Prologue

O you, who have believed: Obey God and obey the Messenger, and those in authority among you.

The Quran, sura al-Nisa’ (the Women), verse 59

Our Lord, indeed,
We obeyed our masters and our dignitaries,
And they led us astray from the [right] path.
Our Lord, give them double the punishment,
And curse them with a great curse.

The Quran, sura al-Ahzab (the Parties), verses 67–68

On 3 July 2013 the Egyptian Armed Forces ousted Dr Mohammed Morsi from power. The sixty-two-year-old chemical engineer had risen from humble provincial origins to win the presidency of the Arab world’s mightiest nation only one year before. But within twelve short and turbulent months, the opposition against him had escalated in dramatic ways. On 1 July, as Morsi’s supporters and opponents gathered across Cairo in a number of spectacular sit-ins, demonstrations, protest marches and rallies, the Minister of Defence and the Commander of the Armed Forces, ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, issued an ultimatum, ordering Morsi to leave office within forty-eight hours. When the latter refused, the army seized power in a well-orchestrated maneuver.

The build-up to these momentous events had been initiated ten days before, after the ‘National Alliance for the Support of Legitimacy’ – a Brotherhood-led coalition combining various Islamist groups and movements – had called on its supporters to converge in front of the Rab’a al-‘Adawiyya mosque in Nasr City and Cairo University in northern Giza. The Brotherhood’s decision to mobilize its rank-and-file members was itself a reaction to the expected mobilization

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1 These verses were depicted as a graffito on a wall at Mohammed Mahmoud Street in late 2012. See ‘Other Graffiti.’ The Fourth Ordeal Online Archive, 18 October 2012. www.thefourthordeal.com/home/graffiti-and-street-art/other-graffiti/ (accessed 29 August 2018).

2 Throughout this book, the term ‘Islamist’ is mainly used as an adjective (e.g. ‘Islamist groups’ or ‘Islamist movements’), while the term ‘Islamism’ is used when referring to the ideology of political Islam. When referring to the adherents of political Islam, we will use the term ‘Islamist activists’ or ‘supporters of political Islam’.
of Morsi’s opponents, who for weeks had prepared to gather on 30 June at Tahrir Square. The anti-Morsi camp was galvanized by a grassroots campaign called ‘Tamarrud’, which since early May had attempted to collect a greater amount of signatures than the number of votes Morsi had won during the June 2012 presidential elections. On 26 June, in a frantic effort to counter the effect of Tamarrud, thousands of buses, microbuses, cars and trucks began shuttling the Brotherhood’s rank and file to the emerging protest sites. Within days, the two spacious intersections in Nasr City and northern Giza were transformed into sprawling sites of political Islamic activism, as over one-hundred-thousand Morsi supporters came together to declare: ‘legitimacy is a red line’.3

Morsi’s supporters were determined to fight until the bitter end, and they had simple and clear arguments in defence of their cause. As the first ‘freely elected civilian president of Egypt’, Morsi was the bearer of constitutional legitimacy. An elderly farmer from Beni Sweif who participated in the protest – a tall and sturdy man wearing a brown galabiyya and a white turban – explained: ‘We have elected a president and we contracted with him for the duration of four years. At the end of his term we can make him accountable – but not after the first year!’4 As soon as the farmer had made his point, the man next to him launched into a forceful tirade against the fulul – those despisable ‘remnants’ of the old regime who had ‘failed to win any of the elections and now conspired with the liars against legitimacy and against Egyptians’.5 Elsewhere in the crowd at Rab’a, a group of women gathered in a circle to express their frustration. They were led by an impressive lady in her thirties, who chanted revolutionary slogans, which the others repeated in chorus while clapping in tune with their hands:

Ishhad, ishhad, ya Allah: shar’ak qawi illi ikhtarna! – Witness, O God, witness this: Your strong law we chose for us!
Yalla, bi-tis’al: ihna min? Ihna al-sha’b min khamsa wa ‘ashrin! – Come on, ask us: Who are we? We’re the youth of twenty-fifth January!
Thawra, thawra hatta al-nasr, thawra fi kull shawari’ Masr! – Revolution, revolution until victory, revolution in all of Egypt’s streets!
Ya hurriyya, ya insaniyya, Masr hatifdal Islamiyya! – O freedom, O humanity, Egypt will stay Islamic!6

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4 ‘Omar. Interview with author. Cairo, 30 June 2013.
5 The term fulul became popular during the 2011 uprising referring to the corrupt ‘remnants’ of Mubarak’s regime, an active participle of falla, ‘run away’ or ‘flee’, hence al-fulul as in ‘the defeated’ or ‘the scattered’.
Such were the voices of ordinary men and women who had gathered in order to defend ‘democracy’ – an idea that was perhaps vague to many, but which combined concepts such as freedom, fairness and dignity, and which was to yield a just and uncorrupted political order inspired by a set of conservative, Sharia-based values, principles, rules and behaviours.

On 29 June in the afternoon, Morsi’s supporters gathered in extended makeshift tent villages, sharing food, praying together and passionately discussing the future of Egypt. Every now and then, as news spread that a celebrity-preacher was about to visit the sit-in, dozens of rank-and-file members jumped up in a frenzied brouhaha in order to greet the new arrival. Scores of street vendors were drawn to the protest sites as well, selling Brotherhood hats, Egyptian flags, Palestine scarves, prayer beads, mini-Qurans and key-chains engraved with the Brotherhood’s logo. After evening prayers, detachments of youths equipped with wooden sticks and yellow helmets set up checkpoints to protect the encampments from unwelcome intruders. Somewhere, a ragtag squadron jogged around the perimeter in a disorderly fashion, with some swinging their wooden sticks through the air like light sabres while chanting *Full-Metal-Jacket*-style running cadences:

*Al-Dustur huwa al-Qur’an, Hasan al-Banna qalha zaman!* – Our constitution is the Quran, Hasan al-Banna said so all along!\(^7\)

As night fell, the sense of anticipation at the opposition’s impending protests in Tahrir Square and at the Ittihadiyya Presidential Palace could be tangibly felt. One participant defiantly exclaimed: ‘We will stay until the problem is solved! We won’t do anything against peaceful protests; but storming the presidential palace or trying to discriminate against the president – this is a red line for us!’\(^8\) From a stage set up in front of the Rab’a mosque, the well-known Brotherhood figure Mohammed al-Beltagi riled up the crowds with fierce slogans: ‘You are here today to defend God’s religion! Today, we have come for the sake of martyrdom, for the sake of defending Islam, by defending Dr Mohammed Morsi against the illegitimate coup!’\(^9\) Moments later, another famous agitator called Safwat Hijazi bellowed: ‘It is a war against Islam! And if it is a Crusader war, then we have one thousand Salah al-Din fighters [to oppose the Crusaders]’. The crowds emphatically responded:

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\(^8\) Group interview with author. Rab’a al-‘Adawiyya, Cairo, 28 June 2013.

Bi-ruh, bi-damm, nifdak ya Islam! – With our souls, with our blood, we sacrifice ourselves to you, O Islam.¹⁰

Then came the much anticipated Talateen Sitta – the thirtieth day of the sixth month. By early afternoon, Tahrir Square had accumulated several hundred-thousand people.¹¹ Watching from atop a tall building at the Square’s eastern perimeter, a puzzled eyewitness to these momentous events could see a mesmerizing and colourful ocean of people moving in a rhythmic flow below. The massive gathering was underlined with countless voices, chants, whistles and firework explosions, while thousands of vuvuzelas filled the air with a monotonous undertone. In a relentless staccato, the crowds chanted:

Yasqut, yasqut, hukm al-Murshid! Yasqut, yasqut, hukm al-Murshid! – Down, down with the rule of the Murshid! Down, down with the rule of the Murshid!  
Irhal! Irhal! Irhal! Irhal! Irhal! – Leave! Leave! Leave! Leave! Leave!  
Al-thawra mustamirra, al-thawra mustamirra! – The revolution continues, the revolution continues!¹²

Suddenly, at around 4.30 p.m., the ra-ta-ta-ta of army helicopters appearing on the sky above Tahrir Square elevated the day’s suspense to its peak. As the silhouettes of the seven Apaches hovered against the sunset atop Cairo’s skyline, they were greeted by the crowds in the Square with ecstatic joy:

Al-gaysh, wa-l-sha’b, eed wahda! Al-gaysh, wa-l-sha’b, eed wahda! – The People and the army are one hand! The People and the army are one hand!

In the early-morning hours of the next day, the atmosphere at Rab’a had grown extraordinarily tense. Morsi’s supporters had heard of the massive

¹⁰ Author’s fieldnotes. Cairo, 29 June 2013.
popular outpouring during the previous day, and while many talked of a ‘Photoshop revolution’, there was a clear sense of incertitude at what was to come next. In the late afternoon, news broke that Sisi had ordered the president to resign within forty-eight hours. If the army failed to intervene, Sisi warned, Egypt would be at risk of sliding into civil war. Morsi had appointed the enigmatic general only ten months before in what was widely regarded at the time as an assertion of presidential prerogatives over the powerful Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. But by now, the tables had turned.

Yet, this did not in any way affect the determination of Morsi’s supporters. As if emboldened by the ultimatum, they chanted:

*Iqtil wahid, iqtil miyya, mish hansibha li-l-haramiya*! – Kill one, kill one hundred, we will not leave [Egypt] to the thieves!

*Qul ma’aya, yalla qul, mish hansibha li-l-fulul*! – Say with me, come on say: we’re not going to leave [Egypt] to the old regime!

It was a strange spectacle, especially in light of the events that would unfold during the coming weeks, months and years. But here they were – those foot soldiers of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nothing could shake their conviction in the righteousness of their cause, for it was for them, they believed, to carry the Egyptian revolution forward and establish God’s law on earth. After all, was it not this that God Almighty had revealed to His Prophet Mohammed? Was it not written in the Quran:

And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war, by which you may terrify the enemy of God and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom God knows. Whatever you spend in the cause of God will be fully repaid to you. You will not be wronged.

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16 Throughout the course of this book, the period between 25 January and 11 February 2011 is sometimes referred to as a ‘revolution’ and sometimes as an ‘uprising’. While the course of subsequent events has proven not to have resulted in a fundamental societal, economic and political transformation, as the term ‘revolution’ would suggest, I refer to them as a ‘revolution’ whenever the vantage points of those who were involved in these events is being narrated. In all analytical sections, where we are able to judge these events with the added wisdom of hindsight, the more accurate notion ‘uprising’ is preferred.
On the night of 2 July, Morsi appeared in front of the cameras. Many among Egypt’s secular and liberal classes who were watching the speech were somewhere between indignant, angered and amused to see a paternalistic president lecturing his ‘children’ about democracy and the rule of law. After a bizarre forty-minute rant, Morsi bluntly defied the military’s ultimatum. It was to be the last time that Morsi would be seen in public. For as soon as the deadline expired the following day, the army took over the reins of power in a slick military manoeuvre. Over the coming days and weeks Mohammed Morsi, along with many of his advisors and high-ranking leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party, were arrested or went into exile or the underground.

The final act of Egypt’s short-lived democratic experiment occurred six weeks later. After a tense month of Ramadan, during which Morsi’s supporters continued to occupy the intersection at Rab’a al-‘Adawiyya, the regime on 14 August brutally cracked down on the Brotherhood’s sit-in, killing hundreds of members and sympathizers, including women and children, in what would become one of the bloodiest acts of violence in recent Egyptian history. The following month, a court ordered the dissolution of the Brotherhood and the confiscation of all its assets. In December 2013, after a deadly suicide attack on the police headquarters in Mansura, the new Egyptian government declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization. As the curtain fell over this historical drama, the Muslim Brotherhood was pushed back underground, where it had been for the greater part of its history.

17 Egypt’s famed political humour was immortalized in this ‘carnival’ video by DJ Ahmed Nu’man: ‘Mahrajān al-Shar’iyya Di Jay Muhammad Mursī (Legitimacy Carnival with DJ Mohammed Morsi).’ YouTube, 2013. www.youtube.com/watch?v=BQppPxQ_tc8 (accessed 11 August 2015).
Introduction

In so far as what men believe to be real is real, my concern was not the validity of these beliefs, but only the fact of their existence.


This book tells the story of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt between 1968 and 2018. It is a tale of the rise and fall of a socio-religious movement and a political organization, which for a short period had reached the pinnacle of power, only to be pushed out again after one year.

For the Brotherhood's own members, the victory of Mohammed Morsi in June 2012 represented a watershed moment that few would have imagined possible in their lifetimes. After eighty-five years of struggle, the Society to which they had devoted their lives had finally reached the top. Once they held the keys to power, the implementation of the 'Islamic project' – that utopian dream of a profound moral, cultural and social reform, which was to be based on Islamic ethics and Sharia law, and which would inevitably culminate in the establishment of an Islamic caliphate – became a rallying call for Islamic political activists around the world. But already on 3 July 2013, Morsi was overthrown and, in the following years, tens of thousands of Brotherhood members were imprisoned, fled into exile or went underground. One of the prisoners was the president himself who, after having spent nearly six years locked away in solitary confinement, unspectacularly passed away following a court hearing on 17 June 2019. The 'fourth ordeal', as one Brotherhood member referred to the period after 2013, was the most vicious crackdown the group had experienced so far.¹

Yet, it was not the first time that the Society had been tested in such a way. Since 1928, when the Brotherhood had been established by that charismatic young imam and schoolteacher called Hasan al-Banna, its members had witnessed three episodes of repression. The first of these 'ordeals' lasted about three years.² After discovering the existence of an armed secret cell within the Brotherhood, the Egyptian government dissolved the Society on

¹ Tariq*. Interview with author. Cairo, 15 September 2013.
8 December 1948. A member of this paramilitary cell, known as the ‘Special Apparatus’, subsequently killed the Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha. According to an MI6 report, the Palace had given its approval for the secret police to assassinate Hasan al-Banna – a plan that was executed on 12 February 1949.\textsuperscript{3} Two years later, after a court trial had absolved the Brotherhood’s senior leaders of responsibility for the assassination of the prime minister, the Brotherhood reconstituted itself in 1951 and then went on to support the Free Officers in overthrowing the monarchy in July 1952.\textsuperscript{4}

The Brotherhood’s ‘second ordeal’ lasted longer and was more arduous. It began after a failed assassination attempt on the life of Gamal Abdel Nasser in October 1954 in the Alexandrian neighbourhood of al-Manshiyya. The secular-minded generals who formed the ranks of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which had replaced the monarchy two years before, had been annoyed for some time with the Brotherhood’s obstinate lobbying for introducing Sharia-based legislation. The ‘Manshiyya incident’ thus presented a welcomed opportunity to blame the Brotherhood’s leaders for the failed assassination plot. During the autumn and winter of 1954, the military regime raided Brotherhood field offices and local branches across the country and imprisoned over 4,000 members. Seven top leaders were handed death sentences. Six of the sentences were carried out in December 1954, while that of the Brotherhood’s General Guide, Hasan al-Hudaybi, was commuted to lifelong imprisonment.\textsuperscript{5} Thousands of members emigrated, mainly to the Gulf, but also to other countries in the Middle East as well as to Europe, Asia and the United States, where they spread the Brotherhood’s message and contributed to the movement’s growth on a regional and global scale.

In the mid 1960s, a group of Brotherhood cadres in Egypt devised a plan to replace the secular military regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser with an Islamic government.\textsuperscript{6} They had been inspired to this course of action by a short and powerful text titled \textit{Signposts on the Road (Ma‘ālim fi-l-Tariq)}, which had

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Quoted in Curtis, Mark. \textit{Secret Affairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam}. London: Serpent’s Tail, 2012, p. 57.
  \item \textsuperscript{5} For a voice-over of the speech, see ‘Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir: Ḥādith al-Manshiyya (Gamal Abdel Nasser: the Manshiyya Incident).’ \textit{YouTube}, 26 October 1954. www.youtube.com/watch?v=zU1cOIL27s8 (accessed 20 September 2015).
\end{itemize}
started to make the rounds in Islamist circles after its publication in 1964. The author of this text was Sayyid Qutb, a former clerk in the Ministry of Education and a self-taught scholar of Islamic law, who had risen to fame as one of the Brotherhood’s most profound and enduring intellectuals. Over some 150 pages, Qutb advised his fellow Brothers that a spiritually enlightened ‘vanguard’ should assume the task of implementing the Islamic project. But in the summer of 1965, the authorities uncovered the plot and proceeded to crack down on the ‘Organization ’65’ (al-tanzim khamsa wa sittin), as the clandestine cell was referred to by the local press. The conspirators, as well as thousands of Brotherhood members, were rounded up and imprisoned, including Hasan al-Hudaybi. On 29 August 1966, following a military mock trial, Sayyid Qutb was hanged together with two other plotters. After this third ordeal, few expected the Brotherhood to resurface again – let alone to ever play any significant role in Egyptian politics. Yet, this is exactly what happened.

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Much has been said and written about the Muslim Brotherhood since its ‘second founding’ in the early 1970s. Scores of scholars have studied this movement in its various aspects and by means of different frameworks and approaches. A popular analytical framework that was frequently used by political scientists was social movement theory, which attempted to explain the Brotherhood’s ability to mobilize its supporters. Other social scientists used democratization theory to understand the Brotherhood’s presumed role as a ‘democratizing’ force in the authoritarian system of Egypt. Some scholars

7 Tariq*. Interview with author. Cairo, 15 September 2013.
have focused on ideology,\textsuperscript{10} while others have looked at specific aspects such as identity politics\textsuperscript{11} or literary production.\textsuperscript{12} Intellectual historians have documented the lives of key Brotherhood figures, including the first two General Guides Hasan al-Banna and Hasan al-Hudaybi, as well as Sayyid Qutb.\textsuperscript{13} Among the few existing accounts of political history, scholars had mainly focused on the period from 1928 to 1954\textsuperscript{14} – with the exception of a handful of studies that examined the Brotherhood’s history during the 1970s.\textsuperscript{15} Beyond the academic literature, the Brothers themselves have written prolifically about their movement,\textsuperscript{16} as have scores of journalists, analysts and experts.\textsuperscript{17}

Among this vast production of knowledge, opinions have been sharply divided between those who sympathize with, and those who fear the Brotherhood. Within the former camp, some portrayed the Brotherhood as

\begin{itemize}
  \item A frequently quoted analyst is Shadi Hamid, who has written a number of books and articles on the Muslim Brotherhood, the latest one being \textit{Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East}. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
\end{itemize}