Introduction
Local Militaries and Imperialism

At its root, imperialism, as an idea and a process, denotes a relationship of dominion. This incursion of one power into the sovereignty of another, however, can take many forms.[1] In Charles Reynolds's telling, the interaction between an imperial power and weaker state can be explicit (political sovereignty asserted by force over subject peoples) or implicit (a system of control and restraint exercised over peoples and territories).[2] If imperialism operates across a spectrum – with loose supervision of intermediaries at one end and tight top-down control at the other – then it stands to reason that the methods used to establish and maintain this subordination also vary. In short, great powers employ different repertoires for projecting power depending on the circumstances.[3]

Scholars often accredit the success of European territorial expansion since the late fifteenth century to the harnessing of superior technologies and the professionalism of their own military forces. Yet European powers would not have made such gains without local manpower.[4] When it came to the Raj, for example, it is unlikely that the British could have taken control over large parts of India without local allies. From the beginning, the English East India Company raised the forces it used for expanding its presence almost entirely through recruiting from

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1. Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914* (London: Longman, 1993), p. 3.
2. Charles Reynolds, *Modes of Imperialism* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), p. 1.
3. This line of thinking forms the central theme of Jane Burbank and Fredrick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), esp. pp. 16–17.
4. On how Western European states harnessed new technologies for military advantage refer to Daniel R. Headrick, *Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism, 1400 to the Present* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982); and Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

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India's traditional military labour markets.[5] As David Killingray has aptly observed: 'For reasons of cost, and because of the difficulties of employing European soldiers in tropical campaigns, most colonial powers sought to recruit "native armies".'[6] Also, because subjected peoples are typically difficult wards, many imperial powers needed means of internal control to suppress revolts and deal with unrest. European powers were, however, reluctant to commit metropolitan resources to empire; dispatching a fleet or army from the home country was and is a costly and logistically taxing enterprise. Those delegated with the authority for managing imperial interests in overseas territory usually had limited military means at their disposal as a result.[7] Moreover, the need to call for military resources from the home government was seen as a failure.

Throughout history and across geography imperial powers have used subjected people to maintain order in newly conquered territory, raising auxiliaries from among indigenous populations or utilising existing forces as proxies. Like the Aztecs, who maintained their empire with great economy of force, Britain also relied on local resources for security and order.[8] This strategy had drawbacks. Although indigenous recruits were cheaper and often healthier in relation to their local

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5 Douglas M. Peers, 'Revolution, Evolution of Devolution: The Military and the Making of Colonial India', in Wayne E. Lee (ed.), *Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), pp. 82 and 98–9; Seema Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India, 1770–1830* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), Chapter 1; and T. R. Moreman, *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1998).

6 David Killingray, 'Introduction' to David Killingray and David Omissi (eds.) *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of Colonial Powers, c. 1700–1964* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 7. See also, Bruce Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998).

7 R. Robinson, 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration', in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longman, 1972), pp. 117–42 reprinted in Wm. Roger Louis (ed.), *The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy* (London: New Viewpoints, 1976), pp. 142–3.

8 Ross Hassig, *Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), p. 19. On Britain's use of local manpower to police the empire see in particular Killingray and Omissi (1999); and T. R. Moreman, 'Small Wars and Imperial Policing: The British Army and the Theory and Practice of Colonial Warfare in the British Empire, 1919–1939', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1996), pp. 105–31.

climes, a question mark remained over their reliability. The Sepoy Revolt of 1857 for instance resulted in metropolitan troops garrisoned in India (until 1947) at a strength whereby they could extinguish any future uprising by local soldiery.[9]

Imperial powers often took the use of local forces in conquered territory a step further, deploying them to fight in other parts of the empire. The Roman Empire, for example, recruited conquered people into an *auxilia*, organised into cavalry or light infantry cohorts. These non-citizen soldiers complemented the traditional legionary forces in far-flung parts of the empire.[10] Returning to the British, David Omissi has argued that:

> The empire could never have depended upon its white soldiers alone … British soldiers cost far more than those raised from the indigenous population. The empire therefore obtained much of its military manpower from local sources. It was easier and cheaper to dominate the world if Asians and Africans could be induced to shoulder much of the white man's burden.[11]

Indian troops especially were used in the nineteenth century as an imperial 'fire brigade', dealing, as Killingray notes, 'with crises from China to Africa'.[12] Moreover, manpower from India and other colonies was utilised extensively by Britain in the campaigns on the Nile (1880s), the South Africa War (1899–1902) and both world wars.[13]

Wayne E. Lee concludes in his study of Spanish imperial expansion into the Americas that 'if it was possible to convince, cajole, and coerce indigenous agents to harness their own resources in the imperial interest then this was the strategy employed'.[14] Using local proxies where possible also suited Britain's general approach to imperialism, which the

9 For a detailed treatment of the British military as a garrisoning force after 1857, refer to T. A. Heathcote, *The Military in British India, 1600–1947* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995).

10 Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century AD to the Third* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 16.

11 David Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860–1940* (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 1–2.

12 Killingray and Omissi (1999), p. 4.

13 David Killingray, 'The Idea of a British Imperial Africa Army', *Journal of African History*, Vol. 20 (1979), pp. 421–36.

14 Wayne E. Lee, 'Projecting Power in the Early Modern World: The Spanish Model?', in *Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), p. 2.

historians Robinson and Gallagher have categorised as 'informal control if possible, formal control if necessary'.[15] The type and level of control Britain employed across the empire depended to a large degree on the success the British had in attracting local collaborators: the scarcer the imperial resources and the less formal the imperial arrangements, the more the British had to collaborate with elites in an indigenous society and rely on local means for control. Thus, in many far-flung places of the world Britain used local intermediaries to extend its hegemony where it would have struggled to enter and stay with its own military force alone. According to Gulf historian James Onley it was 'the collaboration and mediation of indigenous elites in the invaded countries themselves that provided the imperial administrations with their military and administrative muscle'.[16] Onley believes that this paradigm best represents Britain's approach to the Gulf.[17] Here the British succeeded in getting local rulers to collaborate in the pacification of the area and, later, in excluding foreign influences that could threaten its position in India.[18] To be sure, the leading chiefs of the Arab coast were willing to collaborate with Britain only after it achieved maritime dominance in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, when Britain required peace and stability in the interior of the Gulf Arab states, it preferred to develop local coercive instruments under the existing political structures rather than use its own forces. The thinking here was that efficient local forces would reduce the need for Britain to intervene with its own troops.

There are myriad reasons why outside powers in the past and today try and avoid direct military intervention in support of subordinate

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[15] Wm. Roger Louis, 'Introduction: Robinson and Gallagher and Their Critics', in *Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), pp. 2–51; and Ronald Robinson, 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration', in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longman, 1972), pp. 117–42.

[16] James Onley, 'Britain's Native Agents in Arabia and Persia in the Nineteenth Century', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2004), p. 130.

[17] James Onley, 'Britain's Informal Empire in the Gulf, 1820–1971', *Journal of Social Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 87 (2005), p. 35. See also Mathew Elliot, *'Independent Iraq': The Monarchy and British Influence, 1941–58* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), Chapter 5.

[18] Onley (2005), p. 42.

governments, making the use of local proxies an attractive alternative.[19] Andrew Mumford writes how 'proxy wars are the logical replacement for states seeking to further their own strategic goals yet at the same time avoid engaging in direct, costly and bloody warfare'.[20] Firstly, intervention often degrades the legitimacy of the protégé's leaders. Secondly, the presence and use of foreign troops might incite the local population. Lastly, intervention in a foreign territory can cause controversy at home for the intervening power.[21] In his widely read study comparing British counter-insurgency efforts in Malaya with those of the United States in Vietnam, John Nagl makes it explicit that building up the capabilities of local forces is a *sine qua non* for a successful campaign.[22] The fact that the 2006 *US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* sets great store by training and mentoring of host-nation forces is a further indication that building indigenous security capacity continues to be viewed by strategists as a critical means of exercising control or extending influence in a subordinate state.[23] By using local forces to advance and protect its interests in the Gulf, Britain was employing a time-honoured strategy of attempting to achieve security on the cheap.

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[19] Yora Gortzak, 'Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French in Algeria, 1954–1962', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2009), pp. 307–33; and Richard L. Millett, *Searching for Stability: The US Development of Constabulary Forces in Latin America and the Philippines* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010).

[20] Andrew Mumford, 'Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict', *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 182, No. 2 (2013), p. 40.

[21] For a wider discussion on the controversies of foreign deployments, see Robert E. Harkovy, *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[22] John Nagl, *Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2005), pp. xiv–xv and 99–100. See also: Ian Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies* (New York: Routledge 2001); and Thomas Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1990).

[23] The 2006 *US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (The US Army Field Manual No. 3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3–33.5) was first issued in December 2006. It was published by the University of Chicago Press as *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* in 2007. The publication devotes a chapter to the developing host-nation security forces. See Chapter 6, pp. 199–236. For a recent treatment of the influence this manual has had on US military doctrine and operations towards the War on Terror refer to Fred Kaplan, *The Insurgents: David Patraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War* (New York: Simon Schuster, 2013).

1 | *Patterns of Protection in the Gulf*

British interests in the Gulf began with the arrival to the area of the English East India Company (established in 1600), which jostled with its Dutch rival and the Portuguese to establish exclusive trading rights.[1] Between 1622 and 1721, the Portuguese were expelled from all Arab and Persian ports in the vicinity, leaving the Dutch and newly arrived French to compete with the British.[2] Over much of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, British interests in the Gulf were limited to trade and preventing other European powers from establishing a presence. In the late 1790s, an uptick in piracy, combined with heightened Anglo-French rivalry, gave Britain cause to reconsider the level of its involvement in the area.[3]

Raiding and enforced tolling by Arab maritime tribes on Anglo-Indian shipping reached new heights in the early 1800s.[4] In British eyes, the chief perpetrators were the Qawasim (singular Qasimi), a maritime power straddling both sides of the lower Gulf.[5] When in

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[1] They sought to establish direct maritime trade with the East, circumnavigating the Horn of Africa and bypassing the middlemen controlling the profitable overland Silk Road. See R. B. Sergeant, *The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963); C. D. Belgrave, 'The Portuguese in the Bahrain Islands (1521–1602)', *Journal of Central Asian Society*, Vol. XXII (1935), pp. 621–6; and S. Ozbaran, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, 1534–1581', *The Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 6 (1972), pp. 45–87.

[2] In 1622, the English assisted the Persians in expelling the Portuguese from the Straits of Hormuz. Although the Portuguese were the first European power the Gulf experienced, 'they left no religious and hardly any cultural imprint, except for their cannons and the ruined forts of their garrisons'. Frauke Head-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates* (Harlow, UK: Longman Group, 1982), p. 271.

[3] This section is indebted to J. B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795–1880* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).

[4] In 1805, Qasimi ships seized two merchant vessels owned by the British resident at Basra and attempted, but failed, to capture an East India Company cruiser. John G. Lorimer, *Gazetter of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Part 1: Historical 1A* (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1915; reprinted Farnborough, UK: George International Publishers, 1970), pp. 181–2.

[5] For accounts on the early development of British involvement in the Gulf, see M. C. Peck, *The United Arab Emirates* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 22–8;

1808 Qawasim sailors boarded an East India Company cruiser, killing many of its crew, the East India Company authorities in Bombay lobbied London to deploy the Royal Navy to the Gulf.[6] In the meantime, Bombay embarked in 1809 on a retributive naval campaign against suspected transgressors.[7] Planning for the operation, however, moved beyond a simple act of punishment. Historian J. F. Standish has shown that a 'grander design was already forming in the minds of the governing council in India'.[8] Naval captains taking part were ordered to reconnoitre suitable islands for establishing a station to command the entrance to the Gulf, providing a base to police piracy and to check French encroachment. Whilst officials in India supported this proposal, the British government in London calculated that, after the Royal Navy captured the remaining French base in the Indian Ocean in 1810, France no longer posed a threat and so a naval base was no longer necessary.[9]

In the decade that followed, the British government hemmed and hawed over whether to station a naval contingent in Gulf waters. Without a round-the-clock presence of British warships, the halt in attacks on British shipping that followed the 1809 expedition proved short-lived.[10] A further punitive expedition was organised in December 1819. The governor of Bombay, Mountstuart Elphinstone, told the governor general of India that after the retributive campaign he intended 'to station as large a marine force in the Gulf as we can spare, with some armed boats for the purpose of visiting different ports, and

and R. M. Savory, 'The History of the Persian Gulf', in A. J. Cottrell (ed.), *The Persian Gulf States – A General Survey* (London and Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 3–40.

[6]   For a general discussion, see James Onley, 'The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century', *New Arabian Studies* (2004), pp. 30–92.

[7]   In 1809 an eleven-ship armada laid siege to the Qasimi capital at Ras al-Khaimah and burned it. Another Qasimi stronghold at Linegh (on the Persian coast) was stormed next. Finally, a joint British-Muscati fleet captured Shinas on Oman's Batinah coast following a fierce battle. Charles Belgrave, *The Pirate Coast* (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1966).

[8]   J. F. Standish, 'British Maritime Policy in the Persian Gulf', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (July 1967), p. 327.

[9]   In 1810 the East India Company struck an agreement with the ruler of Muscat to exclude the French from his territory and British forces captured Île de France (thereafter named Mauritius), the last major French base in the Indian Ocean.

[10] Patricia R. Dubuisson, 'Qasimi Piracy and the General Treaty of Peace (1820)', *Arabian Studies*, Vol. 4 (1978), pp. 47–57.

guarding against any vessels being equipped of a warlike character'.[11] Forces assembled for this second expedition – which, like the first, included ships from the Sultanate of Muscat – captured the Qawasim headquarters at Ras al-Khaimah town. Smaller parties from the force moved to neighbouring Qawasim ports and towns to accept their submission.[12] The British seized Qishm Island on the Persian coast in 1820, retained it as a naval station, and garrisoned a small detachment of *sepoys* for its defence. With the *sepoys* quickly succumbing to disease, this first attempt to leave a garrison in the area ended in failure.[13] The British received a second warning against using troops in the area when a force of *sepoys* from the Qishm garrison[14] landed in Oman to confront the recalcitrant Bani Bu Ali tribe and was routed.[15] The experiences of 1820–1 convinced the British that they should never station troops in the Gulf again.[16] Fortunately, in safeguarding this key transportation artery to India[17] a ship's cannon was needed more than a *sepoy*'s bayonet.[18]

British Indian officials launched the punitive expeditions of 1809 and 1819–20 to convince the Arab maritime tribes to cease tampering with

[11] Factory Records (Persia and Persian Gulf) Vol. 34. Elphinstone to Hastings, 15 December 1819. Taken from: J. F. Standish, 'British Maritime Policy in the Persian Gulf', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (July 1967), p. 327. On the maritime role: R. St Parry, 'The Navy in the Persian Gulf', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, Vol. 75 (May 1930), pp. 314–31.

[12] Donald Hawley, *The Trucial States* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970), pp. 126–30.

[13] J. E. Peterson, *Defending Arabia* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 11; and Onley (2005), p. 37.

[14] The garrison commander was Captain Perronet.

[15] It took a second force sent out from India in early 1821, combined with the sultan of Muscat's tribal fighters, to defeat the Bani Bu Ali. Afterwards the main settlements of the Bani Bu Ali were razed and their leaders were imprisoned in Muscat. Peterson (1986), p. 11.

[16] James Onley, 'Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820–1971: The Politics of Protection', *Occasional Paper*, No. 4 (Center for International and Regional Studies: Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2009), pp. 6–7.

[17] The East India Company and travellers who wished to avoid the long and tedious ocean route preferred the Gulf. Halford L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India* (London: Longmans Green, 1928), pp. 89–96; and Ghulam Idris Khan, 'Attempts at Swift Communication between India and the West before 1830', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1971), pp. 121–36.

[18] See: Anthony Preston and John Major, *Send a Gunboat! A Study of the Gunboat and Its Role in British Policy, 1854–1904* (London: Longmans, 1967).

British shipping on pain of destruction.[19] But this was not the whole substance of the strategy. In 1820, the British proposed a 'General Treaty of Peace with the Arab Tribes' in which signatories would refrain from piracy at sea and fly a registered flag. British naval power would act as the guarantor.[20] Officials in India formed a Gulf squadron from the Bombay Marine (renamed Indian Navy after 1830)[21] to enforce the maritime truce and protect British shipping.[22] Commanded by the senior naval officer, Persian Gulf (SNOPG), the Gulf squadron usually consisted of five to seven ships-of-war.[23] A residency system of political agents, political officers and native agents, with a political resident at the apex, supervised the truces.[24] After the success of the 1820 General Treaty of Peace, a wider 'Maritime Truce' was signed in 1835 with the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, and the Qawasim of Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Lingeh. The Indian Navy patrolled the pearl banks every year during the pearling season. It proved so popular that it was renewed without hesitation year on year, and in 1843 the political resident agreed to guarantee a 10-year truce, which ran its course without major

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[19] Uzi Rabi, 'Britain's "Special Position" in the Gulf: Its Origins, Dynamics and Legacy', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (May 2006), p. 352.

[20] The texts and the backgrounds to the relevant treaties are found in C. U. Aitchison (Comp.), *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, 5th ed. (Delhi: Manager of Publications, Government of India, 1933), Vol. 11.

[21] Anirudh Deshpande, 'The Bombay Marine: Aspects of Maritime History, 1650–1850', *Studies in History*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1995), 281–301. For a further background see G. S. Graham, *Great Britain in the Indian Ocean: A Study of Maritime Enterprise*, 1810–1850 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).

[22] Onley (2009), p. 5. For a background to the practice of protecting maritime trade at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, refer to C. Northcote Parkinson's two volumes, *War in the Eastern Seas, 1793–1813* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954); and *Trade in the Eastern Seas 1793–1813* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966).

[23] Donald Hastings, *The Royal Indian Navy, 1612–1950* (London: Macfarlane & Co., 1988); Anita Burdett (ed.), *Persian Gulf and Red Sea Naval Reports 1820–1960*, 15 Vols. (Slough: Archive Editions, 1993). The Squadron and the SNOPG were headquartered on Qishm Island (1823–1911); then on Henjam Island in the Strait of Hormuz (1911–35); and finally Ras al-Jufair in Bahrain (1935–71). For two years, Qishm Island was also the headquarters of the Lower Gulf Agency, which, after moving to Bushire (where it would remain for more than a century), would become the Gulf Residency and the seat of the political resident in the Persian Gulf.

[24] Refer to M. H. Fisher, *Indirect Rule in India: Residents and Residency System, 1765–1858* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992).

infraction.[25] This success in turn led to the signing of the 'Perpetual Maritime Truce in 1853'.[26] What British officials had once called the pirate coast, they now referred to as the Trucial coast.[27]

Although the British government was obligated to punish intransigents, it avoided whenever possible becoming embroiled in local disputes.[28] This is why the British were reluctant to admit Bahrain to the truce, not doing so until 1861. '[U]nrest within Bahrain and its dependencies and threats to its independence from outside powers', J. B. Kelly argued, 'made it virtually certain that the waters around the island would be the scene of almost ceaseless warfare'.[29]

The government of India designed the Trucial system as a low-maintenance means of keeping order without constant reversion to the use of force. The naval presence was a deterrent force, that is, it dissuaded those from acting outside the agreed rules of maritime truce by the threat of retaliatory action.[30] In this way, the duty of enforcing the truces concretised British naval dominance in the area.[31] Favouring peace at sea, the coastal rulers entered into the maritime truces

[25] In 1836 Umm al-Quwain was admitted. G. S. Graham, *Great Britain in the Indian Ocean, 1810–1850* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 254.

[26] In 1861 Bahrain was permitted to sign the Perpetual Maritime Truce. Later signatures were Kuwait in 1899 (de facto membership) and Qatar in 1916. Muscat, however, was never formally admitted to the Maritime Truce. Onley (2009), p. 5.

[27] H. M. Al-Baharna, *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States: Their Legal and Political Status and Their International Problems* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1975), pp. 47–8.

[28] The sultan of Muscat, the first ruler to be hesitantly granted protection from the Gulf Squadron in 1809. This was despite having already being an ally of Britain's since the signing of the Anglo-Omani treaty of friendship in 1798. It is interesting to note that protection remained on an ad hoc footing until a formal defence agreement was signed with Oman in 1958.

[29] J. B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795–1880* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 379–80. Bahrain went to war with Abu Dhabi (1839) for harbouring a breakaway tribe; the ruler, Shaikh Abdullah, was deposed (1843) by a confederate of family members; and Bahrain knocked back an invasion (1854) by the forces of Feisal ibn Turki of Najd who had allied with tribes formerly loyal to the ruler.

[30] For a discussion on the differences between deterrence and compellence, see Robert J. Art, 'To What Ends Military Power?', *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 4, (1980), pp. 3–35. The term 'compellence' was coined by Thomas C. Schelling in *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

[31] Hussein M. al-Baharna, 'The Consequences of Britain's Exclusive Treaties: A Gulf View', in B. R. Pridham (ed.), *The Arab Gulf and the West* (London: Croom Helm for the Centre of Arab Gulf Studies, Exeter University), p. 23.