A PHILOSOPHER LOOKS AT HUMAN BEINGS

Why do we think ourselves superior to all other animals? Are we right to think so? In this book, Michael Ruse explores these questions in religion, science, and philosophy. Some people think that the world is an organism – and that humans, as its highest part, have a natural value (this view appeals particularly to people of religion). Others think that the world is a machine – and that we therefore have responsibility for making our own value judgments (including judgments about ourselves). Ruse provides a compelling analysis of these two rival views and the age-old conflict between them. In a wide-ranging and fascinating discussion, he draws on Darwinism and existentialism to argue that only the view that the world is a machine does justice to our humanity. This new series offers short and personal perspectives by expert thinkers on topics that we all encounter in our everyday lives.

Michael Ruse is the former Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. Over his fifty-year career he has authored and co-edited over sixty books on topics ranging from the history and philosophy of science, especially evolutionary biology, to the philosophy of religion. They include Can a Darwinian Be a Christian? (Cambridge, 2001), The Gaia Hypothesis: Science on a Pagan Planet (2013), and A Meaning to Life (2019).
A Philosopher Looks at

In this series, philosophers offer a personal and philosophical exploration of a topic of general interest.

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Raymond Geuss, A Philosopher Looks at Work
Paul Guyer, A Philosopher Looks at Architecture
Stephen Mumford, A Philosopher Looks at Sport
Michael Ruse, A Philosopher Looks at Human Beings
For my son Oliver
and all the other first responders during the coronavirus pandemic
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