialogues, such as *Crito*, *Euthyphro* and *Ion*, so the statement in *Theaetetus* can only be used to exclude from the latest group those dialogues narrated either by Socrates, such as *Republic*, *Charmides* and *Lysis*, or by someone else, such as *Phaedo* and *Symposium*.

Hermann in 1839, and the supposed original, for which there is no independent evidence, was later given the title *Thrasymachus*, on the analogy of other Platonic dialogues.¹¹ Support for the theory seemed to be provided in the late nineteenth century by statistical studies that were interpreted as showing a change in Plato's practice between Book One and the other nine books.¹² More recently, a few influential scholars have argued in favor of the theory on the basis of considerations that go beyond verbal style and relate rather to the content of Book One.¹³ A difficulty, however, is posed by the appearance of what many scholars regard as references to *Republic* in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*, produced in 391 or 392 BC. For the references are not to anything that appears in Book One, but to the extraordinary proposals in Books Four and Five for the collective possession of property and the community of wives and children.¹⁴ As we have seen, those same proposals are mentioned in the summary that Socrates gives in *Timaeus*, along with material from Books Two and Three relating to the division of classes and the training of the Guardians, but nothing from elsewhere in *Republic*. The content referred to by Aristophanes and Socrates, combined, amounts to approximately sixty-five pages in the Stephanus text of *Republic*, the equivalent of two ancient "books." As it happens, Aulus Gellius says that Plato initially published his *Republic* in "roughly two books."¹⁵ This has led to the view, argued for in detail by

¹¹ For details, see Kahn 1993: 131. In the nineteenth century, under the influence of developments in biblical criticism, scholars not only made an effort to discover layers of composition in *Republic* and other works, they also called into question the authenticity of some of the dialogues that have traditionally been ascribed to Plato.

¹² See Brandwood 1990: 73–8, 106–8 and 215–20, reporting the findings of Constantin Ritter and Hans von Arnim. Difference in time of composition, however, is not the only possible explanation for the perceived stylistic variation; see below.

¹³ Friedländer 1964: 50–66, treating Book One as a separate dialogue and saving discussion of *Republic* for the third volume of his *Plato*; Thesleff 1982: 107–10 = 2009: 256–9; Vlastos 1991: 248–51. Kraut (1992: 5) takes for granted the earlier composition of Book One as an independent dialogue.

¹⁴ For detailed discussion, see Adam's appendix to Book Five (1902: 1 345–55). Morosi (2020) finds allusions to Books Four and Five also in Aristophanes' *Wealth* (388 BC).

¹⁵ 14.3.3 *duobus fere libris qui primi in uolgu exierant*; cf. A. Diès *apud* Chambry 1932: xxxix–xlili. But *fere* is suspicious; if Gellius or his source is not sure if the work was in two or three books, how much confidence can we have in the rest of the information given? Gellius goes on to say that this is the version of *Republic* that Xenophon read, inspiring him to write his *Cyropaedia* (in eight books) in response, detailing his own view of the proper form of government, to which Plato in turn responded dismissively in *Laws* (3.694c). He does not cite an authority for this account, but the context makes clear that it comes from a tradition that sought to portray Plato and Xenophon as bitter rivals; cf. Athenaeus 11.504e–505a. In

Holger Thesleff and Debra Nails, that the *Republic* that has come down to us was “cobbled together” from an early aporetic dialogue on justice and an approximately two-book ur-*Republic* dating to the 390s, to which were added the remaining contents of the surviving work in a final revision several years later.¹⁶

There are, then, two claims, that Book One was originally intended as a self-contained aporetic dialogue and that an ur-*Republic* independent of that dialogue was published before the completion of our *Republic*, and two types of evidence, stylistic and external. The two types of evidence have been used selectively in arguing for one or the other of the two claims. When taken together, however, each has the effect of undermining the other. The stylistic features that are used to show a statistical correlation between the *Republic* that we have and the dialogues of Plato's middle period, roughly the 370s and 360s, are also used to demonstrate the incompatibility of Book One with the rest of the dialogue. The same statistics, however, do not demonstrate a significant difference between the books that make up the hypothetical ur-*Republic* and the later books.¹⁷ And yet the external evidence is alleged to date the ur-*Republic* to the 390s, the same decade in which the hypothetical *Thrasymachus* is presumed to have been written. That is, the chronological distance that separates Book One from the ur-*Republic* is much less than that separating the latter from Books Six through Ten, which have not been shown to differ from it stylistically to any significant degree. References to “final editing” or “late revision” only serve to call attention to the fragility of this line of argument.¹⁸ For if Plato was conscious of the need to integrate the ur-*Republic* stylistically into the completed product, he would surely have done the same with Book One, given the exceptional care he took with the construction of the opening of his dialogues.¹⁹

any event, Gellius' “roughly two books” would not have included the material in Books Four and Five that Aristophanes supposedly parodied, nor would it have corresponded to the first two of the six-book *Republic* (above, n. 5), since nothing in the current Book One is relevant.

¹⁶ Thesleff 1997; Nails 1995: 116–25 and 1998 (cf. Nails 2002: 324–6), from whom the quotation is taken (1998: 385). Nails also mentions (393) the argument of Gerald Else that much of Book Ten was a still later addition.

¹⁷ See Brandwood 1990: 67–72 and 79–82. Ledger, who adopts different criteria from those used by nineteenth-century scholars and who does not provide separate statistics for the individual books, dates *Republic* as a whole to the 370s, with *Euthydemus*, *Symposium* and *Cratylus* (1989: 212–17).

¹⁸ Thesleff 1997: 150 = 2009: 520; Nails 1995: 123–6 and 1998: 394 (cf. 395 “revised late into an almost seamless whole”).

¹⁹ For the importance Plato attached to the opening of his dialogues, see Kaklamanou's Introduction (1–9) to Kaklamanou et al. 2021 and the papers in that volume; also 327a11n.

The alternative to accepting the view of *Republic* as an assemblage of *disiecta membra* requires an explanation of why Book One seems to differ stylistically from the remaining books and how Aristophanes in the 390s could seemingly refer to a work dating to the 370s. The latter difficulty only arises, however, if we convince ourselves that the comic poet must have been inspired by a work *in written form*. But philosophical inquiry in Classical Greece, especially of the sort engaged in by Socrates and his followers, was carried out primarily by means of face-to-face discussion, so that, for example, the general Nicias can be represented as saying to Socrates, “I have often heard you say that everyone is good in respect of that in which he is wise” (*Lach.* 194d1–2). And Plato’s Socrates himself acknowledges that it was his practice of personally confronting politicians, poets and craftsmen (*Apol.* 21b–23a) that contributed to the hostility toward him among the Athenians and influenced the verdict at his trial. Similarly, we may assume that the ideas that were eventually enshrined in Plato’s written works were repeatedly aired in conversation with his associates and others, and that the more outrageous of them, particularly those relating to the status of women and personal property, are likely to have been reported in the form of gossip outside Plato’s immediate circle.²⁰ Even among his writings, we find ideas mentioned in passing or expressed in a tentative way that were expounded more systematically in a later dialogue.²¹

As far as the stylistic differences between Book One and the rest of *Republic* – and it is worth stressing, again, that “the rest of *Republic*” has generally been found to be stylistically uniform – time of composition is not the only possible explanation. Statistical studies, whether carried out using pen and paper or software designed for computational analysis, have traditionally treated each of Plato’s works, or occasionally each book

²⁰ Some of the doctrines regarding women that we think of as Platonic may in fact have originated with Socrates (Blair 2012: 39–55), which reminds us that the Aristophanes who produced *Clouds* had no need to consult a written text for his portrayal of Socrates, who wrote nothing. Plato’s reference to *Clouds* in his *Apology* (19c–d) – no such reference is found in Xenophon’s version of Socrates’ speech – and his insistence on correcting its misrepresentations suggest that Plato was indeed attentive to developments on the contemporary comic stage and that in *Republic* he may have sought to clarify what had been presented, without naming Plato, as comic fantasy in *Ecclesiastusae*. For the relationship between Plato and contemporary comedy, which occasionally refers to him and the Academy, see Brock 1990.

²¹ Kahn 1996. See also the list of correspondences between elements systematically laid out in *Timaeus* and doctrines found here and there in earlier dialogues, including several from *Republic*, compiled by Sedley (2017: 106–7, with discussion at 94–6).

within the longer work, as a unit for the purpose of determining either date of composition or authenticity. But anyone who has read the speeches in *Symposium* or that of Lysias in *Phaedrus* recognizes Plato's ability to vary his style according to speaker.²² In the case of *Republic*, Plato has made the deliberate choice to compose the work in such a way that Socrates is seen to converse with three non-Athenians in Book One and with two Athenians who happen to be Plato's brothers in Books Two through Ten. Further, the dominant interlocutor in Book One, Thrasymachus, is one of the most memorably characterized individuals in Plato's works. Not only is he openly belligerent toward Socrates, he is given to using vocabulary that Plato does not put into the mouth of other speakers.²³ His truculence shows up *inter alia* in the types of responses he gives to Socrates' questions and, because of their frequency, reply formulae have been at the heart of a number of stylistic studies.²⁴ Thus, it is to be expected that, because of the nature of the discussion reported in Book One, it will exhibit a different stylistic character from that seen in the remaining books, in which Socrates' interlocutors are the entirely congenial Glaucon and Adeimantus, with whose conversational mannerisms Plato was intimately familiar.²⁵ There is, then, need of studies that compare the language of Glaucon with that of Thrasymachus or the language of Socrates in Book One with that in, say, Book Seven. Until such investigations have been carried out, there is no good reason to suppose that existing stylistic studies can reliably tell us that Book One dates to a different period in Plato's career than the other books of *Republic*. In the absence of more compelling evidence and more convincing arguments it is reasonable to proceed on the assumption that *Republic* was conceived as a whole and was written at one time, likely in the 370s BC. The commentary below will call attention to a number of points at which Plato seems to be anticipating in Book One what is to come in later books.²⁶

²² Whether that extends to those aspects of "style" that are not under the author's conscious control, the sorts of things that computer-assisted analysis is particularly good at uncovering, can only be known when the words spoken by Socrates and those spoken by each of his interlocutors are analyzed as separate "texts."

²³ See 336c2, 337a3, 338d3, 343a6nn. Plato marks the uniqueness of Thrasymachus also by having Socrates describe his behavior using words not occurring elsewhere in the dialogues; see 336b5–6, b6, 337a3nn. For Thrasymachus, see further below, 4(d).

²⁴ Brandwood 1990: 48–91, 96–114, 208–20.

²⁵ So Kahn 1993: 134.

²⁶ See in general Kahn 1993.

2 BOOK ONE, OR WHAT JUSTICE IS NOT

In a series of earlier Platonic dialogues, Socrates is shown attempting, with the help of a variety of interlocutors, to define different virtues: piety in *Euthyphro*, courage in *Laches*, sophrosyne in *Charmides* and, in *Meno*, virtue itself, of which these others are sometimes said to be a “part.”²⁷ On each occasion the attempt is unsuccessful, ending in aporia.²⁸ The same is true of Book One of *Republic*, in which Socrates and his acquaintances fail to arrive at a successful definition of justice. As we have seen, some scholars have been encouraged by this outcome to conclude that Book One was originally a self-contained, aporetic dialogue. But there is an element of the discussion in Book One that makes it different from that in the earlier dialogues (and in the later *Theaetetus*). Elsewhere, Socrates and his interlocutors attempt to define qualities that they regard as unambiguously good and deserving of universal admiration. They are, after all, seeking to define what are customarily regarded as virtues.²⁹ So it never occurs to them to ask what these qualities are good *for* or why we should admire them. In the first book of *Republic* not only is the question raised what advantage justice provides, we are introduced to a character in the person of Thrasymachus who is convinced that, so far from being advantageous, acting justly is a hindrance to an individual’s success and happiness. This will entail for Socrates the need for a better understanding of function (ἔργον) – that is, what such things as eyes, pruning hooks and souls are good for – and will prompt Glaucon, in Book Two, to propose a novel typology of goods (ἀγαθά).³⁰ The remainder of *Republic* constitutes Socrates’ response to the plea of Glaucon and Adeimantus that he supply not only a definition of justice, but an explanation of what justice is good for and how it benefits its possessor (2.367d).

²⁷ E.g. *Lach.* 199e (courage), *Prot.* 330a (wisdom), 329c–d and *Meno* 78d–e (justice, sophrosyne and piety); at *Euthyphr.* 12d it is agreed that piety is a part of justice. In a sense these dialogues, like Book One, are preludes to a more comprehensive inquiry into the nature of, and relationships among, the virtues; cf. the opening sentence of Book Two, in which Socrates acknowledges that the preceding conversation turned out to be no more than a προσίμιον.

²⁸ *Chrm.* 175b, *Euthyphr.* 15c, *Lach.* 200e, *Meno* 100b. The subject of *Theaetetus* is the search for a definition of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, identified with σοφία at 145e); it too ends in disappointment.

²⁹ For ἀρετή and ἀγαθός as “the most powerful words of commendation used of a man both in Homer and in later Greek,” see Adkins 1960: 30–4. In case it needs to be made explicit, Socrates and Meno agree that ἀρετή is an ἀγαθόν (*Meno* 87d2–4).

³⁰ For ἔργον and its relation to ἀρετή, see 352e2–3n.; for the division of goods into those desirable for themselves, those only for the benefits they provide and those both for themselves and for their consequences, see 2.357b–d, with 330c5n.

There is another respect in which the opening book of *Republic* stands apart from Plato's other dialogues that seek to define a specific virtue. In each of those earlier works, Socrates' interlocutor ought to be expected to be able to define the specific virtue about which he is being asked. For, in each case, the interlocutor is an acknowledged representative of the virtue in question: Euthyphro, being a prophet, is regularly consulted by others on matters relating to the gods, Laches and Nicias were each elected general by their fellow Athenians on more than one occasion, and Charmides is introduced as someone who is recognized as being "far and away the most self-controlled of his generation."³¹ There are, as is often the case in Plato, multiple levels of irony involved. Apart from the fact that Charmides, who is presented as a charmingly demure teenager at the time of the dialogue named after him, would end up fighting and dying in support of the ruthless regime of the Thirty Tyrants, Plato portrays Socrates himself as surpassing all his interlocutors, indeed all mortals, in each of the virtues that his interlocutors supposedly embody. In *Symposium*, Alcibiades praises Socrates' unparalleled courage and sophrosyne, and Phaedo ends his account of Socrates' death by recording his pious last words and characterizing him as "the most virtuous, most wise and most just man of his time."³² If this man does not know what courage is, or justice – as is implied by his constant inquiring of others – how is it possible for the rest of us to come to an understanding of those things that it is most important for us to know?

One implication of Plato's *Apology* is that it is not possible, since Socrates owes his designation as unsurpassed for wisdom to nothing more than his acknowledgment of the extent of his ignorance (23a–b). Another implication is that it is imperative that we all persist in our search for understanding, since "for a human being, the unexamined life is not worth living" (38a5–6). And so we find Socrates, in Book One of *Republic*, pressing his acquaintances for a definition of justice. The discussion does not begin, however, with justice, or virtue, or advantage. Rather, Socrates opens the conversation by asking the elderly Cephalus, a notably wealthy metic (a non-Athenian permanently residing in Athens), about old age

³¹ *Chrm.* 157d6–7 πάνυ πολὺ δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος εἶναι τῶν νυνί. Similarly, the young Theaetetus is lauded by Theodorus for possessing all the virtues, especially intelligence (*Th.* 144a–b).

³² Courage: *Symp.* 220d–221c (also *Lach.* 181a–b); sophrosyne: 216d; last words ("We owe a cock to Asclepius, Crito; do not neglect to repay the debt") and concluding judgment (ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου): *Phd.* 118a. Additionally, we have the word of the god at Delphi that no one is wiser than Socrates: μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι, *Apol.* 21a7.

and whether he finds it burdensome.³³ Cephalus admits that many of his contemporaries complain about the advancing years, but he himself has come to terms with being old, attributing his serenity to his character (τρόπος, 329d4) which, we are to assume, he regards as even-tempered and good-natured. Socrates wonders if Cephalus' great wealth may have gone some way toward easing the burden for him, which Cephalus does not deny. All of this is by way of introduction to Socrates' question, "What do you think is the greatest advantage (ἀγαθόν, 330d2) you have enjoyed from acquiring a great fortune?" Cephalus acknowledges that his answer will come as a surprise to some, namely that the possession of great wealth enables a person who has lived life righteously and piously (δικαίως καὶ ὀσίως, 331a3–4) to ensure that all debts to men and gods have been paid before taking leave of this life. The consequence of this is peace of mind and the avoidance of torments in the afterlife, should the stories of such torments turn out to be accurate. When Socrates objects that there are circumstances in which a person is not considered just (δικαίος, 331c6) in giving back what is owed, offering as an example the need to resist and to dissemble when a friend who has gone mad asks for the return of a weapon that has been lent, Cephalus excuses himself and goes off to fulfill his religious obligation to perform a sacrifice. He will not be seen or heard from again.

Thus unobtrusively does Plato introduce, while simultaneously seeming to dismiss, a number of themes that will recur not only in Book One, but throughout *Republic*. These include the importance of one's character, in contrast to external factors, in determining one's happiness; the association of justice and piety; the advantages to the individual of possessing both these virtues; the potential risks of acting impiously or unjustly; and, in general, framing these issues in transactional terms of gains and losses, rewards and punishments. Character, in the form of the disposition of the personal soul, will be the focus of discussion throughout the dialogue, and will involve the question of education, which Socrates defines as turning the soul from darkness toward the light (7.518b–d, 521c). The nominal subject of *Republic* is, as we have seen, justice rather than piety, yet the two virtues are introduced together, with the latter seeming to disappear with the departure of Cephalus.³⁴ Similarly, the religious celebration in honor of the goddess Bendis that serves as the occasion for Socrates' visit

³³ 328e. For Cephalus, see below, 4(b).

³⁴ In *Euthyphro*, which is concerned with the search for the meaning of piety, the discussion begins with the prophet explaining that his decision to prosecute his father was just. Socrates claims to be impressed with the wisdom (4b1) of this man who is so confident of his understanding of both justice and piety.