Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus

1 Readings of the Tractatus and How to Read It

1.1 A Variety of Readings

In this section, I briefly indicate central features of the history of readings of the Tractatus in order to bring into perspective the current debate, which is then discussed in Sections 1.2–1.4. From all this, in Section 1.5, I identify benchmarks for the correct reading.

In the first reactions to the Tractatus in Cambridge and Vienna, readers voiced some concerns about the nature of the sentences of the book. In his introduction, Russell claimed that Wittgenstein managed to say a lot of things that, according to his own restrictions, could not be said (TLP: introduction, xxiii). What underlies Russell’s concern is a fundamental interpretational problem. Wittgenstein writes that anyone who understands him recognizes his sentences as nonsense and must “throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it” (TLP: 6.54). This looks paradoxically self-defeating, for the very sentences of the book seem to give the argument for why they are nonsense. It seems that one must conclude paradoxically that if the sentences are true, they must be nonsense, but if they are nonsense, they cannot be true. In the Vienna Circle, sentences of the Tractatus were taken as preparatory elucidations that should be left behind in “pure science” (Neurath, 1931a: 52). However, Tractarian elucidations became a problem in the Circle because of their “metaphysical mood,” which suggested inexpressible mysticism (Neurath, 1931b: 60). Carnap’s notion of ‘syntax’ was used to address the problem. Allegedly, Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s “syntactical sentences about the language of science” are legitimate, but elucidations related to the mystical are not (Carnap, 1934: 284, 314).

While in contact with the Vienna Circle in the late 1920s, Wittgenstein reworked some views that he presented in the Tractatus, and embedded them in epistemology. Difficulties concerning the logical independency of elementary propositions prompted him to take elementary propositions as descriptions of immediate experience (see RLF). He was changing the philosophy of the Tractatus. However, “positivists” who were not really members of the Circle, particularly Popper and Ayer, erroneously considered that at the time of the Tractatus elementary propositions were Russellian descriptions of immediate experience. Against this background, “anti-positivistic” readings of the book were developed.

1 Ideas of Sections 1.2–1.3 were introduced in Engelmann (2018a).
2 For a history of interpretations of the Tractatus, see Biletzki (2003).
In the first book ever devoted to an exposition of the principal themes of the *Tractatus*, Anscombe correctly argued that the *Tractatus* did not specify elementary propositions as descriptions of immediate experience and that there was no epistemology there (Anscombe, 1959: 26–7). At the same time, she seemed to confirm Neurath’s fear of the mystical when she defended the presence of a lurking “transcendental” in the book in the form of “the mystical and the meaning of life” (Anscombe, 1959: 171). What grounded Anscombe’s book was the adoption of what I would like to call a ‘Fregean perspective.’ The underlying idea was that, since the positivist reading had derived much of its plausibility from a Russelian epistemology, the logical background of Frege could direct the correct reading of the *Tractatus* (Anscombe, 1959: 12). As we will see below, the Fregean perspective will be influential in some readings.

After Anscombe, opposing positivist readings becomes a tradition. ‘Mystical readings’ got traction and substance in the 1960s with the publication of Paul Engelmann’s *Memoir* (1967) and in the 1970s with Janik & Toulmin’s *Wittgenstein’s Vienna* (1973). The *Memoir* brought to light a series of influences on Wittgenstein, which apparently were very distant from Viennese positivism and the logicism of Frege and Russell. Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Kraus, Loos, and Weininger were influences that supposedly demonstrated that fundamental ethical and religious views were the real point of the *Tractatus*, a hidden key to interpreting it. The conclusion was that, for Wittgenstein, what “really matters” is the existence of something that “transcends the realm of facts” (Engelmann, 1967: 97, 105). Although “logically untenable,” sentences of the *Tractatus* that allegedly make that point are “valid” (Engelmann, 1967: 110).

If one adds to all this the letter that Wittgenstein wrote to Ficker telling him that the point of the *Tractatus* was ethical (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 143–4), one arrives at what Janik and Toulmin called the “central paradox” of the book: “how one is to reconcile the ‘ethical’ with the ‘logical’ Wittgenstein” (1973: 26). According to them, one has to give “primacy to the ‘ethical’ interpretation” (1973: 25) for two reasons: because Wittgenstein did not accept others’ interpretations of his work when he was alive and because Paul Engelmann’s testimony is “more authoritative” (1973: 25). However, those reasons are not satisfying. Wittgenstein explicitly disagreed only with Russell’s interpretation of the *Tractatus*. By itself this does not give us a ground for the priority of an

2 Anscombe’s *An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus* (1959) is a landmark in Wittgenstein studies, for it presents the first monograph devoted to giving a detailed account of the *Tractatus*. However, its title is somewhat misleading, for her book is not introductory in the sense that it will help an unprepared reader find his way around. Rather, it is a sophisticated and intricate exposition of several of the insights of the *Tractatus*. For accessible introductions, see Mounce (1989) and White (2006), which are clearly introductory without losing sight of the systematic character of the *Tractatus*. 
ethical interpretation, since Wittgenstein never criticized Russell for not paying attention to *that*. Moreover, Janik and Toulmin underestimate the significance of Russell’s own views on ethics and mysticism (see Sections 4.3–4.4). Finally, although Paul Engelmann’s testimony is important, it cannot be more authoritative than others, for he was neither a specialist in logic, nor well acquainted with the works of Frege and Russell. One might even think that the “ethical Wittgenstein” is the “logical” one (see Sections 4.1–4.5).

Nonetheless, Janik and Toulmin’s interpretation opened new and important perspectives into the historical context of the *Tractatus*. They showed that cultural surroundings and philosophical debates in Vienna must be relevant, and that works of Tolstoy, Kraus, Kierkegaard, and Schopenhauer were part of Wittgenstein’s background. The case of Kierkegaard and his presumed authorial strategies is particularly interesting because it will return in the “resolute reading” (Section 1.3). According to Janik and Toulmin (1973: 202), “to penetrate the heart of Wittgenstein’s *arguments*” we need to “understand him,” as is suggested by Wittgenstein himself in TLP 6.54. They think that understanding *him* means understanding the style, actions, and influences of the author of the book. For them, the style of the *Tractatus* is inspired by Kierkegaard and Kraus. Kierkegaard meant to bring his reader, by means of “indirect communication” grounded in irony, to the “threshold of knowledge, so as to permit him to cross over it by himself” (Janik and Toulmin, 1973: 159).

One must paradoxically leap into the absurd in order to reach the sphere of absolute value, which is beyond the realm of facts (1973: 160–1). Reason brings one to paradox and transcending reason results in a higher truth beyond reason that is communicated indirectly. On their reading, the ‘ethical’ in the *Tractatus* is in the same situation. Kierkegaardian “indirect communication” is also envisaged by Janik and Toulmin as one of the ways to characterize the *Tractatus* as a work closely connected to Karl Kraus – a confessed influence on Wittgenstein. The last aphorisms of the *Tractatus* would show a “Krausian irony, for Wittgenstein considers that this [Tractarian] ‘nonsense’ is anything but *unimportant*” (Janik and Toulmin, 1973: 199). The “paradoxical and self-defeating” character of the book is “less astonishing” (1973: 199), they argue, if we understand that aphorisms, following a Krausian interpretation, are never strictly true. I will evaluate this ‘authorial conspiracy’ reading indirectly in my discussion of the resolute reading, which assumes something similar (Section 1.3).

A second anti-positivist trend after Anscombe’s book is the metaphysical reading: the view that a necessary underlying structure of reality determines the structure of language. In its weaker version, as in Black (1966), the ‘ontology’ “plays an essential part in Wittgenstein’s thought,” particularly because the
necessary feature of independence of atomic facts grounds an inference to a feature of the “essence of language,” namely the logical independence of elementary (atomic) propositions (1966: 35). In Black’s Tractatus, logic is important because “it leads to metaphysics” (1966: 4).

Black grounds such a view in Wittgenstein’s remark in Notes on Logic: “[Philosophy] consists of logic and metaphysics, the former its basis” (NL: 93). He thinks that it means “Logic as the basis of metaphysics” (Black, 1966: 4). As Rhees points out, however, Wittgenstein says something different, namely that logic is the basis of philosophy, and not of metaphysics (Rhees, 1970: 24). Of course, the logical basis of philosophy might destroy metaphysics or make it dispensable (I return to this in Section 3.1–3).

Rhees, together with Winch and Ishiguro, inaugurated a “non-metaphysical” reading at the end of the 1960s. It was further developed by McGinn, and more recently by McGinn (see Section 1.4). The reading takes logic and language as the real issues in the Tractatus. “We could say,” argues Rhees, “that someone knows [. . .] what language is, if he has learned to speak,” which includes an idea “of what it makes sense to ask, or what it makes sense to say” (Rhees, 1970: 47). So the Tractatus presents us with its notions of logic and sense, but we already know them implicitly in our linguistic practices. What Tractarian logical analysis leads one to “is just what ordinary propositions show. Only it is made clearer” (Rhees, 1970: 10). In order to understand the book, Rhees claims, one must pay particular attention to “form and the symbolism” (1970: 37). The apparently ‘ontological’ beginning, thus, does not express metaphysical truths, but the idea that “it would have no sense at all to speak of logical propositions unless there were empirical propositions” (Rhees, 1970: 23). As the context principle makes clear (TLP: 3.3), “apart from language” a proposition that describes states of affairs “would not be a proposition” (Rhees, 1970: 27). What gives sense to the idea of correspondence is not state of affairs or objects as meanings of names, but “the picturing or projection in a proposition” (TLP: 4.0141). When I am projecting, “I am committed to the signs I use and the ways I combine them – by the general rule, the syntax of the language” (Rhees, 1970: 27–8). Although there are gaps in Rhees’ insights, in particular the lack of a real explanation of the role of the ‘ontology,’ they must be taken seriously by any reader of the Tractatus.

Ishiguro brought a more solid basis to the non-metaphysical reading. She argued that realist readings misleadingly presuppose that “the meaning of a name can be secured independently of its use in propositions” (Ishiguro, 1969: 20). Such readings assumed a Russellian perspective in which meaning
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is given independently of the context of a proposition, but the context principle tells us otherwise: “Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning” (TLP 3.3). A name can only refer to a fixed object if it has a “fixed use,” and the use of a name is only fixed contextually “in a set of propositions” (Ishiguro, 1969: 21, 27, 33). So the key Tractarian view is the context principle in TLP 3.3 and 3.326–8 (Ishiguro, 1969: 22, 29, 30). The origin of the principle, she argues, is Fregean, and one must understand that it works against Russell’s epistemological views on meaning.6 On this reading, something like a “private act” of acquaintance with an object, as Russell thought was fundamental, “would not make a sound into a name of an object” (Ishiguro, 1969: 27). Thus, the talk of objects given independently of language use is useless. According to McGuinness, Ishiguro’s reading indicates that the ‘ontology’ is rather a mythology meant to be destroyed “by its own absurdity” (McGuinness, 2002: 95). Any account of the Tractatus as grounded in an ontology that provides a semantical framework for the meaning of names is itself a metaphysical account rejected in the book.

Despite the work by Rhees, Ishiguro, and McGuinness, a strong version of a metaphysical reading became a standard interpretation in the 1980s in works by Malcolm (1986), Hacker (1986), and Pears (1987). All those interpretations construe Wittgenstein as presupposing a kind of Russellian epistemology.

Malcolm maintains that the meaning of names needs a “fixed use,” but that what fixes use is the object named (1986: 29). According to Malcolm, a name stands for a particular object because the “name reflects the form of the object,” and a form of an object “consists of the possibilities of combining with other objects in states of affairs” (1986: 29). From this he concludes that “the objects are the foundation or the theory of logical syntax of the Tractatus,” and are “‘metaphysical entities’ in the sense that their existence is deduced as a necessary presupposition of the form of the world, and of thought and language” (Malcolm, 1986: 30). The “necessary presupposition” is deeply metaphysical: any world imaginable must have the same form (the same objects) (Malcolm, 1986: 61). This is the “metaphysical underpinning” of the Tractatus (Malcolm, 1986: 32). However, Malcolm does not explain how objects miraculously determine names and fix their use. This problem will find strange solutions in other metaphysical readings (see below). On Malcolm’s view, Wittgenstein was not aware of the “metaphysical character” of his conceptions (1986: 33). To say the least, this is implausible, particularly because Wittgenstein explicitly calls his sentences “nonsensical” (TLP 6.54).

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6 Frege’s principle appears in, for instance, (1884: introduction, §60) and (1903: §97).
According to Pears, “the essential structure of our language is imposed on it by the ultimate structure of reality” (1987: 28). This structure is the “grid” of objects that constitutes “the one and only world”: “at that basic level all languages have the same structure, dictated by the structure of reality” (Pears, 1987: 88). Pears’ Wittgenstein defends an “uncritical realism” in which “the question, whether we contribute anything to the constitution of that world, is not even asked” (1987: 29). Like Malcolm, he assumed the unlikely view that Wittgenstein did not see the implications of his philosophy. For Pears, objects determine names because “the nature of the object takes over and controls the logical behavior of the name causing it to make sense in some sentential contexts but not in others” (1987: 88; my emphasis). This is very strange, for “superstition is the belief in the causal nexus” (TLP-OT: 5.1361). Objects “taking over” and “controlling” names is a rather magical or superstitious metaphysical view. However, Pears’ formulation points to the fact that something of the sort is indeed needed in a metaphysical reading; otherwise, “the grid of objects” or Malcolm’s “metaphysical entities” are quite useless. Realist readers need a proxy playing the role of Russell’s theory of acquaintance with or without causality.

Hacker’s solution consists in reading the Tractatus somehow more consistently than Pears and Malcolm, but making it extremely metaphysical, a case of “transcendental idealism coupled with empirical realism” (Hacker, 1986: 63). Underlying the Tractatus, there is a “Doctrine of the Linguistic Soul” (Hacker, 1986: 75). For Hacker, Wittgenstein establishes the “conditions of possibility” of language by means of the picture theory of meaning. The essence of this theory, as in Malcolm, is that kinds of simple objects determine the combinatorial possibilities (categories) of simple names (Hacker, 1986: 20–1). “Logico-syntactical forms” of names, he thinks, mirror “the metaphysical forms of the objects they stand for,” so that the “range of possible worlds” is ultimately exhausted by them (Hacker, 1986: 60). This is ‘realism’ (Hacker, 1986: 63). The “linguistic soul” comes in because meanings are taken from simple objects and “injected” into simple names by ‘projection,’ a task of the transcendental subject. Thus, we get ‘transcendental idealism’ by means of a “metalinguistic soul” that creates language (Hacker, 1986: 100). For Hacker, meaning injection must be ‘transcendental,’ because neither an ordinary fact connected with any causal relation nor an ordinary true thought can establish it, for both options would bring an element of contingency into the theory (as in Pears’ version of realism). So he thinks that there is “a mental act (albeit of a transcendental self, not the self studied by psychology) that injects meaning or significance into signs, whether in thought or in language” (Hacker, 1986: 75). As an ‘injection,’
a non-normative relation between indefinable names and objects establishes meaning (Hacker, 1986: 73).

It seems that Hacker would like to attribute Russell’s theory of acquaintance to the *Tractatus*, but ends up attributing a proxy “transcendental” acquaintance, which is more doubtful and metaphysical than Russell’s acquaintance theory itself. All these metaphysical views are presumably “ineffable metaphysical necessities” that are communicated by means of “illuminating nonsense” (Hacker, 1986: 54, 18).

Hacker understands that if the “metaphysical combinatorial possibilities” of objects determine the combinatorial possibilities of names, and thus nonsense is the violation of those possibilities, one must assume that there are “ontological types” of objects (1986: 18–20). Against the most obvious suggestion that this would imply a Wittgensteinian theory of types, he argues that Wittgenstein can abandon Russell’s theory of types because “if we know the meaning of a symbol, we already know its combinatorial possibilities” (Hacker, 1986: 21). As we saw, ‘knowing’ is a proxy for “transcendental” acquaintance.

Metaphysical readings disrupt a fundamental guiding line of the *Tractatus*: “logic must take care of itself” (NB: 2; TLP: 5.47). “Necessity de re” grounded in types or kinds of objects violates the autonomy of logic that Wittgenstein considered fundamental.\(^7\)

The problem with Russell’s theory of types is not that it is “metaphysically necessary” and nonsense, but that meaning ought never to play a role in logic (TLP: 3.33). Contrary to Hacker, “the whole theory of things, properties, etc. is superfluous” (NB: 2). Wittgenstein never says that mental acts of a transcendental subject inject meaning into names through projection. Moreover, contra Hacker, projection is normative, grounded in general rules (TLP: 4.01n).\(^8\)

As we will see in Sections 2.3–2.6, Wittgenstein had very good reason to hold that it is out of the question that logic should depend on any experience whatsoever.

However, despite Hacker’s view that simple objects are determinants of combinatorial possibilities of simple names, and therefore of what supposedly counts as nonsense, his elucidation of why philosophical propositions and the propositions of the book are nonsense does not rely on that. He uses bipolarity as the ultimate criterion of sense. According to him, the nonsense written in the *Tractatus* results from the ascription of “internal properties,” but this cannot be

\(^7\) The expression *de re* occurs in Hacker (1999: 120), where he defends Malcolm’s interpretation. For Hacker, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy presents a *a de dicto* view of necessity and a critique of the alleged Tractarian idea of *de re* necessity. See Engelmann (2011) for a critique of the presuppositions of such a view and Engelmann (2013) for a different interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development.

\(^8\) From now on, I use ‘n’ in for instance ‘4.01n’ to refer to the group of remarks following 4.01.
done because “a proposition with a sense [...] must be bipolar” (Hacker, 2000: 355). This by itself shows that the role that objects are meant to play is superfluous, since they do not take part in the determination of nonsense. Moreover, since analysis is part of the application of logic (TLP: 5.557), which is absent in the *Tractatus*, if Hacker’s combinatorial-realist reading was correct, Wittgenstein would not be authorized to call anything ‘nonsense’ in his book.

In the end, the metaphysical tradition of reading the book is simply in disagreement with the claim that the book provided us with nothing less than “the final solution of the problems” (TLP: preface) and that it was the “logical finishing [logische Erledigung] of philosophy” (Hänsel, 2012: 45). The *Tractatus* cannot achieve those goals as an exotic variety of metaphysics that generates new philosophical problems.

### 1.2 Resoluteness

Diamond (1996) was not only a wake-up call for those slumbering in metaphysical readings, but also a landmark that brought the *Tractatus* back into the focus of philosophical debate. The historical significance of her “resolute reading” lies in the fact that it offers an alternative reading that could show a way out of difficulties present in metaphysical readings. Moreover, she and other resolute readers have made fundamental contributions to many aspects of the interpretation of the *Tractatus*.

However, it is not easy to unify the wide variety of resolute readings. They do agree on two ideas: there is no theory of meaning and no ineffable nonsensical “truths” in the *Tractatus* (Conant and Diamond, 2004). The trouble here is that one might agree on this without agreeing with the way resolute readers try to show it – see, for instance, McGinn (2006) and Hutto (2006). Without its specificities, the reading collapses into anti-metaphysical readings.

Here I will focus mostly on Diamond and Conant, for it is the specificities of their work that has motivated and has kept the reading moving in the last decades. However, they have not yet offered a complete reading of the *Tractatus*; the reading is still programmatic (Conant and Diamond, 2004: 43). Fundamentally, their reading opposes Hacker’s metaphysical reading and the mystical reading, both of which construe the book as containing nonsensical ineffable truths and a theory of meaning. Also, the resolute reading has changed

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10 For the variety of resolute readings, see McManus (2006), Hutto (2006), and Conant and Bronzo (2017).
over time. We have to consider both the earlier ‘frame-context reading’ and the later ‘piecemeal nonsense reading,’ which perhaps makes the first more precise.

According to the frame-context reading, we must take the ‘frame’ of the book seriously, namely the preface and the ‘conclusion’ (TLP: 6.53–7). The significance of the ‘frame’ comes from Wittgenstein’s letter to von Ficker, in which he urges Ficker to look at the preface and the ending of the book, where the sense of the whole is easier to understand (Conant 2005: 45–6). For Diamond and Conant, the fundamental point of the ‘conclusion’ is that we should understand him, the author Wittgenstein, “instead of his nonsensical sentences” (Diamond, 1996: 19). Now, “understanding the author” is not understanding a Krausian author as for Janik and Toulmin (1973), but understanding the “frame,” the author’s directions for reading the book (Conant, 1993: 216; Diamond, 2000: 149–51). Since the preface tells us that “what lies on the other side of the limit” of language is simply nonsense, the nonsense of the book, according to TLP: 6.54, is simply nonsense as well, and not “illuminating nonsense” of the “metaphysically necessary” or “mythical” kind. The second aspect of the ‘frame’ consists in understanding that the author’s purpose is to entice the reader with the illusion of a theory so that she eventually sees for herself that there is no theory after all (I come back to this in Section 1.3).

We have seen above that Ishiguro used the Fregean context principle to reject the attribution of realism to the Tractatus by claiming that the meaning of a name is identical with its logical syntactical employment.11 Diamond develops a new use for it (Diamond, 1996: 109, 194–6). For Diamond, a traditional reader like Hacker is “irresolute” when he talks about illuminating nonsense that violates combinatorial possibilities of simple objects. This is simply not the Tractarian view of nonsense. According to her, the “Frege-Wittgenstein view of nonsense” implies that there is only one kind of nonsense (Diamond, 1996: 104). Two moves ground her view. First, she argues that Wittgenstein has a “judgment based” view of the proposition according to the Fregean context principle, and not an “object based” view like Russell (Diamond, 2019: 9; 1996: 100). Second, the Fregean context principle implies that there is only one kind of nonsense. This, she argues, is manifest in the following remark by Wittgenstein: “‘Socrates is identical’ means nothing because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination, and not because the symbol, in itself, would be illegitimate” (TLP 5.473). Since words only have meaning (are symbols) in context, there is no such thing as a nonsensical proposition in itself and, therefore, there is no restriction for the combination of names (violation of combinatorial possibilities) either. Words have meanings as long as we

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11 In Section 2, we will see the Russellian contextual view.
determine the contribution that they make to the sense of the whole proposition. Thus, if something that looks like a proposition is in fact nonsense, then it has no sense and, consequently, its constituent parts have no meaning at all (they are not symbols). Thus, “words do not have meaning” boils down to the fact that we have failed to give them meaning, although we could have done so (TLP: 5.473). According to Diamond and Conant, from the logical point of view of the *Tractatus* “objects are simple” is as nonsensical as gibberish. For Diamond and Conant, we can follow the nonsensical sentences of the *Tractatus* only ‘imaginatively’ as somehow expressions of Wittgenstein’s intention. They are “transitional remarks” intended to show ultimately that they are, indeed, simply nonsense (Diamond, 2000).

On this reading, sentences TLP 3.3 and 5.473 must help us determine the nonsensicality of sentences. However, they are not part of what Diamond called the “frame” originally. Conant’s answer to this problem is that remarks outside the original “frame” might *function as* frame elucidations according to their “role within the work” (Conant, 2000: 100). This broader sense of frame implies two difficult tasks: how to decide which remarks have such a role and how to decide who decides it. The enlargement of the ‘frame’ introduces precluded exceptions. Wittgenstein does not say in the ‘frame’ (understood in its original or in its broader sense) that only some of his sentences are nonsense. He simply says, without exceptions, that his sentences elucidate in the same way and are nonsense (TLP: 6.54). This takes away some of the credibility of the reading, for the original frame story has been taken only “as seriously as possible” (Conant and Bronzo, 2017: 176), but not seriously enough in light of the original standards of resoluteness.

Moreover, although Wittgenstein indeed says in his letter to Ficker that the sense or point of the *Tractatus* is expressed in the preface and ending, he does not say that the ‘ending’ corresponds exactly to sentences 6.53, 6.54, and 7. Thus, one could include 6.521–2 or 6.5n, or 6.n as frame remarks. According to Wittgenstein’s explanation of the numbering system of the *Tractatus* in the sole footnote of the book, the ‘ending’ must be TLP 7, whereas 6.53–4 explain or clarify 6.5, which in turn elucidates the significance of TLP 6. Accordingly, the very idea of the ending/conclusion as part of the frame is unclear. Actually, whatever ending Wittgenstein had in mind in his letter, his instructions concerning the number system demand an explanation of the ending ‘frame’ as part of the transition from TLP 6 to 7, which is absent in the resolute reading.  

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12 Diamond (2019, 5) says that a “minor change” in her views has taken place. Now she thinks that “the image of the ‘frame’ of the *Tractatus* turned out to be unhelpful.” She does not explain, however, why it turned out that way. It is also not clear why it is a minor change, for the ‘frame’ has been used as a distinctive mark of the resolute reading.