

Mind and World in Aristotle's *De Anima*

Why is the human mind able to perceive and understand the truth about reality; that is, why does it seem to be the mind's specific function to know the world? Sean Kelsey argues that both the question itself and the way Aristotle answers it are key to understanding his work *De Anima*, a systematic philosophical account of the soul and its powers. In this original reading of a familiar but highly compressed text, Kelsey shows how this question underpins Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of soul, sensibility, and intelligence. He argues that, for Aristotle, the reason why it is in human nature to know beings is that "the soul in a way is all beings." This new perspective on the *De Anima* throws fresh and interesting light on familiar Aristotelian doctrines: for example, that sensibility is a kind of ratio (*logos*), or that the intellect is simple, separate, and unmixed.

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What is intelligence? (Aristotle, *De Anima* III, 4–8). *Philosophia (Yearbook of the Research Centre for Greek Philosophy at the Academy of Athens)*, 48, 2018, pp. 139–151.

Abbreviations

Aristotle

APo	Posterior Analytics
Cael.	On the Heavens
Cat.	Categories
DA	On the Soul (De Anima)
EE	Eudemian Ethics
EN	Nicomachean Ethics
GA	On the Generation of Animals
GC	On Generation and Corruption
HA	On the History of Animals
Insom.	On Dreams
Iuv.	On Youth and Old Age
Mem.	On Memory
Met.	Metaphysics
Meteor.	Meteorology
PA	On the Parts of Animals
Phys.	Physics
Pol.	Politics
[Prob.]	[Problems]
Rhet.	Rhetoric
SE	On Sophistical Refutations
Sens.	On Sense and Sense-Objects
Somn.	On Sleep
Top.	Topics

Plato

Phdr.	Phaedrus
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Phil.	Philebus
Prot.	Protagoras
Rep.	Republic
Stsmn.	Statesman
Tht.	Theaetetus
Tim.	Timaeus