

## Introduction

There's no point in rebuilding that collective farm. There's no village there, the farm worked poorly in the past and the soil is bad. What's worse, the people there aren't even real *kolkhozniki* – they're just rotten.

Soviet official, Kyiv Oblast, Ukraine, 1948<sup>1</sup>

This is a history of 'rotten' people. Thousands of them returned victorious from fighting against the Germans in World War II to their 'bad soil' in Soviet Ukraine from 1945, but had to keep fighting until the end of that decade. Now they were fighting against their own Soviet government, which obstructed them from rebuilding their villages, farms and what remained of their pre-war lives. These people were not wartime collaborators, forced labourers or other 'traitorous' Soviet citizens whom officials normally discriminated against and slandered after the war. Numerous works have been published on their experiences.<sup>2</sup> The people whom authorities called 'rotten' were decorated war veterans and committed *kolkhozniki*, whom authorities were supposed to assist in, not obstruct from, rebuilding post-war Soviet society. This book examines the struggle between these 'rotten' people and the authorities, which reveals a new fault line in the restoration of Soviet control in parts of the Ukrainian countryside after World War II. The Soviet society that re-emerged in these areas shook chaotically along this fault line in ways we are only beginning to understand.

<sup>1</sup> Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii – RGASPI) f. (fond) 17, op. (opis') 122, d. (delo) 316, l. (list) 155. *Kolkhozniki* are collective farmers and members of a collective farm (*kolkhoz*).

<sup>2</sup> On the difficulties encountered by displaced persons returning to Ukraine after the war, see Tetyana Pastushenko, *V'izd repatriantiv do Kyiva zaboronenyi . . . 'Povoienne zhyttya kolyshnykh ostarbaiteriv ta viiskovopolonenykh v Ukraïni* (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukraïny NAN Ukraïny, 2011). For a Soviet-wide history, see Pavel Polian, *Zhertvy dvukh diktatur. Ostarbaitery i voennoplennyye v Tret' em reikhe i ikh repatriatsiia* (Moscow: Vash Vybor Tsirz, 1996).

The specific people that authorities called ‘rotten’ in the above epitaph were soldiers who returned to the land on which their village of Raska once stood. Raska, 90 kilometres west of Kyiv, had been burnt to the ground, the soldiers’ murdered loved ones buried beneath it. Like so many of their comrades, in victory the soldiers lost the very things they had fought to protect. On 11 April 1943, German occupation forces and local Ukrainian collaborators launched a pre-dawn raid on this ethnically Polish village in response to the murder of three German soldiers in the area.<sup>3</sup> They herded almost all of Raska’s remaining 421 women, children and elderly inhabitants – or ‘partisans’ as the Germans called them – into a ditch and shot them. Before torching the village, the murderers also killed the visitors who had come to Raska to celebrate a holiday.<sup>4</sup> That is why ‘there was no village there’.<sup>5</sup> The soldiers’ first task upon their return home after the war was to give their loved ones a proper burial. The soldiers swore an oath to their dead to rebuild the village and collective farm on this ‘grave of honour’ that can still be visited today (see Figure 1).<sup>6</sup>

Similar oaths rang out across post-war Ukraine. More *kolkhozniki* labelled ‘rotten’ by authorities swore oaths about 140 km south-west of Raska, outside what remained of the large city of Bila Tserkva. This city, too, was a site of massacres – of Ukrainian Jews in 1941 – and remaining civilian populations especially in 1943 as part of the German forces’ ‘anti-partisan’ war and retreat westwards from the advancing Red Army.<sup>7</sup> Almost the whole of the city’s remaining infrastructure was destroyed in

<sup>3</sup> State Archive of Kyiv Oblast (Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyïvskoï oblasti – DAKO) f. 4810, op. 1, d. 3, l. 22.

<sup>4</sup> This is the conservative estimate of total casualties offered by World War II Museum in Kyiv, which is the same as in RGASPI f. 17, op. 122, d. 316, l. 151. This figure, however, does not take into account visitors to the village attending a holiday celebration on that weekend. Locals remaining in Raska have given higher figures inclusive of visitors. On the memorial at the gravesite in the village, 613 victims are listed, 120 of them children. See Chapter 5.

<sup>5</sup> DAKO f. r-880, op. 11, d. 95, l. 7.

<sup>6</sup> A handful of men originally from Raska who had not been drafted into the Red Army worked in the area or fought in partisan units, though most would join the Red Army as it advanced through Kyiv Oblast in late 1943. Some of these men were the first to arrive at the village after its destruction. Small snippets of information, comprising a few pages, about Raska’s destruction are found in recollections gathered from some remaining residents in 1973 and later published in a book of poetry (the only such published book found by the author) in Ukraine: L. N. Horlach and I. M. Pal’chik et al., *Dzvony pam’iati. Knyha pro trahediï sil Kyïvshchyny, znyshchennykh fashystamy u roky viiny* (Kyiv: Radyanskyi pys’mennyk, 1985), 188. For the difference between this ‘official information’ and the recollections of other survivors of the massacre and the post-war struggle against the authorities, see Chapter 5.

<sup>7</sup> For details of casualties in the German ‘anti-partisan’ war and the broader ‘scorched earth’ policy during the retreat from the Soviet Union, see Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, ed., *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges 1941–1944: Ausstellungskatalog* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002), 387–9.

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1 Grave of honour in Raska (2016)

the heavy fighting. The city's pre-war population had been massively reduced. *Kolkhozniki* who had survived brutal German occupation since 1941 joined with those returning from military service to try to rebuild their collective farms and villages where there was little trace of them. Local authorities first obstructed the rebuilding and then tried to liquidate the farms as soon as the *kolkhozniki* were successful in rebuilding them.<sup>8</sup>

Most local authorities tried to fulfil their legal obligations to assist the masses of citizens seeking to rebuild their post-war lives, but it was not unusual to deny it to some people, 'rotten' or otherwise.<sup>9</sup> There was

<sup>8</sup> 'Local authorities' refers to village-, city-, *raion*- and oblast-level authorities, unless specifically designated. In Raska, the lowest authority was the local village council (*sel' sovet*), followed by two *raion* authorities representing the state (*raispolkom*) and party (*raikom*), with the latter usually making decisions carried out by the former. In Bila Tserkva, city authorities comprised the state representative (*gorsovet*) and party arms (*gorkom*) as well as two *raion* authorities, the *raispolkom* and *raikom*. All reported to their superiors at the oblast level, the state arm (*obliispolkom*) and party arm (*obkom*), who reported to their superiors at the nationwide republican level, who, along with all-Union authorities, are referred to as 'central authorities' unless otherwise designated.

<sup>9</sup> Immediately after the war, most of the Soviet population still lived in the countryside, and the majority of war veterans initially returned to their villages, or what remained of them, after demobilisation. The mass emigration from the countryside to the cities happened after the initial resettlement of the villages following demobilisation. See Mark Edele, 'Veterans and the Village: The Impact of Red Army Demobilization on Soviet Urbanization, 1945–1955', *Russian History* 36, no. 2 (2009), 159–82; Mark Edele, *Soviet Veterans of World War II: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941–1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Robert Dale, *Demobilized Veterans in Late Stalinist Leningrad: Soldiers to Civilians* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).

considerable competition for the scant resources on offer, from food rations and building material, to pension payments, loans and housing allocations. In addition to the farms and villages in Raska and Bila Tserkva, 30,000 farms were destroyed during the war and needed to be rebuilt.<sup>10</sup> As many as 8 million Ukrainians may have died from war and occupation among the 28 million Soviet dead.<sup>11</sup> Many returning soldiers, like those in Raska and Bila Tserkva, failed to receive these resources as part of the more generous state assistance to which they were legally entitled, promised to them in the din of war by the state, which had been too impoverished by the war to provide it now.<sup>12</sup> To make matters worse, the consequences of war and occupation continued to unravel years after their cessation. By the time most soldiers returned home in late 1946,<sup>13</sup> the country was hurtling from mass drought to famine, which killed at least a million more people and reversed many of the gains made in rebuilding the countryside upon Ukraine's liberation from late 1943.<sup>14</sup> In this context of enduring material deprivation and massive social disorganisation, the assistance to which people were legally entitled became conditional.<sup>15</sup> 'Rebuilding' or 'reconstructing' the country was by no means a linear process that could be simply facilitated successfully by 'assistance'.

<sup>10</sup> This number includes state farms (*sovkhozy*) and machine tractor stations (MTSs) destroyed or pillaged: V. M. Danylenko, ed., *Povoienna Ukraïna. Narysy sotsial'noi istorii (druha polovyna 1940-kh—seredyna 1950-kh rr.)* (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukraïny NAN Ukraïny, 2010), 7.

<sup>11</sup> S. V. Kul'chyts'kyi, *Chervonyi vyklyk. Istoriia komunizmu v Ukraïni vid yoho narodzhennia do zahybeli*, vol. III (Kyiv: Tempora, 2013), 106. See here too for the broader debate over casualty figures.

<sup>12</sup> There is an emerging literature on authorities failing to assist desperate people as part of their broader inability to negotiate the competing claims for resources among soldiers and other members of society in a period of severe material shortage. This was an enduring problem in the immediate post-war period, even for soldiers, whose status as veterans at this time did not guarantee them the advantages they had been promised by the state. See Edele, *Soviet Veterans of World War II* and Dale, *Demobilized Veterans*.

<sup>13</sup> For demobilisation figures, see Mark Edele, 'A "Generation of Victors"? Soviet Second World War Veterans from Demobilization to Organization 1941–1956', PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2004, 102.

<sup>14</sup> Union-wide casualties. On the collapse of the agricultural sector and the famine across the western parts of the Soviet Union in 1946–7, see two major works with varying viewpoints on the state's role in causing and/or exacerbating the famine: V. F. Zima, *Golod v SSSR 1946–1947 godov. Proiskhozhdenie i posledstviia* (Moscow: Institut Rossiskoi Istorii RAN, 1996); and Nicholas Ganson, *The Soviet Famine of 1946–1947 in Global and Historical Perspective* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

<sup>15</sup> It was only in the mid-1950s that *kolkhozniki* in the countryside ate as well as they had done before the war and broader Soviet economic indicators approximated pre-war norms. For comparative pre- and post-war consumption data in each oblast of Ukraine, see the Russian State Archive of the Economy (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki – RGAE) f. 582, op. 24, d. 430. It is important to remember, however, that these figures are averages.

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It was unusual for local authorities, however, to disobey the law and central policy to conspire to obstruct *kolkhozniki* from rebuilding their own villages and collective farms or to try to liquidate operating ones. In Raska, they tore down homes and the school that the soldiers, now *kolkhozniki*, had rebuilt upon their return from the war, and stole their last morsels of food and livestock, before ordering the physical liquidation of the partially reconstructed farm and village. Authorities ejected *kolkhozniki* from their homes and land, and stole farm equipment on the outskirts of Bila Tserkva in their attempt to liquidate the farms as well as in other locations across Kyiv Oblast, where Raska and Bila Tserkva are located. Authorities along the vertical of political power were involved, from the *raion* (district) level – committing the violence on the ground – to the oblast (provincial) level – directing and protecting the former from prosecution. Along this vertical, levels of government were formally separated into party and state bodies, which had different responsibilities for managing agriculture. On the *raion* level, the management lay mainly with the district state committee (*raispolkom*). The district party committee (*raikom*) was more a decision-making body less involved in day-to-day agricultural affairs. This structure was mirrored at the next and highest level in the oblast with the *obliispolkom* and *obkom*. In practice, there was overlap of personnel and responsibilities between these bodies. This overlap intensified especially around harvest time, in times of food crisis or, in the cases of Raska and Bila Tserkva, when authorities conspired to act against the law and the broader thrust of post-war building to obstruct the *kolkhozniki*.

This obstruction was not simply unusual behaviour: it was potential political suicide for authorities to obstruct the development of the collective farm system – the state's rapacious extraction of food from the countryside to feed the cities and armies and for export. Although this system was economically inefficient, as with most forms of forced labour, it remained the backbone of the entire Soviet economy and economic foundation of Stalinism.<sup>16</sup> The job of local authorities was to make this system work by enforcing the law that bound *kolkhozniki* to their farms and engaged them in work for the state, not kick them off the farms and stop them from operating. *Kolkhozniki* were generally reluctant to work on the farms when they received only a share of the grain or income from produce that remained after the state requisitioned it. This share was often insufficient to keep them alive, so most *kolkhozniki* survived only by

<sup>16</sup> Paul Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

farming the small plot of private land permitted to them, where they could grow their own food.

Soviet officials investigating the crimes committed by these local authorities thus struggled to understand their motivations in obstructing the rebuilding or trying to liquidate farms, especially in regard to Raska. Its inhabitants had been massacred and its collective farm, called ‘First of May’ (Pershe Travnia), destroyed by German occupiers, making its reconstruction part of the broader narrative of patriotic rebuilding espoused by the state. The *kolkhozniki* too struggled to understand the local authorities’ motivations for obstructing them from rebuilding the farms when, unlike many other *kolkhozniki*, they were happy to work on them. By the poor standards of the Ukrainian collective farm sector, the farms in Raska and Bila Tserkva had operated reasonably well by the eve of the war, and *kolkhozniki* earned a decent living, which they all now sought to resume afterwards.<sup>17</sup> Importantly, their commitment to working on their rebuilt farms bound them to the land and to the communities from which the authorities were trying to remove them. Land and lifestyle were entwined for the *kolkhozniki*, and their attachment to both ran deep in these places. Local authorities clearly understood this, but it made no difference to their behaviour.

Leon Koval’skyi (Kowalski), a war veteran and *kolkhoznik* in Raska, best expressed this sense of confusion among *kolkhozniki* over the local authorities’ unusual behaviour when he spoke to the investigating officials who visited the farms in the winter of 1948. The officials quickly passed Koval’skyi’s plea, made through tears, on to their superiors to address in the highest echelons of Soviet government in Moscow:

I’m a Red Army soldier. I fought against the enemy for four years while the fascists executed my wife and three children at home. Now I’m back, it’s not enough that I cannot be with my family, but I . . . have to put up with the most inhumane treatment [from the local authorities]. What are we asking for? We’re asking to rebuild our collective farm . . . on the graves of our murdered loved ones. But the authorities deny us! I can’t explain why they’re treating us so callously [*bezdušno*].<sup>18</sup>

This book answers Koval’skyi’s final question by examining the struggle of *kolkhozniki* to rebuild their villages and farms in Raska, Bila Tserkva and other areas of Kyiv Oblast. These are atypical cases. Nowhere else in Ukraine did local authorities stop *kolkhozniki* rebuilding their farms and villages so violently. Authorities claimed to have rebuilt almost all of the sector’s other

<sup>17</sup> For data on the pre-war performance of these farms, see Chapter 3.

<sup>18</sup> RGASPI f. 17, op. 122, d. 316, l. 154.



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pre-war collective farms by the beginning of 1946, totalling 2,368 farms in Kyiv Oblast and 26,368 Ukraine-wide.<sup>19</sup> Nowhere else did *kolkhozniki* fight for years for the right to rebuild their farms. By the end of the 1940s, life on the collective farms was no longer tolerable, indeed viable, for millions of *kolkhozniki* from Ukraine and across the Soviet Union. Through both legal and illegal means, they fled their farms for new lives in the cities.<sup>20</sup>

Though atypical, these cases teach us a great deal new about the problems of broader post-war agriculture, national rebuilding and post-war Stalinism. They occurred at the extremity of a wider, yet poorly understood process – local authorities' theft of collective farmland. The answer to Koval'skyi's question, then, concerns not only Raska and Kyiv Oblast, but all of Ukraine. Local authorities in Raska and Bila Tserkva refused to allow the *kolkhozniki* to rebuild their farms so callously because they had taken away the land where their farms were located and given it to others (appropriation). Local authorities appropriating collective farmland that was used to grow food for the state and distributing it for other uses, mostly to factories, institutions and workers to grow food for local consumption, was a widespread practice in wartime across the unoccupied Soviet Union and then in the liberated territories such as Ukraine. There were both legal and illegal appropriations, though the divisions between them in wartime were blurry and not enforced widely. Central authorities succeeded in stamping out illegal appropriations conducted by authorities and by factories, institutions and workers themselves, much of the literature argues, by prosecuting them in a massive political campaign launched in September 1946 called 'On measures to eliminate abuses of collective farm rules'.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> For Kyiv Oblast, see DAKO f. r-880, op. 11, d. 95. For Ukraine-wide figures not including west Ukrainian oblasts, which were only forcibly collectivised from 1948, see Yu. V. Arutiunian, *Sovetskoe krest'ianstvo v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny* (Moscow: Akademia Nauk SSSR, Institut Istorii, 1963), 386.

<sup>20</sup> *Kolkhozniki* engaged in fluid migrations from farm to urban work both legally and illegally. Many were recruited for seasonal urban labour projects by state agencies for short periods after the war and were expected to return to their farms for sowing/harvest periods. Many ended up staying in urban areas permanently and eventually brought their families to settle, especially after 1949. Others left their farms on their own accord. Through both avenues, *kolkhozniki* left the collective farm sector in a massive migratory process across the Soviet Union. Some *kolkhozniki* were prosecuted for engaging in other work without authorisation and especially for failing to return from their urban employment to farm work in the sowing/harvest seasons. They were generally not prosecuted for leaving the farms permanently after 1949, but often lost their membership in them, and thus their claims to private plots. On more detail of the migratory process, see the discussion in Chapter 3 and Zima, *Golod*, ch. 8.

<sup>21</sup> The full title is *Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR (Sovmin) 'O merakh po likvidatsii narushenii Ustava sel'skokhoziaistvennoi arteli v kolkhozakh'* (19 September 1946). From this point onwards, I refer to it as the 'Campaign on Collective Farm Rules'.

This campaign returned millions of hectares of the land that had been appropriated during the war both legally and illegally to the collective farm sector to grow food to supply central rather than local demands.

The atypical – indeed, extreme – cases of Raska and Bila Tserkva, evident from recently declassified Soviet archival sources and survivor testimony, now reveal that local authorities refused to return large tracts of collective farmland in response to the 1946 campaign. Some continued appropriating it, secretly and illegally after 1946, not only here and across Kyiv Oblast, but also in other areas of Ukraine. Without knowledge of these extreme cases, we would have little idea that this problem endured widely after this time. Local authorities left no transparent paper trail of the numerous, less extreme illegal appropriations that remain in the archival record. The extreme cases did leave a transparent and rich trail, because the struggle between *kolkhozniki* and authorities was investigated and recorded.

An examination of this paper trail reveals a conspiracy emanating from the oblast-level state government (*obliispolkom*) in Kyiv to continue illegal appropriations. The heads of various government departments and other leading officials used their positions to spearhead a broader network of subordinates who operated on their orders or at least under their protection. Officials within this network possessed numerous strategies to conduct illegal appropriations, including coercing *kolkhozniki* into accepting the theft of land and concealing and falsifying records of their behaviour. Officials applied these strategies *in extremis* in Raska and Bila Tserkva where they met resistance from *kolkhozniki*. They and officials elsewhere in Ukraine applied them less extremely in other cases of appropriation where they met little or no resistance. Officials recorded these cases falsely in the archival record as legal appropriations reached by agreement between *kolkhozniki* and authorities or simply as mundane land transfers. With knowledge of how this network operated and its strategies of concealment and falsification laid bare, we can now reveal where these ‘legal appropriations’ conceal illegal ones and thus make transparent the opaque record in the archives. We can begin to understand land theft in Ukraine from its extreme iterations in the cases of Raska and Bila Tserkva to its moderate ones across Kyiv Oblast and elsewhere, committed by other local authorities. In this way, these cases are not limited in what they tell us about post-war reconstruction because they are not typical of general experiences. They shed the greatest



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insight into general experiences otherwise unknown exactly because these cases are atypical.<sup>22</sup>

Uncovering this hidden aspect of this period of history raises new questions: where *kolkhozniki* could not resist local authorities taking their land, how much of it remained unreturned to the collective farm sector? What impact did this illegal and largely unaccounted-for division in land have on local and central food supply, especially in time of famine and, indeed, on the fate of the post-war rebuilding of the agricultural sector and broader economies in Ukraine? What spurred such illegal conspiratorial behaviour among officials, and how was this resistance to central authorities possible at the local level in Kyiv Oblast and elsewhere? What spurred the resistance of the *kolkhozniki*? What does all of this tell us about the broader problems of post-war Stalinism? By addressing these questions in this book, we can arrive at a much better understanding of the intersections of land, food and power in post-war Stalinism.

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A clash between local and central authorities over land usage was bound to emerge at some stage in the post-war period. By the end of the war across the entire Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands of factories and institutions, and millions of workers, were in possession of millions of hectares of collective farmland in areas that had avoided German occupation and then in those that had been liberated from it. This was not the case in areas annexed by the Soviet Union in its invasion of eastern Poland from September 1939, including parts of western Ukraine.<sup>23</sup> Former collective farmland was divided into small plots among individual workers and their families, who used it to grow their own food, primarily vegetables and mostly for personal consumption. Land used in this way was called *podsobnoe khoziaistvo*.<sup>24</sup> Local authorities usually made it available to factories/institutions and trade unions; the latter distributed it to their

<sup>22</sup> For a discussion of the capacity of local studies to shed insight into more general realities and, broadly, how local conditions can shape central ones, see Allan Pred, *Making Histories and Constructing Human Geographies: The Local Transformation of Practice, Power Relations, and Consciousness* (Boulder: Westview, 1990).

<sup>23</sup> David Marples, *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), ch. 7.

<sup>24</sup> In some cases factories/institutions set up their own farms to feed workforces; see Donald Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 70–5, and, more broadly, T. D. Nadkin, *Stalinskaiia agrarnaia politika i krest'ianstvo Mordovii* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2010), 235–51; E. V. Maksimenko, 'Istoriografiia problemy razvitiia individual'nogo i kollektivnogo ogorodnichestva i podsobnykh khoziaistv na iuzhnom Urale v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voyny i poslevoennyi period', *Vestnik Orenburgskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta* 5, no. 1 (2013), 83–6.

workers or factories/institutions. Alternatively, individual workers appropriated the land themselves with or without the consent of the authorities.<sup>25</sup> This land provided a major food source for workers and thus, for local authorities, a basis for the economic reconstruction of their localities in Ukraine from the time of liberation in late 1943. This dependence did not wane in late 1946 when central authorities sought to recover this land. There was thus great impetus for local authorities in the most destitute areas to prevent the return of the land to the collective farm sector, which would have put the land back into state use with the food grown on it to supply mainly the central food supply system, not local demands. The impetus increased in late 1946 as mass famine loomed over the Ukrainian countryside.

Central authorities' decision to recover collective farmland and to begin prosecuting illegal appropriations in late 1946 was part of a broader reversal of a wartime policy of 'self-supply' that had encouraged local authorities to appropriate this land in the first place. Self-supply involved central authorities devolving power to local ones to organise their local economies and food sources, as the central economy was directed towards military consumption.<sup>26</sup> This policy continued in the territories where Soviet power was re-established from late 1943 onwards, such as Ukraine. Once the war was over, central authorities sought to recover the power they had ceded to local levels, along with land and control over food production in the countryside.<sup>27</sup>

This was a difficult process of recovery. Self-supply had worked well in providing food and economic needs on the local level across the Soviet

<sup>25</sup> Trade unions usually distributed *podsobnoe khoziaistvo* among their members who worked at the enterprises to which the land was distributed. See Stephen Lovell, *Summerfolk: A History of the Dacha, 1710–2000* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 164–8.

<sup>26</sup> On the devolution of authority to the local level in wartime, see William Moskoﬀ, *The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John Barber and Mark Harrison, *The Soviet Home Front, 1941–1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II* (London and New York: Longman, 1991); Peter Hachten, 'Property Relations and the Economic Organization of Soviet Russia, 1941–1948', PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2005). On the re-establishment of post-war control over liberated territories, see Sanford R. Lieberman, 'The Re-Sovietization of Formerly Occupied Territories of the USSR during World War II', in Sanford R. Lieberman et al., eds., *The Soviet Empire Reconsidered* (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 49–67. On the restoration of central control over the localities, see Oleg Khlevniuk, ed., *Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) i Sovet Ministrov SSSR 1945–1953* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2002); V. Denisov, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. Malashenko, A. Iu. Miniuk, M. Iu. Prozumenshchikov and O. V. Khlevniuk, eds., *TsK VKP(b) i regional'nye partiinye komitety 1945–1953* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004); and Yoram Gorlizki, 'Ordinary Stalinism: The Council of Ministers and the Soviet Neopatrimonial State, 1946–1953', *Journal of Modern History* 74, no. 4 (2002), 699–736.

<sup>27</sup> Urban residents received smaller plots to use as small vegetable gardens (*ogorodnichestvo*), though this land was generally not affected by the campaign.