Introduction

Whether or not we acknowledge them, the territorial borders of our modern world still shape the narratives historians write. These ubiquitous lines of political control have become “global uniformities,” emerging with what C. A. Bayly termed the “birth of the modern world.”¹ Many of today’s borders embody linear legacies of empire, reflecting the territorialization of the globe in the nineteenth century as European empires reached the zeniths of their power. And while many historians have recently attempted to transcend the national borders of the present by turning (or returning) to global scales of analysis, persistent questions of state formation at the core of even the most global histories resist the boundary-dissolving tendencies of transnational history—though the history of modern border making is itself a decidedly transnational one.

For all their continued relevance, however, territorial borders are rarely examined through the historical practices and ideas that actually produced them.² Analyzing border making has mostly fallen to political theorists interested in examining issues of sovereignty and the rise of border infrastructures relating to globalization, migration, security, and capital flow.³ For historians, territorial borders are too often assumed to be diplomatic or cartographic byproducts of imperial rivalries and state

² Recent work in political geography, however, has given rise to a number of “border biographies” that examine the histories of individual borders. The term “boundary biography” was proposed by Nick Megoran, Nationalism in Central Asia: A Biography of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Boundary (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017). Other notable examples at varying geographical scales include Peter Sahlin, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Wim van Spengen, Tibetan Border Worlds: A Geohistorical Analysis of Trade and Traders (London: Kegan Paul International, 2000); Willem van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia (London: Anthem Press, 2003); and Madeleine Reeves, Border Work: Spatial Lives of the State in Rural Central Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). Thanks to Claire Kaiser for this last recommendation and others on Central Asian borderlands.
³ Recent examples in political theory and philosophy include Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (New York: Zone Books, 2010); Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson,
formation, ignored on the ground until walls were built and guards were deployed. But borders and borderlands, whether real or imagined, are spaces and ideas produced over time through particular practices. Though these practices may result in built structures — what the philosopher Thomas Nail has recently called “border regimes” — these structures are rooted in much more significant changes in conceptions of space, geography, territory, and the concept of the border itself. Similarly, acknowledging the mutable quality of borders should not imply a neat, progressive trajectory within a given border’s history. This teleological tendency has been too often asserted or assumed in scholarship on borderlands. Rather, as this book will show, the creation of borders and borderlands is far from linear in practice. The transformation of regions into borderlands is not simply about the making of a particular kind of space. Instead, the history of colonial border making reveals new ways of thinking about geography, politics, and power. For the British in the Himalaya, the process of transforming a historical crossroads into a frontier also transformed the colonial, and eventually the postcolonial, state.


This tendency is reflected in Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel’s pathbreaking essay, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,” Journal of World History 8, no. 2 (1997): 211–42, often considered to have inaugurated borderland history beyond North America. In their essay, Baud and van Schendel propose a “life cycle” of borders: moving from “infant” and “adolescent” stages to “adult,” “declining,” and “defunct” ones.

I use the term “Himalaya” to refer to the broader cultural region and “Himalayas” to refer to the complex of mountain ranges stretching from Afghanistan to Burma.
This book reveals this transformation by examining ongoing tensions between precolonial understandings of space and territory and colonial ones, embedded in archival records from British India. Similar tensions are also revealed between the practices of surveyors in situ and the ideal conception of borders formulated by administrators and geographers far afield. More significantly, this book shows how the colonial state’s use of geography became intimately tied to the particular demands of security and to the general process of making legible political territory. This increasingly close relationship between geography and the state reveals a major spatial reorientation of the modern period: a geopolitical vision that conceived of the world as a set of coterminous territories tied to, and dependent upon, geographical features. While the British Empire would ultimately fail to define its territorial borders in the northwestern Himalaya, it bequeathed to its successor nation-states a conception of political space that made borders objects of existential significance.

To explore this transformation, this book focuses on the history of the northwestern Himalaya centered on Ladakh – now a fragmented part of India that long served as a gateway to the plains of India and Central Asia. It examines the colonial-era border-making practices that transformed a once central “exchange market” – the “crossroads of High Asia” – into a fractured and disputed borderland. Central to this transformation was the deployment of geography in the service of the imperial state. The British Government of India attempted to rationalize its territory through geographical science and, in so doing, tried to work toward what James C. Scott has described as “the complete elimination of nonstate spaces.”8 Ironically, the failure to achieve a suitable border in the remote northwestern Himalaya became one of the most durable legacies of the British Empire in South Asia.

8 The phrase “crossroads of High Asia” comes from Janet Rizvi, Ladakh: Crossroads of High Asia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). Rizvi credits Pinto Narboo in her acknowledgments with the title. Others before and after Rizvi have made similar observations. Hashmatullah Khan Lakhnavi, the Dogra-appointed wazīr-i-wazārat (district administrator) of Ladakh in the early twentieth century, and a classic example of the “administrator-scholar,” made similar observations on Ladakh’s position as a nexus of trade between Central Asia and the plains of India. “Ladakh’s city [Leh],” he wrote, “is an exchange market for traded goods from the plains of India and the mountainous regions of Chinese Turkistan and Lhasa” (Ladakh kā shaher turkistān chini aur lhāsa ke māl tajārāt ke mamāliṭ Hind ke medānī aur ma‘ḍī darjah ke kohistānī laqāḥ jāt ke sāṃmān tijārat ke sāṭh tīkādālah ki māndī ḥe). My translation. Hashmatulah Khan Lakhnavi, Tārīkh-i-Jamnīṭ (Anarkali, Lahore: Maktaba Asha’t Adab [publishing house for the dissemination of literature], 1968), 380.

Part of the British failure to establish a suitable borderline through Ladakh rested in the processes of border making itself. This transformation of space into territory involved the development of surveying techniques, cartography, and boundary-making principles, all of which became political practices as well. Indigenous landscapes, long understood in multiple and noncontiguous ways, were rationalized through the development of principles that employed systematized natural objects – mountains, rivers, and, most importantly, watersheds (which combined the two). The surveying process rendered land and water onto increasingly authoritative maps that, in turn, became political instruments. These maps also shaped the systematic organization of geographical information about territory and borders into manuals of governance – most noticeably in the imperial and district-level gazetteers produced by the government of India, beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth century. As more precise geographical information about the frontier was collected, greater efforts were employed to control the flow of goods and people across it – most directly by regulating all forms of communication through a network of frontier roads. Finally, the increased volume of intelligence on the regions beyond the ideal border, gathered by a growing number of experts, induced the British to expend more resources to establish and regulate the border itself. In this process, a new geopolitical approach to global territory, security, and geography emerged. This complex of practices and ideas about borders and border space was inherited by the Indian state at its independence.

But in the case of the northwestern Himalaya – as in much of South Asia’s borderland – imperial border-making practices failed to achieve their desired territorial legibility. The apparently fixed “water-parting” limits of the “Indus watershed system” that were used to determine the northern boundaries of India had a suspicious tendency to move. As British surveyors examined more and more of the Himalayas and Tibetan Plateau, their neat assumption that the highest mountain ranges and the major watersheds were coterminous broke down. Changing rationales in frontier road building, and in regulating the movement of people and goods along them, also challenged the imperial state’s ability to demarcate its border. This challenge grew more potent as security concerns gradually replaced commercial aspirations. In fact, the desire

to open up trade and communication with Central Asia paradoxically helped produce the security concerns that pushed the state to define, secure, and “close” its border. And all this while preexisting historical relations among so-called trans-frontier peoples frequently eroded the political meaning of the imposed imperial border, resisting its authority. These failures troubled the Raj. But it was only with Indian independence that this legacy of failure became intolerable. India and China went to war over not only the Aksai Chin, but also an ambiguous territorial claim in northeastern India: now known as the state of Arunachal Pradesh but claimed by China as South Tibet. Today, India and China remain locked in a political and military standoff over these two borders. While much of the legacy of the British in India has receded in the decades since 1947, this inheritance of ambiguity remains.

To examine this legacy, this book begins with a survey of precolonial understandings of space in Ladakh. By examining an array of Ladakhi, Tibetan, Urdu, and English sources, the book first reveals how local cosmologies, seasonal trade, and pastoralism shaped indigenous conceptions of territory that failed to adhere to a standardized, mappable image of political space. It then analyzes the strategies that the British administrators, engineers, and strategists deployed to bound the region: boundary commissions, surveying and mapping, road building, trade regulation, and the production and restriction of “trans-frontier” information. Finally, it illustrates the problems produced by these processes, exposing the troubled inheritance of imperial frontiers for the modern Indian nation-state.

In doing so, this book brings together macro-level historical studies of imperial frontiers, and regional work on the northwestern Himalaya, to examine how multiple modes of seeing space can cohabitate and conflict with each other, producing borderlands that simultaneously reflect the hegemony of the nation-state and the historical forces that have undermined the state’s power. It also challenges the work of political theorists and historians that discounts the role of geographical science in general, and border-making practices in particular. Instead, this book shows how geography played an intimate role in imperial state formation and, when coupled with growing security concerns, gave birth to a new, geopolitical way of envisioning space. Geographical science not only rationalized natural objects like rivers and mountains, but also turned them into political tools. It also suggests an alternative approach to borderland studies, one focused on the production of the border itself. Finally, this book offers a new approach to the global history of frontiers: one that reveals the colonial practices and ideas that helped to shape postcolonial borders. By treating the history of borders and frontiers as a complex of
practices and ideas— a frontier complex— we can better understand the active legacies of empires in today’s postcolonial nation-states. The following sections discuss each of these interventions in greater detail.

I.1 Space

Unlike the many social scientists seeking to identify laws independent of space and time, historians have long acknowledged the heterogeneity of time as one of the distinguishing features of historical approaches to socio-political phenomena.¹¹ Less explicitly articulated are historical investigations into the heterogeneity of space. While many scholars have explored what Edward Said called “the extraordinary constitutive role of space in human affairs,” historians, with some notable exceptions, have shied away from applying theories of space and place to the fluctuating temporality of their subjects.¹²

Philosophical engagement with the often unwieldy concept of space has led to an array of understandings of the term itself.¹³ Michel de Certeau chose to define space in contrast to place: place was stable and specific, while space existed “when one takes into consideration vectors of direction, velocities, and time variables.”¹⁴ Other philosophers have described


Space is uniform and static, while place is a far more fluid concept. Michel Foucault further abstracted the binary by positing a distinction between utopias and heterotopias: the former being “no place,” while the latter being places where “all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.” But regardless of the particular aspects of differentiation, across the Western philosophical tradition “space” – particularly since the seventeenth century – has been uniformly privileged over “place.”

The modern discipline of geography contains this philosophical place/space distinction, particularly with regard to the scholarly traditions associated with Carl O. Sauer and Yi-Fu Tuan (cultural and human geography, respectively). However, drawing too sharp a division obscures the inherent instability of ideas of place and space over time. “Place,” for instance, often reflects tensions between localizing and universalizing forces within complex traditions. One need only examine the history of pilgrimage sites to see how many conceptions of place have existed and co-existed at the same locale over time. Place and space should, I suggest, be viewed as co-constitutive categories, reflecting both scalar difference and the perspective of the viewer.

Without itemizing all the differences found in this vast body of scholarship, we may conclude that most contemporary scholars addressing the concepts of space and place broadly agree on a point put most succinctly by Lefebvre: “If space is produced, then we are dealing with history.” But missing from much of this philosophical literature is a sense of space in historical time. Over the last few decades, however, different scholars have begun to interrogate the construction of space in

15 For instance, Pierre Gassendi (1592–1633), whose articulations of the place/space distinction, according to Edward Casey, “emboldened Newton to make his own, still more decisive formulations” of space. Casey, The Fate of Place, 139.
17 This is the argument of Edward S. Casey in The Fate of Place.
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historical context – particularly in terms of the modern state, the rise of nationalism, and the processes through which the state comes to “see” its population and territory. Scholars such as the historian Thongchai Winichakul (1994), the political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott (1998, 2009), the historical sociologist Patrick Carroll (2006), and the political theorist and geographer Stuart Elden (2013) have illustrated the role of various geographical, technological, and political practices in the standardizing visions of the modern state.21 James Hevia, in his Imperial Security State (2012), has described how imperial military intelligence, surveying, and expertise combined to “[discipline] the space of Asia” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.22 This growing interdisciplinary body of literature illuminates the evolution of techniques with which the state (imperial or otherwise) has attempted to make its population and territory legible.23

In contrast, scholarship in the fields of Ladakhi, Tibetan, and Himalayan studies has highlighted the deep influence of locality – or place – on Himalayan societies.24 It establishes a crucial perspective “from below,” exploring the varied and complex means by which locality shapes conceptions of social, political, and spiritual space. This is particularly true of notions of locality that are separate from political visions of territory controlled by a central state or nonlocal government. At the same time, this scholarship has tended toward synchronic studies of culture and environment, due in part to the dearth of traditional historical records and in part to the academic domination of anthropologists in studying a region long relegated to the antiquated categories of “primitive” and “remote.” As Arik Moran and Catherine Warner recently put it, historians of the Himalaya have often been “fundamentally dependent on the ethnographic studies that have defined the field [of Himalayan studies] since the 1950s.”25 Some of these regionally focused scholars have also employed compelling conceptual frames to explore and critique


23 I use “legible” in the sense of the term “legibility” employed by James C. Scott in Seeing Like a State.

24 See, for example, Joëlle Smadja, ed., Reading Himalayan Landscapes over Time: Environmental Perception, Knowledge and Practice in Nepal and Ladakh (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 2003).

tendencies within their own field. Ravina Aggarwal, for instance, used Foucault’s concept of heterotopia to discuss how anthropological studies of Ladakh tended to use excessively “Tibetan,” static, and homogenous images of Himalayan space.26 Echoing earlier critiques by Arjun Appadurai and Margaret Rodman, Aggarwal showed that much of the regional literature, while producing valuable insights with deeply local textures, reinforced a purely synchronic genre centered on a supposedly timeless relationship between culture and environment.

Despite the potential complementarity of these macro- and micro-spatial approaches, there exists to date little historical scholarship analyzing multiple, cohabitating visions of a single region. Perhaps more significantly, few scholars have asked how these visions might change over time. Yet such an approach could effectively challenge the inevitability of the modern political mode of envisioning space as territory. There is much to be gleaned from a sustained focus on the pluralistic precursors to modern, statist visions of organized social space. In other words, I suggest, we should invert James C. Scott’s phrase – “seeing like a state” – to make the state a political object, not just a subject. But we should also extend this exercise historically. In doing so we may recover alternative spatial configurations: modes of seeing space that are simultaneously social, physical, and imagined.27

Ideas of space, I will show throughout this book, are historical, multiple, and often rooted in their localities. To support this argument, in the first chapter I focus on how the space of precolonial Ladakh was envisioned by its inhabitants over time.

One of the central concerns of modern South Asian historiography – and imperial historiographies more broadly – has been to ascertain the degree to which colonial rule affected and transformed the societies it encountered. Studying the continued existence, modification, or erasure of concepts of space can therefore reveal how colonial practices impacted indigenous modes of seeing space. This study can also reveal the converse: how colonial ideas of space might have been challenged by indigenous conceptions. Recent work on the historical production of South Asian sacred spaces by Chitralekha Zutshi and others have shown how ideas of space were transformed

26 Ravina Aggarwal, “From Mixed Strains of Barley Grain: Person and Place in a Ladakhi Village” (PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 1994), and “From Utopia to Heterotopia: Toward an Anthropology of Ladakh,” in Recent Research on Ladakh 6, ed. Henry Osmaston and Nawang Tsering (Bristol, UK: University of Bristol, 1997).
27 I use “imagined” in the sense employed by Benedict Anderson in his Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), namely, spaces that exist beyond the immediate community experienced in everyday life.
by the colonial encounter. I seek to build on this literature by extending it beyond the too-often segregated realm of “sacred space.” In doing so, I uncover significant transformations occurring in the last two centuries across a wider range of modes of seeing, modes that included historically distinct ways of ordering past worlds. In other words, the colonial history of the northwestern Himalaya graphically illustrates a broader structural change in spatiality. This structural shift in seeing space was enacted through specific spatial practices – surveying, road building, map making – and through the development of scientific theories, fears, and fantasies about spatial limits and the peoples who lay beyond and moved across them. It is most graphically represented in the development of concepts of territory and changing geographical epistemes manifest in increasingly restricted “trans-frontier” maps, expansive boundary commissions, and the compilation of gazetteers and other manuals of governance – subjects discussed throughout this book.

I.2 Geography and Territory

Few geological events in the earth’s 4.54 billion-year-old history have produced such dramatic physical results as the slow collision of the Indian Plate with the Eurasian Plate some 50–55 million years ago. The result – the Himalayas – is one of the great corporeal features of the planet: “a rod taking the Earth’s whole measure,” as the Sanskrit poet Kālidāsa wrote in the fourth or fifth century CE. This complex of the highest mountain ranges in the world – the Karakoram, the Pamir, the Hindu Kush, and the


29 This is a rough paraphrase of Reinhardt Koselleck’s observation on temporality in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 12.

30 Here I borrow Foucault’s definition of episteme: “the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities.” In his rather rambling definition, he elaborates that epistemes are “the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems.” Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), 191. I use Foucault’s term here in a very general sense, given that the “discursive regularities” and “orders of things” I am focused on are distinct from the subjects Foucault actually examines in his work.