1 East Meets West

In his discourse on the general background conditions for the development of the indigenous psychologies (IPs), Allwood (2018) cited Basalla’s (1967) model of three stages for the historical spread of Western science to non-Western countries. In the first stage, non-Western countries simply provided resources for European or Western science. Data related to flora, fauna, geography, and anthropology were collected by Western explorers and their non-Western assistants. In the second stage of colonial science, non-Western researchers in a discipline are dependent on the research community in one or more Western countries for their development. In the third stage of independent scientific tradition, the non-Western nation establishes a full-fledged research community of its own, including its own institutions and Ph.D. education.

The emergence of the indigenization movement in psychology can generally be conceived as the second stage of Basalla’s model. My major argument in this Element is that a comprehensive understanding of Western philosophy of science is necessary for non-Western countries to develop a full-fledged independent social science. If non-Western nations cannot provide an adequate program of education in philosophy of science for their Ph.D. students, their scientific community might be trapped in a dilemma of self-colonization.

In his section on “Specific Conditions for the Development of IPs,” Allwood (2018) suggested classification of types of IPs into South and East Asian IPs with subtypes, Nationalistic IPs (e.g., the Philippines), IPs in the Muslim world (specifically in Iran), Oceanian (e.g., Australian and New Zealand) and fourth-world IPs, very small size IPs (e.g., African IPs in the Cameroon and Ghana), and Western IPs (e.g., Canadian). Such a post hoc classification seems plausible. But it seems to me that East Asian IPs in Taiwan, China, Korea, and Japan, with a similar cultural heritage of Confucianism, should be classified as an independent type. The reason can be explained from the perspective of anthropology of knowledge.

1.1 Archaeology of Knowledge in the West and China

Adair (2006) argued that the need for indigenization depends on the difference between the culture of the IP researcher and the US culture; therefore, the need for indigenization is “greatest in Asia and Africa, much less in Latin America, even less in Europe and probably least in Canada” (p. 470). This argument is acceptable. Nevertheless, he cautioned against spending too much attention on early religious or philosophical writings (Adair, 1996). Viewed from the archaeology of knowledge advocated by Foucault (1966), his warning is
unsophisticated. On the contrary, the anthropology of knowledge in a given culture should be traced back to its historical origin.

1.1.1 Cultural Origin of Western Science

In his classical work *The Origin and Goal of History*, the eminent German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1953) indicated that the 600 years from 800 BC to 200 BC was the axial age for the progress of human civilizations. Groups of thinkers emerged simultaneously during this age in four separate and independent areas of the world. Their thoughts had been summarized by four paradigmatic figures, namely, Buddha (566–486 BC), Socrates (470–399 BC), Confucius (551–479 BC), and Jesus. Buddhism was imported into China during the first century of the Han dynasty to mix with Taoism and Confucianism that constituted the most significant future of Chinese civilization.

On the other side of the world, during the period from 1096 to 1270, the religious Crusades facilitated cultural exchange between the Eastern and Western branches of Christendom, which had been divided since the East–West Schism of 1054. The implementation of ancient Greek philosophy into the Western world of Christianity resulted in the European Renaissance movement after the fourteenth century. The start of the scientific revolution in the 1620s initiated the age of Enlightenment. This intellectual and philosophical movement that dominated the world of ideas in Europe undermined the authority of the monarchy and the Church and paved the way for the political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The emergence of the philosophy of science in the twentieth century can trace its intellectual heritage to the Enlightenment.

1.1.2 Totalistic Anti-traditionalism in China

Western science was introduced into China by Jesuit priests in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, because traditional organic science originating from the cosmology of yin/yang is essentially incompatible with the newly emerged Western mechanic science (Needham, 1969, 1978), it is very hard for Chinese intellectuals to understand the meaning as well as the substantial content of the imported science with their educational background of Confucian classics.

The defeat of China by Great Britain in the First Opium War (1839–1842) signified the beginning of the Century of Humiliation. During the period of intervention and imperialism by Western powers and Japan between 1839 and 1949, China suffered major internal fragmentation, lost almost all of the wars it fought, and was often forced to give major concessions to the great powers in the subsequent treaties. Due to the political chaos caused by civil wars among
war lords in the early years of the Republic of China, three major ideologies prevailed among Chinese intellectuals in the period of the May Fourth Movement, namely, social Darwinism, scientism, and anti-traditionalism (Kwok, 1965). They believed that only democracy and science could save China from the crisis of dissolution. Because traditional Chinese culture was essentially different from Western culture, and both were absolutely incommensurable, “Mr. Confucius” must be replaced by two foreign Bodhisattvas, “Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy.” As a consequence, modernization implied an ideology of “totalistic anti-traditionalism” in China (Lin, 1979).

These were the cultural and historical causes of the Cultural Revolution in Communist China from 1966 to 1976. The emergence and progress of the indigenization movement in the social sciences of Taiwan implies that another similar but different story happened in this small island.

1.1.3 May Fourth Ideologies

When Nationalist China retreated to Taiwan, Ching Kai-Shek brought about 1.3 million people with him to this island, which had a population of 6 million. Most of them were descendants of earlier Chinese immigrants who migrated to Taiwan from coastal areas of China in the Qing Dynasty. Only about 40 to 60 thousand of them were aboriginal people. About half of the 1.3 million new immigrants were soldiers of the Nationalist army, while the other half were “cultural elites” escaped from various provinces of China. They were the “five categories of disgraced people” (黑五類), including landlords, rich farmers, rightists, counter-revolutionists, and bad elements, who fled their homeland to avoid the political movements of the class struggle initiated by the communists.

After the end of World War II, all Japanese teachers in the educational system of Taiwan were sent back to Japan. Their vacancies were soon occupied by those Chinese elites taking refuge with the Nationalist government in 1949. They also brought to Taiwan the ideologies of the May Fourth Movement. The one-party political system in the Cold War era further provided social support for those ideologies. When the communist regime initiated a series of political movements in mainland China, escalating to the Cultural Revolution, the Nationalist government in Taiwan pushed forward the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement as an antagonistic response. Such cross-strait politics prompted liberal intellectuals to consolidate their ideologies of the May Fourth period. They generally believed it necessary to fight against the cultural tradition of one-party domination in the political system for the sake of promoting modernization through science and democracy of the American style.
Western philosophy of science addresses issues of ontology, epistemology, and methodology, reflecting on a scientist’s ontological presumption about the subject of study, and critically examining the epistemological knowledge constructed on one’s ontological presumption through various methods of empirical research. Notwithstanding, liberal intellectuals in Taiwan had established an academic tradition that indulged students in issues of methodology without intensive reflection on ontology and epistemology. Consequently, most Taiwanese graduate students tend to conduct empirical research following Western theories or paradigms, without knowing how to construct their own theories, let alone challenging imported Western theories.

The approach of naïve positivism or naïve empiricism without deliberate elaboration in philosophy of science can be viewed as a modern version of scientism, which might be the cultural foundation of self-colonization.

Here it should be noted that traditional China had its own educational system of colleges (書院) where Confucian classics were taught to intellectuals in preparation of civil examinations. After abolition of the civil examination system in 1905, the traditional colleges were replaced by a Western-style educational system. The ideologies of May Fourth, originating from the New Cultural Movement before 1919, have created in Chinese intellectuals a mentality of stagnation in scientism, and, lacking sophistication in philosophy of science, may hinder escape from the trap of self-colonization.

1.2 Two Approaches of IP in Taiwan

Allwood (2018: p. 8) is correct in indicating that “some engaged researchers have, at least to some extent, put their hallmark on specific IPs.” In his analysis of the development of IP in Taiwan, he mentioned Kuo-Shu Yang and Kwang-Kuo Hwang as two representative IP figures in this area. He noted that Yang was a pioneer of IP in Taiwan who entered on a mission to Sinicize psychology in 1976; but he did not know Yang’s major academic interest before 1976. He said:

The IP in Taiwan has also been characterized by debates on what type(s) of IP should be developed. Here the distinction made by Virgio Enriquez between exogenous indigenization and endogenous indigenization is useful. As noted above, exogenous indigenization means a type of indigenization process where foreign thinking (typically Western) is used as a basis for the development of the country’s IP and by endogenous indigenization is meant indigenization from within, that is, where no foreign thinking is used in the indigenization process. Yang (quoted in Hwang, 2005: p. 232) wrote in 1993 “What we mean by indigenous psychology is restricted to endogenous psychology, and that is what we seek.” In contrast, Hwang (e.g., 2005, 2015) has repeatedly argued
that IP in Taiwan and elsewhere should be based on a methodological and philosophical platform from the West, that is, an exogenous type of indigenization process. (Allwood, 2018: p. 14)

1.2.1 Sensitivity to Colonization

Allwood concluded, “The current state of the IP in Taiwan is somewhat unclear” (2018: p. 14). In order to understand the current state, as well as the future development of IP in Taiwan and China, it is necessary to know Yang’s historical background, his ultimate concern, and his relationship with K. K. Hwang (author of this monograph). Kuo-Shu Yang (1932–2018) was born in a village of Shandong, mainland China. He escaped to Taiwan with his family in 1947 to avoid the civil war between Nationalists and Communists. Under the influence of the May Fourth ideologies, he had a passion for modernization of Chinese society. He was an activist who had participated in many programs of political, social, and educational reform in his youth, with significant contributions to the democratization of Taiwan. Meanwhile, he was engaged in research on individual modernity reflecting naive empiricism (Hwang, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Yang, 2003). This may be why Yang “did not mention the influence of colonialism and imperialism when he described the introduction of Western psychology in non-Western countries” (Allwood, 2018: p. 7).

My life story is different from that of Yang. I am a native Taiwanese. The island of Taiwan was colonized by Japan for a period of fifty years from 1895 to 1945, the year when I was born. My life experience makes me very sensitive to issues related to colonization. Yang was my mentor when I studied for the master’s degree in the graduate school of psychology, National Taiwan University. I completed a thesis titled Studies on Individual Modernity and Social Orientation under his supervision (Hwang & Yang, 1972).

1.2.2 Paradigm Shift in Psychology

In those days, when I was studying in Taiwan, psychology was defined as “behavioral” science. The most influential paradigm in psychology was behaviorism, and personality was conceived as a “black box.” Culture had no position at all in its formation.

I obtained a scholarship from the East-West Center, which enabled me to work for the Ph.D. degree at the University of Hawaii from 1972 to 1976. During that period, I experienced a cultural shock that caused me to reflect on the meaning of research in psychology. We had a famous professor, Arthur W. Staats, at UH who published a book titled Social Behaviorism and tried to explain all social behaviors in terms of several principles of S-R psychology.
But the textbook for our class in social psychology had a subtitle emphasizing that it adopted a cognitive approach (Stotland & Canon, 1972). My academic advisor, Anthony Marsella, was interested in studying psychopathology in various culture, and an eminent professor of philosophy, L. Lauden (1978), advocated for the psychology of pragmatism on our campus. This experience of multiple approaches in psychology enabled me to become aware that a paradigm shift was occurring in the field, and that various paradigms in Western psychology have their own philosophical grounds.

1.2.3 Face and Favor Model

My experience studying abroad had a profound influence on my research orientation after I returned to Taiwan and began my academic career at the National Taiwan University in 1976. Kuo-Shu Yang initiated an indigenization movement in psychology during the early years of the 1980s (Yang & Wen, 1982). I soon realized that most Western theories of psychology had been constructed on the presumption of individualism, but that most non-Western cultures emphasize the importance of interpersonal relationships, which was relatively neglected by Western psychologists. Therefore, I constructed a Face and Favor model to describe the mechanism of dyad interaction between two parties of various relationships (Hwang, 1987). Then I used this model as a framework to analyze the content of Confucianism and published a book, Confucianism and the East Asia Modernization (Hwang, 1988).

1.2.4 Philosophy of Science

Because my approach was very different from the typical ways of doing psychological research, it was strongly questioned by others within the camp of indigenous psychology in Taiwan. The experience of debating with others reminded me of the relationships between Western psychology and philosophy of science which I had learned at UH. Because philosophy of science is a product of Western civilization, it is very hard for Chinese scholars to understand the dialectical relationships among various paradigms of philosophy. So I decided to write a book to help other Chinese scholars understand the meaning of my approach for promoting the progress of indigenous psychology.

I spent more than ten years writing the book Logics of Social Science (Hwang, 2001/2003/2018a), which addresses different perspectives on crucial issues of ontology, epistemology, and methodology proposed by eighteen Western philosophers since the beginning of the twentieth century. The first half of this book discussed the philosophical switch of nature science from
positivism to post-positivism. The second half expounded the philosophy of social science, including structuralism, hermeneutics, and critical science.

1.2.5 Confucian Relationalism

The experience of writing this book fostered in me an attitude of postcolonialism, but not anti-colonialism, in my career of developing IP (Hwang, 2005). It is one of my eternal beliefs that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered in the work of theoretical construction, non-Western indigenous psychologists have to understand not only their own cultural tradition, but also the Western philosophy of science. Therefore, I disagree with Allwood’s (2018: p. 14) argument that my approach means “an exogenous type of indigenization process.” I don’t think that the distinction between exogenous indigenization and endogenous indigenization has sound philosophical implications, nor can it make a significant contribution to the future progress of IP.

Based on such a belief, since the beginning of 2000 when I was appointed as principal investigator of the Project in Search of Excellence for Research on Chinese Indigenous Psychology by the Ministry of Education in Taiwan, I have constantly attempted to resolve the difficulties of constructing culture-inclusive theories in psychology by using various paradigms in the Western philosophy of science. When the project was finished in 2008, I integrated findings from previous related research into a book titled Confucian Relationalism: Philosophical Reflection, Theoretical Construction and Empirical Research (Hwang, 2009); its English version was published with a new title, Foundations of Chinese Psychology: Confucian Social Relations (Hwang, 2012).

2 Relativism vs. Universalism

The Asian Association of Social Psychology sponsored its third International Conference with the theme “Striving for a New Era for Asian Social Psychology” in Taipei, Taiwan, August 4–7, 1999. Kuo-Shu Yang, as the organizer of this conference, invited six distinguished scholars to give keynote speeches on the future development of IP from the perspectives of cross-cultural psychology, cultural psychology, and indigenous psychology. All these keynote speeches were published as a special issue of Asian Journal of Social Psychology (Hwang & Yang, 2000).

2.1 A New Emerging Field

Unlike cultural psychology and cross-cultural psychology, whose theoretical positions have long been established elsewhere and are well known to most in
the field of social psychology, indigenous psychology is a relatively new and emerging field. Its conceptualization and theoretical directions remain unsettled and are still subject to more debates and reformulation. I was fortunate to meet three key people whose theoretical or philosophical stances are very helpful as I sought solutions to overcome difficulties encountered in developing IP in Confucian culture. They were Richard Shweder, Fritz Wallner, and Patricia Greenfield. Shweder gave me an important principle of cultural psychology: “One mind, many mentalities”; Wallner reminded me of the necessity of making a distinction between the scientific microworld and lifeworld; and Greenfield emphasized the importance of structuralism.

Their suggestions, along with my knowledge of the philosophy of science, enabled me to define the goal of IPs, to resolve the controversial debate about the relation between IPs and other types of psychology, and to formulate my epistemological strategy for constructing culture-inclusive theories in psychology. All these issues are closely related, and will be elaborated in the following sections of this monograph.

2.1.1 Bottom-up Model Building Paradigm

Generally speaking, indigenization movements have been initiated by non-Western psychologists in a spirit of nationalism and academic anticolonialism. They have argued that current mainstream psychology is basically a kind of Westernized or Americanized psychology. Both its theory and research methods contain Western ethnocentric bias (Berry et al., 1992). When the Western psychology research paradigm is transplanted blindly to non-Western countries, it is usually irrelevant, inappropriate, or incompatible for understanding the mentalities of non-Western people (Sinha 1984, 1986). Such a practice has been regarded as a kind of academic imperialism or colonialism (Ho, 1993). By ignoring the fact that many Western theories of social psychology are culturally bound, duplication of a Western paradigm in non-Western countries may result in neglect of cultural factors that may influence the development and manifestation of human behavior (Hwang, 2006).

As a reaction to the state of being colonized, many indigenous psychologists have advocated “a bottom-up model building paradigm” (Kim, 2000: p. 265) to promote “the study of human behavior and mental processes within a cultural context that relies on values, concepts, belief systems, methodologies, and other resources” (Ho, 1998: p. 71), and that treats people “as interactive and proactive agents of their own actions” that occur in a meaningful context (Kim, Park, & Park, 2000: p. 71). They perform a “scientific study of human behavior (or the mind) that is native, which is not transported from other regions and that is
designed for its peoples” (Kim & Berry, 1993: p. 2) in order to develop a “cultural-appropriate psychology” (Azuma, 1984: p. 53), “a psychology based on and responsive to indigenous culture and indigenous realities” (Enriquez, 1993: p. 158), or a psychology whose “concepts, problems, hypotheses, methods, and tests emanate from, adequately represent, and reflect upon the cultural context in which the behavior is observed” (Adair, Puhan, & Vohra, 1993: p. 149).

2.1.2 Challenges to Indigenous Psychology

The legitimacy of relativism implied in this approach was challenged by cross-cultural psychologists who advocated for a symbiosis of cultural and comparative approaches. For example, Triandis (2000) pointed out that anthropologists have used a similar approach for years, and that accumulating anthropological data with an idiosyncratic approach may not have much significance in terms of contribution to the development of scientific psychology. Poortinga (1999) indicated that the usage of the plural “indigenous psychologies” by many indigenous psychologists suggests an implicit restriction on the potential for development of indigenous psychology. The development of multiple psychologies not only contradicts the scientific requirement of parsimony, but also makes the demarcation of cultural populations a pending problem. If every culture has to develop its own psychology, how many indigenous psychologies should there be? How many psychologies would have to be developed for Africa? What is the optimal number of indigenous psychologies? What is the meaning of an indigenous psychology developed in a specific culture to people in other cultures?

Ho (1988), a supporter of indigenous psychology, advocated the development of an Asian psychology, but also pointed out that if every culture develops its own psychology, another kind of ethnocentrism in reverse would arise. Poortinga (1996: p. 59) has similar criticisms, arguing that overemphasis on the nature and extent of differences in psychological functioning between people of different cultures may make indigenous psychology a kind of “scientific ethnocentrism in a new guise.”

2.1.3 Final Goal of Indigenous Psychology

In order to seek common ground for cross-cultural comparison, cross-cultural psychologists advocated for the position of universalism instead of relativism. For instance, Poortinga (1999: p. 425) strongly suggested that “differences in behavioral repertoires across cultural populations should be understood against the background of a broader frame of commonness.” He argued that
overemphasis on cross-cultural differences in behaviors and negation of important commonalities in psychological functioning across different cultures is not only “factually incorrect,” but also “theoretically misleading” (p. 419).

In order to respond to these challenges, most indigenous psychologists have argued that the development of numerous indigenous psychologies is not their final goal. Rather, their final goal is to develop an Asian psychology (Ho, 1988), a global psychology (Enriquez, 1993), a universal psychology (Kim & Berry, 1993), or a human psychology (Yang, 1993). To achieve this goal, they have proposed several research methods or approaches, including the derived etic approach (Berry, 1989), the metatheory method (Ho, 1998), and the cross-indigenous method (Enriquez, 1977), as well as cross-cultural indigenous psychology (Yang 1997). Yang (2012) argued that all those methods or approaches are designed to achieve the final goal of genuine, global human psychology.

Unfortunately, as Allwood (2018) indicated in his review, none of those final goals has been achieved by indigenous psychologists with any of these methods. In order to set an appropriate goal for IP to pursue, it is necessary for us to clarify the relationships among indigenous psychologies, cultural psychology, and cross-cultural psychology.

2.2 IP and Cultural Psychology

In their earlier works on IP, Kim and Berry (1993: pp. 21–22) claimed, “The closet sibling to the indigenous psychologies is cross-cultural psychology,” because “the indigenous psychology approach represents indigenization from within, whereas the cross-cultural psychology approach represents indigenization from without.” In fact, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but complement each other. Later, Ho (1998: p. 101) agreed that “indigenous psychologies are best regarded as a subdomain of cross-cultural psychology.”

2.2.1 One Mind, Many Mentalities

Nevertheless, after the beginning of the 2000s, another group of IP authors criticized the abstract comparative approach of cross-cultural psychology (e.g., Hwang, 2015; Kim et al., 2000; Kim, Yang, & Hwang, 2006), and declared their affinity to the cultural psychology advocated by Michael Cole (1996) and Richard Shweder (1990), both of whom argued for the study of intentional activities carried out by people striving to attain goals in their everyday life. Furthermore, Shweder (1990) has strongly argued against the so-called Platonic central processing mechanism which assumes that people operate in a context-free environment. He concluded that there is little difference between cultural