
INDEX

- acyclic, 20–22, 62, 66–68
- affinely independent, 110
- allocation rule, 255–257
- announced state, 244, 245, 247, 253
- anonymity, 9, 10, 29, 30, 90–93, 95, 97, 98, 130, 156, 171, 235
- asymptotic saturation, 165
- benchmark package, 129
- binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, 79–81, 83
- bistochastic matrix, 134, 135, 189
- Black, Duncan, 2
- Borda count, 2, 17, 23, 24, 28, 42, 44, 57
- Borda rule, 42
- budget balanced, 248, 249
- capability-functioning approach, 184
- certainty equivalent, 119, 147
- completeness, 2, 3, 18, 20–23, 41, 49, 65, 73, 120, 133
- compromise property, 138
- Condorcet cycle, 44, 58
- consequentialist premise, 103, 104
- correlation increasing switch, 192–194, 198, 204, 205, 208, 209
- cubical array lemma, 249, 258
- Daltonian population principle, 131, 169, 188, 189, 194
- dashboard, 198, 199
- dictatorial rule, 44
- dominant strategy, 221, 242, 244–247, 251–257
- efficiency, 10, 68, 133, 136, 144, 145, 153, 164, 167, 235, 236, 242–244, 246–249, 252–254, 257
- elasticity of substitution, 202, 204
- equality, 11, 128, 135, 136, 145, 155, 156, 159, 161, 163, 164, 167–169, 172, 188
- equivalence relation, 18, 19
- expected utility, x , 102, 105, 119–121, 147, 148
- expected utility axioms, 9, 102, 104, 105, 118
- favorable composite change, 162, 163
- full-range property, 222–226, 232, 236, 237
- Hammond equity, 93
- Harsanyi's aggregation equation, 106
- Harsanyi–Sen debate, 120
- impartial observer, 121
- inactive user independence, 167–169, 171
- independence of irrelevant alternatives, 3, 39, 42–49, 51, 52, 57–61, 63–68, 80, 81, 83, 97, 228–230
- independent prospects, 110–115, 117, 118
- informationally equivalent, 82

262

interpersonal comparability, x, 94

Kenneth Arrow, 39

Kolm, S-C, 11

leximax, 92

leximin, 92–95, 98

Leximin rule, 93

liberal Paradox, 58, 68

Liberalism, 69

List, C., 5

Little, I. M. D., 5

Lorenz

consistent, 133

curve, 132–134, 139

superior, 133, 134, 208

lottery

compound, 103, 104

reduced, 103, 104

manipulable preference, 221

maximax, 92, 151

maximin, 92, 94, 95, 137, 138, 141, 142

maximizer, 121, 242, 243, 254, 257

May, K., 9, 32

mechanism design, 242

min ratio, 168

multiple-priors, 207

Nash equilibrium, 237, 238

non-degeneracy, 8

non-manipulability, 8

option set, 220, 223–226

outcome efficiency, 242–244, 246–249,
252–254, 257

Pareto indifference, 79

payment function, 255, 257

perfect complementarity, 149, 150

pivotal, 46, 51–54, 242, 250–254, 258

population-size neutrality, 131, 139,
145, 158, 171, 195, 204

Positional dictatorship, 89

preference diversity, 110

priority parameter, 137, 141

*Index*progressive transfer, 132, 134, 135, 141,
190, 191, 194, 195, 197, 206public good, 3, 7, 8, 183, 242, 243, 245,
249, 250, 258

quasi-transitive, 20, 22, 62–64, 66, 68

rationality principle, 19

redistribution sensitive, 132, 133, 136,
139, 145

reference income, 129

reflexivity, 2, 3, 18, 20–23

representative income, 135, 137,
140–143, 147, 194, 195

right-system, 68, 69

Robin Hood operation, 132, 167, 168,
171

S-concave, 134, 137, 145, 166, 170

Shannon entropy, 168

single-user normalization, 165, 171

smoothly connected, 252

social evaluation functional, 6, 9, 10,
78, 79

social welfare function, 41

Arrovian, ix, 22, 31, 42

Sonnenschein, H., 67

squared coefficient of variation, 144

strategy proofness, 232

strategyproof, 8

strong neutrality, 79

symmetry, 29, 33–38, 130–132, 156,
161, 165, 166, 171, 188

third price, 258

transformation, 4–6, 82–85, 88, 98, 105,
119, 135, 146, 151–153, 162–164, 168,
169, 190transitivity, 2, 3, 18, 21–23, 26, 41, 48,
49, 51, 52, 58, 62, 63, 68, 72–74, 80,
81, 87, 88, 90–92, 95, 96, 229

two-stage aggregation, 197, 199

unit translatable, 138, 141, 196, 199

universality, 3, 8, 39

unrestricted domain, 39, 42, 44, 45, 47–49, 54, 57–61, 63–70, 73, 79, 81, 83, 97, 221–227, 230–232, 236, 241, 254, 256	von Neumann–Morgenstern utility, 101, 102, 104–108, 110, 113, 114, 116–119, 147, 172
utilitarian, 6, 9, 95, 97–99, 117, 120, 121, 140, 141, 201, 204, 209, 210	weak Pareto, 42, 58
veil of ignorance, 9, 121, 146–148	weak quasi-orderings, 22, 27, 58, 62, 63, 67
veto power, 25, 58, 63, 65, 68	welfarism, 79, 81, 83, 85, 88–90, 93–95, 98, 140, 197