

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>page</i> viii
<i>List of Maps</i>	ix
<i>List of Tables</i>	x
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
<i>Comparative Ranks</i>	xiv
<i>Chronology</i>	xv
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xxiii
Introduction	1
1 Context	34
2 Principles	60
3 Organisation	91
4 Personality	117
5 Intelligence	156
6 Communication	190
7 Learning	215
8 Performance	245
Conclusion	276
<i>Bibliography</i>	286
<i>Index</i>	314

Figures

1.1 German defences at Arras in early 1917 (not to scale)	<i>page</i> 39
2.1 Divisional commanders by arm of service (percentage)	75
2.2 <i>Kriegsakademie</i> and general staff experience of divisional <i>Ias</i> , April–May 1917	82
2.3 <i>Kriegsakademie</i> students and divisional <i>Ias</i> by arm of service (percentage)	82
2.4 Composition of divisional command teams by arm of service (percentage)	86
5.1 OHL departments involved in intelligence, early 1917	166
5.2 Organisation of intelligence in an Army, early 1917	168
8.1 Difference between percentage of army and percentage of formations engaged in battle, by category of formation	251
8.2 Comparison of German Western Front casualties in 1916–17	257
8.3 Actual strength and total wastage of the field army, January 1916–December 1917	259
8.4 Total wastage by front, January 1916–December 1917	260
8.5 Current combat value of Seventh Army's divisions as a percentage of its total strength	260
8.6 Total wastage if the Kerensky offensive had taken place in May–June 1917	272