Introduction

How deeply this notion of one's own language seems to be connected to our feelings for our own country . . .

Minae Mizumura, *The Fall of Language in the Age of English*

What language represents the Chinese nation? Seemingly a straightforward question, the simplest answer would be what in English we call "Mandarin." Known as *Putonghua* (普通话), or the common tongue in the People's Republic of China (PRC), it is the nation's official language. *Putonghua* is the language PRC children learn in schools. It is the language that broadcasts on the nation's television and radio, that blares in shopping centers, and announces subway stops. It is also the titular Chinese language abroad. Today it is taught in millions of "Chinese" language classes across the world. At the United Nations, translators asked to render speeches delivered in Russian or Arabic into "Chinese" would recite them in *Putonghua*'s four tones.

But on a day-to-day basis, remarkably few people within the PRC's borders speak this language exclusively. Nearly 80 percent of PRC citizens grew up speaking one or several *fangyan* (方言): local Chinese languages that are often mutually unintelligible with spoken *Putonghua*. This group includes the well-known *fangyan* Cantonese, Shanghainese, and Sichuanese, but also dozens of others. For millions of Chinese citizens from Qingdao to Kunming, *fangyan* are what is most commonly spoken at home, on the street, and among close companions. For them, *Putonghua* is often not the language they use to joke with neighborhood friends. *Putonghua* is often not the language they use to greet their mothers or fathers, or the language they use to ask for their grandmother's signature dish. It is often not the language they use to express frustration or to yell profanities.

We thus begin with a contradiction. It is well established that the language we speak helps form our identity – and by extension, a national language forms national identity. But when so much of a country's citizenry regularly choose not to speak its national language, wherein lies the nation? Specifically in the case of China, how did a Chinese

national identity get constructed when *fangyan* – languages that are decidedly *not* the national language – often served as the languages of daily life? And if most people regularly speak *fangyan* today, how ought we to frame, or reframe, the role of *Putonghua* in the nation's creation and perpetuation? These questions animate this book. I propose that the answers are interred in a history of Chinese nation building and national identity that places *fangyan* at its heart.

A study of Chinese national identity from the perspective of *fangyan* seems to propose solving one contradiction with another: *fangyan* are much more associated with the local than the national.[1] Literally "languages of place,"[2] they are often given monikers associated with a province, a city, or a region – Sichuan *fangyan*, Shanghai *fangyan*, Panyu *fangyan,* and so on. Indeed, they are rarely thought of as languages at all, most commonly directly translated into the English term "dialect." A dialect carries with it a connotation of subordination. They are variants of another language – a "dialect" is amorphous until we understand what it is a dialect of. In China, this presumption of subordination is a cornerstone of the country's current language policy. *Putonghua* is proclaimed the "common language" of the Chinese people; *fangyan* are described as "variants" of the Chinese language; they simply "orbit" around its core.[3]

The assumption of *fangyan*'s subordination is not limited to linguistic structure alone. Calling *Putonghua* a national "standard" and *fangyan*

[1] While uncommon several scholars have confirmed and adopted thinking of Chinese language in the plural. Victor H. Mair, "The Classification of Sinitic Languages: What Is 'Chinese?'," in Guangshun Cao, Hilary Chappell, Redouane Djamouri, and Thekla Wiebusch eds., *Breaking Down the Barriers: Interdisciplinary Studies in Chinese Linguistics and Beyond* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2013), 735–754; Margaret Mian Yan, *Introduction to Chinese Dialectology* (Munich: Lincom Europa, 2006), 2; John DeFrancis, *The Chinese Language: Fact and Fantasy* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), 39; Dana Funywe Ng and Juanjuan Zhao, "Investigating Cantonese Speakers' Language Attitudes in Mainland China," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 36, no. 4 (2015), 357–371; Gerald Roche, "Articulating Language Oppression: Colonialism, Coloniality, and the Erasure of Tibet's Minority Languages," *Patterns of Prejudice* 53, no. 5 (2019) (forthcoming); David Moser, *A Billion Voices: China's Search for a Common Language* (Melbourne: Penguin Randomhouse, 2016).

[2] This was a number given to me by Hou Jingyi, the editor of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences journal *Zhongguo yuwen* (Chinese Language) in an interview in 2014. It is also quoted here in Dexter Roberts, "400 million Chinese can't speak Mandarin and Beijing is worried," *Bloomberg*, September 23, 2014, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014–09-23/in-china-say-everything-in-mandarin-please

[3] This quote comes from Gao Mingkai and Shi Anshi, eds., *Yuyanxue gailun* (Introduction to linguistics) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1963), 229. But such implications still are seen in common textbooks for the Chinese language. Li Xiaofan and Xiang Mengbing, *Hanyu fangyanxue jichu jiaocheng* (Fundamentals of Chinese dialect studies) (Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe, 2013); Ping Chen, *Modern Chinese: History and Sociolinguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–4.

"variants" implies that *Putonghua* can represent a unified sense of national identity and citizenship in a way that no *fangyan* could. It is not difficult to locate rhetoric that grants *Putonghua* this outsized significance. Seasoned linguists hail *Putonghua* as the "common language of the Chinese Han ethnicity," without which society can neither "be preserved, develop, or progress."[4] A children's periodical in Fujian held a competition in which elementary students submitted suggestions for "promulgate *Putonghua*" advertisements. "Speak Putonghua! It is the language of our people!" the children wrote.[5] In the western province of Xinjiang, where much of the population speaks neither Putonghua nor any *fangyan*, zealous journalists write of ethnic Uighurs exclaiming, "We are Chinese, we should therefore speak Putonghua."[6] Whether or not these quotes are authentic is beside the point. State and popular discourses presuppose that *Putonghua* is the sole representative of Chinese national identity, and that *fangyan* are incommensurate local variants and nothing more.

Yet this ubiquitous rhetoric marking *Putonghua* as the nation's representative language belies how frequently and poignantly *fangyan* function as symbols and stewards of national identity, not just of local pride or regionalism.[7] Cantonese and Fujianese speakers habitually claim their *fangyan* is the "oldest" Chinese language, offering a more direct link to the nation's imagined archaic history than *Putonghua*. Rappers in Chengdu, Sichuan, hurling jingoistic rap disses at foreigners for historical injustices against the Chinese nation, claim that only the emotional authenticity of their gritty *fangyan* can capture the passion

[4] Tang Qiyun, "Nuli tuiguang Putonghua, jiji tuixing pinyin fangyan: Jinian quanguo wenzi gaige huiyi he xiandai Hanyu guifanhua wenti xueshu huiyi sishizhou nian" (Arduously promulgate Putonghua, actively carry out *pinyin* program: Commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the conference on language reform and the academic conference on the problem of the standardization of *Hanyu*), *Yuwen yuekan zazhi* 3, no. 4 (1995).

[5] "Yao shuo jiu shuo Putonghua" (If you want to speak Putonghua, just speak it) *Chuzhongsheng xuexi*, August 8, 2012, 66.

[6] Xinjiang guniang: Wo shi zhongguoren, weishenme bu xue Putonghua? "Xinjiang woman: I am Chinese, why wouldn't I study *Putonghua*?" *Huanqiu shibao*, October 24, 2018, http://china.huanqiu.com/article/2018–10/13345644.html; "Wu Shiqing huiwang gaige kaifang licheng: Shenhuai zhongguoxin wei guojia fazhan chu li" (Wu Shuqing remembers the opening up reforms process: Embodying the heart of China, put forth effort to develop the country). *Zhongguo xinwen wang* (China News), December 23, 2018, www.chinanews.com/gn/2018/12–23/8710308.shtml

[7] There is extensive research on the limits of "Mandarinization" both within and outside China. See Kevin Zi-Hao Wong and Ying-Ying Tan, "Mandarinization and the Construction of Chinese Ethnicity in Singapore," *Chinese Language and Discourse: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal* 8, no. 1 (January, 2017), 18–50; Wendy D. Bokhorst-Heng, "Singapore's Speak Mandarin Campaign: Language Ideological Debates in the Imagining of the Nation," in Jan Blommaert, ed., *Language Ideological Debates* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999), 235–265.

of patriotic fervor.[8] Shanghai natives insist that China's 1980s economic transformation is best captured by memories of crowded alleyways with communal kitchens torn down in the name of progress, memories that live in the sounds and syntax of their *fangyan* alone.[9] These diverse languages all represent national belonging, making the narrative of assumed uniformity at odds with lived reality. Cantonese, Shanghainese, and *Putonghua* – linguistically approximately as dissimilar as French, Spanish, and Portuguese – all have the capability of denoting a singular category of identity.

Returning then to the question of which language represents the Chinese nation, we see two possible lines of interpretation: a loudly proclaimed narrative that promotes a homogenous Chinese identity represented by a unified language, and a more subtle narrative that lives in the quotidian, where heterogenous expressions of that national identity are represented by a plethora of other so-called nonstandard variants. These narratives of Chinese national belonging, and the central role *fangyan* played in their making, constitute the subject of this book. I argue that *fangyan* shaped Chinese nationalism and national identity from the late Qing (1644–1911) through the eve of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), which I trace through the history of these two distinct but interdependent narratives. The former narrative emerged as late-Qing linguists, reformers, and educators emphasized that *fangyan* were not independent languages themselves, but rather subsidiaries or variants of a broader Chinese language. *Fangyan* for them were an obstacle to a homogenous identity, a problem to be solved. The latter narrative was sustained by contemporaneous opposing groups who revered *fangyan* as having a historical and emotional connection to the nation that felt unfathomable for the common tongue. These groups juxtaposed the emotional authenticity of *fangyan* against the stark artificiality of the official tongue, the historical richness of local languages against the modern contrivance of the national standard.

These narratives each tell their own story about Chinese nationalism as a whole. The former tells us how forces of homogenization subsumed

[8] Rob Schmidt, "Chengdu emerges as a new home for Chinese hip-hop," *NPR,* February 1, 2018, www.npr.org/2018/02/01/576819311/chengdu-emerges-as-a-new-home-for-chinese-hip-hop. Fat Shady, one of the more famous Sichuan rappers, says this frequently to foreign media outlets. He made his feelings clear similarly to his fans in his song "Sichuan Pride," Chengdu Rap House, YouTube video, December 15, 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8yDA9jo3wA

[9] Fang Xu, "Only Shanghainese Can Understand: Popularity of Vernacular Performance and Shanghainese Identity," in Lisa Bernstein and Chu-chueh Cheng, eds., *Revealing/Reveiling Shanghai: Cultural Representations from the 20th and 21st Centuries* (Albany: State University of New York (SUNY) Press, 2020, forthcoming), 20.

and discredited visions of the Chinese nation that ran counter to the standard; the latter emphasizes the persistence of a bottom-up declaration that national culture can be flexible and heterogenous. When taken together, however, we see that these two narratives informed and shaped one another and, in the process, collective identity as a whole. I thus propose that we study these two narratives not as simply coexisting, but as mutually co-constructive. In a word, I see their relationship as dialectical: while these opposing narratives argued for different framings of *fangyan* vis-à-vis the nation and its official language, the debate itself and its history of occasional resolution that collapsed into new debates were what truly constituted the ideology of nationalism. I emphasize the dialectical nature of these debates to suggest that the nation and the ideology prescribed to it was never static – its meaning changed over time. It also moves our analysis beyond the simple fact of struggle itself. A dialectic implies that from opposing positions something new emerges; its emphasis is on the generative quality of debate.

What I thus suggest is a radical reconception of what the nation is and how it was formed. Certainly scholars have long noted that there were diverse voices promoting multitudinous visions of what the nation was and could be. But by focusing on the dialectical process that manifested as an ongoing series of debates rather than the results of those debates, I not only place these diverse voices at the center of the national narrative, I also lay bare the mechanisms by which the assumption of homogeneity became accepted as constitutive of the nation in the first place. Both sides of the evolving debates over language and nation insisted that language, standard or not, was an essential part of Chinese national identity. The existence of these two divergent narratives shows that Chinese nationalism neither forced nor required linguistic conformity, and indeed, that nationalism thrived even in opposition to forces of homogenization. The story of *fangyan* therefore encourages us to flip order of causation on its head, asking not how standardization created a nation, but how nationalism influenced debates about standardization. Arguments for and rejections of the homogenizing power of standardization, not standardization itself, defined what it meant to be Chinese in the modern period.

Language and Nationalism

The idea that standardized languages foster national belonging has long been inscribed in histories of China. Almost seventy years ago, John DeFrancis's *Nationalism and Language Reform in China* detailed how late-Qing scholars, bureaucrats, and revolutionaries, inspired by a

global panoply of language reform models, created a national language in order to foment a spirit of citizenship.[10] Since then, studies of the creation and promulgation of a Chinese national language have abounded, and among these works, few have questioned the basic assumption that the language was designed to, and successfully did, create Chinese citizens. Indeed, parallel narratives linking national languages to nation building are recounted around the globe. Following a Hobsbawmian model that regards a unified language as one of the "decisive ... criteria of nationhood,"[11] histories of the standardization of languages from French to Tamil, Italian to Japanese, have long noted how states use language unification to, in the words of Eugen Weber, transform "peasants" into citizens.[12]

These narratives are not perpetuated solely by historians exploring them in retrospect. The engineers of national language proposals themselves also saw their creations as instruments for molding a cohesive citizenry. Since the Chinese nation's earliest imaginings, a vocal group of reformers passionately insisted that their new nation required a unified language. The year 1895 was a turning point, when a humiliating defeat by Japan inspired late-Qing elites to see their empire as woefully inadequate for facing the modern world and its threats. These elites believed that their multiethnic, polyglot empire lacked many of the defining markers of modern nationhood, and that a unifying identity could literally save the Chinese people

[10] John DeFrancis, *Nationalism and Language Reform in China* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950).

[11] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 102.

[12] Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1940* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976). Dozens of similar studies have followed Weber's influential study, particularly in locations with both a high level of linguistic diversity and strong state control over language. An exhaustive list of titles inspired by Weber can be found in the footnotes of Alexander Maxwell, *Choosing Slovakia: Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language, and Accidental Nationalism* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 1–3. Other examples of this kind of narrative about language standardization include Nannette Gottlieb, *Language Policy in Japan: The Challenge of Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jasna Čapo Žmegač, "Anton Radić: Peasants into Croats," in Dunja Rihtman-Augustin, ed., *Ethnology, Myth and Politics: Anthropologizing Croatian Ethnology* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 35–46; James Stergios, "Language and Nationalism in Italy," *Nations and Nationalism* 12, no. 1 (2006), 15–33. Several works in South Asian history have challenged this particular narrative. See Sumathi Ramaswamy, *Passions of the Tongue: Language Devotion in Tamil India, 1891–1970* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Kavita Datla, *The Language of Secular Islam: Urdu Nationalism and Colonial India* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2013); Farina Mir, *The Social Space of Language: Vernacular Culture in British Colonial Punjab* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

from extinction.[13] Yet few agreed on what constituted its core. Some saw unity radiating from a shared imagined past, which had the dual effect of emphasizing a powerful historical "China" while distancing it from the alien Qing.[14] Others believed that unity could be culled and cultivated from the empire's people through education and civic engagement. But regardless of whether they sought unity in the past or present, all of their visions were aspirational. These late-Qing elites agreed that a Chinese nation and a language to match it were necessary, but few believed it already existed.[15]

Their intoxicating aspirations for Chinese unity ushered in a subtle if not insidious amnesia among the next generation of reformers. China's continuous history became normative – not critically analyzed as an invented narrative, but spoken about as fact. Such an imagining of China's history imbues most descriptions of the nation today. In China itself, popular culture and government rhetoric consistently make timeless unity a central point of nationalism, from the refrain that the country has "five thousand years" of unbroken history, to movies like *Red Cliff* that portray third-century military leaders as fighting for "the nation."[16] Scholars within China and outside it also popularize these generalizations. Within academic circles, comparative studies of global nationalism habitually describe China as a "historic nation" like France or England that emerged from a partially invented, partially real unified past.[17] In scholarship, journalism, popular culture, and art, China appears as a

[13] Peter Zarrow, *After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 5.

[14] Tze-ki Hon, *Revolution as Restoration: Guocui xuebao and China's Path to Modernity* (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Viren Murthy, *The Political Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan: The Resistance of Consciousness* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

[15] Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 95. John Fitzgerald, "The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism," in Jonathan Unger, ed., *Chinese Nationalism* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 57. Flipping Ernest Gellner's concept of "stateless nations," or communities of people who see themselves as nations without a state to represent them, on its head, John Fitzgerald argues that China was a "nationless state," in which the state "presumes that the nation it represents is an autonomous entity which could conceivably exist in the forms in which the state has chosen to represent it but *independently of the state*" (emphasis in the original) when in fact the early twentieth-century Chinese state claimed to operate for a nation that was not only imaginary, but was ultimately summoned into being by that state. Fitzgerald sees a clear bifurcation between a state narrative of a homogenous nation and other narratives about nationhood that preceded or emerged independently from that state narrative – that the homogenous nation was not just imagined and invented, but was nearly nonexistent without the state itself.

[16] A good example of this can be found here: "What China claims to have invented," *The Economist*, December 20, 2016, www.economist.com/china/2016/12/20/what-china-claims-to-have-invented

[17] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 66; Jim Maclaughlin, *Reimagining the Nation-State: The Contested Terrains of Nation-Building* (London: Pluto Press, 2001).

singular perennial entity regardless of whether such unity was, or is, actually represented in lived experience.

Recently, however, several works have challenged the premise that nation building forged a homogenous China. These studies show how early twentieth-century state-sponsored drives to eliminate "popular superstition" did little to convince locals to abandon their religious rituals.[18] They narrate anarchic communist movements that imagined a Chinese nation with little, or no, central state coexisting with the autocratic Communist Party in the post-May Fourth era.[19] And this book itself highlights movements celebrating local languages as signifiers of an idealized national past and present that flourished alongside language standardization campaigns throughout the Republican and Maoist periods. Ultimately, cultural and political practices that have suggested a more diverse vision of the Chinese nation were just as common as those practices that seemingly accorded with idealized homogeny.

This body of scholarship does not simply reveal a multiplicity of narratives; it compels us to ask how we interpret the contradiction between the claims of national homogeneity and the reality of national heterogeneity.[20] Here, Prasenjit Duara offers us a way forward. Duara conceives of national identity not as singular or monolithic, but rather, as something produced within a "network of changing and often conflicting representations." We are not solely our national identities – our identities are comprised of an array of collective representations demarcated by gender, age, locality, ethnicity, and religion. With such criss-crossed modes of constructing the self, no identity, national or otherwise, is static or unified. For Duara, nationalism is best conceived not as "nationalism of the *nation*" (emphasis in the original) but "the site where different representations of the nation contest and negotiate with one another."[21]

Eminent historian Joseph Levenson, for instance, describes the transition from the Qing empire to the Chinese nation as "culturalism" to "nationalism" in such a way that subtly validates a coherent Chinese culture maintained since antiquity. Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

[18] Rebecca Nedostup, *Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009); Margaret Greene, *Resisting Spirits: Drama Reform and Cultural Transformation in the People's Republic of China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019).

[19] Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 95–105; Arif Dirlik, *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 63–75;

[20] Joan Judge, *The Republican Lens: Gender, Visuality and Experience in Early Chinese Periodical Press* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015); Barbara Mittler, *A Newspaper for China? Power Identity and Change in Shanghai's News Media* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004).

[21] Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 4, 16.

I take as my starting point Duara's conceptualization of nationalism as a site of negotiation. I use his framing not simply to celebrate multitudinous understandings of Chinese collective identity – it also brings into sharp relief how some notions of collective identity become hegemonic as they arbitrated with or tried to suppress alternative visions. By writing a history of Chinese nationalism centered on *fangyan*, I argue that those terms to which we attach the adjective "national" – a national language, a national song, a national dish – often hold significance, but are neither a prerequisite for national sentiment nor the be-all-and-end-all of a national culture. Rather, nationalism is defined by how different kinds of people understood, tethered themselves to, and excluded others from a putative nation. For some, that nation is, was, and must be homogenous. Others imagined it in heterogenous, multitudinous expressions. By not assuming that a nation is monolithic, regardless of its own rhetoric, we can make space in our histories for a multiplicity of Chinese identities being expressed and defended without ignoring those who seek to maintain it as a homogenous concept.

Chinese-ness, Ethnicity, and Nation

The celebration of and tolerance for diverse expressions of Chinese nationalism has always had limits. Those nationalists trumpeting the significance of *fangyan* were not simultaneously claiming that just any language – existing or invented – could represent China. Nationalists agreed that there had to be some boundaries circumscribing who could be considered part of the nation and who ought to be excluded.

These boundaries were inextricably linked to questions of ethnicity and race. *Fangyan* are habitually called *Hanyu fangyan* (汉语方言), or "*fangyan* of the Han (people's) language." Arguably the largest collective identity group in the world, Han is a complex term; it overlaps with, though is not entirely synonymous with, the English adjective "Chinese," a more multivalent term that can be used to denote an ethnic identity, a racial category, or a nationality. The state today claims that Han is China's largest ethnic group – or *minzu* (民族) – constituting over 90 percent of the country's population.[22] Yet work in the nascent but growing field of "Critical Han studies" has questioned this designation.

[22] Han as identity also overlaps with numerous other monikers, such as *Hua* and *Tangren*. Each of these terms has its own history, and each of them, at various points in time, referred to inhabitants of the geographic space that today we call China. Mark Elliott, "Hushuo 胡说: The Northern Other and the Naming of the Han Chinese," in Thomas Mullaney, James Leibold, Stéphane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche, eds., *Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation and Identity of China's Majority* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 173–190.

These scholars point to the "incomparable immensity" of Han, both in sheer numbers and geographic breadth, and its notable cultural diversity to argue that Han functions "less like a coherent category of identity and more like an umbrella term encompassing a plurality of diverse cultures, languages and ethnicities."[23]

I will leave aside the question, "Is Han an ethnicity?," which lies outside the purview of this book, and ask instead, "How has the term functioned in relation to nation building?" Indeed, the modern transformation of Han and the construction of China as a nation occurred in tandem.[24] Late-Qing reformers started planning a nation in response to warnings from Western imperial powers that only nation-states could survive global modernity, while Han as an ethnicity emerged as those same men earnestly adopted claims they read in European and American texts that the world was divided, hierarchically, into racial categories. Some Chinese reformers and revolutionaries mobilized racial theories to prove the superiority of the Han over the Manchu founders of the Qing dynasty.[25] Others used them to refute the claims of an increasingly militaristic Japan that both groups were biologically branches of the same race. Still others endorsed Sino-Babylonian theories that connected the contemporary Han to the Bak tribes of ancient

[23] Thomas Mullaney, "Critical Han Studies: Introduction and Prolegomenon," in Thomas Mullaney, James Leibold, Stéphane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche, eds., *Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation and Identity of China's Majority* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 2. Other works include Kevin Carrico, *The Great Han: Race, Nationalism and Tradition in China Today* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017); Joniak-Luthi Agnieszka, *The Han: China's Diverse Majority* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015).

[24] Scholars like Mark Elliott have noted that Han has described a collective identity since the Ming (1368–1644), but many argue that the term transformed in the late Qing in response to both nation building and the introduction of racial theories from Europe and the United States. Elliott, "Hushuo 胡说"; Kai-Wing Chow, "Narrating Nation, Race, and National Culture: Imagining the Hanzu Identity in Modern China," in Kai-Wing Chow, Kevin Doak, and Poshek Fu, eds., *Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 48–83; James Leibold, "From Subjects to Han: The Rise of Han as Identity in Nineteenth-Century Southwest China," in Thomas Mullaney, James Leibold, Stéphane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche, eds., *Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation and Identity of China's Majority* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 191–209.

[25] Kai-Wing Chow, "Imagining Boundaries of Blood: Zhang Binglin and the Invention of the Han "Race" in Modern China," in Frank Dikkoter, ed., *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997) 34–52; Chow, "Narrating Nation, Race, and National Culture"; James Leibold, "Searching for Han: Early Twentieth-Century Narratives of Chinese Origins and Development," in Thomas Mullaney, James Patrick Leibold, Stéphane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche, eds., *Critical Han Studies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 210–233; Julia Schneider, *Nation and Ethnicity: Chinese Discourses on History, Historiography, and Nationalism* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 120–125.