

Index

Actual Reasons Are Epistemic Reasons, 113
 Alternative Argument, 153
 anti-essentialism, 14–19, 22
 Arnold, 19, 22
 Audi, 2
 Ball and Blome-Tillman, 13, 22, 98
 Buford and Cloos, 26, 31
 Burattino, 142–145
 Cases
Agoraphobia, 35, 37, 39, 41–45, 47, 51, 54, 68, 72, 74–77, 79–80, 91–92, 95–97, 99, 102, 129, 158, 160, 164
Birthday, 50–60, 91–92
Border, 9, 11
Campanile, 73–80, 82
Coral, 63, 65–69, 91–92
Corrupt Mayor, 168–170, 172, 174–175, 177, 179
Creationist Teacher, 125–126, 132–133, 140–141, 155, 168, 179
Cult Friends, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183
Deer Tracks, 180–182
Dogmatic Believer, 127, 132–133, 141, 164, 168, 170, 179
Extra Reasons, 15–19
Failed Proof, 172–175, 179, 182–183
Fancy Watch, 9–11, 13, 15–17, 19, 22–25, 28–30, 44, 72–75, 91, 93, 95–97, 101, 111–112, 114, 129
*Fancy Watch**, 24–25
Ford, 27
Marriage, 92
Milk, 156, 158–159, 161–165
One Short, 20, 22
Overloaded Driver, 176–177, 179
Persistent Believer, 127, 132–133, 141, 164, 168, 172, 179
Territorial Farmer, 162
Yard, 12–13, 20

causal chain. *See* connection, causal
 Clark, 9, 77
 Coffman, 36
 Cohen, ix, 59, 86, 89–91
 coherentism, 117–118
 conditional proof, 108, 119
 connection, causal, 53, 60, 77–80
 contextualism, viii, 33, 47, 49–51, 54–55, 58–61, 67, 84, 95
 defeaters
 factual, 128–132, 163–164, 168, 171, 180–183, 187
 normative, 128, 130–132, 163, 168–169, 171–172, 174, 176, 178–179, 181, 183–184, 187
 psychological, 127, 130, 132–133, 164, 174, 176, 181–183, 187
 Different-Standards Strategy, 54
 Doxastically Justified Premise, 97, 100–103, 105–110, 114–116, 118–119, 132
 Dretske, vii, 3, 33, 40, 45, 94, 188
 easy knowledge, ix, 7, 86–87, 90–91, 119
 entitlement requirement, 151–152
 Epistemic Permissibility Counter-Closure, 93–97, 99
 epistemic position, 48, 50–51, 56, 58–59, 63, 95, 102, 129, 132, 135, 148
 externalism, 94, 99, 104
 false premise objection, 113–114
 Feit and Cullison, 28–31
 Fitelson, 4, 13, 24, 69, 71, 73–77, 79–85, 112
 foundationalism, 117–118
 Fricker, 133–154
 Gettier, 9, 12, 19, 27–28, 32, 34, 38, 44, 46, 60, 64, 69–70, 76–77, 80, 83–85, 128, 131, 165, 181, 191–192, 195
 Ginet, 34, 38, 46, 181, 187

198

Index

- Goldberg, 122, 155–158, 163
- Goldman, 34, 38, 78, 181
- Graham, 126
- Grounding Argument, 137, 144, 150, 153
- Hawthorne, 5
- Hetherington, 35, 38
- Hilpinen, 4
- inference, phenomenology of, 23, 26
- infinitism, 117–118
- interest-relative invariantism, viii, 33, 47, 61, 84
- internalism, 99, 104–107
- Justified Speaker, 132
- Kelp, 133
- Klein, 4, 8, 11, 27, 29–30
- Klein’s condition, 13–15, 17–19
- Knowing Past Self, 167–169, 174–179, 181–183
- Knowing Speaker, 122–126, 129, 132–133, 166–167
- Knowing Speaker*, 134, 139–141, 153, 166–167
- knowledge
 - from essential falsehood, 31, 70, 73–76, 80–83, 85
 - from falsehood, viii, 3–4, 7–17, 19, 22–28, 30–33, 39–40, 44, 70–77, 80, 82–84, 86, 96, 111–112, 114, 118, 185
 - from knowledge, 1–4, 6–7, 46
 - from non-belief, 108–109
 - from non-knowledge, viii–ix, 7, 31, 83, 90, 115–116, 118, 121–122, 129–133, 155–156, 158, 160, 162–166, 168, 172, 174–175, 177, 179, 183–188
 - from unjustified belief, 103–108
 - from unknown truth, 7, 31, 84, 115, 165
- Knowledge Closure, vii, 3–6, 34, 40, 47, 50, 89–90, 109–113, 120, 188
- Knowledge Counter-Closure, vii–ix, 4–6, 8, 31–32, 35, 37, 39–41, 43–44, 46–47, 50, 61–63, 65–67, 69–70, 83–86, 90–91, 93–103, 105–106, 108–113, 117–120, 123, 188
- Contextualist, 50–55, 57–58, 60
- Multi-Premise, 118–119
- knowledge norm of belief, 97–99, 120
- knowledge-first, 97–98, 120, 150
- Lackey, ix, 38, 121–129, 132–133, 138–142, 150, 154–155, 158–163, 165, 167–172, 174–179, 187, 189
- Link, 71–73
- lottery proposition, 115
- Luck Transmission, 45
- luck, evidential, 170, 172, 180
- McGlynn, 116
- Montminy, 12–22
- Murphy, viii, 86, 103–107, 109, 119, 124
- no-false-lemmas, 10, 77
- No-False-Premise, 8–13
- Nozick, 2–3, 33, 46
- Pelling, 162
- permissibility, epistemic, 93–101
- Pinocchio, 138–139, 141–142
- Propositionally Justified Speaker, 133
- proxy premise, 11–14, 19–28, 30–31, 39, 112–113, 117
- reductio ad absurdum, 108, 119
- reductionism, 124, 138, 145, 157
- reiteration worry, 19, 23
- Russell, 78, 195
- safety, 4, 32, 34–36, 41–42, 44–46, 51, 60, 71–73, 75, 82, 85, 116, 143, 147, 154, 156–158, 160–161, 163–165
- belief-, 41–43
- testimonial, 154–155
- Salience Transmission, 57–59
- Saunders and Champawat, 4
- Schnee, 25–27
- Señor, ix, 177–179
- sensitivity, 4, 32–36, 41, 44–46, 48, 51, 60, 72, 75, 82, 85, 143
- Rule of, 48, 53, 59
- serious practical question, 62–67, 92
- Stanley, 2, 33, 47, 61–62, 64–69, 84–85
- stopped clock, 78
- transmission failure, ix, 7, 86, 88–91, 119
- trust, 133–154
- trustworthiness. *See* trust
- unknown premise objection, 115, 117
- Warfield, viii, 2, 4, 6, 8–14, 19, 21–23, 25, 30–31, 36, 51, 70–71, 73–74, 86, 101, 111, 118, 129
- Weatherson, 41–42
- Williamson, 1, 96, 150
- Wright, ix, 24, 86–91
- zebra, vii, 3, 87, 188