

## LOGICAL PLURALISM AND LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This is not necessarily a controversial claim but in its most exciting formulations, pluralism extends to logics that have typically been considered rival accounts of logical consequence – to logics, that is, which adopt seemingly contradictory views about basic logical laws or argument forms. The logical pluralist challenges the philosophical orthodoxy that an argument is either deductively valid or invalid by claiming that there is more than one way for an argument to be valid. In this book, Erik Stei defends logical monism, the view that there is exactly one correct logic. He provides a detailed analysis of different possible formulations of logical pluralism, and offers an original account of the plurality of correct logics that incorporates the benefits of both pluralist and monist approaches to logical consequence. His book will be valuable for a range of readers in the philosophy of logic.

ERIK STEI is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Utrecht University.

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ERIK STEI

*Utrecht University*



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## *Preface*

Logical theories are typically austere. Logical theorizing, in contrast, can often be ingenuous, inquisitive, and quite unconstrained. In his *Logical Syntax of Language*, Rudolf Carnap likened the flexibility of logical theory building to “the boundless ocean of unlimited possibilities”. Carnap also claimed that we needed to overcome the “impediment” of striving after correct logics in order to be able to appreciate the immense freedom that modern mathematical methods provide. But maybe striving after correctness does not impede that freedom. Properly understood, the thought that exactly one logic provides the correct theory of logical consequence is quite compatible with the unlimited possibilities of formal logical theorizing. This, at least, is one of the central theses of this book.

I have been thinking about logical pluralism for quite a while now and during that time I was lucky enough to be able to talk to many people who were generous with their feedback and advice. I would like to thank Elke Brendel, Colin Caret, Daniel Cohnitz, Michael De, Filippo Ferrari, and Bjørn Jespersen for their helpful comments on drafts of some of the material of this book. I am particularly grateful to Graham Priest and Gillian Russell for their incredibly helpful feedback and for being such wonderful hosts during my research leave at the CUNY Graduate Center and at UNC Chapel Hill. Thanks also to the German Research Foundation (DFG) for funding the research fellowship enabling that leave.

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Some of the book has appeared in print before. Parts of Chapters 6 and 7 appeared as “Disagreement about Logic from a Pluralist Perspective” in *Philosophical Studies* 177 (2020), Chapters 6 and 8 contain material that first appeared in “Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism”, *Inquiry* 63 (2020), and Chapter 8 draws on “Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection” published in *The Philosophical Quarterly* 70 (2020). Thanks to Springer, Taylor and Francis, and Oxford University Press for permission to use this material.