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1 Introduction

The Nonexistence of Katanga, Rhodesia, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana

This is a book about four African countries that may not have ever existed.[1] No one denied that Katanga, Rhodesia, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana existed in a literal and physical sense: People could visit them, and many did.[2] Uniformed officials greeted visitors at border posts and airport passport controls, stamps and visas were impressed on travel documents, images of their political leaders hung on the walls of government offices, and they had functioning bureaucracies which produced all the requisite documents of legal statehood. They also created all of the universal trappings of statehood: designing new flags, currencies, postage stamps, and national anthems. In every possible way they held themselves out as independent countries, spoke the language of sovereignty,

[1] This opening sentence is a nod to John Sack's humorous travel log from the 1950s, *Report from Practically Nowhere: An Uproarious Account of Thirteen No-Account Countries – From Sark to Sikkim to Swat* (Harper & Bros., New York, 1955). Sack's book jacket reads: "This is a timely, authoritative assessment of thirteen of the most unimportant nations on the face of the earth … The amazing fact is that all these countries exist."

[2] While there eventually would be four Bantustans that would declare their independence – Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979), and Ciskei (1981) – this book only concerns the first two that declared independence, which were the only ones that made serious efforts to win international recognition. All four pseudo-states in this book were within the geographic and political region of "Southern Africa." Leroy Vail demarcates this region as "extending from Cape Town to south central Zaire [Congo] on a south-north axis, and from Namibia to Mozambique on a west-east axis, but with Angola largely excluded." Vail defined this region primarily in terms of the effects of the interconnected labor markets and related migrations to the economic hub of South Africa, writing "it has constituted a coherent regional unit over the past century or so." *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (James Currey, London, 1989) p. 7. Filipe Ribiero de Meneses and Robert McNamara define Southern Africa in terms of the postcolonial white power structures remaining on the continent therough the 1970s, and as only constituting a distinct political concept from the mid-1960s onward. But they conceive of it as having similar geographic boundaries as did Vail, except that they include Angola "bounded at the south by the Cape of Good Hope, while its northern extent was a line that, by 1960, stretched westward from Luanda, Elizabethville (today's Lubumbashi) in Katanga … Mufiliria, Ndola, Lusaka … Kariba, Salisbury … and Beira …" Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses and Robert McNamara, *The White Redoubt, the Great Powers and the Struggle for Southern Africa* (Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2018) p. 4.

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and in big and small ways they tried to assert their own individual international personalities. In terms of their actual state capacity and functionality, some of them were arguably more real than many of the legally recognized states to the north of them in Africa.[3] But while they existed in reality, Katanga, Rhodesia, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana did not exist in a legal sense. In each case, the international community considered them to be a component of a larger sovereign state through which all official communications and interactions were still conducted. This was because their many critics inside and outside Africa saw each of their claims for independence as little more than sleights of hand that coopted the language and distorted the values of anti-colonial nationalism as a means to preserve the structures of white power in postcolonial Africa.[4] As a consequence, these unrecognized regimes were not simply ignored, they were affirmatively shunned from the international community. So, while they imagined themselves to be sovereign states, the active rejections of their existences by the world community were perhaps greater acts of imagination. As detailed in this book, the stories of these reactionary pseudo-states were in part battles of competing illusions, with each one pretending to be a legal state, and the international community pretending that each one was not there at all.

In telling the stories of these four aspirant African states, this book aims to pull out the big from the small.[5] It is organized around a series of contests over the expressions of sovereignty made by these pseudo-states and their friends abroad, and their enemies' responses to those expressions. It unpacks the claims and counterclaims, representations and counter representations, and performances and counter performances, as a means to bring forward why the fates of these four reactionary

[3] On a visit to Bophuthatswana the Deputy Mayor of Paris, Pierre Bas, quoted the French writer Max Jalade in saying, "For a state whose existence is not recognised, Bophuthatswana seems strangely real!" Quoted in Peris Sean Jones, "Mmabatho, 'Mother of the People': Identity and Development in an 'Independent' Bantustan, Bophuthatswana, 1975–1994," PhD dissertation, Loughborough University (1997) p. 280.

[4] An editorial from *Sechaba*, the official organ of the ANC, described Bophuthatswana as "one of those racist tricks to fool the word that 'changes are taking place in South Africa.'" Editorial, "No to Bantustan Recognition!" *Sechaba* (October 1982).

[5] There are several terms that have been used to describe self-governing territories that claim sovereignty but which have not been accepted by the international community: contested states, de facto states, para-states, quasi-states, and unrecognized states. This book will refer to Katanga, Rhodesia, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana as contested states, aspirant states, would-be states, or pseudo-states, but sometimes will refer to their governments as regimes. For an overview of these various terms, see: J. Ker Lindsay, "Engagement without Recognition: The Limits of Diplomatic Interaction with Contested States," *International Affairs*, vol. 91, no. 2 (2015) fn. 6.

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would-be states were seen to be so important at the time and why their precedents continue to matter to this day. It will concern both the symbolic and rhetorical contests over statehood in the realm of ideas and imagination, and the very tangible contests over their sovereign status. Among other things, this book will demonstrate that it was often in the outer extremities of these contested states, in the seemingly picayune legal details concerning the diplomatic statuses of foreign missions and the arcane minutia of passport visas or the rhetorical and propagandic significance of sending and receiving official visitors, where the international and domestic politics of nonrecognition were manifested. At times these were strange struggles, such as the controversies surrounding Rhodesia's issuance of postage stamps, or when herds of livestock wandered over the border from Lesotho into Transkei. Other times they could spark brightly, as with the uproar over Frank Sinatra performing at the Sun City Resort in Bophuthatswana. Simply put, this book examines the ways these four pseudo-states told themselves and the outside world that they were, and should rightly be, sovereign states, and the ways their opponents told them and the entire world that they were not and should never be.

All four would ultimately fail to win diplomatic recognition and gain acceptance in the family of nations. This book does not make any normative claims that these four should have been accepted into the international state system, nor does it argue that the international community treated them unfairly by denying them legal statehood.[6] Neither does it assert that they were fully without access to power, as in fact, each of them, in ways that will be discussed in detail below, had access to many resources – economic, political, and military – that in some respects made them much more powerful than their rival claimants to state control. As such, contrary to how they portrayed themselves in their propaganda campaigns, whether Katanga, Rhodesia, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana could rightly be described as underdogs depended upon what contextual frame was used: they were certainly underdogs in the United Nations in midtown Manhattan, but not in the financial canyons of lower Manhattan; underdogs in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, but not on the streets of Elisabethville, Salisbury, Umtata, or Mmabatho; underdogs perhaps in the British

[6] This book aims, in part, to take up Frederick Cooper's broad challenge to look back on decolonization without "falling into the teleology of nation-building" and reexamine "the paths not taken, the dead ends of historical processes, the alternatives that appeared to people in their time." *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2005) pp. 12, 18.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Whitehall and the State Department in Foggy Bottom, but not always in the Houses of Parliament or up on Capitol Hill, and certainly not in the Union Buildings on Meintjieskop.

Pulling out these four would-be African states and analyzing them together has never been done before, and it is not intuitively obvious that they should be grouped together, nor that other would-be states should then be excluded. On the surface they appear to be quite different from one another, and those who have studied and written about these pseudo-states have taken them off on very different historiographical paths, grouping them with other movements and nations not included in this study.[7] Katanga, Rhodesia, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana were not exactly the same, and this book will not argue that they were. For what it is worth, when they existed these aspirant states often tried to distance themselves from each other – the short-lived Central African Federation (CAF), of which Rhodesia was the dominant member, did not publicly support the full independence of Katanga. Neither did Transkei nor Bophuthatswana recognize Rhodesia, and Rhodesia did not recognize either of them. Indeed, it was only after pressure was brought to bear on Transkei from South Africa that it decided to recognize Bophuthatswana and the other Bantustans. But it was partly because they *were* so similar that they tried to actively distance themselves from each other, since it was believed that each one's individual claims for statehood was weakened when it was associated with the others.[8] When

[7] There have been some notable transnational studies involving one or some of these four would-be states but never all four and only these four. See: de Meneses and McNamara, *White Redoubt*; Erik Kennes and Miles Larmer, *The Katangese Gendarmes and War in Central Africa: Fighting Their Way Home* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2016); Lazlo Passemiers, "Safeguarding White Minority Power: The South African Government and the Secession of Katanga, 1960–1963," *South African History Journal*, vol. 68, no. 1 (2016); Donal Lowry, "The Ulster of South Africa," *Southern African-Irish Studies*, vol. 1 (1991); M. Rafiqul Islam, "Secessionist Self-Determination: Some Lessons from Katanga, Biafra, and Bangladesh," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 22, no. 3 (September 1985); M. Hughes, "Fighting for White Rule in Africa: The Central African Federation, Katanga, and the Congo Crisis, 1958–1965," *International History Review*, vol. 25, no. 3 (September 2003); James Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2006); S. Williams, *Who Killed Hammarskjold? The UN, The Cold War, and White Supremacy* (Hurst, London, 2011); T. Scarnecchia, "The Congo Crisis, the United Nations, and Zimbabwean Nationalism, 1960–1963," *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 11, no. 1 (2011).

[8] This matches with what Geldenhys also argued: "The fact, however, that Transkei's acceptance of independence was followed by Bophuthatswana and Venda inevitably strengthens the argument that Transkei is as much the product of Grand Apartheid as any other homeland. In short, Transkei's claims to international recognition have in effect been undermined by other homelands also opting for independence." Deon Geldenhuys,

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these four are viewed together, however, over the tops of the walls of their respective national, regional, and linguistic historiographies, they reveal larger patterns and expose continuities through space and time that are hidden when each is seen only in its walled-off isolation.

While different in many ways, this book will show that these would-be states shared certain common elements that were of fundamental importance. All four emerged as reactions to the dramatic upheavals caused by the rise of pan-ethnic African nationalism and the rapid decolonization of the African continent. All of them harnessed important transnational right-wing networks across Africa, Europe, and North America that were energized by the dissolution of the European empires, the rise of the Afro-Asian Bloc, postcolonial migrations, and the international civil rights movements.[9] These four and only these four brought forth specific kinds of ideological, political, and symbolic contests with regard to the roles of ethnicity, race, and power in postcolonial Africa. It will be demonstrated below that they all presented related challenges to the dominant paradigm of postcolonial African statehood, and those with a stake in that vision of the African state system's success or failure viewed the successes or failures of these four would-be states as vitally important to their causes.[10]

There were certain resonances among all four independence bids that could be heard most clearly in the shared symbolic and rhetorical themes of their supporters and opponents. This can be partly explained by the allied aims behind their secessions and the similarly cold international receptions that welcomed each one, but they also reflected what typologies

"International Attitudes on the Recognition of Transkei," Occasional paper given to the South African Institute of International Affairs (October 1979), p. 7.

[9] For more on these white nationalist networks, see: Daniel Geary, Jennie Sutton, and Camilla Schofield (eds.), *Global White Nationalism: From Apartheid to Trump* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2020).

[10] Ryan Irwin makes the argument that it was the Katangese secession that "enlarged ongoing disagreements about the nature and meaning of postcolonial sovereignty." Among other things, this led to the creation of the Casablanca Group led by Ghana and Guinea, who united against a common understanding of neocolonialism. Ryan Irwin, "Sovereignty in the Congo Crisis," in Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake (eds.), *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence* (Bloomsbury, London, 2015) pp. 211–212. There were serious ideological, political disagreements between the Casablanca Group and the so-called Brazzaville Group led by the Ivory Coast. Additionally, there were ongoing tensions between African state leaders and leaders of liberation organizations. Nonetheless, from a wide perspective there were certain fundamental, shared ideological pillars that encompassed all these various individuals and groups. For a clear overview of some the tensions and divisions between the Brazzaville Group and the Casablanca Group, see: Anton Andereggen, *France's Relationship with Subsaharan Africa* (Praeger, Westport, 1994). For tensions between African state leaders and Southern African liberation groups, see: Ryan Irwin, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012).

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their supporters and opponents overseas used to categorize them. It is important to note that while these would-be states were shaped in part by how others categorized them, they were also active subjects in these discourses, and they worked to associate their claims to self-determination as being like some and being unlike others, which played into the ideological predilections of potential overseas friends. There was also an important time element, and birth order mattered. Katanga's fate was well known to Rhodesia and all the Bantustans and provided their leaders with a template to follow or avoid, and overseas observers were also provided with a category into which Rhodesia and the Bantustans could be made to fit, or not. Likewise, Transkei and Bophuthatswana emerged a full decade after Rhodesia's declaration of independence from Britain, and while they overlapped for several years, Transkei and Bophuthatswana continued on long after Rhodesia collapsed. Bophuthatswana's independence was celebrated just over a year after Transkei's, an event which Transkeian regime strategists feared would indelibly stain Transkei's own independence movement by associating it with South Africa's wider Bantustan project. Comparisons over time such as this one, where the later subjects were intimately aware of the earlier ones, and some interacting with contemporary ones, necessarily complicates their objective comparisons, especially since there was a high degree of mimicry and purposeful repetition, avoidance, and rejection of earlier examples.

Katanga, Rhodesia, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana each made political decisions as to how they should present themselves to the outside world. The chapters below will pick through and separate out how these aspirant states saw themselves, how they wanted to be perceived overseas, and how important overseas constituencies projected what they wanted to see upon them. Attention will be given to the design and production of these pseudo-states' symbolic repertoires and their invented national traditions. As explained below, these four states looked the way they did partly to attach themselves to certain aesthetico-ideological lineages designed to generate the maximum sympathy and support from particular overseas constituencies. For example, this book will explain the significance of Katanga's ubiquitous copper crosses, why Rhodesia's founding moment and subsequent commemorations so closely mimicked American independence traditions and national symbols, and why the Bantustans' independence moments were closely scripted to follow the "freedoms at midnight" ceremonies elsewhere in Africa.[11]

[11] For Rhodesia's independence celebrations specifically, see: J. Brownell, "Out of Time: Global Settlerism, Nostalgia, and the Selling of the Rhodesian Rebellion Overseas," *The Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 43, no. 4 (Fall 2016) pp. 805–824.

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One of the most intriguing elements that all four would-be states shared was that some of the same people played significant roles in each of them, and some bounced back and forth over their borders playing roles in two or more of these breakaway states. A common pivot point for many of these people was Rhodesia: first when it was still a colony of Britain and a component part of the CAF, then after 1965 when it attempted to secede from the British Empire, and finally even after the rebellion collapsed in 1980. Among this group were white mercenaries from Rhodesia and elsewhere who were drawn to the Katangese conflict to defend Moise Tshombe's secession from the Congolese National Army and United Nations troops. It was the federation that was one of the primary rallying points for mercenary recruitment and main entry point for mercenaries entering Katanga, and it was no accident that during the fighting against United Nations troops Katanga's leader, Moise Tshombe, briefly fled to the CAF for protection, before later returning to Katanga.[12] During the Rhodesian Liberation War, the white settler regime itself welcomed mercenaries from around Africa and the Western world to complement its regular forces in their fight against African guerrillas. Later still, many Rhodesian military men were invited to work for Transkei and Bophuthatswana.[13] The founder and leader of the elite Rhodesian special forces unit called the Selous Scouts was a man named Ron Reid Daly. After the end of the Rhodesian War, Reid Daly would go on to be the head of the Transkei Defense Forces for much of the 1980s, bringing along with him many of his former Rhodesian compatriots.

Not all of these Rhodesian men who bounced around were fighters, some were businessmen, economic or technical advisors, or seasoned politicians. Most famously there was Rowan Cronje, a South African-born Rhodesian who served as a minister in the Rhodesian cabinet throughout the entirety of the Rhodesian rebellion, holding such important posts as minister of health, labour and social welfare; manpower and social affairs; and education. In the mid-1980s, Cronje emigrated from Zimbabwe and quickly became Bophuthatswana's minister of defense, aviation, and foreign affairs. He would hold these portfolios until Bophuthatswana's reincorporation back into South Africa in 1994, a

[12] There were serious high-level talks between the Central African Federation Prime Minister, Roy Welensky, and Katangese leaders, including Tshombe, in the buildup to independence about Katanga possibly amalgamating into the CAF upon Congolese independence. See: Hughes, "Fighting for White Rule in Africa."

[13] See for example: Peris Sean Jones, "From 'Nationhood' to Regionalism to the North West Province: 'Bophuthatswananess' and the Birth of the 'New' South Africa," *African Affairs*, vol. 98, no. 393 (October 1999) p. 514.

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process in which Cronje played an important role. These men included a man named Kenneth Towsey who was a Rhodesian official in the CAF's Department of External Affairs during the Katanga secession and was intimately involved in the formation of the federation's delicate policy toward Tshombe's regime. After Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), he headed the Rhodesian Information Office (RIO) in Washington, DC for many years and served as the pseudo-ambassador to the United States. After the fall of Rhodesia, Towsey became a public relations officer for the Transkei government for much of the 1980s. This fluid network of white postimperials who used Rhodesia as a way station and a pivot point, all played important roles in bolstering, defending, and guiding these pseudo-states during their struggles for independence. It will be argued below that it was not simply a coincidence that these men with Rhodesian affiliations ended up playing significant roles in all of these breakaway states, and it was not that they were driven merely by better economic opportunities outside of Rhodesia. It will be shown that they identified these four independence movements, including Rhodesia, as all manifestations of the same ideological project. They were not alone in thinking this.

Others from further afield also saw in these four pseudo-states parts of a common project. Despite the uniform state-level rejection, each of these four could rely upon many powerful supporters inside and outside Africa. In the West it was often the very same people and institutions supporting all of them, and it was often the same people opposing them.[14] The degree to which the same characters reappear across each of these contested independence bids is remarkable. As a result, their struggles for recognition overseas, while different in some ways, still mapped along similar lines, featuring many of the same contestants, same sites of contest, and having the same general shape to their rhetorical exchanges. Even so, there was no single guiding hand behind this common project, no centralized cabal controlling its direction over the twenty-five years of this study. The reactionary project described below was largely given its shape by different people inside and outside Africa reacting to the same phenomena in similar ways.[15]

[14] See for example: J. Brownell, "Diplomatic Lepers: The Katangan and Rhodesian Foreign Missions in the United States and the Politics of Nonrecognition," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 47, no. 2 (2014).

[15] This common ideological project was not the result of any formal agreement between political leaders. It was broader in terms of its scope of time and participants but also much more decentralized than the "unholy alliance" theory of an explicit conspiracy between South Africa, the federation, Portugal, and Katanga to halt African

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This common ideological project took the specific form of what can be called reactionary statehood, though this was a term that no one used at the time, and one that the regime officials and their friends would have certainly disavowed. Nevertheless, it was reactionary because all were born in part as reactions to the decolonization of the continent under anti-colonial African nationalists, and in ways that will be described below, each represented an anathema to the ideological and structural pillars of African nationalism. While challenging this dominant anti-colonial African nationalist ideology, these four were still constrained by the radically changed international structure of postcolonial Africa, in particular the triumph of the nation-state model over competing forms of sovereignty, so each adopted the form and structure of statehood, and wrapped their causes in the clothing of national self-determination. It was their efforts to create new state forms and invent national traditions, to win international acceptance and create a foreign presence overseas, and the complex political contests this initiated inside and outside Africa that are the story lines around which this book is structured.

Struggles for Self-Determination focuses on a twenty-five-year period beginning in 1960 and ending in 1985. It begins just prior to the two-and-a-half-year Katangese secession from the Congo, through Rhodesia's fifteen-year rebellion against Britain, the declarations of independence of Transkei and Bophuthatswana, and ending in 1985 when, as a result of the anti-apartheid cultural boycott, Bophuthatswana's Sun City Resort effectively ceased to be a venue for world-class entertainment.

The Katangese secession from the Congo, which lasted from 1960 to 1963, was viewed at the time, and has been studied since, primarily through the lens of neocolonialism.[16] In a handful of days between the

independence and protect Western business interests. See: Rosalynde Ainslie, "The Unholy Alliance: Salazar, Verwoerd, Welensky" (AAM pamphlet, 1962). For the relationship between the federation and Katanga, see: Hughes, "Fighting for White Rule in Africa." Lazlo Pessemiers concludes in his study of South African and Katangese relations that the "unholy alliance" was not based upon any formal collusion between these leaders but was a product of a more "cautious and ad hoc" approach. Pessemiers, "Safeguarding White Minority Power." It was also related to but distinct from the "white redoubt" notion of the early to mid-1970s, which was actualized by a secret military and intelligence agreement between South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal between 1971 and 1974, called Exercise ALCORA. See: Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses and Robert McNamara, "The Last Throw of the Dice: Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1970–74," *Portuguese Studies*, vol. 28, no. 2 (2012) p. 205; de Meneses and McNamara, *White Redoubt*.

[16] "Conventional wisdom," Ryan Irwin writes, was that "Tshombe was merely a stooge of Belgian mining interests whose power stemmed from his willingness to pass along Katanga's riches to neocolonial overseers." Irwin goes on to argue that "up-close, the situation was less straightforward." Irwin, "Sovereignty in the Congo Crisis," p. 204.

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Congo's independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960 and Katanga's secession from the Congo on July 11th, there was a mutiny of the Congolese army sparking widespread disorder throughout the country, and the reentry of Belgian troops into sovereign Congolese territory against the wishes of the Congolese central government headed by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. It was in this context, though not for that reason, that the provincial President of Katanga, Moise Tshombe, declared that his mineral rich province was "seceding from chaos," depriving the central government of a massive amount of its total tax revenue. Days after the secession, United Nations forces began to pour into the Congo. While Moise Tshombe was the head of the Katangese government, opponents of the secession pointed out that much of the workings of the state in the beginning were in the hands of his Belgian advisors, order was maintained by the Belgian-led security forces and foreign mercenaries, and the state was financed in large part by the giant Belgian and British company, Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK).[17] Despite aggressively making a case for sovereign recognition, no state, not even Belgium, ever officially recognized the Katangese regime's independence, even after the more overt links to Belgium were cut in 1961. Its secession was condemned by the Congo and the United Nations, and a series of UN resolutions created the legal foundations for the forcible reincorporation of the province back into the Congo. After complex political maneuverings in Leopoldville, Lumumba was forcibly removed from office in September 1960. In January 1961, Lumumba, who was then being detained at a Congolese military camp, was flown down to secessionist Katanga where he was beaten and then killed by a Katangese firing squad in the presence of Belgian officers and Katangese officials.[18] Though the precise details of Lumumba's death

A much welcome turn away from this conventional wisdom of Katanga which places the secession within wider regional context can be found in the excellent book by Kennes and Larmer, *Katangese Gendarmes*. See also: J. Brownell, "Book Review: Eric Kennes and Miles Larmer, *The Katangese Gendarmes and War in Central Africa*," *Journal of Modern African History*, vol. 55, no. 3 (2017).

[17] For arguments about the role of foreign interests in Katanga, see: D. N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and US Policy in the Congo Crisis* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991); L. DeWitte, *The Assassination of Lumumba* (Verso, London, 2001); W. Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited* (Basic Books, New York, 1986). For a compelling argument that the Katangese secession was in large part driven by local concerns and not external machinations, see: Kennes and Larmer, *Katangese Gendarmes*. They argue that had Katanga been entirely an external product, then it would have collapsed in mid-1961 when the bulk of the Belgian technicians, advisors, and military officers were forced to leave.

[18] See: Edouard Bustin, "Remembrance of Sins Past: Unraveling the Murder of Patrice Lumumba," *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 29, no. 93/94, State Failure in the

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