Part I

Introduction
1 A Conceptual Map

The topic of the present monograph rests on the concepts of culture, identity, and the lexicon. They will hence be addressed in turn. Given that the analysis is conducted on material from Slavic languages, Slavdom is an important additional concept that needs to be defined. This will be followed by a brisk discussion of two auxiliary concepts: authority and ethnicity, based on their importance in the surface layer of cultural identity.

The concept of culture clearly belongs among the so-called notational terms (see Lipka 1992:5), where definitions depend on the approach in which the term is defined. Spencer-Oatey (2012:2) illustrates a range of possible definitions for this term.

Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. (Tyler [British anthropologist], 1870:1; cited by Avruch, 1998:6)

Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other, as conditional elements of future action. (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952:181; cited by Adler, 1997:14)

Culture consists of the derivatives of experience, more or less organized, learned or created by the individuals of a population, including those images or encodements and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past generations, from contemporaries, or formed by individuals themselves. (Schwartz, 1992; cited by Avruch, 1998:17)

[Culture] is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another. (Hofstede, 1994:5)

[It is] the set of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors shared by a group of people, but different for each individual, communicated from one generation to the next. (Matsumoto, 1996:16)

Culture is a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by a group of people,
and that influence (but do not determine) each member’s behaviour and his/her interpretations of the “meaning” of other people’s behaviour. (Spencer-Oatey, 2008:3)

One should note that even this range of definitions does not give justice to the variations in the definition of culture. Thus Kymlicka (1995:18) uses a completely different definition: “I am using ‘a culture’ as synonymous with ‘a nation’ or ‘a people’ – that is, as an integrational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history.” Further variations of the definition of culture, often far apart from one another, can be found in Eagleton (2016), who provides a review of how the concept has changed historically, and Jenks (1993), who offers a review of the concept of culture in philosophy and literary theory, among many others. It seems that theories of culture (in which its definition is part and parcel) constitute a scholarly discipline on their own based on the elusiveness of the concept. One can see this from early reviews such as Keesing (1974) and Moore (1980) to more recent ones like Jahoda (2012).

In this monograph, realizing that the definition of the concept will ultimately depend on its use, I am taking the aforementioned definition proposed by Spencer-Oatey as the point of departure, inasmuch as it offers a realistic assessment of the complexity of the concept and a broad scope, while it brings the definition down to the level of individuals. The same complexity and individual variation exist within linguistic features, which makes this definition of culture highly operational in discussing the linguistic markers of cultural characteristics.

Let us dissect this definition and put it in the context of the lexical markers of cultural identity to make it operational. I understand “fuzzy” to mean that there is no one straightforward version of the assumptions, values, etc. but rather a set of complex converging belief systems and practices with some degree of individual variation. From all aforementioned elements that define a culture, of particular interest here are basic assumptions, values, beliefs, and behavioral conventions. In making basic assumptions, the speakers are defined by the way their lexicons carve out the concepts within reality and by the way their meanings and words are interconnected. Higher and lower value is placed on different lexical spheres, speakers share beliefs about the lexicon and changes in it (e.g., believing that inherited lexicon is preferable to borrowed lexicon). They also linguistically behave in a certain way in a given culture (e.g., being defined by a stricter or looser adherence to the norms of linguistic authorities).

All this, as the author of the definition notes, influences but does not determine each speaker’s behavior and interpretation of others. To connect this discussion to the aforementioned three layers, the central theme of this book, what culturally defines the speakers in the deep layer is a set of basic assumptions about reality, values, and beliefs that find their expression in the lexicon in
a coarser or finer division of the conceptual sphere, the way that meanings and words are interconnected, and the richness of words that are available in certain semantic fields. In the exchange layer, speakers are culturally defined by the values and beliefs about the civilizational circles to which they belong, and this is reflected in the lexical exchange of their respective language, most notably by the borrowings from certain language groups. Finally, in the surface layer, what defines the speakers is the set of values and beliefs about norms established by linguistic authorities and their behavior in following them either strictly or loosely, or opposing them. In the lexicon this is reflected in the groups of words that are “correct” or “incorrect,” and therefore more or less desirable.

I will now address identity, the second key concept. One should keep in mind the following observation by Hofstede (2001:10):

Culture is not the same as identity. Identities consist of people’s answers to the question: Where do I belong? They are based on mutual images and stereotypes and on emotions linked to the outer layers of the onion, but not to values. Populations that fight each other on the basis of their different “felt” identities may very well share the same values. Examples are the linguistic regions in Belgium, the religions in Northern Ireland, and tribal groups in Africa. A shared identity needs a shared Other: At home, I feel Dutch and very different from other Europeans, such as Belgians and Germans; in Asia or the United States, we all feel like Europeans.

The concept of identity is equally problematic as culture albeit for a different set of reasons. It is indisputable that social identity is the kind of identity relevant in this study. It is quite clear from the following two quotations that such a notion of identity relies on the existence of a collective, i.e., a group to which one belongs, which is identified and categorized in relation to other social groups.

A social identity is based on a person’s identification with a social group . . . A social group is a set of individuals who share the view that they are members of the same social category. Through a social comparison and categorization process, persons who are similar to the self are categorized with the self and are labeled the ingroup. Correspondingly, persons who differ from the self are categorized as the outgroup. (Burke et al. 2009:118)

Defining “us” involves defining a range of “them” also. When we say something about others, we are often also saying something about ourselves. In the human world, similarity and difference are always functions of a point of view: our similarity is their difference and vice versa. Similarity and difference reflect each other across a shared boundary. At the boundary, we discover what we are in what we are not, and vice versa. (Jenkins 2014:104–105)

This latter author also lists basic characteristics of social identity as understood in the presently dominant social psychological approaches (Jenkins 2014:
6 Introduction

There are fundamental differences between social and individual identity; social identity gives sense to the members of the group; it is a base for separating in- and out-groups; the society is organized into categories; social categories build identity; stereotypes and other cognitive simplifications are formed around identity; in-group uniqueness is a base for group comparison; the group is distinct from other groups in order to maintain a positive image of themselves; people and groups with negative self-perception strive for a positive self-perception; in-group dynamics leads toward cohesion; individuals are establishing collective existence using stereotypical categorization; and individuals will determine themselves differently in different contexts.

All of the aforenamed characteristics will be present and even conspicuous in some types of social identity, e.g., in the ethnic identity of southern Slavs. Other types of social identity are not so clearly prototypically organized. Slavic group identity certainly falls into the latter category and so does the identity of a speaker of any given language. What is important is the realization that Slavic social identity (and the analysis here is based on Slavic languages and cultures) and the identity of speakers of any individual Slavic language or their ethnic variants does not fall under an ideal type of category – it is not the most prototypical type of social identity, the way many ethnic identities are. Thus, for example, the speakers are generally aware that somebody else may speak a similar or the same language (e.g., when communicating with speakers who share that broader identity), and these speakers may also be aware of the similarities in making judgments or handling matters, but that identity is generally not as mobilizing and dominant as ethnic identity. I am thus adopting a definition of Slavic identity and that of the speakers of individual Slavic languages as a rather loose social identity – a type of identity on the very edge of a prototypically organized concept of identity.

Obviously, just as with culture, a great degree of variation in defining identity exists between various authors, as evidenced by Preston (1997), Worchel et al. (1998), and Wearing (2011).

At this point, just as was done with the concept of culture itself, I will put the notion of identity in the context of the three layers and connect it to the previously adopted definition of culture. What is part and parcel of the present discussion is cultural identity. In defining this type of identity, I will start with the following definition, which emerges from a very careful review of relevant literature.

Cultural identity is a special case of social identity... and is defined as the interface between the person and the cultural context... Cultural identity refers to a sense of solidarity with the ideals of a given cultural group and to the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors manifested toward one’s own (and other) cultural groups as a result of this solidarity. (Schwartz et al., 2006:10)
The kind of cultural identity addressed here is certainly an interface between a person and his/her cultural context. However, rather than solidarity, which may be decisive in some spheres (e.g., with ethnic aspects of cultural identity) and rather inconspicuous in others (e.g., with being a speaker of a standard language, or being a Slav in this concrete case), I will use belonging in the operational definition of cultural identity deployed here. I will then consider cultural identity as a complex interface between a person (in this particular case a speaker of a standard language) and his/her cultural context. Consisting of belongingness to overlapping cultural circles of the groups united around common linguistic, ethnic, or religious heritage resulting in basic assumptions, values, beliefs, and behavioral conventions that are widely distributed among the members of these groups. What is of particular interest here is that the speaker self-identifies but also gets identified by others. Identity is thus a two-way street and it can exist even without overt self-identification.

To finally come to the layers I am proposing, in the deep layer, speakers are following basic assumptions about reality, values, and beliefs that find their expression in the lexicon in coarser or finer division of the conceptual sphere, in the way the meanings and words are interconnected, and in the richness of words that are available in certain fields. In the exchange layer, speakers identify with the values and beliefs toward civilizational circles to which they belong, and this is reflected in the lexical exchange of their respective language, most notably by the borrowings from certain language groups (e.g., Greco-Latin borrowings are an important part of the cultural identity of speakers of European languages). Finally, in the surface layer, speakers identify with the set of values and beliefs about the norms established by linguistic authorities or with the strategies of their contestation. In the lexicon this is reflected in the groups of words that are “correct” or “incorrect,” more or less desirable, and so on.

To conclude the review of the three key concepts used in this monograph, one should say that the notion of the lexeme (which is a technical term for what is known as “word” in common parlance) is equally elusive as those of culture and identity. I have shown, in Šipka (2005), that various criteria have been proposed to define a lexeme (independent use, pronunciation unity, ability to change information structure of utterances, ability to convey meanings, incommutability of its parts, separation in writing and pronunciation). Various authors, such as Eluerd (2000), Jackson (2000), Lehman and Martin-Bethet (1998), Lipka (1992, 2002), Niklas-Saliminen (1997), Picoche (1977), Polguère (2002), Rey (1980), Schwarze and Wunderlich (1985) in Western lexicology, and Dragičević (2010a), Filipčec and Čermak (1985), Fomina (1978), Kalinin (1971), Kuznecova (1982), Miodunka (1989), Ondruš (1972), Šmelev (1977) in Slavic lexicology have ascribed varied degrees of importance to all those criteria. While they are all useful in differentiating
lexemes from other linguistic elements, there is no single criterion, or their cluster that can unequivocally define a lexeme. This concept, then, remains a prototype with a core of typical lexemes and a periphery where lexemes and non-lexemes (sublexemic elements like affixes and suprarexemic elements like phrases) overlap. One can assume various strategies in this field, but, for all practical purposes, I will consider lexemes those items one would normally look up in a dictionary: words, idioms, and lexical affixes (but not grammatical affixes, syntactic frames, collocations, etc.). These entities participate in all three layers of cultural identity to be discussed further in this text. In this regard, the distinction between a lexical unit and lexeme, introduced by Cruse (1986:49) may be helpful:

Lexical units are those form–meaning complexes with (relatively) stable and discrete semantic properties which stand in meaning relationships such as antonymy (e.g., long: short) and hyponymy (e.g., dog: animal) and which interact syntagmatically with the contexts in various ways . . .Lexemes, on the other hand, are the items listed in the lexicon, or ‘ideal dictionary’ of a language.

The objects of our research here, as was the case in Cruse (1986) are lexical units rather than lexemes (given their embeddedness in the context). In addition, the fuzziness of the border between lexicon and grammar has long been identified in cognitive linguistics (e.g., Langacker 1987, 1991) and systemic-functional linguistics (see under “lexicogrammar” in Matthiessen et al. 2010).

One important standard lexicological distinction is that between open and closed lexical classes, nicely summarized in Lipka (1992:133):

We will start with a simplified summary of the treatment in Quirk et al. (1985:77ff.). The following categories of words can be distinguished in English:
(1) (a) CLOSED CLASSES: preposition, pronoun, determiner, conjunction, auxiliary verb
(b) OPEN CLASSES: noun, adjective, verb, adverb
(c) LESSER CATEGORIES: numeral, interjection

Category (a) is often referred to as function words, because of their grammatical function. Traditional lexicology, however, is almost exclusively concerned with category (b); but dictionaries normally include (a) and (c). Category (b) is often called “major word classes,” content words (contentives), or lexical items.

This distinction is germane here given that open classes change with the ebbs and flows of historical events, social environment, and sometimes even ideological programs, which is not the case with closed classes. This makes open classes the primary subject of the surface layer. They are also much more readily borrowed, which makes them important in the exchange layer. Finally, they are somewhat more embedded into culture-specific elements of thinking
A Conceptual Map

(while closed classes typically relate to more broadly distributed cognitive categories), which makes them more important in the deep layer.

As previously noted, being aware of the ultimate elusiveness of the concept, I will use a very broad notion of a lexeme as a linguistic unit that can carry conceptual meaning or signal meaning of some kind, encompassing thus one-word and multiword lexemes and also affixoids (affixes that can carry lexical meaning, e.g., *ethno-* and *-logy* as found in the word *ethnology*). Just as in the case of the other two key concepts, culture and identity, the definition deployed here is one from the range of possibilities. This particular one is selected, as it gives clear focus on the elements that are readily accessible in lexicographic datasets. This certainly does not mean that a different approach would be impossible or inappropriate in another attempt at exploring the phenomena under discussion here.

Another distinction relevant to the study of the lexicon is that between local and global levels of analysis. Lexemes do not exist in isolation; they are a constituent part of the lexicon. When comparing and contrasting two different languages, we can establish links between a lexeme in one language with one or more lexemes in another. We can thus say that the Russian word *нога* [*noga*] corresponds to two English words: *foot* and *leg*. This is a local (or lexemic) level of analysis. If the number of such local differences forms a trend of some kind, we can notice global differences. For example, Slavic languages are less precise in forming concepts for body parts than English. As previously noted, they do not have to differentiate between *foot* and *leg*, but this difference is a part of the trend. Slavs also do not have to separate *hand* and *arm*, *finger* and *toe*, *ankle*, *chin*, and *beard*, *nipple*, and *wart*, and in some of them the speakers do not even have to distinguish between the *brain* and the *spinal cord*. The establishment of this trend belongs to the lexicon, or the global level of analysis.

I will now turn to the concept of Slavic cultural identity, which is pivotal to the concrete material on which the analysis will be conducted, and also for the secondary agenda item of this monograph—the question of whether Slavic linguistics is possible as opposed to linguistics using Slavic language data. While speakers of English will not have a problem in identifying someone as, for example, Russian or Polish, a general Slavic cultural identity is somewhat more elusive. The very word *Slavdom* (Slavic people collectively) is rather exotic in English even in professional circles.\(^1\)

---

\(^1\) According to www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Slavdom, it belongs to the bottom 10 percent of English words. One should say that the word is actually close to the bottom of that bottom 10 percent. Another source (www.forgottenbooks.com/worddata/slavdom), which covers fiction and non-fiction sources from 1869 to 1945 (i.e., in the period of efflorescence of Slavic studies), shows that the word *Slavdom* is found once in 45,454,545 words (the frequency of 0.000002%). According to Google Books (https://books.google.com/ngrams/), the peak use of this word was in 1918, the usage then fell and reached two short-lived minor increases in 1949 and 1963, and it continued falling to reach 0.0000014188% in 2008. On a side note, one should say that this
In sharp contrast to the obscurity of Slavdom in English, a vast majority of major research universities in English-speaking countries feature a department of Slavic languages and literatures or at least sections, chairs, etc. Similarly, major universities feature Slavic and Eurasian research centers. There are, furthermore, professional organizations.

This brings us to the underlying dilemma of Slavic studies, the question that an established field of study may not have a well-established subject of study. Needless to say, the obscurity of a word that covers a subject does not necessarily mean that the subject itself remains obscured or non-existent. It seems that in non-Slavic countries, departments of Slavic languages around the world remain the only remnants of Slavdom-based philology. A thorough recent review about the development of the idea of Slavdom in the work of linguists in one particular narrow field of Slavic studies can be found in Krečmer (2015). A serious challenge to earlier understanding of Slavic ethnic identity was offered by Curta (2001:350), who showed that the idea of Slavic ethnicity was much younger and much less clear than previously believed: the first clear statement that ‘we are Slavs’ comes from the twelfth-century Russian Primary Chronicle. The idea of Slavdom is based on genetic and structural similarities of Slavic languages and, to a lesser extent, cultures. The range of this concept is not problematic — it extends to cover the speakers of all Slavic languages. The problematic question at hand is if linguistic similarities mean cultural similarities. The areas of Slavic languages feature a high degree of diversity. Geographically and climatically, they range from Mediterranean landscapes in the south to polar tundra in the north. Historical differences are no less important — Slavic peoples were a constitutive part of various European, Middle Eastern, and Central Asian empires, and they exhibited considerable differences as to the emergence and duration of their own statehood. Finally, among Slavic peoples we find Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, and various less commonly practiced religious systems. The question is, then, if one can talk about Slavdom as a cultural category and a type of identity. Mere structural and genetic similarities of languages surely do not suffice to prove cultural similarity. One should note that in the course of human events one can find areas and periods of strong feelings of Slavic unity (in many areas in the context of the nineteenth-century national revivals of Slavic peoples and their resistance to Germanization or German geopolitical influences) but also ongoing conflicts between Slavic peoples (e.g., rebellions of the Poles against Russian rule). As for now, I will use Slavic cultural identity source gives a considerably higher frequency to the Russian equivalent of Slavdom, i.e., славянство, ranging from its peak in the 1880s of 0.000250% to 0.0000702942% in 2008. Some examples include the American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages, British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies, Canadian Association of Slavists, Australia and New Zealand Slavists’ Association, Slavic Linguistics Society.
to refer to the basic assumptions, values, beliefs, and behavioral practices that are widespread across Slavic cultures and that stem from their speakers’ sense of belonging to the community of Slavs. At this point it is important to realize that the idea of Slavic cultural unity is highly convoluted and even controversial.

Two additional auxiliary concepts need to be addressed here given their pivotal role in the maneuvers in the surface level, namely, authority and ethnicity. These two concepts are what greatly defines the cultural context of Slavic speakers in the surface layer. Both concepts represent notational terms, which have as many definitions as there are definers. Given that they are of limited interest here, it would be unproductive to go through the variations of their defining. I will therefore concentrate on those characteristics that are germane to the present research.

Authority has been the focus of social sciences since the publication of Max Weber’s ground-breaking essay (1992, 1919) established its three main types: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal. In a recent book, Huemer (2013) reviews the notion of authority (primarily political) in various authors and intellectual traditions, most of them after the aforesaid Weber’s seminal essay. The picture that emerges is that a multitude of justifications have been used and a variety of sources have been introduced. In the particular context of this monograph, it is important to realize that the establishment of normative linguistic authority can take various forms and resort to various justifications. Linguistic authority is the one form of authority often intertwined with the political kind. It is based on the fact that the source of authority (e.g., linguists, writers, journalists, educators) establishes a model that the general body of speakers is expected to follow (e.g., in a word being “correct” or “incorrect”). Obviously, normative linguists and other sources of authority will always make claims that the source of their authority is rational, but in reality their decisions may have various other motivating factors behind them. This particular idea of normative linguistic authority is widespread in all Slavic cultures, and it is considerably more prominent than in some other cultures, e.g., in English, where normative linguists have extremely limited impact, as demonstrated by Milroy and Milroy (2012), who explored the idea of authority in the English language.

When we talk about ethnicity here, the line of research is leading from Gellner (1983), who emphasized the constructivist nature of nationalism to Brubaker (2002, 2004, 2009), who understands ethnicity not as a state but rather as a process. The following quote is representative in that regard.

Ethnicity, race and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals – as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded and enduring “groups” encourages us to do – but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms. This means thinking of